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As to MILITARY AFFAIRS for 1950, four issues as usual are planned. These will be described numerically rather than seasonally. The *First Issue* for 1950 is now in process of preparation and will be ready for distribution on or about 25 October 1950.

MILTON SKELLY  
*Secretary*

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## INDEX TO VOLUME XIII

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# FRENCH MILITARY LEGISLATION IN THE THIRD REPUBLIC 1871-1940

BY ARPAD F. KOVACS\*

AFTER WATERLOO the French nation was too tired to support a large standing army and the popularity of the Bourbons, such as it was, rested to a considerable extent on the abolition of universal military service. To build up its own armed forces the restored monarchy introduced the drawing of lots to determine the small part of the annual contingent of recruits who would have to serve for seven years. A liberal interpretation of the law concerning deferments and exemptions reduced the military responsibilities of the bourgeoisie, mostly Bonapartist and Republican, to a minimum. The higher officers' commissions were the monopoly of the old feudal aristocracy. The regime, as far as the army was concerned, rested on secure foundations. The July Monarchy superimposed its own political and social philosophy on this system. The organic law of 1832 fully recognized the privileges of the wealthy by legalizing the practice of substitution, whereby any one who hired a man to serve could exempt himself in time of peace as well as in war.<sup>1</sup>

\*Dr. Kovacs is Professor of History at St. John's College, Brooklyn, N. Y.

<sup>1</sup>The best sources for the study of the interplay between the political interests of the various regimes and military legislation are the *exposé des motifs* of the organic laws of 1872 and 1905 published as introductions to the bills drawn up by the historical section of the ministry of war. See *Journal Officiel*, April 6, 1872, and *Annales du Sénat*, Documents, XL, (1901), 519-578. Cf. also Intendant General Mazars, "Conscription et Recrutement," *Revue d'Histoire*, XVIII (1939), 119-145.

<sup>2</sup>General L. J. Trochu's *L'armée française en 1867* (Paris, 1868) is an admirable study of social attitudes during the Second Empire. E. Ollivier, "La réorganisation militaire après 1866; Napoléon III et Niel," *Correspondant*, CCXXIII (1906), 1033-57 and A. Bécheyras, "La question militaire à la veille de 1870; le projet du

## POLICIES OF NAPOLEON III

In the hands of Louis Napoleon, anxious to set up an organization devoted to him personally, this system turned into an admirable instrument. By changing substitution from a private transaction to a fee paid to the treasury, he made exemption possible even for the lower bourgeoisie. The fees of exoneration, as the new method was called, provided the extra pay for volunteers and veterans who reengaged for another term of seven years. "Old soldiers" were at a high premium because grizzled veterans symbolized the great traditions of the First Napoleon's invincible Old Guard. Besides, each volunteer and reengaged soldier reduced the "bad numbers" of the lottery and consequently lessened dissatisfaction with the regime. Only the very poor had to serve and for them there were compensations in the form of retirement with pension after twenty years of meritorious service. The French army gradually turned into a glorified bodyguard, the personal police force of the dictator, recruited mostly from proletarian elements. Napoleon III knew that as long as personal military service was not imposed on the bourgeoisie they would tolerate his rule. The French middle class had grown opulent, pleasure loving, and selfish. They were not interested in the army. For two generations they, like the Chinese, had become accustomed to look upon soldiering as the lowest of human occupations. Pacifism dominated public opinion. Illusions about international cooperation and permanent peace were widely entertained.<sup>2</sup>

Maréchal Niel," *La Revue Critique*, XXI (1913), 385-402 furnish additional valuable information.

The victory of Prussia over Austria, considered a power second only to France, shook the country out of its complacent attitude. The Austrian defeat at Sadowa, 1866, completely upsetting the European balance, was interpreted as the greatest French defeat since Waterloo. The opposition made great capital of it, establishing a direct connection between Napoleon's heedless and selfish policy and the emergence of Greater Prussia. Something drastic had to be done but Napoleon found himself in a dilemma. If he proposed to increase the military burden, his popularity would suffer. On the other hand, unless he strengthened the army, Bismarck would win the game of power politics and he might just as well abdicate.

To sound out public opinion, a reform very much resembling the Prussian *Landwehr* was announced. It aroused such a violent reaction in the public that every major effort had to be ruled out. Forced by the general indignation to abandon any attempt to introduce 'Prussian barbarism,' Napoleon allowed the project to be amended, changed and finally trimmed down by the *Corps Legislatif* to a mere paper reform. Evidently the French nation in the face of Bismarck's *realpolitik* preferred to put its head ostrich-like into the sand. Trusting blindly in myths like the "old soldier," and "the irresistible French élan," the country failed to realize, as in 1939, that national greatness implies great responsibilities and sometimes heavy sacrifices. France had merely a private army but no national defense, and refused to make the effort necessary to organize one. Because military questions were dominated by narrow political considerations nothing was done beyond demonstrations, agitations and endless discussions.<sup>3</sup> There are striking similarities between 1869 and 1939. Neither Bismarck nor Hitler could arouse the French to take proper measures. Facing a great military danger, their chief interest was politics. In

both cases disaster was the result and, in a third instance — in 1914 — catastrophe was averted only by a hair's breadth.

The war of 1870-71 furnished a striking proof of the superiority of the Prussian system which put large numbers of well-trained men at the disposal of the high command, whereas the French had no reserves. Only 350,000 men could be mobilized. When they were taken prisoner at Metz and Sedan, France found herself without an army. The *levée en masse* ordered by the Government of National Defense on the traditional lines of 1792-93 could not match the veterans of the German army. The hopes placed in a new Valmy were quickly shattered.

#### FIRST MILITARY LAW OF THE NEW REPUBLIC —1872

The National Assembly elected immediately after the armistice had to solve fundamental military problems. It had a large Royalist majority. The provisional head of the state, Adolphe Thiers, the famous historian of the Consulate and the Empire and one of the outstanding political figures of the July Monarchy, entertained singularly conservative views in army matters. He put his faith in "old soldiers," that is in a semi-professional long service system not unlike that of Napoleon III. The bloody excesses of the Paris Commune firmly convinced him that, in order to safeguard law and order, the previous military system, a glorified police force, had to be reestablished. The Royalists in the Assembly looked forward to the day when the vacant throne might be filled, perhaps not without the employment of force. They willingly endorsed Thiers' views, since an army

<sup>3</sup>Napoleon's carefully conducted political campaign for military reform is analyzed on the basis of documentary material in Comte de la Chappelle, *Les forces militaires de la France en 1870* (Paris, 1872), G. Wright, "Public Opinion and Conscription in France 1866-1870," *Journal of Modern History*, XIV (1942), 26-45, and A. F. Kovacs, "French Military Institutions Before the Franco-Prussian War," *American Historical Review*, LI (1946), 217-237.



of old soldiers trained in blind obedience might be the very instrument of a second restoration. The army which recently had been shooting Communists might be called upon in the near future to shoot—Republicans. In this way the conservatism of Thiers and the plans of the Royalist majority found a common platform in the question of army reorganization.

Against them stood a formidable opposition. There were many high ranking officers in the National Assembly—some of them ardent supporters of the principle of the nation-in-arms: that is, a short-service army able to train large numbers of men, adding them to the reserve each year. In other words the Prussian system. Their leader was General Trochu, commander of the Paris garrison during the war, and author of the famous *L'armée Française en 1867* published at the time of the greatest controversy over army reform. He criticized Napoleon's system bitterly and advocated a national force with large reserves. The republican opposition under Gambetta gave the military experts strong support. Their combined forces, however, could not outweigh the authority of Thiers. When Trochu's oratory threatened to carry the Assembly, Thiers threatened it with his resignation, which saved a substantial majority for his plan. But the opposition did not retreat without a stiff rearguard action. Thiers had to accept a compromise. Actual service under the colors was reduced to four years, though a clause enabled the minister of war to keep the men one year longer if necessary. Thiers advocated seven years. The opposition, on the other hand, suffered a severe setback in the division of the annual contingent of recruits into two portions—to be determined by the drawing of lots: one serving four years, the other only six months. This gross inequality acted as a standing provocation to the successors of the Jacobins. It was a personal triumph of Thiers, who

professed a horror of mass armies. The undisciplined conduct of the improvised national guards during the winter campaign of 1870/1 only confirmed his aversion to "putting a gun on the shoulder of every socialist." But the Assembly, impressed by the Prussian victories, exerted such pressure on him for numbers that he had to yield. The concession he made was a six months training to be given to the *deuxième portion*; that is the part incorporated over and above the long service men. Budgetary considerations, he argued, would not allow a more thorough training. The fact is that he had faith in nothing except old soldiers and reduced the term of service of the second portion to six months to make them worthless.<sup>4</sup>

The military law of 1872 reflected the political composition of the National Assembly. But the National Assembly was the manifestation of a transitory condition of the French electorate and not the result of a final process of crystallization in political trends. As a matter of fact the National Assembly of 1871-76 was born in the midst of very violent fluctuations of political opinion and, as events proved, was very far from representing true sentiment. In May 1870 the plebiscite gave Napoleon III a large majority, willingly endorsing the reforms which established the *Empire Libérale*. On September fourth the Republic was proclaimed without a voice being raised in defense of the previous regime. Five months later the elections for the Na-

<sup>4</sup>In his memoirs Thiers says: "To win the reality of things we had to sacrifice words . . . it was agreed that the words 'compulsory service' should be set at the head of the law but that the principle would be applied in the following way." And then he describes the division of the contingent into two portions. *Memoirs of M. Thiers* (London, 1915), p. 232. Defending the project in the National Assembly on March 13, 1872, he said that originally the plan was that the second portion should serve one year but it was realized that by keeping the men half-a-year longer they would have to send home as many from the old soldiers in order to make room for these. "That means, we would get 75,000 bad soldiers for as many good ones." *Chambre des Députés, Débats*, XII (1872), p. 3869.

tional Assembly returned a Royalist majority favoring Bourbon restoration. The supplementary elections of July 1871 resulted in an overwhelming Republican victory. Subsequent by-elections and the final victory of the Republicans in 1876 showed clearly that the disasters of Napoleon's armies and the hopelessness of the continuation of the war under the Republican Government of National Defense produced a Monarchist reaction, but only temporarily. Yet this brief period of Royalist revival gave France a very conservative National Assembly, which in turn gave France a very conservative if not reactionary army organization. It was a burdensome legacy. Decades passed before more advanced principles could be embodied in military legislation recognizing equality and the interests of the common man. In the meantime there were interminable disputes which succeeded in making a political football of the army.

The military system set up in 1872 was the outgrowth of various principles reflecting the political upheavals of the last hundred years of French history. It was a combination of feudal conditions, bourgeois privileges and dictatorial ambitions to which were added some concessions granted to the idea of universal compulsory service, the achievement of the Great Revolution. The first of these principles handed down the tradition that the higher army commissions were the exclusive domain of the aristocracy or at any rate of "good Frenchmen"; the second engendered the sentiments which made military service appear as a degradation of human life good only for the scum and the third, in a logical development of the second, created a military organization which was not a part of the nation but an instrument of personal policy leading a life of its own almost outside of the nation; the fourth paid only lip service to the principles of 1792/3 because the division of the contingent into first and second por-

tions fully preserved the good-number bad-number traditions and chances of the lottery so dear to the population. No wonder that the country was brought on the verge of civil war before its military institutions could be reshaped to conform to the political philosophy of the Third Republic.

#### THE SENATE OBSTRUCTS REFORM— 1876-1889

After 1876 attempts were made again and again to amend the law of 1872 and make a reasonable period of service under the colors equal and compulsory for all. Aside from egalitarian principles the main argument was that reduction of the term of service would enable the army to train more men in the same budgetary framework. The majority of the legislators, particularly in the newly elected Senate, could not so easily be convinced that sacrifice of quality—the old soldier!—would be completely balanced by quantity. The secret thought was still lurking in the back of many legislative minds that the French army ought to be able to march on Paris as well as to Berlin! And so Thiers' work, inspired by politics, stayed on. When the reform finally got under way the principal motive was not the reduction of the term of service but a new political issue.

The law of 1872 contained various provisions inspired by the old spirit of privilege. The rich, if chosen by lot in the long service contingent could, by paying 1500 francs, reduce this burden to one year only—a nice compromise between Napoleon's exoneration and the principle of universal service. Priests and theological students were completely exempted. This provision was particularly provoking to the left Republicans who saw in it, as Paul Bert, their spokesman, said, the recognition of the medieval principle that the clergy were above civil law.<sup>5</sup> When Ferry's

<sup>5</sup>*Annales de la Chambre des Députés, Documents, 1881*<sup>1</sup>, p. 359.



campaign for the establishment of lay education was at its height the Republicans launched a vigorous campaign to abolish these privileges by reducing military service to three years, equal for all. The Chamber passed the proposal twice, to be rejected by the Senate each time. In the endless wrangling over the question of priests and seminarists eight years passed and no compromise could be found. The country finally got tired and the chamber, facing elections in 1889, accepted the three years' service without being able to "put the haversack on the back of the priest." In fact, due to the Senate's opposition, not only the seminarists remained fully exempted but the term of service of all university students was reduced to ten months.<sup>6</sup>

The first great effort to democratize the army broke down on the resistance of conservatism still too powerful in public opinion. A further swing to the left was necessary. That had been going on slowly but steadily until the Dreyfus Affair accelerated the process, with such impetus that in the elections of 1902 enough leftist senators were returned to constitute the majority in the upper house.<sup>7</sup> Action followed immediately. To demonstrate its new composition the Senate took the initiative and the Chamber with its huge leftist majority followed without hesitation. Service was reduced to two years and all exemptions abolished.<sup>8</sup> Not only the able bodied men but even people with slight physical defects like loss of one eye, stammering, limping, etc., were drafted and put on auxiliary duties. Equal, compulsory, personal military service finally became a reality! But a great political revolution was necessary to achieve it.

<sup>6</sup>With the result that the number of registrants in the higher institutions of learning began to increase by leaps and bounds.

<sup>7</sup>R. A. Winnacker, "The Influence of the Dreyfus Affair on the Political Development of France," *Papers of the Michigan Academy*, XXI (1935), 465-79.

<sup>8</sup>In the World War priests served as common soldiers in the trenches.

#### REFORMS OF GENERAL ANDRÉ

The law of 1905 was, indeed, more than a reform. It marked a drastic break with the old school of military thought. The former system with its privileges of caste, notably as far as the officers were concerned; the so-called *armée de caserne*, became a thing of the past—at least on paper. The power of the officers based on the authority of rank and blind discipline was to give way to a new concept. Henceforth the army, declared General André, the minister of war and promoter of the project, was to be imbued with a deeply republican civic spirit since the virtues of the good citizen were also excellent military qualities. Discipline should henceforth arise from an inward conviction, and not from machine-like reflexes at the sound of a command, no matter how stupid. The officer and noncom were to be educators and not soulless drillmasters.<sup>9</sup>

Obviously the success of this idealistic program depended on the attitude of the officer corps. It was up to them to translate it into reality. But their mentality and political outlook, according to the left parties, made most of them unfit for the task. Trained in the old school of formal discipline, steeped in the spirit of the *armée de caserne* where officers were surrounded with privileges and generals ruled like kinglets, many of them would be badly handicapped even if willing to cooperate. Some of them were too conservative if not downright reactionary to do anything but scoff at this "nonsense" and sabotage it. Moreover, the Dreyfus Affair, developing into a desperate struggle between the civil and military authority for control of the army, only increased the cleavage between parliament and the officer corps. Zola's *J'accuse* was the signal for a campaign against them which, pushed to the extreme, overreached itself and caused new reaction. The program

<sup>9</sup>*Annales du Sénat, Débats*, LXI/II (1902), p. 1040.

of a citizen army of civic virtues, after degenerating into petty intrigue and factionalism of the meanest sort, ended again in a bigger and better *armée de caserne*.

To take away the influence of the officers in the *comité de classement* over the promotion lists, the Waldeck-Rousseau cabinet had introduced a system in 1899 reserving this right exclusively to the minister of war. At the same time the worst reactionaries among the generals were pensioned off.<sup>10</sup> With one stroke the long-held monopoly of the conservative clique, which had succeeded only too well in preventing republican and democratic elements from filling the higher positions, was destroyed. The shift from military to political control of the promotion lists should have been enough to assure the ultimate triumph of the new spirit in the officer corps. As usual in cases where two extreme political ideologies clash, the swing of the pendulum had to be complete. General André, encouraged by the ever increasing radicalization of French political life<sup>11</sup> and eager to hasten the realization of his program, conceived the idea of classifying all officers on the basis of their former political attitude. Aided by the chief lodge of the Free Masons in Paris, he organized a vast network of espionage. Reports came in systematically from all garrisons, which were carefully sorted and filed away in the ministry. The effect of this ill-conceived and clumsily executed system upon the officers was inevitable. When they realized that colleague denounced colleague in the same garrison, that every word or act was weighed on the political scales by secret informers, that professional prowess or expert knowledge amounted to little or nothing except one's attitude toward ideological doctrines, many resigned and the general indig-

nation reached dangerous proportions.<sup>12</sup> When finally reports sent by all kinds of political informers through the intermediary of the Grande Orient were stolen and revealed in the Chamber of Deputies amid indescribable tumult, the whole system was shaken to its very foundations. André was soon forced out of power and the idealistic program discarded.<sup>13</sup>

The system of informers, intrigues and purges was now openly discussed and scandalous revelations followed one after the other. An article published in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* by General Negrier, considered at that time one of the most outstanding military authorities of the country, caused particularly great concern. He told about the neglect of the eastern defenses, a sensitive point to every Frenchman.<sup>14</sup> Other articles revealed flagrant cases of insubordination due to political intrigue and the low morale of the officer corps.<sup>15</sup> There was a general uneasiness in the army and the sudden outbreak

<sup>12</sup>A similar purge and political intrigue went on in the navy under the minister Pelletan with similar results.

<sup>13</sup>The best account of this scandalous affair, aside from the debates of the Chamber on October 28 and November 4, 1904, and April 19, 1905, are Ch. Humbert, "L'état d'âme de l'armée," *Grande Revue*, XLII (1907), 177-194, Captain J. H. Mollin, General André's secretary, *La vérité sur l'affaire des fiches* (Paris, n. d.), General André *Cinq ans de ministère* (Paris, 1909) and Winnacker, *op. cit.* On General André and his predecessor General Gallifet see the brilliant analysis of A. Brisson, *Deux ministres de la guerre* (Paris, 1904), a reprint and French translation of articles published in the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse*. A rare copy in the New York Public Library has interesting marginal notes of General Gallifet.

<sup>14</sup>General de Negrier, "Le moral des troupes," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 5th sér. XXV (1905), 481-506, particularly pages 493/4. Just completing a tour of inspection of the eastern defenses, he was the man of the moment to influence public opinion and still more the *Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre*, for whom he prepared a special report. See *Documents Diplomatiques Français*, Sér. 2, vol. 6, Annex II, p. 605.

<sup>15</sup>Particularly General Bourelly, "L'armée française en 1905; l'œuvre du General André," *Correspondant*, CCXIV (1904), 402-27 and 686-714. Commandant Driant, *Vers un nouveau Sedan* (Paris, 1906). A good summary is in G. Terrail (Mermeix), *Au sein des commissions* (Paris, 1924).

<sup>10</sup>E. Lavis, *Histoire de France Contemporaine*, 7th vol. (Paris, 1921), p. 207.

<sup>11</sup>R. A. Winnacker, "La délégation des gauches," *Journal of Modern History*, X (1937), 48-70.



of the Morocco crisis (1905) turned the military problem into a grave threat to national security. At the height of the crisis it became evident that the army was not in the position to wage a major war.<sup>16</sup> The government had to yield to German pressure. Delcassé's resignation, an abject surrender, was a terrible blow to French prestige. The ambitious program to destroy the *armée de caserne* by weeding out the reactionaries and by substituting civic virtues for the spirit of blind obedience received a mortal blow.

Though the left parties remained in control of parliament, the three years' premiership of Clemenceau guaranteed the exclusion of all political intrigue from the army. Only merit decided in promotions and though an atheist and a most determined enemy of the Church, he nevertheless unhesitatingly promoted such Catholic officers as Foch, Castelnau and Joffre to key positions. But at the same time, by his ministerial decree of 1907, he gave final expression to the supremacy of the civil authority over the military by relegating the representatives of the army to second rank at official celebrations. The generals never forgave him and his party for that.

#### EFFECTS OF THE DREYFUS CASE

The Dreyfus Affair brought to a head the latent antagonism and long pent up hostility of the two opposing ideologies. The crisis led to the complete defeat of clerical and feudal influences, but the victory of radicalism did not ban the spirit of reaction. Its flames were fanned by a thirst for revenge and only a good opportunity was necessary to start a new political conflagration. It is the supreme tragedy of the Third Republic that the mighty who had fallen from power decided to stage a comeback by skillfully hid-

ing their interests behind nationalism. Nationalism has deeper sources than political faction fighting and transcends party lines, as Clemenceau's example had demonstrated. By insisting that the army be above parties or else the nation would court disaster they might enact new military legislation which would check radicalism and perchance even defeat it. The mightiest symbol, expression and very guarantee of nationalism, the army, therefore, remained the last hope of the reactionary forces and particularly of the generals whose influence despite the purges remained unshaken. There were other powerful factors. Colonial interests would insist on overseas expansion by all means. It was unthinkable to push colonial penetration without a strong army and navy. The interests of big business, especially of heavy industry, were in a similar way tied up with armaments and colonization. All these groups found a common platform in new armaments which they identified with national interests. If for some reason a nationalist wave should sweep the country, by harnessing it to a new army program, they could easily ride back into power, provided that the new military legislation would strengthen *their* army.

The chances of reaction, however, were not propitious. By the beginning of the century republicanism and democracy were so universally accepted that the old conservative and rightist parties were reduced to a mere shadow of their former strength. Not one party dared to call itself openly conservative, and the benches on the extreme right in the chamber of deputies were left vacant for fear lest their occupation bring disaster and the label of a reactionary. The increasing industrialization of the country gave rise to Socialism and as an aftermath of the Dreyfus Affair antimilitarism became a permanent feature of public life. There were strikes, riots and even mutinies. If no outside danger had threatened the country further radi-

<sup>16</sup>*Documents Diplomatiques Français, Sér. 2, vol. 6, Annex I, and M. Paléologue, Un prélude à l'invasion de Belgique* (Paris, 1932), 145-156.

calization of political life would have been only a matter of time, producing new military legislation in line with the traditional policy of the Left; that is, complete realization of the nation-in-arms.

In this respect an outstanding event was the publication of *L'armée nouvelle*<sup>17</sup> by Jean Jaurès, leader of the Socialists, now one of the strongest groups on the Left. Since his appearance in political life he had consistently put his powerful oratory in the service of the idea of national militia. He argued that France, being a democracy, would never attack her neighbors. For defensive warfare, on the other hand, a large army of well trained citizens was the best. To attain that goal eight months of service would be sufficient provided that the training was intensive and did not waste time with unnecessary occupations so common in barrack routine. The book, aside from advocating the nation-in-arms and attacking the *armée de caserne*, contained also remarkable strategic theories. Its author foresaw a tremendous German drive across Belgium which he thought could not be stemmed in its first rush. The best way to meet it would be a vast outflanking movement in northern France. Only an army of several millions could carry out such a gigantic maneuver; therefore, he proposed the full incorporation of the entire trained reserve in the field army. The concept was daring and as gigantic in its proportions as Schlieffen's plan, which it was to check though unaware of its exact intentions. It had a sharp edge pointed against the vested interests of the existing military system, that is against the officers who for professional reasons insisted on the maintenance of a large active force concentrated in the barracks. The existence of the active officers, constantly increasing in number, would thus be safe whereas Jaurès' reform, placing the emphasis on and operating mainly with the reserve,

would have jeopardized their very *raison d'être*. His grandiose schemes were to influence events after 1918 to a considerable extent but on the eve of the war they were doomed to failure and their author assassinated.<sup>18</sup>

Opposed to Jaurès' plan was the constantly recurring argument of the professional school that a sudden German attack without mobilization might overrun the French defenses and garrisons in the East and throw mobilization completely out of gear.<sup>19</sup> The large effectives of the German troops stationed near the French frontier permanently in readiness to march were a clear indication of the danger. The only way to avert it, they said, was to increase the French frontier garrisons, the *couverture*. Where to get the additional men for it? The two year service reduced the peace establishments in the regiments to a minimum so that they could not spare a single man. Some regiments, of course, could be abolished and their complements sent to swell the effectives of the *couverture*. The chiefs of the army consistently rejected such plans since they wanted a vast number of regiments. This was the policy of the *armée de caserne* justified by a similar number of German active regiments. What was good in a feudal country, thundered the Socialists, fitted ill in a democracy. France, they said, needed trained men to defend the country but not huge garrisons in peace time full of arrogant officers idling away their time in the cafés. The Right argued that since the num-

<sup>18</sup>The old controversy between nation-in-arms and *armée de caserne* is discussed at great length and in its historical setting by Jaurès' disciple J. Monteilhet, *Les institutions militaires de la France 1814-1932*, sec. ed. (Paris, 1932).

<sup>19</sup>Interference with or breakdown of mobilization was always a very sensitive point in the public discussions in France since the nightmare days of August-September, 1870. General Negrier and other writers duly exploited this point. For a summary of the preoccupation of the general staff about a German *attaque foudroyante* see *Documents Diplomatique Français*, sér. 2, vol. 6, Annex II, pp. 604/5, and M. Paléologue, *op. cit. passim*.

<sup>17</sup>Paris, 1911.



ber of regiments was fixed and irreducible the only way out of the dilemma was to increase the term of service. That, however, would have created a grave political issue conjuring up the ghosts of the Dreyfus Affair. For the time being it was out of the question. But the lines were being drawn for a new battle-royal over the army.

When the Agadir crisis raised the specter of war again and the German demands of compensation for Morocco revived the humiliations of 1905, a violent nationalist sentiment flared up with immediate consequences as regards army problems.<sup>20</sup>

#### TRIUMPH OF THE CONSERVATIVES — 1913

A new trend in military policy appeared parallel with the increasing patriotic wave in public opinion and legislature. Millerand as minister of war initiated reforms abolishing many of the innovations of the André period, and restoring the authority of the officers. Emboldened by the change of temper in public opinion, heavy industry and high finance organized a campaign which gave strong backing to the rightist revival. What the *Délégation des gauches* did to the radical groups, great capital and colonial interests proposed to do to the nationalist parties.<sup>21</sup> The triumph of these forces came to full expression in 1913 when Poincaré was elected to the presidency with the help of the Right parties. The manifestations of public rejoicing and celebrations following the election heralded a new trend in politics. Poincaré left no doubt as to its implications upon military legislation. Thiers *redivivus* was to exert his authority again and the old soldier, believed to be dead and long forgotten, was just around the corner.

Only the right excuse was necessary to open up the army question again. When the

German government, alarmed by the result of the Balkan Wars, decided to enlarge the army, action followed immediately. The reasons were that the project of the Berlin government would increase the preparedness of the German frontier garrisons, enabling them more than ever to strike without mobilization and overwhelm the French *couverture*. To increase the peace complement of the French frontier troops, the generals declared, three year service was indispensable.<sup>22</sup> Justification of the return to three year service on this basis, however, was hotly contested by the experts on the opposite side. They showed conclusively that the German troops in Alsace-Lorraine could not move without adding a considerable number of horses to their artillery teams.<sup>23</sup> That would take several days during which the French covering troops could also be reinforced by calling up the reserves from the immediate neighborhood. Without artillery a sudden attack could be easily checked.<sup>24</sup>

The German military reform was deliber-

<sup>22</sup>M. Paléologue, "Comment le service de trois ans fut rétabli en 1913," *Revue Des Deux Mondes*, 8th ser., vol. XXVII (1935), 67-95 and 307-45 is perhaps the best source. Another excellent source are the reports of the French military attaché in Berlin, Colonel Serret, which greatly influenced the decisions of the government and the general staff. *Documents Diplomatiques Français*, sér. 3, vol. VI, 123-210.

<sup>23</sup>During the debates C. Chautemps, after consulting military experts, gave the best analysis of the problem. His arguments concerning the time that it would take the covering forces on both sides to march were fully borne out by actual events. General Pedoya calculated that the artillery of a German army corps after the new law will have 4,000 horses but needed 7-8,000 more on M day. The incorporation of so many reserve horses, he concluded, would take several days. *Chambre, Débats*, 100/1 (1913), 429-30 and 706.

<sup>24</sup>In August 1914 the Germans did not make any early move in Alsace-Lorraine. The French tried a thrust against Mulhouse but it took them almost a week to make their troops ready. The battle between the covering forces took place on August seventh, ending in a French withdrawal. On the other hand, the Germans succeeded in rushing the fortress of Liège with troops which marched without incorporating their reserve contingents. The raid, however, despite very careful preparations, almost turned into a rout and only Ludendorff's personal intervention saved the situation.

<sup>20</sup>E. Rey, *La renaissance de l'orgueil Français* (Paris 1914).

<sup>21</sup>G. Michon, *La préparation à la guerre; la loi de trois ans 1910-1914* (Paris, 1934), pp. 33-41.

ately played up by the nationalist press. Aside from the dangers of *attaque foudroyante* they pointed to other preparations on the German side of the frontier like the double tracking of railways, the building of large detraining platforms, etc. All this might result in an invasion before the French troops could be made ready. An inundation of French territory could be prevented only by a corresponding increase of the active army—that was the inevitable final conclusion of these arguments. Their effect upon public opinion was great. The general revival of nationalism helped to create a new spirit of defiance against Germany. The challenge was readily accepted and on the wave of this patriotic enthusiasm and determination the Right parties rode back to power. Big business had its great day when, after an extremely violent agitation the legislature restored the three year service. Democracy too could be satisfied since there were no exemptions. Revenge was sweet for reaction when the principle of equality could be forced down the throat of the masses during three years in the barracks.

France now had an enormous standing army of more than 800,000 men. Was the sacrifice worth the gain? The measure required an enormous financial effort and for what? Only a few hours would be saved during the process of changing the army from peace footing to war footing. The time tables of the railroads remained the same because the number of units to be transported to the frontier did not change. And that is the decisive factor in mobilization. The opposition exploited this point, analyzed it to its minutest detail and publicized it in the country, especially during the campaign of national elections following shortly after the passage of the army law. The country was again drifting toward a condition of latent civil war. The Socialist Party, increasing its representation in the Chamber enormously,

came back from the elections firmly determined to put an end to the "folly of armaments." Supported by the other leftist parties the Socialists, led by Jaurès, would have opened up the army question again; only to meet with the most stubborn resistance from the other side.

The Right won a great victory of principle in the law of July, 1913 and it was determined to keep the fruits of that victory. The active part of the army was increased by fifty per cent, and now only three reserve classes need be incorporated to bring it to its mobilizable strength of 1,200,000 men. So much for the *couverture*. The other principal argument, not only of the generals but also of the conservative groups in parliament, was the necessity of keeping a large active army in the barracks under their officers. The "old soldier" was always more reliable, in more than one respect, than the reservist who quickly forgot routine and discipline and reacquired the old civilian habits. The days were gone when civilian virtues were appreciated in the army. The new tactics, establishing blind faith in the attack, called for a large young army kept in training and excellent physical trim. Reinforced with only three of the youngest classes of the reserves, this would be an admirable instrument for a hard-fought offensive campaign.

The law of 1913, in short, was the sum total of the new political tendencies, of public sentiment and of a military doctrine which all produced an irresistible pressure. Whether the opposition could have overcome it is difficult to say. There was enough inflammable material, however, which not even the four years' conflagration of the World War could consume completely and the struggle for control of the armed forces broke out after the armistice as fiercely as ever. The real significance of the controversy raging on the eve of the World War was not the term of service and the *armée de caserne* but the fact



that political passions obscured the real issues, the tactical and strategic problems. From that point of view it mattered little whether this or that side controlled the army if another Sedan would engulf the nation. For what the French army really needed in 1913, aside from large numbers and a defensive doctrine, was modernization of its equipment.<sup>25</sup> The red trousers and képis in which the soldiers went to the front in 1914 served as admirable targets for the German machine gunners. The French had an inferior number of machine guns and practically no heavy artillery, without which a vigorous offensive is an insane idea.<sup>26</sup> In the early days of the war the French army, forcing attack upon attack against the German barrage of heavy artillery and machine guns suffered frightful casualties without being able to prevent invasion. There was numerical inferiority too since the Germans, well aware of the importance of the older classes, sprang a surprise of fifteen reserve army corps upon the French whose troops of the same category were not intended for the front line. Hasty improvisations were necessary while the enemy was at the gates of Paris. Jaurès might well turn in his grave!

Lack of proper equipment and reserves in

<sup>25</sup>When the German law was proposed Poincaré immediately called the *Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre* to discuss counter measures. Two projects were competing on March fourth; one proposed to improve the material and increase the heavy artillery; the other insisted on the increase of the effectives. The latter won. Two days later it was submitted to the Chamber. E. Lavis, *op. cit.*, 284.

<sup>26</sup>The question of lack of heavy artillery had occupied the attention of many people in France. Since the war a large literature grew up around the subject excellently discussed in G. Michon's *op. cit.*, 212-222. See also the first volume of *Les armées françaises dans la grande guerre*, published by the historical section of the French general staff. The most expert and at the same time the most dramatic revelations concerning lack of equipment and heavy artillery can be found in the debate between Senator Ch. Humbert, reporter of the army committee, and the minister of war Messimy on July 13, 1914, when the former proved to the stupefied Senate that, on the eve of the war, the French army was not ready. *Sénat, Débats*, 1913/II, 1199-1268.

the decisive moment because of blind insistence on high peace effectives put France on the brink of ruin. The "Miracle of the Marne" stopped the Germans but complete catastrophe was averted more on account of the enemy's poor leadership than by virtue of French superiority, excepting their spirit of sacrifice.<sup>27</sup> The desperate plight of the French army in these trying days, the very existence of the country hanging in the balance for weeks, remained an inexhaustible source of propaganda for the Left. After the war they renewed their campaign for the nation-in-arms which to the unthinking rank and file of the party meant merely a further reduction of the term of service. It had an almost purely political instead of military significance. It became one of the cardinal points of their program of which Jaurès' book had been the sacred text. The majority returned in the elections of 1919 were nationalists who would not hear of making a militia out of the French army which covered itself with so much glory during the four years' ordeal. The generals came out of it with great prestige, though the Left contested their merit, saying that it was the nation-in-arms fighting in the trenches which won the war and not the generals. At any rate the argument could not be contested that Jaurès' principles were fully vindicated by events and therefore they insisted on the abolition of the standing army. A militia would be sufficient now that Germany was disarmed. The debates went on intermittently for years until the invasion of the Ruhr brought home to the French that peace had not been restored by forcing the Germans to sign a document. Acting under the pressure of this new crisis a compromise was found

<sup>27</sup>The superior German guns could throw twice the weight of metal of the French artillery. The gaps torn in the French lines had to be filled with men—is the conclusion of another chairman of the army commission of the Senate. Cf. E. Bénazet, *Défense nationale, notre sécurité* (Paris, 1938), 1-15.

which reduced the term of service to eighteen months.<sup>28</sup>

#### POST-WAR REORGANIZATION — THE MAGINOT LINE

A comparative lull set in until the next elections in 1924 when the Left coalition won a resounding victory. This time the program of the Left had every chance of passage. To prevent it the Right opposition backed by the military experts again raised the bogey of a sudden German invasion despite the reduction of the *Reichswehr* to 100,000 men. It was claimed that these after opening a breach in the French frontier defenses could, since trained in blitzkrieg tactics, act as the spearhead of an invasion followed by secret military organizations and the masses of the German war veterans.<sup>29</sup> Only a large covering force could avert such a catastrophe. The old argument sounded hollow though it did have a real content. It was not the danger of invasion. When they talked about *couverture* the Right really meant to cover up their desire to keep the *armée de caserne*. *Couverture* and the old soldier were connected by a link which, they insisted, was immunity from invasion. With the World War in living memory of all it was difficult to refute the argument.

It was not oratory which maintained the position of the Left. The deputies were bound by far reaching promises given to the electorate concerning military legislation. There was general tiredness and ever-increasing pacifist sentiment in the public and the army ceased to be a popular institution. Many looked upon it as a burden, the cause of endless taxation.

Hand in hand with the general tiredness came a new military doctrine as a reaction to the *attaque à outrance* of the early war period, the Moloch of French manhood. Trench warfare and particularly the successful defense of Verdun in 1916 convinced the military that passive defense, in positions supported by heavy artillery, was far superior to the offensive which, as the war had showed, usually cost three to four times as many lives as the defense. And France had few lives left to spare. The defensive theory fitted very well into the political program of the majority. Only the demands of the *couverture* stood in the way. For how could a citizen army with only militia-like training supply the manpower for it? It seemed as if the Right, hiding behind the "Eastern defenses" would again defeat the offensive of the Left.

The *couverture* of 1913, in conformity with the prevailing emphasis on the attack, was to serve offensive purposes; therefore, it had to consist mainly of manpower. The complete change of the tactical and strategic doctrine of the French general staff made the *couverture* of the postwar period a defensive instrument which need not necessarily be manpower alone. It could be strongly supplemented with fortifications and this was the origin of the Maginot line. The way for a compromise could be easily paved by money. If the majority were willing to vote the funds, the *Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre* would be ready to reduce the term of service. Finally, in a series of laws voted in 1927-28 the funds were appropriated for the Maginot line and the term of service reduced to one year.<sup>30</sup> It was the most important reform ever voted in the French parliament, because it made a fundamental change in the old concept of standing armies. It split the army, hitherto a compact organization, into three

<sup>28</sup>Projet de loi . . . sur le recrutement de l'armée présenté par M. Maginot, ministère de la guerre (Paris, 1923).

<sup>29</sup>This was the official view based on the reports of the head of the Allied Military Control Commission in Germany, General Nollet. See *Chambre, Débats*, CXXXIX (1929), 1723.

<sup>30</sup>Rapport fait au nom de la commission de l'armée chargé d'examiner le projet de loi relatif au recrutement de l'armée, ed. M. Paul-Berrier (Paris, 1927).



separate and distinct groups: the units where the recruits received their instruction, the fortified *couverture* garrisoned by trained troops and mobilization centers with civilian workers who kept the equipment in good repair and readiness for the field army which from now on would consist of the reserve alone. There was no more active standing army, unless the garrisons of the Maginot line be considered as such.

The new system had great defects. The six months training in the schools of instruction were just enough to break the men into military habits, to teach them how to handle the small arms of World War vintage or the great variety of artillery pieces, but insufficient to prepare them for the exacting efforts of battle between mechanized forces. In the Maginot line the soldiers might learn the mysteries of the fortifications deep underground and how to find their way in them, but not mobile warfare. The army was made ready for passive defense and so the offensive spirit died out. The men felt themselves civilians in uniform and their only concern was to look forward to the day of their liberation.

The nation-in-arms in its prewar form outlived its usefulness. By 1939 the system of which Jaurès had dreamed became an anachronism and only contributed to the general feeling of tiredness. The one year service did not improve the situation. It merely confirmed the belief that military affairs after Versailles were not important, and that it was merely the observance of an outworn tradition that all young men of twenty had to undergo formal training. As in 1867 the dead weight of the past, the force of habit and prejudice defeated all attempts to read the writing on the wall. Brilliant advocates of reform like C. Rougeron, De Gaulle, Generals Loizeau and Alléhaut, whom the British and the Germans studied with great interest,

were either silenced or ignored by the French so that their military institutions on the eve of the second World War sank deeper and deeper in the old rut. Even though the two years service was reintroduced in 1935, the passive spirit, engendered by the continuous harping on short service and defensive doctrine sanctioned by the acts of 1927-28 kept their hold on officers and men alike.<sup>31</sup>

For more than two generations an incessant and often very violent struggle went on around the army. Problems of recruiting, service, equipment, organization were often the subjects of interminable discussions always conducted from the point of view of party politics. Between the establishment of the Third Republic and its fall in 1940, the fundamental laws of the country concerning national defense were changed six times, not counting the scores of supplementary laws. Because the influence of politics upon military legislation was so great, the interplay between political developments and the doctrines of war should have been in harmony. Unfortunately for the Third Republic military legislation and the exigencies of actual warfare showed divergent tendencies. In 1913 the attack was stressed and a large standing army insisted upon. The battlefield demonstrated that defense and masses of reserves were the decisive factors. Prior to the Second World War defense with masses of reserves, "citizens in uniform" became the credo. The realities of the battlefield, however, called for semi-professional groups trained in fast-moving mechanized warfare. In the first case disaster was avoided by the "Miracle of the Marne," in the second Sedan repeated itself.

<sup>31</sup>For a more detailed account of the significance of the military legislation of these years see Irving M. Gibson, "The Maginot Line," *The Journal of Modern History*, XVII (1945), 130-146.



## THE TEACHING OF MILITARY HISTORY

BY THEODORE ROPP\*

"Half a century ago John Richard Green, in his *History of the English People*, that historical best-seller, delivered himself of the statement—'War plays a small part in the real story of European nations, and in that of England its part is smaller than in any.' It was an astoundingly unhistorical statement. In the light of today it has an inescapable irony.

We live in a time when 'war' is on everyone's lips; when everything contemporary is dated in relation to the last war; when those, who dislike the subject most, talk about it most—if their talk be only about the prevention of war.

That volume of talk is proof of their subconscious realization of the part that war has played in the story of their lives, and the life of modern Europe. Subconscious, because they give astoundingly little recognition, in a practical sense, to the importance of the subject. They talk much *about* war, but rarely do they talk *of* it—as a subject so serious as to be worth the serious study of every thinking man and woman. They appear to regard it as a disturbance of nature similar to an earthquake, to be guarded against by structural precautions, rather than as a disease that might be prevented through investigation of its causes, and the danger of which might at least be curtailed by scientific treatment.

If war is not strictly either the one or the other, the analogy with a disease is far closer than that with an earthquake. And close enough to warrant a demand for scientific research into its nature, conduct and effects.

For the failure to treat it as a branch of scientific knowledge, responsibility lies as much on men of learning as on men of war. By the nature of their duties, soldiers are practitioners, not detached researchers. . . . Even a Staff College training is more akin to walking the wards than to work in a laboratory.

The study of war as a branch of knowledge, requires the method of work that prevails in a University as well as the attitude of mind which is inculcated there. But it is not likely that these needs will be fulfilled until men of

learning change their attitude of mind toward war, and learn to regard it as a branch of knowledge worthy of exploration.

Their present attitude is still dominated by that of John Richard Green. It reflects the spirit in which he wrote—'It is the reproach of historians that they have too often turned history into a mere record of butchery of men by their fellow men.' In their eagerness to rid themselves of this reproach, modern historians have not only tended to lose sight of reality, but have lost the chance, to mankind's loss, of elucidating the course and influence of war.

They have yielded to the pendulum of fashion, swinging from one extreme to the other, to the distortion of history. For while they have turned history into a record from which war is almost missing, they have left what remains as meaningless as their predecessors did, so that it still seems mere unintelligible butchery."<sup>1</sup>

This indictment is still, after fifteen years and the disaster of a Second World War, essentially true for the average American college or university. It is true of the textbooks from which the average student studies history and political science; it is true of the teachers who teach him, and it is true of the administrators who plan and finance general programs of undergraduate education. Yet few students, or teachers, or administrators would now be able to deny that war has been one of the forces which have made the world of today or that this phase of social activity should be studied in colleges and universities. Though advanced research in the history of warfare can be done in only a few places,

\*Dr. Ropp, Associate Professor of History in Duke University, read this paper at the joint meeting of the American Military Institute and the American Historical Association in Washington on December 28, 1948.

<sup>1</sup>B. H. Liddell Hart, *The Ghost of Napoleon* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1933), 145-147.

military historians must now begin to popularize the knowledge which already lies in our libraries. Our generation simply cannot ignore this branch of human activity because we do not like it, or believe in it, or because it is very difficult for us to understand. What I will do in this paper is simply to outline my own approach to this teaching problem, with some suggestions for a teaching bibliography in a field where there are few guideposts for the average historian. These last suggestions are, of course, rather personal and quixotic, but they will suffice to suggest the types of material which my students have found interesting. The more forbidding works should be supplemented with those of some human interest, especially those which deal with war from the standpoint of the common soldier.<sup>2</sup> But the problem of informing public opinion will not wait on a perfect bibliography. Our fellow social scientists will not even understand our questions until we make a start toward popularizing our present materials.

<sup>2</sup>On the American Civil War, to take a familiar example, there are three readable general military surveys: Colonel G. F. R. Henderson's wonderful *The Science of War* (Sixth Impression, London: Longmans, Green, 1913), George Fort Milton, *Conflict* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1941), and the new edition of Fletcher Pratt, *Ordeal by Fire* (New York: Sloane, 1948). Mr. Pratt's excellent *Short History of the Army and Navy* (Washington: The Infantry Journal, 1944) seems to be presently out of print. In spite of its lack of balance—the Civil War is given a bit too much space—this is still the best survey of our overall military and naval policy for students. From the human interest standpoint, to mention only recent works, there are Bell I. Wiley, *The Life of Johnny Reb* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1943), W. W. Blackford, *War Years with Jeb Stuart* (New York: Scribners, 1946), John W. De Forest, *A Volunteer's Adventures* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), and John Beatty, *Memoirs of a Volunteer* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1946). Dr. Freeman's great works can best be compared to Sir John Fortescue's monumental *History of the British Army*. They represent a lifetime of thought and reflection on military problems.

In studying the First World War, no teacher can afford to neglect the great war novels. A pioneer anthology is Eugene Lohrke, *Armageddon* (New York: Johnathan Cape and Harrison Smith, 1930), and the splendid William K. Pfeiler, *War and the German Mind* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944).

Fortunately, we can dodge the pseudo-Darwinism of many nineteenth century historians of warfare and the pseudo-Freudianism of some more recent volumes and take our stand on Clausewitz. "War is only a part of political intercourse, therefore by no means an independent thing in itself." If we can prove that war has been a recurrent — note that we do not have to commit ourselves by saying *normal* or *natural* or even *regular* — part of social intercourse in the western world, then its study is *ipso facto* important to all social scientists, and particularly to historians, political scientists, and students of international relations and economics. Our natural clientele will be students of the social sciences, and our course and our reading lists should be as comprehensive as possible, to enable each student to integrate the history of warfare with that social science in which he is specializing. Since most civilian teachers are not equipped to teach the sort of course usually required of reserve officers but had better go fishing for civilians, we can reasonably expect that our students will have had elementary work in modern history or political science. Those who have already had R.O.T.C. courses in military or naval history will be ready, in turn, to benefit from a somewhat less technical standpoint, but the primary aim of a college or university's teaching of military history should be a broadly informed public opinion rather than the technical training of a military reserve.

As I have already mentioned, there is no better place to begin than with Clausewitz. None of the great thinkers of the last century was more distorted by his interpreters, there are few who can be read with greater profit by serious students, and nothing is clearer in Clausewitz than his insistence that war is a part of social intercourse and that its laws are closely related to those of politics in general. There are now two cheap English translations of Clausewitz — the Modern

Library Giant by O. M. Jollis and a splendid condensation in the Living Thoughts Library which can be read by any mature student.<sup>3</sup>

Our own course then approaches most wars from three angles and tries to tie them together in such a way that a student of any one of the three can see the importance of the other two factors. They are (1) the political, (2) the technological, and (3) what can be called the organizational or professional — both awkward terms for describing the means by which a state's armed forces are organized to utilize its political and technological resources. The political factor includes military economics. It is the amount of force a state can muster from its population at a given time and the way in which this amount has, on the whole, been constantly increasing since the latter part of the fifteenth century. While Americans must be the first to deny that the power of a state resides entirely in its armed forces, the modern state and the modern army have, in fact, developed together. This may be little more than *Geopolitik* divested of its pseudo-biology, but American students can greatly profit from this type of political analysis. For the whole history of modern warfare the best single book is Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy*.<sup>4</sup> For all its

errors of omission — it is weakest on British and American military thought — it is a pioneer work, and its bibliographies are the indispensable starting point for any serious course in military history. The political angle is, on the whole, the best to begin with. More students will be familiar with the main outlines of political history, and they can be easily reviewed in any standard text. Students who are not interested in political history are not very likely to be interested in military history anyway, and the reserve officer with some background in military history usually needs to become familiar with the political framework.

The technological side is developed along the lines of General J. F. C. Fuller's *Armament and History*,<sup>5</sup> a work which, characteristically enough, tries to prove that all military history is a function of technology. Most students like his stimulating and simple explanation; it remains for the humdrum professor to point out that the history of warfare is as complex as that of any other social phenomenon. But if — to quote Napoleon — "Strategy is the art of the possible," it is quite clear that the possibilities have changed as violence has "armed itself with the inventions of art and science" — another trenchant phrase from Clausewitz.<sup>6</sup> Fuller's book is, indeed, a fascinating study in intellectual history, for much of it is based on Lewis Mumford's *Technics and Civilization*, and that, in turn, on Sombart's *Krieg und Kapitalismus*. In this connection, naval history is very rich

<sup>3</sup>*On War* (New York: Random House, 1943). *The Living Thoughts of Clausewitz*, with an Introduction by Col. Joseph I. Greene (New York: Longmans, Green, 1943).

Also Lord Wavell's thoughtful lecture on *Generals and Generalship*, reprinted in *The Good Soldier* (London: Macmillan, 1948), and the first chapters of Col. Alfred H. Burne, *Strategy in World War II* (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1947). There is a good history of logistics by Col. G. C. Shaw, *Supply in Modern War* (London: Faber and Faber, 1948).

<sup>4</sup>(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943.) J. F. Horrabin, *An Outline of Political Geography* (New York: Knopf, 1942) is short and easy. For more details, use *Foundations of National Power*, edited by Harold and Margaret Sprout (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945). Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (2 vols., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942) is for the instructor only.

<sup>5</sup>(New York: Scribners, 1945.) Students who like to read about battles enjoy his *Decisive Battles* (New York: Scribners, 1940) and the first part of *Machine Warfare* (Washington: The Infantry Journal, 1943). Another readable account of the development of weapons, and one equally opinionated is Tom Wintringham, *The Story of Weapons and Tactics* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943). On the social side, from a leftist point of view, there is Wintringham's stimulating *Mutiny* (New York: Fortune's, 1936). There are good illustrations in James R. Newman, *The Tools of War* (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, 1942).

<sup>6</sup>This, like my other quotations, is taken from Jollis' translation.



in works which show the interrelations of technics and warfare, and the principles of sea power cannot be neglected in a course which is primarily aimed at Americans.<sup>7</sup> Military and naval history has, in fact, been written from each of these three angles—as a tale of great captains, of great states, and of great technological inventions.

Related finally to the other two factors—both rather easier for civilians to grasp—is the problem of organization. How—to quote again from Clausewitz—“the soldier is levied, clothed, armed, trained, sleeps, eats, drinks, and marches merely to fight at the right place and the right time.” It is best to approach these problems from the British point of view, because so many of our own military traditions are British and because our present diplomatic and military position is most nearly comparable to the historical position of Britain. In both countries the broad lines of politics and strategy are properly the concern of every informed citizen, though the details are obviously matters for professionals. For this reason it is not only impossible but unwise to neglect the principles of air and sea power. For our aim is an informed public opinion and the air is presently filled with many over-simplifications.

<sup>7</sup>Mumford's work was published in New York by Harcourt, Brace in 1934, Sombart's in 3 vols. in Munich, 1913. For the technical side of naval history, the following belong in every college library. William L. Rodgers, *Greek and Roman Naval Warfare* (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1937) and *Naval Warfare under Oars* (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1939). Samuel Eliot Morison, *Admiral of the Ocean Sea* (2 vols., Boston: Little, Brown, 1946). Romola and R. C. Anderson, *The Sailing Ship* (New York: Robert McBride, 1947). James P. Baxter, *The Introduction of the Ironclad Warship* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933). Bernard Brodie, *Sea Power in the Machine Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941). Brodie's *A Guide to Naval Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944) is the best in its field, while his, as editor, *The Absolute Weapon* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946) is one of the best general surveys of some of the consequences of the atomic bomb. Alfred Vagts, *Landing Operations* (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Co., 1946) is a pioneer work, as is the same author's *A History of Militarism* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1937).

Since the period from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century was both the “classical” age of modern warfare and that which saw the emergence of the United States, the first three sections (after the theoretical introduction) of our course survey these centuries; the art of war on land, the naval wars which opened much of North America to the English speaking peoples, and the ideas of national defense which were incorporated in 1789 into our own governmental structure. After 1789 we follow the chronological pattern of European international relations in general, with periods of “practical” military application during war and revolution alternating with those of the “theoretical” speculation during the generations of relative international peace and stability. The first period of practical application was that of the French Revolution, which transformed the art of war on land and threw up the last “great captain,” Napoleon. During the years which followed (1814-1848), philosophers like Clausewitz and Jomini tried to assimilate the social and political lessons of the Revolution and to learn the “secret” of Napoleonic generalship. The next period of war and revolution (1848-1871) saw the first military use of the new inventions of the Industrial Revolution—such as the railroad—the founding of the German Empire, and the replacement of the individual “great captain” by a collective brain known as the General Staff. From 1871 to 1914 military men worked out the implications of these and certain other innovations, and their theories were, in turn, tested during the First World War. This led to a new revision of military thought during the truce of 1918 to 1939; the Second World War probed these doctrines, and introduced at its end such “absolute weapons” as the atomic bomb and the supersonic missile. The last section points up some of the problems involved in the evaluation and control of these new factors and, above all, emphasizes

the absolute necessity of the highest type of imaginative intelligence in dealing with them. For if "the work of war, plain and simple though it appears, can never be conducted with distinguished success by people without distinguished intellectual powers," the prevention of war must first of all depend upon the creative imagination. It is a type of thinking which has never been better described than by one of the great prophets of modern warfare, Guilio Douhet.

"The study . . . of the war of the future presents some very interesting aspects. First is the vastness of the phenomenon which makes whole peoples hurl themselves against one another; forgetting for a time that they all wear the aspect of human beings, that they belong to the same family of humanity striving toward the same goal of ideal perfection, to become wolves and throw themselves into torment and a bloody work of destruction, as though possessed by blind folly. Next comes the impressive scale of war, which demands the assembling, ordering and directing toward a single goal, victory, of all the formidable material and moral forces of whole nations. . . . And, finally, there is what might be called the mysterious aspect of war, which . . . presses upon everyone, and is shrouded by a heavy veil of mystery. . . ."

To prepare for war is to prepare to face this vaguely felt eventuality of the future. . . . We are compelled to make a mental excursion into the future . . . by exercise of the imagination within the confines of rigid logic. . . . Our itinerary will be simple: we shall start from the past, look over the present, and from there jump into the future. We shall glance at the war of the past long enough to retrace its essential features; we shall ask of the present what it is preparing for the future; and, finally, we shall try to demand what modifications will be made in the character of war by the causes at work today in order to point out their inevitable consequences."<sup>8</sup>

A general example of the way in which we bring each of the three factors to bear on a specific problem is in our treatment of land

warfare from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century, where we concentrate on two "typical" military organizations, those of the Spanish Hapsburgs and of Prussia. The former was the first European army to appear in the New World, while that of Frederick the Great was the epitome of eighteenth century "classicism." The Spanish Army shows the transition from a medieval to a modern force, with its mixture of fire and muscle weapons, of élite standing troops with mercenaries and feudal militia, in the service of a state which faced, above all others, the political problems of a Europe just emerging from extreme political decentralization and fairly bristling with physical and moral obstacles. The Prussian Army has been brilliantly described in several books and students have little trouble in understanding its essential characteristics. Its drill was a function of its weapons—the muzzle loader was no weapon for an amateur. The state of the Prussian common soldier came from the necessity of getting long-service troops from the unproductive classes of the population, and then training them—in the only way men could be trained in that illiterate age—into military automatons. There being little qualitative or quantitative competition in weapons, Frederick's tactics depended—as he himself recognized—on going through a complex set of physical motions more efficiently than any of his competitors. War in his day was really an art—in the eighteenth century term for craftsmanship—precisely because it was then so nearly static on both the political and the technological levels.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup>See especially Frederick's attempt to define the *coup d'oeil* of a general for an attempt to put into quite unsatisfactory words the real "secret" of a great captain, "The Instruction of Frederick the Great for His Generals," in *Roots of Strategy*, ed. by Major Thomas R. Phillips (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Co., 1940). The best short account of his army is Walter Dorn, *Competition for Empire* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1940), Chapters I-III. See also Robert Ergang, *The Potsdam Fuhrer* (New York: Columbia University

<sup>9</sup>*The Command of the Air*, tr. by Dino Ferrari (New York: Coward-McCann, 1942), 119-120.



These remarks will, I hope, give an idea of what can be done in an introductory course. Wise selection can cover a great deal of ground, and battle or campaign studies must try to illuminate the principles of a whole period of politics, technology, and strategy. But no introductory course in history can be other than selective, and such a selection can, I believe, be usefully presented to many American students. Its aim, and, in my opinion, the aim of all undergraduate courses in history, is not the sprouting of future graduate students, but the creation of an informed opinion. Such a course must be taught, I think, in such a way as to prove that this is a field vital to the understanding of the social sciences and one teeming with possibilities for research by civilians; points which will have to be driven home before we can hope to have any decent graduate students anyway. Our teaching problems are very much like those in the history of medi-

Press, 1941) and Herbert Rosinski, *The German Army* (new ed., Washington: The Infantry Journal, 1944).

For the older period, there is little recent work. F. L. Taylor, *The Art of War in Italy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921) is out of print. Charles Oman, *A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1937) and Oliver L. Spaulding, Hoffman Nickerson, and John W. Wright, *Warfare* (Washington: The Infantry Journal, n. d.) are still the best. There is much light in C. G. Cruickshank's brilliant new *Elizabeth's Army* (London: Oxford, 1946) and C. H. Firth's old *Cromwell's Army* (London: Methuen, 1902). I like Elbridge Colby, *Masters of Mobile Warfare* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943), Harold T. Parker, *Three Napoleonic Battles* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1944), and Charles Oman, *Wellington's Army* (London: Edward Arnold, 1912).

More recently, to support Earle, I use such works as Katharine Chorley, *Armies and the Art of Revolution* (London: Faber, 1943), D. Fedotoff White, *The Growth of the Red Army* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945), B. H. Liddell Hart, *The War in Outline* (New York: Random House, 1936), and H. A. De Weerd, *Great Soldiers of the Two World Wars* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1941). For the Second World War the list of good books is already enormous, but they all start with George C. Marshall, *The Winning of the War in Europe and the Pacific* (paper edition, Washington: The Infantry Journal, 1946) and the publications of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey.

cine or of science in general. Most military history will continue to be written by military men. But their writings, like those of surgeons, or inventors, or scientists, must be placed within the general framework of the social sciences, if they are to rise above mere antiquarianism or reach the general reader. We cannot afford in our present day America to ignore this phase of human activity entirely, and the experience of Germany is a standing warning to those who would simply leave it to those experts who were—in Douhet's prophetic words—"competent by definition." Because of these facts, one of our greatest stumbling blocks is the absence of critical bibliographies, and of general textbooks, handbooks, atlases and encyclopedias. The whole field is, in short, so new and involves so many problems that it seems to me our first cooperative effort might well be directed toward the sort of activity which historians in other fields carried on a generation or two ago. Inventories of our holdings of periodicals and manuscripts, check lists of important current periodical articles, evaluations of materials which would belong in a basic working library—all of these must come along with the monographic research essential to a really scientific history of military institutions. There is no field in which the bibliography is quite as overwhelming, and none in which so little has been done to systematize what has already been accomplished. Yet we cannot be expected to be taken seriously by other historians until we can point to works which can be read by the ordinary college student or teacher. Nothing can kill the beginner's interest more quickly than the old drum-and-trumpet type of military literature, and nothing can stir him up as quickly as some of the really splendid work already published. That is the reason for the over-long list of titles in this paper; for I can think of few fields in which the average historian or student is more in need of guidance.



# THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ALLIED CONTROL IN ITALY

By ROBERT W. KOMER\*

Allied operations in the Mediterranean in the fall of 1943 raised a civil affairs problem of unprecedented magnitude—that of how to deal with occupied Italy, the first Axis power defeated in the war. In Sicily the problem had been relatively simple. Since there could be no question of leaving the Fascist administration in power, the Allies established a direct military government. The capitulation of Italy presented the Allied Governments with a larger and more complex question. Should the Allies disarm the Italians or use them in the war? Should Italy be governed under a military administration or should this responsibility be left to the Italian Government? If the latter course were adopted what type of control machinery should be established? Besides their far-reaching political implications, decisions on these questions would have a vital bearing on future operations in Italy, and might mean the difference between complete and partial success in the hard and risky campaign ahead. Because of these military ramifications, great weight was given by the two Allied Governments to the recommendations of General Eisenhower, the Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean.

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\*Mr. Komer, who holds a graduate degree from Harvard University, was a historian with Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) and later with the Historical Division, War Department Special Staff. The material for this article has been taken from a larger study on civil affairs policy and administration in the Mediterranean Theater prepared by Mr. Komer from the files of G-5, AFHQ. The study will shortly be published by the Army Historical Division for use in the army service schools and will also serve as one of the preliminary narratives utilized in the civil affairs subseries of the official *U. S. Army in World War II*.

## *Planning for Military Government and Armistice Control*

Even before the Sicilian campaign General Eisenhower had concluded that the strategic situation was favorable to subsequent invasion of the mainland in an attempt to eliminate Italy from the war. By the last week in June the MGS (Military Government Section) of Allied Force Headquarters had begun preliminary civil affairs planning, based on the assumption that Italy would be gradually, or more quickly in case of collapse or surrender, occupied to a line just north of Rome. Since there was no intention of utilizing the Fascist administration, it was proposed to institute a combined military government similar to that already planned for Sicily. It would be necessary to provide, however, not only for local and provincial administration but for supervision of as much of the national administration as might remain in Rome.

On 25 July, with the dramatic fall of Mussolini and the abolition of the Fascist Party by the successor Badoglio regime, the Italian picture suddenly changed. This appeared to be not a mere shift in government but, taken together with the weak Italian opposition in Sicily and Italy's known war-weariness, probably the first step in Italy's withdrawal from the war. AFHQ had already envisaged two possibilities in the event of Italian collapse or surrender. If no Italian group would be willing or able to assume the task of administering Italy under Allied control, it would be necessary to establish Allied Military Government (AMG) throughout the country. The second possibility was that some central

authority would emerge which could relieve the Allies of the burden of full military government and minimize the need for garrison troops and AMG personnel. General Eisenhower considered that such a solution would also promote the Allied political objective of restoring Italy as a free nation. Even before the fall of Mussolini he had recommended to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) that he be left free to judge on military grounds whether he should deal with the royal family or an anti-Fascist group, should one arise. Consequently the Allied C-in-C was eager to take full advantage of Mussolini's downfall. Italy was apparently ready to surrender, but if the Allies offered her only one bondage for another she might prefer to wait upon events. Therefore, after securing permission from the CCS, General Eisenhower broadcast to the Italian people commending their removal of Mussolini and suggesting that they call for an honorable peace.

Supervision of an Italian administration under the terms of an armistice would require an Allied control organization to supervise the execution of these terms. Moreover, in event of surrender the Allies envisaged a relatively quick occupation of almost all Italy. Thus it now became necessary for MGS to plan also for the possible administration of all Italy under an armistice control commission. This commission would be similar in organization to the proposed national regional headquarters for AMG but would exercise control through the Italian administration instead of supplanting it.

By mid-August it became evident that the anticipated quick occupation of Italy was unduly optimistic. To be sure, the fall of Sicily and the almost simultaneous opening of armistice negotiations at Lisbon made Italian surrender appear near at hand. But the weak German forces in Italy were being strongly reinforced, and it was unlikely that they would relinquish the country without a bit-

ter struggle. Consequently, while a relatively quick capture of Rome was still anticipated, the Allies recognized that they faced a contested march up the peninsula. If extensive fighting should take place AMG would undoubtedly be needed in forward areas until local administration and a semblance of normal economic life could be restored. Moreover, it was desirable that zones of active operations be under closer supervision than that afforded by armistice control. Therefore, civil affairs planning now shifted to a flexible combination of military government in the combat area and armistice control in more stable rear areas. As the front moved forward, AMG would progressively restore rear areas to the Italian Government under supervision of the Armistice Control Authority (ACA), as it was named for planning purposes. The ACA would consist of a national headquarters divided into sections corresponding to Italian Government ministries, regional headquarters, and provincial control officers. Since the form of armistice control was a matter for decision by the two Allied Governments, AFHQ submitted its plan to the CCS.

Italy signed the Armistice on 3 September 1943 at Cassibile, Sicily. Although the CCS at first wished to have Italy sign a comprehensive instrument of surrender, General Eisenhower secured CCS approval of negotiating on the so-called "Short Terms," with the understanding that Italy would sign full terms later. On the evening of 8 September news of the Armistice was broadcast to the world. The King, Badoglio, and a handful of generals fled to a safe haven at Brindisi, near the Allied lines. The Fifth and Eighth Armies, operating under command of Fifteenth Army Group, were ashore at Salerno and in Calabria and the weakest of the Axis partners had ceased to fight. As the Allies advanced up the Italian boot they established AMG.

### *Allied Policy on Relations with Italy*

The question of the status to be accorded the Badoglio government was carefully considered during September in Washington, London, and Algiers. Although the government at Brindisi was hardly more than a name, its importance lay in the fact that it was the only established authority with which the Allies could deal. The only alternative to recognizing this group would be the establishment of military government throughout Italy, with its consequent heavy commitment in personnel. Twenty-one years of Fascism had obliterated any democratic opposition groups which could assume the burden of governing Italy. Furthermore, the Badoglio regime had a claim to legality which could be used to counter the pretensions of the Fascist Republican Government created by Mussolini under German auspices in Northern Italy. Finally, Badoglio and the King enjoyed the allegiance of the Italian armed forces, the utilization of which was a primary Allied concern. Badoglio appeared to be honest and sincere in his intention of cooperating with the Allies and was requesting an alliance in order to rally Italy to the Allied cause. Although the Allies were not prepared to go to this length with a defeated enemy, AFHQ sought to devise some formula short of alliance but better than military government to insure Italian support.

General Eisenhower in September recommended to the CCS that the Allies should not establish military government throughout Italy, but should strengthen the authority and prestige of the existing government by every means in order that it might contribute materially to the Allied war effort. In particular, the Allies should recognize that Italy was in fact fighting the Germans by granting her a status of co-belligerency. He pointed out that, while Badoglio himself favored war against the Germans, it was uncertain whether

the Italian people and armed forces would understand that this was their duty unless Italy's participation was recognized by the Allies. Eisenhower agreed with President Roosevelt that the question of whether or not the monarchy should be retained was not for the Allies to settle but a matter to be determined later by the Italians themselves. The C-in-C was willing that responsibility for these decisions be placed squarely upon him on the ground of military necessity.

The two Allied governments, through the CCS, accepted most of General Eisenhower's proposals. They decided to permit the Badoglio government to remain in office, subject to guidance from an Allied control body, and to treat Italy as a co-belligerent if she declared war. Meanwhile Badoglio would be required to build up his government on the strongest possible anti-Fascist basis as the first step in the democratization of Italy. This policy involved no Allied commitment to continue support of Badoglio or the King should this become inexpedient; it was also without prejudice to the right of the Italian people to select their form of government once the country was free. Moreover the CCS required the Italian Government to accept the full armistice terms in order to define clearly its obligations. On 29 September 1943 General Eisenhower and Marshal Badoglio signed at Malta the Supplementary Instrument of Surrender, the so-called "Long Terms." These articles, although not containing the formula of unconditional surrender, in fact placed the two Allied governments in a position to require virtually any measure in Italian civil affairs, as in other matters, that their interest demanded. Article 37 provided the legal basis for the establishment of a control body by stating that "there will be appointed a Control Commission charged with regulating and executing this instrument under the orders and general direction of the Allied Commander-in-Chief."



### *The Military Mission to the Italian Government*

Although the Long Terms thus included a decision to establish armistice control, the forms which this control was to take and the time when it was to be instituted were still unsettled. Unfortunately, the anticipated quick occupation of Italy following the armistice did not materialize. German forces, strongly reinforced shortly before the Allied invasion, bitterly contested the Fifth Army landing at Salerno. The King, Badoglio, and a few Ministers were safe in Allied-occupied territory, but the highly centralized administration and archives in Rome were in German hands. Since the surrender General Eisenhower had maintained contact with the Badoglio group through Vice Admiral Power, his personal representative, but a more formal and extensive liaison was required. MGS proposed that Advance Headquarters ACA, which was ready to function, be sent forward to Brindisi. The Chief of Staff of AFHQ decided that this would be premature until a more complete Italian government had been formed. Instead a small Allied Military Mission, under Lt. General Sir Noel Mason MacFarlane, was sent to establish liaison with the Italian armed forces. The British and American Ministers were associated with the Mission to establish political relations and deal with political matters. Although the Mission did not supplant ACA, it had to find solutions for many civil affairs questions arising from the Armistice.

AFHQ also concluded that it would be inadvisable to establish the usual form of Allied military government in the heel of Italy where the King was present. Badoglio had appointed a Commissioner for Liberated Areas through whom the Italian civil government of the four provinces of Apulia was functioning. In these provinces, Allied civil affairs officers were placed under the Military

Mission and directed to work with the local authorities on a liaison basis. Other administrative problems had presented themselves in Sardinia and Corsica, where the Germans had begun a hasty evacuation. Since Corsica was French soil, General Eisenhower, unable to spare any forces from the major battle in progress, entrusted its occupation to French troops. The CCS approved allowing the French to govern Corsica under a state of siege. Sardinia, in view of its quick occupation, was considered an armistice area. It was not placed under AMG but was administered by an Italian High Commissioner appointed by the Badoglio government, subject to the control of a Regional Allied Commissioner. An Allied mission under direct control of AFHQ exercised provisional control over the Italian administration pending establishment of the armistice commission.

### *The Plan to Continue Military Government*

Despite the Allied decision to support the existing Italian regime and establish armistice control, it seemed clear by the end of September that such a policy could not be instituted at an early date. With the Germans occupying most of Italy and strongly contesting the Allied advance, it was evident that an advance as far as Rome would take much longer than had been anticipated. Reports from Brindisi indicated that the Badoglio government was still too weak and ineffective to be entrusted with greater authority. Moreover the Allies had stipulated that Italy must declare war on Germany to attain the status of co-belligerent. The King, who alone could declare war, refused to take this step. Although pressed by Badoglio, he took the position that to declare war with most of Italy still in German hands would invite severe reprisals. Consequently, it appeared that until the Badoglio regime was installed in Rome, where the central archives, the government bureaus and most of the able ad-

ministrators were located, it would not be able to declare war on Germany, to complete the formation of a liberal government, or to administer effectively any large part of Italian territory. Beyond this, the prospect of a fighting advance on Rome made it desirable that the Allies exercise a more direct control over what would be largely a combat zone.

In the light of this changed political and military situation, General Eisenhower determined to retain military government in all occupied territory except Apulia and Sardinia until Rome was reached. As soon as Badoglio and the King were installed in Rome and in a position to fulfill Allied political requirements, the Allies would accord Italy the status of co-belligerency and turn over to Italian administration all territory which operational requirements would permit. Hence in early October MGS modified its plans and decided to continue AMG as long as necessary while preparing for ultimate establishment of a control commission.

Since protracted operations in Italy were now in prospect MGS recognized that some military government would be needed in forward areas where operational conditions and disruption of local administration made it essential. It conceived of AMG as primarily mobile, following the active front, while armistice control would prevail in static rear areas. But if military government was to be established initially throughout occupied Italy, MGS agreed with the recommendation of Major General Lord Rennell, Chief Civil Affairs officer of Fifteenth Army Group, that it should be divided into two parts: a mobile component to accompany the field armies and a static branch for rear areas, such as Sicily and Southern Italy, where AMG was to be continued only until the Italian administration was strong enough to take charge. General Rennell did not believe that two senior officers, his deputy, Brig. Gen. Frank J. McSherry and himself, could supervise both

the mobile AMG and the rapidly expanding static areas. He had found the combination of these functions unsatisfactory both in Sicily and in the planning for Calabria and Campania, where control of plans and personnel was divided between Palermo and Algiers. This was especially true of long-range civilian relief activities, which in stabilized rear areas should depend on a headquarters removed from immediate combat problems.

Accordingly, on 24 October 1943 AMG was divided into AMG Fifteenth Army Group and Headquarters AMG, under Generals Rennell and McSherry respectively. AMG Fifteenth Army Group was made responsible for military government in the area north of the northern boundary of the provinces of Salerno, Potenza, and Bari. It consisted of civil affairs personnel with the Fifth and Eighth Armies, including a headquarters with each, and a small civil affairs staff at Fifteenth Army Group. This advance body was to establish military government in the combat zone and to continue it as long as the military situation required. HQ AMG, which was being formed at Palermo and would be directly under AFHQ, would administer the remaining area under military government at the time—all except Sardinia and the four provinces of Apulia—and later all other rear areas pending movement of the Italian Government to Rome and the establishment of the control commission. When the commission came into existence HQ AMG would be merged with it and cease to function as such.

#### *The Decision for Early Activation of the Control Commission*

Even before the dividing of AMG took place, planning once more had shifted to a program for early activation of a control commission. On 13 October the King, finally convinced that only by this means could Italy obtain Allied confidence and support,



declared war on Germany. In a tripartite statement the same day, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States accepted "the active co-operation of the Italian Nation and Armed Forces as a co-belligerent in the war against Germany." It was made clear that the relationship of co-belligerency could not of itself "affect the terms recently signed, which retain their full force and can only be adjusted by agreement between the Allied Governments in the light of the assistance which the Italian Government may be able to afford to the United Nations." This statement established the Allied policy of "payment by results" under which Italy would be granted concessions only in accordance with her contribution to the Allied war effort and her progress toward democratization.

The three governments elaborated their policy toward Italy in the declaration of their respective Foreign Secretaries at the Moscow Conference in late October. This called for democratization and broadening of the government, restoration of civil liberties, suppression of Fascist organizations, removal of Fascist elements from public life, release of political prisoners, creation of democratic organs of local government, and the arrest and surrender of war criminals. On the principle that civil affairs in a zone of active military operations were of paramount military concern, the execution of Allied policy toward Italy was left with AFHQ.

Once the Badoglio government had gained acceptance as a co-belligerent, the plan to maintain military government throughout occupied Italy until the capture of Rome did not seem compatible with either the changed status of the Italian Government or with the basic purposes of Allied policy. The CCS had set for General Eisenhower two objectives: to broaden the base of the Italian Government and to convert it into an effective national force against Germany. Since ever-stiffening enemy resistance made the capture

of Rome seem remote, General Eisenhower decided to strengthen the Badoglio government so that it could assume enlarged responsibilities under the supervision of a control commission.

Accordingly, AFHQ began planning for the activation of a skeleton commission headquarters at Brindisi. Since the Italian Government consisted at the time of only Badoglio and his Ministers of Navy, Air, and Industry, without staffs or archives, Badoglio considered that a large group of Allied economic and administrative officers was unnecessary. AFHQ also believed that a minimum staff, limited to the heads of sections, was preferable at the outset. It decided to send to Brindisi only a small group of senior personnel who would gain experience in supervising the Italians and at the same time prepare the commission for assumption of its full responsibilities.

One of the principal immediate functions of the new headquarters would be the provision of machinery for the gradual restoration of rear areas from AMG to Italian administration. The prerequisites of any such transfer were that the Italian Government develop a capacity to administer the new regions satisfactorily and that it broaden and liberalize itself. Since armistice control, therefore, could not supplant military government for some time, MGS decided that HQ AMG at Palermo should continue to administer the static rear areas and should transfer them to the Italian Government only gradually. Later, when no areas outside the combat zone remained under military government, HQ AMG would merge completely into the control commission.

The formal execution of these plans could not take place till arrival of a directive from the CCS, which as early as August had received AFHQ's views on the form of armistice control. A tentative CCS directive had been received on 6 September, but it con-



tained certain changes in the Theater's own plans which Military Government Section did not consider feasible. Further negotiations took place, and finally on 15 October the official CCS directive was received. The control body was to be named the Allied Control Commission for Italy (ACC). It was to be divided into four sections to which AFHQ had agreed. The Allied C-in-C, General Eisenhower, was to be the ex-officio president but a senior American officer was to be appointed as his deputy and its actual head. Allocation of personnel was to be generally on an equal Anglo-American basis, with all appointments of senior officials subject to approval of the CCS. The personnel of all sections except that concerned with political matters were to be military. The directive stressed the importance of insuring that AMG and ACC would follow uniform procedures and policies and be co-ordinated under one head. Therefore the areas under AMG were to be reduced to a minimum and completely integrated with the Control Commission as soon as possible. However, the CCS later approved the AFHQ proposal that AMG be permitted to continue indefinitely in the combat zone as planned and that only rear AMG be merged.

#### *Activation of the Allied Control Commission*

On 10 November 1943 the Allied Control Commission was established with advance headquarters at Brindisi. At the same time the Military Mission was abolished and its functions assumed by the ACC. The ACC was placed directly under AFHQ, which was to be the channel for all communications to London or Washington. HQ AMG was not immediately abolished but was directed to reorganize itself for merger with ACC. Relations between ACC and AMG, the two civil affairs organizations in the field, would be co-ordinated by AFHQ.

As originally activated the ACC was ad-

ministered by a Deputy President, under the Ex-Officio President, The Allied C-in-C. Subordinate to the Deputy President was a Chief of Staff, to whom reported the heads of the four Sections, designated as Vice-Presidents. The four Sections, Military, Political, Economic and Administrative, and Communications, each supervised and co-ordinated the work of various subcommissions which were directly responsible for relations with the appropriate agencies of the Italian Government. Senior officers of the Commission were appointed directly by the two governments. The War Department nominated Maj. Gen. Kenyon W. Joyce as Acting Deputy President, ACC, and Brig. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, former Chief of Staff of the Military Mission, was appointed Chief of Staff.

The functions of the Commission as defined by the CCS directive were as follows:

1. To enforce and execute the instrument of surrender under the orders and general directives of the Allied C-in-C.
2. To insure that the conduct of the Italian Government conforms to the requirements of an Allied base of operations, especially transportation and communications.
3. To be the organ through which the policy of the United Nations toward the Italian Government is conducted and the relations with the Italian Government are handled.<sup>1</sup>

The Allied C-in-C would decide when territory should be transferred from AMG to Italian administration under the ACC. When the Control Commission determined that the Italian governmental system was capable of assuming responsibility it was to advise AFHQ, which then would order the transfer of certain areas from military government to Italian administration. The ACC was to be careful that its operations created no precedents which would be prejudicial to the interests of the United Nations. It should be a cardinal principle that operations of Allied

<sup>1</sup>IFAN Cable No. 248, CCS to Eisenhower, 15 Oct 43; AFHQ Admin Memo No. 74, 2 Nov 43.

troops throughout Italy must be kept free from any restraint or impediment. Long-range commitments were to be avoided except upon instructions from the Allied C-in-C. The Commission was to be careful to act through the Italian Government rather than in place of it, to guide and supervise that government rather than supersede it.

ACC could not at the outset assume very many of its prospective responsibilities or even centralize its activities. Because of the weakness of the Italian Government ACC remained divided during November into three widely separated parts. Only the small Advance Headquarters remained at Brindisi to supervise an Italian administration which still controlled only the four provinces of Apulia. To prepare for later absorption of HQ AMG a large group of ACC personnel organized into subcommissions was sent to this headquarters. A third segment of ACC was left as a rear echelon in North Africa to plan for the eventual full establishment of the ACC at Brindisi or Rome.

#### *Establishment of the Advisory Council for Italy*

Although the ACC consisted only of representatives of the two major Allied powers in the Mediterranean, these powers realized that other interested nations, notably the Soviet Union, would desire some medium for participation. Moreover, because ACC would be primarily military in character and directly under the Allied C-in-C, AFHQ as early as July believed it desirable to establish some separate advisory body through which the political agencies of the Allied governments could express their views. In order to give the interested governments a voice on Italian affairs, while still not permitting them to interfere with the C-in-C's control over ACC, Mr. Harold MacMillan, the British Resident Minister, in early October had proposed establishment of an Advisory Council

for Italy. He suggested that the council not only advise the C-in-C during the period of primary military responsibility but that it eventually assume responsibility for armistice control in Italy. Experience in North Africa, according to Mr. MacMillan, showed that as long as active military operations were in progress in any area final authority over civil affairs must remain with the C-in-C. When operations ceased the C-in-C's interest was reduced merely to security of his bases and line of communications, and normal diplomatic machinery could safely be allowed to function. Except for the transfer of authority to an advisory council, which was considered too far in the uncertain future to be the subject of recommendations, these views were accepted by the C-in-C and presented by him to the CCS.

At the Moscow Conference of October 1943 the British Government suggested organization of such an advisory council. The Moscow Conference agreed upon terms of reference and these were incorporated by the CCS in a directive of 26 November 1943 to General Eisenhower. An advisory Council for Italy was to be established forthwith, composed of representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Soviet Union and the French Committee of National Liberation. Representatives of Greece and Yugoslavia were to be added as full members as soon as practicable, in view of the special interests of these two countries arising from Italian aggressions upon their territory. The Council was to keep itself closely informed of current Italian affairs and advise the respective governments in regard to problems relating to Italy, other than military operational problems. The members of the Council would make joint or several recommendations to their governments but would not have power to take final decisions. They were not to concern themselves with the military function of the Com-

mander-in-Chief. The Council would have the duty in particular of watching the operation of the machinery of control in Italy. It would advise the Allied Commander-in-Chief in his capacity as President of the Allied Control Commission on general policy connected with the work of control. When in the opinion of the Allied Commander-in-Chief it was practicable to bring direct military control over Italy to an end, the Commander-in-Chief would relinquish the Presidency of the Allied Control Commission and the Advisory Council would assume the direction of its work.

The Council held its first meeting on 28 November 1943 in Algiers. Members appointed by their respective governments were as follows: Mr. Harold MacMillan, Great Britain; Mr. Robert D. Murphy, United States; M. Andrei Vyshinsky, Russia; M. Rene Massigli, French Committee of National Liberation; M. Jean Politis, Greece; and Dr. Miho Kreka, Yugoslavia.

#### *Appointment of Soviet and French Members to the ACC*

A similar broadening of the international basis of control in Italy was shortly to become necessary in the ACC itself. Originally the CCS had intended that the ACC should contain only representatives of the two Allied powers directly concerned in operations in Italy. The Soviet Foreign Ministry, however, informed its allies in mid-November that in accordance with Article 37 of the Supplementary Terms of Surrender a Soviet representative had been selected for the ACC. Article 37 provided for appointment of a control commission "representative of the United Nations," and the Soviet Union maintained that as a member of the United Nations it was entitled to representation. When the prospect of early arrival of the Soviet representative brought the issue to a

head, General Eisenhower referred it to the newly established Advisory Council. The French as well as the Soviet member of the Council insisted on a right to membership of the ACC. The Soviet member stated that the right of other interested nations to representation on the ACC had been understood by Great Britain and the United States at the Moscow Conference. It was decided to refer the matter to the respective governments.

Although AFHQ did not consider it desirable to have other than British and American representation on the ACC while military operations continued, the U.S.S.R. seemed likely to insist. Consequently the British Resident Minister suggested as a compromise that the Allies agree to their participation on a purely consultative basis. With the concurrence of the French and Soviet members, the Advisory Council so recommended to the C-in-C. He secured CCS approval, however, only for the Soviet member. On 28 January 1944 Maj. Gen. N. S. Solovodnik was accredited to the ACC. The Allied C-in-C then intervened with the CCS to secure approval for a French member, stating that with French troops fighting gallantly in Italy the French had earned the right to participation, that it had become a matter of prestige for them, and that the Allies would seem ungrateful in refusing. The CCS finally gave their approval, and in March Brig. Gen. A. de Sevin was appointed the French member of the ACC.<sup>2</sup> This admission of consultative members on the ACC served as a precedent for later British and American representation on the control commissions established by Russia in her sphere of influence in southeast Europe.

<sup>2</sup>When in July 1944, however, the Polish Government proposed to accredit a representative to the ACC to handle Polish affairs in Italy, AFHQ secured CCS approval of the principle that the present system did not provide for the representation of other allies on that body.



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## NOTES AND DOCUMENTS

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### FORT MISSOULA

BY THOMAS E. BLADES AND JOHN W. WIKE\*

As the location of Fort Missoula was governed largely by geographical considerations, a rough description of the area seems appropriate. The border between Montana and Idaho is largely a natural one, following the crests of a mountain chain called the Beaverhead Mountains in the south, and the Bitter Root Mountains in the center and north. Of these, only the Beaverheads constitute the Continental Divide. The Beaverheads, starting in Yellowstone Park, run westward for about 100 miles, then turn abruptly north for another hundred miles. At this point the Bitter Root Mountains continue north, but the Continental Divide swings east, following another mountain chain for about eighty miles. Just south-west of the city of Butte, this chain attaches to the main range of the Rockies, and from here the Continental Divide turns north again for several hundred miles, reaching the Canadian border in what is now Glacier National Park. Thus we see that a large, roughly rectangular area in north-west Montana is cut off from the rest of the state by high mountains, and drains into the Columbia river. The mountain passes, easily negotiable in summer, were blocked with snow for many months each year (railroad tunnels and snowsheds have now conquered this obstacle). Prior to the

establishment of Fort Missoula, there was no military post in this whole area.

The Nez Perces Indians from Idaho often crossed the Bitter Root range into Montana with their families. They stayed for a considerable period, following the buffalo herds and living for a time like true Plains Indians. Diminishing buffalo herds and the settlement of western Montana by white people failed to discourage this custom. If buffalo were lacking, they ate the ranchers' cattle, and vigorously opposed all attempts to drive them away. Bloodshed resulted and the white settlers called for military aid. Deer Lodge and Missoula counties were the areas most threatened. As early as the spring of 1874 their inhabitants pressed for the construction of a military post in the vicinity of Hell Gate Pass, near the town of Missoula. Even though petitions requesting such a post were submitted by Governor Potts,<sup>1</sup> the Legislature of Montana, the Honorable Martin Maginnis, Delegate to the House of Representatives, Joseph H. Booth,<sup>2</sup> and other citizens of Missoula County,<sup>3</sup> little was done until May of 1877. At that time the Quartermaster General remitted \$20,000 to the Chief Quartermaster of the Department of Dakota for the construction of a new post in the

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\*Mr. Blades and Mr. Wike are Army Department Liaison Representatives in the War Records Division, National Archives.

<sup>1</sup>Document file of the Adjutant General's Office, 3921 AGO 1875. (All Documents cited are in the National Archives, Washington, D. C.)

<sup>2</sup>3696 AGO 1875.

<sup>3</sup>4813 AGO 1875.

vicinity of Hell Gate.<sup>4</sup>

Brig. General A. H. Terry, commanding the Department of Dakota, was in favor of establishing a new post at the forks of the Musselshell and another on the Yellowstone, which he regarded as being of more importance than a post at Hell Gate.<sup>5</sup> Both these locations were east of the Continental Divide, and much nearer his headquarters. He also expressed the opinion that he had no cavalry forces to spare and did not feel that he could allot infantry troops to garrison a post near Missoula. Colonel John Gibbon, 7th Infantry, had reported the [Flathead] Indians in that section as peaceful, partially civilized (many of them living in houses and farming the land) and most of them strict church members who never caused trouble except when crazed by whiskey sold them by the white man.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, Lieutenant Colonel Wesley Merritt,<sup>7</sup> 9th Cavalry, was sent to that region to report as to the necessity for the establishment of such a post. On February 8, 1876,<sup>8</sup> he recommended the establishment of a one- or two-company post at or near Hell Gate Pass. Lieut. General P. H. Sheridan, commanding the Military Division of the Missouri, concurred and President Grant approved. Later, in 1876, Lieut. Colonel Charles C. Gilbert, 7th Infantry, and 2nd Lieutenant Charles A. Worden, 7th Infantry, Acting Engineer Officer of the Department of Dakota, were ordered to Missoula to locate a post near the Hell Gate.

Colonel Gilbert crossed the Missoula River and camped on the bank of the Bitter Root River. After a careful survey of the surrounding territory he decided the camp which

he was then occupying was the ideal location for the new post. Lieutenant Worden laid out the reservation, subsequently named Fort Missoula.<sup>9</sup> The county surveyor was called upon to designate the limits of the post, and on the basis of the information furnished by him, the east bank of the Bitter Root River near the supposed center of Section 31 (about four miles from the river's confluence with the Hell Gate Canyon, where lies the town of Missoula) was selected. At an elevation of 3,400 feet above the sea, on a large flat surrounded by mountains, the new post had a pleasant and healthful climate. To the southwest, 15 miles away, could be seen snow-clad Lo-Lo, one of the highest peaks of the Bitter Root range, with the easy gradients of Lo-Lo Pass beside it. The fertile valley of the Bitter Root stretched 60 miles southward from the new site, watered by the river from which it took its name.

On June 9, 1877, Captain Charles C. Rawn, 7th Infantry, with Companies A and I, 7th Infantry, left Fort Shaw,<sup>10</sup> Montana Territory, for the purpose of establishing a post<sup>11</sup> at the site Gilbert and Worden had selected. Company I was to compose the entire garrison of the post and Company A was to assist in erecting quarters, etc. After a march of 217 miles the two companies reached the location of the post on June 25, 1877.<sup>12</sup> Though work on the building began immediately, lack of equipment, the long distance over which lumber had to be hauled and the shortage of labor made progress slow.

<sup>4</sup>Document file of the Military Division of Missouri, 2461 M.D. Mo. 1877.

<sup>5</sup>6073 M.D. Mo. 1875.

<sup>6</sup>2363 M.D. Mo. 1875. Colonel Gibbon, class of 1847 at West Point, served in the Mexican War, and in the Civil War attained the rank of Major General, U. S. Volunteers.

<sup>7</sup>749 M.D. Mo. 1876.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup>Para. 3, General Orders No. 101, H.Q.A., A.G.O. November 8, 1877.

<sup>10</sup>On West Branch of the Sun River, 85 miles north of Helena. All locations of Army posts are as given in T. H. S. Hamersley, "Army Register of the United States for One Hundred Years."

<sup>11</sup>Annual report of Capt. Rawn, 4085 D.D. 1877 (filed with Annual Report of Department of Dakota in A.G.O. files).

<sup>12</sup>*Op. cit.*

In July of 1877 orders were received by Captain Rawn directing him to seek to check Chief Joseph and his Nez Perces Indians, pursued by Brig. General O. O. Howard, commanding the Department of the Columbia, and his troops, who were coming down the Lo-Lo Trail. Sending out a detachment on July 18th produced no results. Another detachment despatched three days later brought back word from a former halfbreed prisoner of the Nez Perces that the fugitive band was not far off and was heading down the Lo-Lo Trail to Bitter Root Valley. On the 25th all construction work on the new post ceased as Rawn mustered every available man. His force, consisting of five officers and about 30 enlisted men and little more than one hundred citizen volunteers, proceeded to Lo-Lo. At a point about eight miles from the mouth of the canyon and two miles from the camp of the Indians, Rawn and his men took up their position. The main purpose was to force surrender of arms and ammunition and otherwise dispute passage of the Nez Perces into Bitter Root Valley.

On the 27th a conference was held with Chiefs Joseph, White Bud, and Looking Glass, who proposed to pass peaceably through the Bitter Root Valley if not molested. These terms were not acceptable because they did not include surrender of arms. Seeking to delay Joseph and his tribe until General Howard and his troops could arrive on the scene, Rawn suggested another meeting be held the next day in open prairie outside of rifle range of the Indians' camp. The meeting was held but no agreement could be reached. Another meeting was scheduled for the following day at noon; however, having been informed unofficially that the Nez Perces meant to pass in peace if no opposition was met, the citizens began to desert Rawn in large numbers. Later in the day the Indians began to move from the canyon to the hills, ascending the sides of the

canyon a half mile in front of Rawn's flanks, and entering the Bitter Root Valley. Abandoning his breastworks, and forming a skirmish line across the canyon, Rawn started in pursuit with his regulars and what remained of his volunteers; however, on reaching the Indians who retreated into the valley, all volunteers with the exception of about 20 Missoula men had deserted. In the face of this Rawn withdrew to the post. Later on, when Chief Joseph and his tribe began to trade with the white man, many of these same volunteers eager to gain quick profits, forgot their grievances and proceeded to sell supplies, ammunition, and whiskey to the Indians.<sup>13</sup>

Meanwhile, Colonel John Gibbon, 7th Infantry, commanding the District of Montana, with headquarters at Fort Shaw, received a dispatch from Lieutenant General Sheridan that the Nez Perces were coming eastward over the "Lou Lou," and immediately proceeded to concentrate all available troops within the district. Company G, 7th Infantry, stationed at Fort Ellis<sup>14</sup> was directed to proceed at once to Missoula and arrived there on July 29, 1877. Company D, then stationed at Camp Baker,<sup>15</sup> and company F, at Fort Benton,<sup>16</sup> were ordered to Fort Shaw. These companies were mobilized at Fort Shaw on July 27th, together with company K. The command, availing itself of every man the post could spare, commenced the westward march of 150 miles by way of Cadotte's Pass to Missoula, which was completed in seven days. Subsequent operations against the Nez Perces are recounted by Colonel Gibbon in his own report:<sup>17</sup>

<sup>13</sup>4085 D.D. 1877, *op cit*.

<sup>14</sup>On the East Gallatin River at Bozeman Pass.

<sup>15</sup>Later re-named Fort Logan; near the junction of Smith River and Camas Creek, Montana.

<sup>16</sup>At the head of navigation on the Missouri, about 40 miles NE of Great Falls.

<sup>17</sup>Colonel Gibbon report of operations, dated September 2, 1877, with Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1877, Vol. 1, pp. 502-504.



"On the 4th, with my command re-enforced with seven officers and all the men to be spared from Captain Rawn's command (which had been in the meantime strengthened by G Company, Seventh Infantry, and every available man to be spared from Fort Ellis), I left the post at one o'clock with fifteen officers and one hundred and forty-six men, in wagons, and moved [southward] to Stevensville, a distance of some 25 miles. The next day we made 30 miles, and were joined by a number of citizens from the Upper Valley, who volunteered as scouts, and to join us in the fight if we should overtake the Indians. I had been informed that beyond a certain point it would be impracticable to take wagons, and brought along our pack-mules and pack-saddles, intending, when the time came, to cut loose from our wagons and take to the packs; but on this day I secured the services of Mr. Joe Blodgett, who assured me that he had brought lightly-loaded wagons over the trail all the way from Bannock, and that it was a passable, although a difficult road. The road was excellent until we commenced to climb the divide separating us from Ross Hole, at the extreme upper [south] end of the Bitter Root Valley. Here the ascent was so steep, rugged, and crooked that we were compelled to halt at night-fall and make a dry camp before reaching the summit. The next day (7th) we were four hours in reaching the summit, and succeeded in making only 13½ miles, with a still greater ascent before us for the next day. We had up to this time been passing regularly Indian camping grounds, which showed that they were moving at the rate of about 12 or 14 miles a day; so that if we could continue to double the distance, the question of overtaking the enemy was simply one of time. No accurate estimate of their strength could be made, as many of them occupied simple brush shelters. The best estimate I could obtain gave them two hun-

dred and sixty warriors, all of whom were well armed, and with a plentiful supply of ammunition.

On camping at the foot of the main divide on the evening of the 7th, Lieutenant Bradley offered to make a night march, if possible overtake the camp, and make an attempt to stampede the herd, which every indication showed was very large. Some twenty-five of the citizens volunteered to accompany him; as did also Lieut. J. W. Jacobs, regimental quartermaster, Seventh Infantry; his nephew, Mr. S. J. Herron, of Kentucky; Sergeant Wilson, I Company, Seventh Infantry; and Bostwick, the post guide of Fort Shaw. In accordance with this suggestion, Lieutenant Bradley, with his command, amounting to some sixty men, was ordered to push forward during the night and try to strike the camp before daylight.

The next morning the main body resumed the march at five o'clock, the difficulties of the road being increased by the quantities of fallen timber which had to be removed or got around. Our wagons were very lightly loaded, and by doubling teams and using the men at drag-ropes we succeeded in reaching the summit, a distance of about two miles, in six hours. From thence a gentle incline led for over 20 miles down into the Big Hole Basin, but the road was much obstructed by fallen timber. Here the services of our excellent guide, Joe Blodget[t], were most valuable, and but for him we could not possibly have made even the time we did. Before we had reached the summit I received a courier from Lieutenant Bradley, informing us that daylight had overtaken him before he had succeeded in reaching the camp of the Indians. We pushed ahead without waiting to rest or feed the animals, and later in the day I received another message from him, informing me that he had discovered the location of the Indian camp, and had concealed his command in the hills. Fearing the Indians would

discover him, I left the train under charge of one company (Logan's) and started forward with the rest of the command and the mountain howitzer; but with all the speed we could make, it was nearly sunset before we reached Lieutenant Bradley's position, and the Indian camp was still four or five miles distant. The train was now brought up, closely parked amid the brush of the little valley down which we were traveling. No fires were built, and after posting pickets, all laid down to rest until eleven o'clock. At that hour the command, now consisting of seventeen officers, one hundred and thirty-two men, and thirty-four citizens, started down the trail on foot, each man being provided with ninety rounds of ammunition. Orders were given that at early daylight the howitzer should start after us with a pack-mule, loaded with two thousand rounds of extra ammunition. The thirty-four citizens who volunteered to accompany us being joined to Lieutenant Bradley's command, the advance was given to him, and the column moved in silence down the trail, the night being clear and starlight. After proceeding about three miles the country opened out into the Big Hole Basin, and still following the trail, we turned to the left, and following along the low foot-hills, soon came in sight of fires. After proceeding about another mile we encountered a large herd of ponies grazing upon the hill-side. As we silently advanced they commenced neighing, but fortunately did not become alarmed, and by the time we had passed through the herd the outline of the teepees could be made out in the bottom below. Here we waited for two hours in plain hearing of the barking dogs, crying of babies, and other noises of the camp. Just before daylight Sanno's company and then Comba's were sent down into the valley and deployed as skirmishers. As day began to break and enable me to make out the ground beneath us, I found that the teepees, in the form of

an open V, with the apex toward us, extended along the opposite side of a large creek some two or three hundred yards from us.

The intervening space between the camp and the foot of the slope upon which we stood was almost entirely covered with a dense growth of willow brush. A deep slough wound through this bottom from right to left, and had to be crossed before the stream itself could be reached. As the light increased Comba and Sanno were ordered to move forward, then Bradley and his citizens on the left, with Rawn and Williams in support. Suddenly a single shot in the extreme left rang out on the clear morning air, followed quickly by several others, and the whole line pushed rapidly forward through the brush. Logan's company being sent in on the run on the extreme right, a heavy fire was at once opened along the whole line of the teepees, the startled Indians rushing from them in every direction, and for a few moments no shots were returned. Comba and Sanno first struck the camp at the apex of the V, crossed them in a stream, and delivered their fire at close range into the teepees and the Indians as they passed from them. Many of the Indians broke at once for the brush, and sheltering themselves behind the creek bank, opened fire on the troops as they came into the open ground. This was especially the case on the right or upper end of the camp where the creek made a bend toward our line. As Logan and the right of the line swept forward our men found themselves directly at the backs of these Indians, and here the greatest slaughter took place. In less than twenty minutes we had complete possession of the whole camp, and orders were given to commence destroying it. But the Indians had not given up the fight, and a portion of the command was occupied in replying to the rifle-shots which now came upon us from every direction—the brush, the creek-bank, the open prairie, and the distant



hills. The fire from these latter positions, although at long range, was by far the most deadly, and it soon became evident that the enemy's sharp-shooters, hidden behind trees, rocks, &c., possessed an immense advantage over us, in so much that we could not compete with them. My acting adjutant, Lieut. C. A. Woodruff, and myself, with our horses, were wounded at this time. The only remedy was to take up some position where we would be more on an equality with the enemy. Orders were given to withdraw through the brush, to a position under the hill from which we had first started, and then push for the timber through which we had passed in the night. This movement was successfully accomplished, such of our wounded as we could find being carried with us. Here we took up our position, and sheltering ourselves behind the trees, fallen logs, &c., replied to the fire of the sharp-shooters, who soon gathered around us, occupying the brush below and the timber above. For a time their fire was very close and deadly, and here Lieutenant English received a mortal wound, Captain Williams was struck a second time, and a large number of men killed and wounded. The Indians crawled up as closely as they dared to come, and with yells of encouragement urged each other on; but our men met them with a bold front, and our fire, as we afterward learned by the blood and dead Indians found, punished them severely.

Just as we took up our position in the timber two shots from our howitzer on the trail above us were heard, and we afterward learned that the gun and pack-mule with ammunition were on the road to us intercepted by the Indians.

The non-commissioned officers in charge, Sergeants Daly and Frederics and Corporal Sales, made the best resistance they could, whilst the two privates cowardly fled at the first appearance of danger, and never stopped

until they had put a hundred miles between themselves and the battle-field, spreading, of course, as such cowards always do, when they reached the settlements, the most exaggerated reports of the dire calamity which had overtaken the entire command. The piece was fired twice, and as the Indians closed around it the men used their rifles. Corporal Sales was killed, the two sergeants wounded, the animals shot down, and private John O. Bennett, the driver, entangled in their fall. Cutting himself loose, he succeeded in reaching the brush and escaped to the train, which the two sergeants, Blodgett, the guide, and William, a colored servant of Lieutenant Jacobs, also reached. In the meantime our fight in the timber continued, with more or less activity, all day. But every hour was increasing the strength of our position, when a new danger threatened us. A strong wind was blowing from the west, and, taking advantage of this, the Indians set fire to the grass, intending, doubtless, to follow up the fire and make a dash upon us whilst we were blinded by the dense smoke. But fortunately, the grass was too green to burn rapidly, and before the fire reached any of the dead timber lying about us it went out. The Indians remained around us, firing occasionally nearly all night. They had, however, broken camp immediately after we abandoned it. During the night I sent a runner to the train, and two others to Deer Lodge, via French's Gulch, for medical assistance and supplies, fearing our train had been captured. This fear was increased early the next morning, on the arrival of a courier from General Howard, who said he had seen nothing of it. He had passed it in the darkness of the night without seeing it. Later in the day we communicated with the train; but the Indians, in small parties, still appearing in the interval which separated us from it, I sent Captain Browning, with twenty-five men to bring it in, and it reached us just before sundown,



bringing us our much-needed blankets and provisions, not, however, until we had partially consumed the flesh of Lieutenant Woodruff's horse, brought wounded to our position and conveniently killed by the Indians inside our lines. The Indians gave us a parting shower of bullets about eleven o'clock that night, and we saw no more of them afterward."

Colonel Gibbon's command aggregating 191 suffered casualties of 29 killed and 40 wounded in this short but vigorous battle.

On the 12th the column marched toward Deer Lodge, 95 miles away. There, such of the wounded as were unable to travel were placed in St. Joseph's hospital. Company D was ordered to return with Companies A, G, and I, to Missoula, arriving there on the 21st of August, after a march of 95 miles. Companies A, G, and D, along with Company I, the permanent garrison company, besides their regular military duties, resumed construction of the buildings on the new post.<sup>18</sup>

Under command of 2nd Lieut. Van Orsdale, 7th Infantry, a detachment left Fort Missoula on September 20th for the scene of the battle of Big Hole to re-inter the bodies of those who had fallen in that fight, information having been received that several of the graves had been opened. On his return to Fort Missoula Lieut. Van Orsdale reported that many of the bodies of the soldiers had been brought to the surface and scalped.<sup>19</sup> An examination of the battlefield disclosed that approximately 80 Nez Perces had been killed.<sup>20</sup>

On the arrival in Fort Missoula of four companies of the 3rd Infantry November 14, 1877, no buildings were ready for occupancy with the exception of a storehouse. By December 31st, however, after a great deal of

hard work, sufficient buildings were erected to house the companies, some being quartered in the mess room, others in the squad room. Though considerable progress was made in the construction of buildings during 1878, many officers had still to be housed in Missoula.<sup>21</sup>

On July 15, 1878, Lieut. Wallace, 3rd Infantry, with a mounted detachment of 15 men attempted to locate a band of Indians in the Bitter Root Valley who had committed sundry murders and depredations in the neighborhood. Upon obtaining information that they were on the Elk City Trail, he started in hot pursuit. He engaged them in battle on the 21st. Suffering no casualties himself, he was able to inflict losses upon the enemy of six killed and three wounded, plus 23 horses and mules killed. Lieut. Wallace returned to the post with his command and 31 captured horses and mules on the 25th of July, thus completing a scout of 450 miles.<sup>22</sup>

After 1878 it appears that the duties of the troops stationed at the fort consisted mainly in policing and escorting the peaceful Flathead Indians to and from the buffalo hunting grounds, and of rendering assistance to the citizens of the surrounding territory in maintaining law and order.

Since it was understood that Fort Harrison, Montana,<sup>23</sup> upon completion, was to replace Forts Shaw and Missoula, abandonment of the post of Fort Missoula was ordered on March 30, 1898.<sup>24</sup> Because of the protest of the people who lived in the vicinity, and upon the solicitation of Senator Thomas H. Carter, the Secretary of War revoked the order three days later in a telegram to the Commanding General of the Department of Dakota. However, the strength of the garri-

<sup>18</sup>4085 D.D. 1877, *op. cit.*

<sup>19</sup>Report dated September 29, 1877, with Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1877, Vol. 1, pages 549 and 550.

<sup>20</sup>*Idem.*

<sup>21</sup>Medical History of Post, Vol. 239.

<sup>22</sup>Post return, Fort Missoula, July 1878.

<sup>23</sup>Four miles from Helena, Montana.

<sup>24</sup>Par. 2, General Orders No. 14, H.Q.A.; A.G.O., March 30, 1898.

son was reduced to about 20 men.

Solicitations of Senator Carter, together with the protests of the people in Missoula and vicinity, were sufficient to persuade the Secretary of War to forego the abandonment of Fort Missoula. Strength of the garrison was increased in August of 1901, at which time Company C, 8th Infantry, joined the post.

Through an error of survey the greater part of the post of Missoula was built on a section of the school land of the State of Montana. Another portion of the land embraced by the military reservation was claimed by the Northern Pacific Railroad Company. To settle the question of title the citizens of Missoula purchased these parcels and tendered them to the United States Government. Congress then authorized the Secretary of War to accept this land as a gift.<sup>25</sup>

In February 1913, the third battalion of the 14th Infantry was ordered to Fort Wright, Spokane, Washington, for duty, leaving only a small detachment at Fort Missoula. When, in the summer of the following year a group of members of the Industrial Workers of the World and direct-action Socialists, who were on strike from the mines near Butte, Montana, threatened violence if the State Militia were called out, Governor Steward, backed by leading citizens of the State of Montana, notified United States Government authorities that bloodshed could be prevented if Federal troops were furnished.<sup>26</sup> Accordingly the Secretary of War, upon the authority of the President of the United States, directed the 3rd battalion of the 14th Infantry be sent to Fort William H. Harrison to assist the State Militia in preserving order. Because of lack of facilities for accommodating troops in winter quarters at Helena, this battalion was trans-

ferred to Fort Missoula.<sup>27</sup> In the spring of 1915 the troops were returned to Fort George Wright, Washington, again leaving only a small detachment at the post.

As early as 1900 the President of the University of Montana had requested permission to use some of the buildings at the fort for educational purposes,<sup>28</sup> but no action appears to have been taken until World War I. Authority was then granted by the War Department to use quarters there for 200 enlisted men assigned as students to the University of Montana for special mechanical training.<sup>29</sup> Also, at about the same time, in conjunction with anticipated I.W.W. disturbances, upon the request of Mr. J. T. Green, Sheriff, the County of Missoula was granted a license by the Secretary of War to "occupy and use for the purpose of confining violators of the law therein, the guard house on the Fort Missoula Military Reservation [provided the county jail shall have been filled to its capacity]."<sup>30</sup>

The post was regarrisoned on September 1, 1927, by a battalion of Infantry and remained so until it was turned over to the Department of Justice in the Spring of 1941. It was returned to the War Department June 1, 1944. It was then garrisoned by army service units. On 16 December 1946 a large part was declared surplus and the remaining portion retained for use in the Organized Reserve Corps Training Program.

Historical events have proved that military authorities were correct in concluding that there had been no great need for a post in the vicinity of Missoula. It appears, however, that this fort has at least figured significantly as a factor in maintaining peace and preserving law and order by exerting a salutary effect upon discipline and morale, by virtue of its very existence.

<sup>27</sup>*Idem.*

<sup>28</sup>A.G.O. 331228.

<sup>29</sup>The Adjutant General's Office decimal files, A.G.O. 680.3 Fort Missoula 3-26-18.

<sup>30</sup>A.G.O. 680.32 Fort Missoula 5-10-18.

<sup>25</sup>33 Stat. 142, approved March 19, 1904.

<sup>26</sup>A.G.O. 2181151.

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## HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

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### THE ANNUAL MEETING

The annual joint meeting of the American Military Institute and the American Historical Association was held at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington on December 28th, 1948. The attendance was extremely large—it was unfortunate that a larger room was not available. Dr. Douglas Freeman presided with the authority and wit which one would expect from this dean of American writers on military history.

Dr. James P. Baxter, III, spoke with wry humor of the financial predicament of a college president today—especially the president of a small New England college. It would appear that the "GI Bill of Rights" was a somewhat mixed blessing to our institutions of higher learning, and that the present period of retrenchment is a most difficult one. Despite these pressing problems, it is heartening to hear that Dr. Baxter strongly advocates the addition of courses in military history to the college curriculum; and as he points out, most college faculties now include at least one wartime Historical Officer qualified to teach such courses.

Dr. Robert Albion described his long and sometimes discouraging experience in teaching military (and especially naval) history in the years prior to the last war. He explained how it began almost by accident when he, a civilian professor of history with some knowledge of our merchant marine, was asked to substitute for a naval officer in teaching a naval ROTC class in history. The experience stimulated his own interest as well as that of the students, and Dr. Albion strongly recommends the ROTC program as

an "entering wedge" for the would-be teacher of military history.

Dr. Theodore Ropp spoke at some length on a course in military institutions which he is now giving at Duke University. This is an undergraduate introductory course for students with no military experience of any kind, and is therefore a new departure in the field of military history. Dr. Ropp's address is printed in full elsewhere in this issue, with the full working bibliography of his course. Senior members of the *Institute* may remember that the compilation of military bibliographies was one of the original objectives of the old American Military History Foundation. Meetings were devoted to this subject in the days before the publication of a quarterly journal was even considered, and at least one list was compiled. But it never received any wide recognition, and in any case it has now been made obsolete by a tremendous new national experience, and a vast amount of writing about that experience. Dr. Ropp is to be congratulated upon a pioneer effort. That he should have been forced to pioneer in this direction, as a preliminary step before teaching an undergraduate beginner's course, is regrettable if not surprising. There is much work to be done here. MILITARY AFFAIRS would welcome articles on this subject.

### THE MONCADO MILITARY HISTORY AWARD

The American Military Institute announces a competition for The Moncado Military History Award of Five Hundred Dollars. This award, made possible through the generosity of General Hilario Camino Moncado of Manila, Philippine Republic, is



designed to stimulate the writing of scholarly works on military subjects.

Manuscripts in English, treating any phase of American military history, which make a definite contribution to the field, are solicited. They may be on such subjects as military administration, armament, personnel, policy, strategy, tactics, and theory. The term military includes all forces of the land, the sea, and the air.

Manuscripts submitted will be considered by a Committee of Judges to be announced later. In making the award, which will include an attractive publishing arrangement, the Committee will consider subject matter, organization, treatment, quality of research, and literary excellence. Should none of the contributions measure up to the standards established, the Committee is not required to make an award.

Manuscripts must be submitted on or before 30 June 1950, and should be addressed to the General Secretary, Jacob B. Lishchiner, American Military Institute, 1115 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington 6, D.C. Further information, if desired, will be furnished upon application to the General Secretary.

#### MEMBERSHIP OF THE AMI

Our General Secretary, Mr. Jacob B. Lishchiner, reports some interesting facts developed by his "let's get acquainted" invitation to the membership, of 1 September 1948. Some of our numbers are in WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA. Many more have otherwise distinguished themselves. The listing immediately following—though not exhaustive—is indicative of the distribution of our membership in point of the professions and vocations: college professors (various subjects—biology, English, chemistry, classics, mathematics, physiology, etc.); engineers (chemical, civil, lubrication, mechanical, sales and sanitary); business executives

(presidents, vice-presidents, general managers, etc.); authors; editors; lawyers; newspaper correspondents and columnists; artists; professional soldiers (active and retired); judges (State Supreme Court, juvenile court, probate court); retailers (of groceries, flowers, etc.); manufacturers (of notions, novelties, aluminum ware, etc.); farmers; breeders (of horses and cattle); funeral directors and morticians; printers; ministers; etc., etc.

Countries represented include, in addition to the United States, Argentina, Australia, Canada, Central America, Chile, China, England, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Holland, India, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Palestine, Peru, Philippine Islands, Russia, Sweden, Turkey and Uruguay.

#### U. S. ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR 1917-1919

Thirty-one years after the entry of the United States into the first World War, the official history of the Army in that war is scheduled to come off the presses of the GPO. Although journalists and many historians will make unflattering comparisons between this delay and the prompt commencement of the World War II history, the *military* historian will realize that within his particular field this is a very respectable performance. The additional information that all seventeen volumes have now been sent to the printer encourages the hope that this series may be added to the very short list of completed national historical projects. (Cf., "Writing Contemporary Military History," by Hugh M. Cole, in *Military Affairs*, Fall 1948 [XII, 162-167].)

The first volume, *Organization of the American Expeditionary Force*, will be ready for release early in April, and others will follow rapidly. While the History is presented in the form of selected official documents, volume I contains an illuminating preface, and a most excellent narrative summary, in some seventy pages, of the AEF.

Presented with all the objectivity of the professional historian, this summary of problems in organization, training, and operations sets in proper focus, perhaps for the first time, our military participation in the World War. It provides a wealth of perspective for a better understanding of World War II. The 1917-1919 experience was rich in painful lessons learned, but not, until now, assimilated into the body of military knowledge. The student of World War II will be unpleasantly surprised to realize how many of them had to be learned all over again. Here, if it is still needed, is a final and overwhelming example to prove the value of historical study to the professional soldier.

#### LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Readers of the leading article in your Fall, 1948, issue must have been puzzled, as I have been, at the unusual employment of troops and artillery by the Marines near Roi-Namur which it describes. Of two small landing forces, the larger group is pictured as being sent to the smaller of the first pair of minor islands to be seized. When both islands have been secured, a battalion of 105-mm. howitzers is said to have been sent to the one nearer the main target (Roi-Namur) while a battalion of 75-mm. pack howitzers is landed on the larger one farther from Roi. The principal collection of documents cited by the author as his source, the 4th Marine Division's *Final Report on Flintlock Operation* with enclosures, does not bear out the description which he has given. There, the journal states (p. 8) that at "0952, Co. 'B', LT 1/25 landed on Ennuebing" and at "1015, Co. 'C', LT 1/25 landed on southwest (seaward) side of Mellu." Again it adds, at "1200, 3d Bn, 14th Marines began landing guns and ammo on Ennuebing," and continues (p. 9) at "1305, 4th Bn, 14th Marines landing on Mellu." The author's account has these landing groups and artillery bat-

talions going to Mellu and Ennuebing, respectively, or in exact reverse of what the record asserts. The confusion may be traceable to an erroneous identification also of the code names for the islands, since *Ivan*, actually the code name for Mellu, is stated to be that for Ennuebing, and *Jacob*, the code name for Ennuebing, is declared to be that for Mellu. Various evidence shows the author to be mistaken in this point, of which an example is the report of the 14th Marines (Enclosure G of the *Final Report*) that observation posts for controlling the artillery fire from the two battalions were on *Jacob* island, that nearer the target.

The error applies to a very minor portion of only a preliminary operation and is a flaw in what it is a pleasure to recognize as an admirable article, possessing much literary charm. The mistake has a somewhat greater significance because it applies, we are told, to what was the first Japanese (i.e., held by Japan before the war) soil, on which the U.S. Marines set foot in World War II. That would appear, on the record of this operation, to be Ennuebing Island, not Mellu. It is still possible to challenge this claim by the record of the Reconnaissance Company, Fifth Amphibious Corps, commanded by 1st Lt. Harvey C. Weeks, USMC, which landed at Calalin Island in Majuro atoll, approximately ten hours earlier.

GEORGE F. HOWE,  
*Historical Division,*  
*Department of the Army,*  
*Washington, D. C.*

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As a keen student of military history I welcome your letter concerning the American Military Institute and MILITARY AFFAIRS. I have many pen friends in the USA with whom I correspond on the Old West—Pioneers, Indians, Wars of 1812 and Revolu-

tion. I visited the Mohawk Valley and Niagara in 1939.

Our *Journal* (*Army Historical Research*) carries on despite the paper shortage. I am glad that *MILITARY AFFAIRS* is returning somewhat to its old format. I hesitate to criticize but somehow feel that too much space was given to modern warfare and tactics, to the almost absolute exclusion of prior wars, uniforms, equipment etc. If this could be rectified I believe you would get more subscribers interested in military antiquities and the interesting past of the U. S. Army—on the frontier, in the Revolution, 1812, Mexican, Civil and Indian Wars. The Archives and private families must have a rich store of letters and documents suitable for publication. You also need more illustrations such as Mr. McBarron used to do. *Field* uniforms worn in the past wars, equipment etc. Don't pack all so-called antiquities into two or three small pages. By all means keep the book reviews and notices of articles in *Service* and *State Historical* journals. Get Mr. Freeman to contribute if you can. Give us more of the Indian Wars—Apache, Sioux, etc. Two of my great-uncles practiced medicine in the Old West. One had previously served as a Midshipman in Nelson's Navy. I have his diary.

My criticisms are all intended to be instructive; forgive me if they seem to critical.

RUSSELL V. STEELE,

Penryn Lodge, Gloucestersgate,  
London NW, 1, England.

Your editor finds this an extreme view, though he approves of illustrations. This is printed in full because it is the only detailed, constructive criticism of the *Journal* that has been received in over a year. We are glad to receive letters on any military subject, but anything on the form or content of "*Military Affairs*" is particularly welcome. Our subscribers are invited to make their wishes known.

#### DER WELTKRIEG 1914-1918, VOLUME 14

A microfilm copy of an almost complete page-proof (pp. 1-644) of the unpublished vol. 14 of *Der Weltkrieg, 1914-1918* prepared by the Kriegsgeschichtliche Forschungsanstalt des Heeres at the Potsdam Reichsarchiv, has been received by the Library of Congress. The military records, on which this volume is based, must be regarded as completely lost by fire.

The political influence exercised by the German Supreme Command (OHL) in 1918 is ignored or minimized in an amazing manner; for instance the sudden dismissal of von Kuehlmann, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, at the request of the OHL is glossed over in two lines. The multiple changes made in the page-proof of the chapter dealing with measures and events of the second half of September, 1918, are due to a frantic search for extenuating circumstances made by obvious partisans of the former Heeresleitung; they show a desperate effort to shoulder the Civilian Government, the Reichsleitung, with as much responsibility as possible for the capitulation in November. This volume is indispensable for research on American participation in the fighting of 1917-1918.

#### AT LAST—AN ARMY HISTORICAL RESERVE

During the last war, considerable numbers of professional historians in the armed forces were able to serve their country as historians. After V-J Day such opportunities were severely curtailed, and those who wished to maintain their reserve status were forced to affiliate with units of other types. Combat historians have proved their worth, and the formation of historical reserve units to keep alive the skills acquired in wartime is an obvious step. All of the armed services have contemplated such programs, and im-



plemented them to a limited extent within their Washington headquarters. The Air Force is planning to create such units in various locations in the near future.

For the Army, historical staff sections have been approved as organic parts of army, corps, and division headquarters. This change is shown for the infantry division in T/O & E 7-IN. Revised Tables for armored and airborne divisions, and for corps and army headquarters will soon show these changes. These organic units will be augmented by three cellular types of reserve historical teams. T/O & E 20-17 (Historical Service Organization), now in process of publication, replaces that portion of T/O & E 20-12S under which historical teams operated during World War II. Qualified reserve officers who are interested in the activation of cellular historical teams are requested to contact their Senior Reserve Instructors.

Military historians will be interested in the revised Army Regulation 345-105: *Historical Reports*, published 3 February 1949, and Special Regulation 345-105-1, same date, which gives detailed instructions for preparation and disposition of such reports. A most important innovation is the provision for a war diary, to be kept on a day-to-day basis, replacing the "After Action Reports," required of Army units during World War II.

#### MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL SECTION NOTES

The Marine Corps Historical Section has recently completed an expansion of archives space, incident to which both the Writing and the Administrative and Production Sections are now located in new quarters, in Rooms 4002-4004, Marine Corps Headquarters.

"The Campaign of Guadalcanal," official Marine Corps narrative of that operation, is nearing completion. Publication is anticipated at some time during the summer of

1949. Other official narratives presently in process of preparation by the Marine Corps are those dealing with the Marshalls, the Palaus, Saipan, Central Solomons, and Marine air operations in the Philippines.

#### AMI MEMBERSHIP INSIGNIA

The distinctive AMI insignia underwritten for our members by General Moncado (see Headquarters Gazette, Fall 1948 issue) are now available. Orders should be sent direct to the General Secretary, Mr. Jacob B. Lishchiner. Minatures of the coat of arms appearing on the front of this journal, they have been beautifully executed in gold on a dark red background. The price is one dollar.

#### MILITARY COLLECTOR & HISTORIAN

The first issue of a publication on American military costume, insignia and equipment appeared in January 1949. It contains four hand-colored plates, 11 x 14 inches in size, of the highest quality, and twelve pages of text describing the plates and offering short notes on topics of interest and reference value to military collectors.

The MILITARY COLLECTOR & HISTORIAN is at present strictly limited to 100 copies. A few issues remain for sale. The subscription price is \$17.50 a year, the actual cost price. If you are interested in subscribing please send your remittance to Frederick P. Todd, Editor, 4119 W. Street, N.W., Washington 7, D.C.

#### ERRATUM

On page 210 of the Winter 1948 issue of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, footnote No. 25 is given as "Gavin, *op. cit.*" The correct reference is, of course, to *Airborne Warfare*, by Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin. (Washington: Infantry Journal Press. 1948. Pp. 186. \$3.00.)

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## THE MILITARY LIBRARY

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### NOVELS OF WORLD WAR II: THE FIRST ROUND

BY CHARLES B. MACDONALD\*

Some months ago when Norman Mailer's bulky, often repetitive war novel, *The Naked and the Dead*,<sup>1</sup> began to top best seller lists and instituted an ever-growing cycle of war novels, both our publishing houses and the American public became suddenly aware that the American public wanted to read war novels. Although *The Naked and the Dead* did focus attention on the war novel, in reality it has been given more credit for starting a trend than it deserves, for the paradoxical fact remains that more novels about World War II appeared before this recent cycle than since. What is to be found in both this late deluge and in earlier books about World War II of interest to the student of military affairs?

The vast amount of writing about World War II makes essential a delimitation for the purposes of a review of this type. By dealing only with works of fiction having to do with the war, we avoid consideration of a host of autobiographical and historical narratives. But however narrow the scope, disagreement may still follow since many of the novels which fit these confines are primarily studies of character, philosophical and/or psychological, which would be just as effective against the background of any holocaust, not necessarily war. However, we must limit our subject, not eliminate it. The list can be shortened by assuming that a war novel should have most of its scenes in a combat

theater while the war is in progress, thus omitting novels which deal only with state-side and occupation experiences. That is hardly so heavy a stroke as it might appear at first glance, for in so doing one eliminates only one novel which would be of equal importance if set against a combat background, James Gould Cozzens's *Guard of Honor*<sup>2</sup> (Air Corps personnel in a Florida training camp). Space limitations require also that we omit foreign novels unless they have been published in America and, since they are so numerous, novels about the French Resistance.<sup>3</sup>

From the viewpoint of the student of military affairs, perhaps the most valuable of the current crop of war novels is Germany's best-selling *Stalingrad*<sup>4</sup> by Theodore Plievier. Although it falls short of others as literature because of the unrelieved monotony of its horror passages and little attempt at delineation of characters, it is a valuable study in deterioration of command which pictures vividly the depths to which man, crushed by war, can fall. For comparable scenes of war's horror one must go back to descriptions of the Napoleonic retreat from Moscow.

Turning to America's World War II novelists, at least one salient fact emerges

<sup>2</sup>*Guard of Honor* by James Gould Cozzens. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1948, \$3.50.)

<sup>3</sup>Scheduled to be published in this country this spring is Alexander Baron's best-selling British war novel about an infantry battalion in the Normandy invasion, *From the City, from the Plough*. Also omitted because of a late publication date is the American novel *They Never Had It So Good* by Joseph Gies. (New York: Harper and Bros., 1949, \$2.75.)

<sup>4</sup>*Stalingrad* by Theodore Plievier. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1948, \$3.00.)

\*Mr. MacDonald, author of *Company Commander*, is now an historian in the Historical Division, Department of the Army.

<sup>1</sup>*The Naked and the Dead* by Norman Mailer. (New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1948, \$4.00.)

from consideration of the entire crop: despite the blurb writers, who strive to compare their products to classics of other wars, our neophyte novelists are different. There has been little of the extreme "pacifist" school which came from our earlier world war but instead a more sober acceptance of war and its consequences and an earnest attempt to better a world in which wars are born. Where World War I writers showed a tendency to decry injustices and oppressions of the war machine and the war itself, World War II writers accept the war and direct their crusades more deeply, against the injustices which cause wars. Sometimes their efforts appear misdirected, as we shall examine in one instance later, but at least they seem sincere. This new generation of writers escapes in most instances from the "lost generation" idea, despite a lack of feeling that we have seen the end of war. Far from pitying themselves because they did have to go to war, they are out to attack the roots to keep from going again.

Somewhat different from the other World War II novels is the sales leader, *The Naked and the Dead*. A depressing, fatalistic piece offering little hope, this book gives the idea that it was not war which affected its characters but that they were doomed creatures before they ever got into a war, combat only hastening their degeneration. All of them are doomed either by society or their own inadequacy except General Cummings, an essentially frustrated man in a dictatorial role. Perhaps it is regrettable that Mr. Mailer has pictured his ideas with such effective writing, because they certainly speak no good for democracy as we have known it. Neither have many men with combat experience been reconciled to *The Naked and the Dead's* war background. It is primarily the story of a regimental I & R platoon in the invasion of fictional Anopopei island in the Pacific. To a combat veteran it seems incredible that a division commander should

deal directly with an I & R platoon, ignoring regiment; that such a platoon should be sent on a 65-mile patrol behind enemy lines with the purpose of causing the enemy's collapse; and that there should be a wholesale Japanese surrender in the pre-atom era. In the face of such inconsistencies, one is left to wonder about the value of Mr. Mailer's book in preserving a true picture of how Americans fought.

Perhaps more true to World War II form is John Hersey's earlier Pulitzer Prize winner, *A Bell for Adano*.<sup>5</sup> Its story, presented later by both the theatre and motion pictures, is familiar to most: a conscientious military government officer, Major Victor Joppolo, seeks to establish a democratic regime in a small Italian town, only to meet resistance at every turn from a dictatorial Army general. It remains among the most effective of World War II novels, particularly in pointing out a lesson which this war tended to emphasize: that the field commander must remember that such things as public relations, propaganda, and civil affairs are of the utmost importance in the successful conduct of a military campaign. Mr. Hersey's book also tends to show indirectly why many men fought this war, something which most World War II novelists have had difficulty in presenting. More valuable from the point of showing physical combat would be Mr. Hersey's *Into the Valley*,<sup>6</sup> a combat story about Marines in the Pacific war, but this volume is non-fiction and thus oversteps our subject limitations.

Three novels which attempt to picture the physical and psychological experiences of privates in combat and are no doubt written from first-hand experience are: Allan Lyon's *Toward an Unknown Station*,<sup>7</sup> Sidney and

<sup>5</sup>*A Bell for Adano* by John Hersey. (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1944, \$2.50.)

<sup>6</sup>*Into the Valley* by John Hersey. (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1943, \$2.00.)

<sup>7</sup>*Toward an Unknown Station* by Allan Lyon. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948, \$3.00.)



Samuel Moss's *Thy Men Shall Fall*,<sup>8</sup> and Allen R. Matthews' *The Assault*.<sup>9</sup> (The latter, although generally considered a novel, is apparently non-fiction.) All three are valuable despite a failure to create any genuine feel of the battlefield. Both Mr. Lyon and Mr. Matthews have added to a previous revelation from Stephen Crane that infantry privates in combat see and know very little about what is going on around them. Although both write with simple, intelligent pens—Mr. Lyons about his experiences as a replacement in one European battle and Mr. Matthews about more than a week on Iwo Jima—neither saw nor tells enough of war to make the stories themselves very interesting. The Moss brothers' book, although picturing experiences through both North Africa and Europe, is of interest only because it shows the reactions of another type of soldier, the embittered one.

For a more impersonal type of novel picturing ground combat, Harry Brown's *A Walk in the Sun*,<sup>10</sup> the story of a rifle platoon in the taking of an Italian beachhead, one of the first of the war novels, remains important. While some combat veterans have objected to its combat scenes as unreal, particularly in excessive whistle blowing by the platoon's leaders while supposedly striving for stealth, others have endorsed it wholeheartedly, thus emphasizing the varied views of war which the various participants hold. Two other books dealing almost exclusively with ground combat are Peter Bowman's novel of a Pacific island invasion, *Beach Red*,<sup>11</sup> which is of more interest because of its unique poetry-style lines than for any historical value, and a British battalion head-

quarters officer's story of the battle for Monte Cassino in Italy, F. Majdalany's *The Monastery*.<sup>12</sup> While the latter is not actually a novel, both its observations of physical and psychological effects of war upon participants and its literary qualities make it among the most outstanding of any war material yet published.

Except for examples of how rare individuals fought the war and for sheer charm in the telling, the student of military affairs will find little of value in either Thomas Heggen's *Mister Roberts*<sup>13</sup> or James A. Michener's Pulitzer Prize winner, *Tales of the South Pacific*.<sup>14</sup> The former pictures life aboard a Navy cargo ship which sails from "Tedium to Apathy," with occasional stops at "Monotony," and back again. The latter is a series of short stories about the war in the Pacific told with an intriguing 19th-Century flavor and creating at least two memorable characters: Tony Fry, a naval lieutenant whose experiences provide a thread of continuity for all the stories, and "Bloody Mary," a Tonkinese woman in an unforgettable story entitled "Fo' Dolla'." Both the student of military affairs and the student of literature will choose to ignore Basil Heatter's *The Dim View*,<sup>15</sup> a weak imitation of Ernest Hemingway with a story about a neurotic mosquito-boat commander and an Australian bar maid, and Robert Lowry's *Casualty*,<sup>16</sup> a short novel about a rear echelon GI in Italy who commits suicide, apparently because he doesn't like officers.

How a group of Navy combat veterans spent a week-end in a San Francisco hotel,

<sup>8</sup>*Thy Men Shall Fall* by Sidney and Samuel Moss. (Chicago: Ziff-Davis Publishing Co., 1948, \$3.00.)

<sup>9</sup>*The Assault* by Allen R. Matthews. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1947, \$2.50.)

<sup>10</sup>*A Walk in the Sun* by Harry Brown. (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1944, \$2.00.)

<sup>11</sup>*Beach Red* by Peter Bowman. (New York: Random House, 1946, \$2.50.)

<sup>12</sup>*The Monastery* by F. Majdalany. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1946, \$1.50.)

<sup>13</sup>*Mister Roberts* by Thomas Heggen. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1946, \$2.50.)

<sup>14</sup>*Tales of the South Pacific* by James A. Michener. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1947, \$3.00.)

<sup>15</sup>*The Dim View* by Basil Heatter. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Co., Inc., 1946, \$2.50.)

<sup>16</sup>*Casualty* by Robert Lowry. (New York: New Directions, 1947, \$2.00.)

as told in Frederic Wakeman's *Shore Leave*,<sup>17</sup> gives good insight into the reactions of individuals to war, but its stateside locale all but eliminates it from consideration here. And except for two good examples of how war acts upon Italian civilians and for appreciation of two excellent writers, we need only make mention here of *All Thy Conquests*<sup>18</sup> by Alfred Hayes, sketches about GIs and civilians in Rome on the day of liberation and six months later; and *The Sky Is Red*<sup>19</sup> by Giuseppe Berto, a compelling Italian novel about the struggle of a group of bomb-orphaned children for survival. Easily the worst novel of the entire lot is a thoroughly ridiculous little love story about a GI and a British girl in wartime London, Gilbert W. Gabriel's *Love from London*.<sup>20</sup> It is mentioned here only because it happens to fall within the stated confines of this article.

The military affairs student will appreciate the story of an Air Corps general's battle with higher brass, Congressmen, and Washington, William Wister Haines' *Command Decision*.<sup>21</sup> Although it is the story of a unique officer and a unique situation, it is apparently based on an officer known to the author, and its smoothly-developed plot and excellent dialogue recommend it as literature. Also important, for its psychological study of rear echelon service personnel as well as for its excellent prose, is John Horne Burns' *The Gallery*.<sup>22</sup> A series of sketches about GIs and civilians in North Africa and Italy, it is threaded together by the fact that all at one time or another pass through the *Galleria*

*Umberto* in Naples. Only once does Mr. Burns seem to go astray of his knowledge, when he attempts the story of an infantry lieutenant in combat. Giving the lower side of the picture in a situation somewhat similar to that in *Command Decision*, John Cobb's *The Gesture*<sup>23</sup> gains reality through its telling in retrospect the story of disintegration of morale in an American bomber unit stationed in England. Forced to endure heavy losses day after day because of no fighter escort, the men finally explode after a pseudo-patriotic major attempts to experiment with his personal theories on race relations.

There have been three panoramic novels about the European war, all of which have at least one special point to recommend them to the student of military affairs. Martha Gellhorn's *The Wine of Astonishment*,<sup>24</sup> while only a superficial novel about two love affairs, is nevertheless amazingly correct in its military background, a surprising fact when one considers some of the glaring errors made by male war novelists. *The Young Lions*<sup>25</sup> by Irwin Shaw, a story of the background and war experiences of three men, two Americans and a German, who must inevitably meet in combat, is most noteworthy for the creation of one character, the German, Christian Diestl. Regrettably, Mr. Shaw's intense feeling about anti-Semitism leaves him without any restraint in the treatment of this subject; and both his Jewish characters and a number of scenes, particularly those involving the Jewish hero in a series of fights in a stateside training camp, become unbelievable. Stefan Heym's *The Crusaders*<sup>26</sup> is the most panoramic of all and

<sup>17</sup>*Shore Leave* by Frederic Wakeman. (New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1944, \$2.50.)

<sup>18</sup>*All Thy Conquests* by Alfred Hayes. (New York: Howell, Soskin, 1947, \$2.75.)

<sup>19</sup>*The Sky Is Red* by Giuseppe Berto. (New York: New Directions, 1948, \$3.00.)

<sup>20</sup>*Love from London* by Gilbert W. Gabriel. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1946, \$2.50.)

<sup>21</sup>*Command Decision* by William Wister Haines. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1947, \$2.50.)

<sup>22</sup>*The Gallery* by John Horne Burns. (New York: Harper and Bros., 1946, \$3.00.)

<sup>23</sup>*The Gesture* by John Cobb. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948, \$2.75.)

<sup>24</sup>*The Wine of Astonishment* by Martha Gellhorn. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948, \$3.00.)

<sup>25</sup>*The Young Lions* by Irwin Shaw. (New York: Random House, 1948, \$3.50.)

<sup>26</sup>*The Crusaders* by Stefan Heym. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1948, \$3.50.)

deals primarily with a propaganda intelligence unit in its progress from Normandy through the occupation. Despite numerous plot contrivances, it manages to remain militarily reliable in most instances and creates at least two characters who should be of interest to the military affairs student: an infantry company commander, whose capability and will are eventually crushed by a series of unfortunate combat circumstances and the reappearance of Mr. Hersey's dictatorial general, and a rear echelon cook, who illustrates the consequences involved when an unscrupulous civilian type changes into uniform.

All three of these novels concern themselves at length with German concentration camp atrocities and merit consideration from this angle if from no other. Two, however, show a rather distressing trend in treatment of anti-Semitism, which also figures prominently in *The Crusaders*, *The Naked and the Dead*, and *An Act of Love*,<sup>27</sup> a novel about the Pacific war which will be considered later. These two, *The Young Lions* and *The Wine of Astonishment*, while indicating with the others that anti-Semitism is a problem to be considered seriously by the services, are guilty of a distortion common in modern writing which does not aid in the solution of the problem. By restricting anti-Semitic bias to Southerners, they overlook the fact that the South has only a small Jewish population and ignore the fierce anti-Semitism of many Northern population groups.

There remains one war novel, Ira Wolfert's *An Act of Love*, which somehow manages to encompass good material on air, sea, and land warfare in one volume and make it all convincing. This, coupled with the inner fight against cowardice of its principal character, a naval flight lieutenant who is washed ashore after his ship is sunk to await the invasion of a Pacific island, makes this novel of more

than usual interest to the student of military experience. Although one may have difficulty in accepting some of Mr. Wolfert's characters, primarily his three principal civilians—a planter, his wife, and daughter—several military types are pictured most effectively, and a Japanese captain provides a heretofore undeveloped Japanese type. Combat scenes, including the sinking of the lieutenant's ship and the invasion of the island, are among the most vivid to be told thus far in World War II fiction and give excellent examples of the varied reactions of men under fire. Lest the book's title be misleading, it is the "act of love" of one ground combat soldier for his companions which helps the principal character overcome his cowardice and gives the novel its name.

Several of the novelists herein considered have done excellent work in capturing the distinctive vernacular of the men who fought this last war. Although many readers have been dismayed by the blatancy with which *The Naked and the Dead* has reproduced the GI language, one turns instinctively to Mr. Mailer's dialogue when making such a consideration. But there are others who have succeeded well, although perhaps with more reserve; among them: Thomas Heggen in *Mister Roberts*, William Wister Haines in *Command Decision*, Harry Brown in *A Walk in the Sun*, John Horne Burns in *The Gallery*, and Allan Lyon in *Toward an Unknown Station*. Although only one of the novelists attacks directly the intricate problem of what Americans were fighting for, Stefan Heym in *The Crusaders*, at least two others cast indirect light on the subject: John Hersey in *A Bell for Adano* and Ira Wolfert in *An Act of Love*.

All things considered, both from the point of view of the student of military affairs and the student of literature, the men and women who saw World War II close up are doing a noteworthy job of writing fiction about it.

<sup>27</sup>*An Act of Love* by Ira Wolfert. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1948, \$3.95.)



## THE AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION SERIES

BY COLONEL C. P. STACEY\*

On 16 May 1944 (I discover from my diary) I ventured somewhat timorously into what was known in those days as the Occupied Area of London and called upon Colonel W. A. Ganoe, the head of the historical service of ETOUSA, in his office at 21 Eisenhowerplatz. Colonel Ganoe had with him another American army historian, Lt.-Col. C. H. Taylor; and I remember being rather severely shaken by the transformation of a Harvard medievalist into a field officer of formidable aspect. This, I reflected, was the sort of thing that really brought the war home to one.

We talked about our respective historical programs, and what makes the conversation significant for my present business is that Colonel Taylor gave me a copy of a little booklet called *To Bizerte with the II Corps*. I carried it back to my lair in the Canadian enclave near Trafalgar Square, and my office-mates and I dissected it. The diary above referred to contains a commentary upon it. It remarks that the book is intended for wounded men in hospital, and goes on to say that it is "beautifully produced" but that it seems doubtful whether it is altogether suited to its immediate audience: "it is too much like a General Staff monograph to interest the average soldier." Looking back now, this seems a rather bleak welcome to the *American Forces in Action* series.<sup>1</sup> But, after all, how was I to know?

That comment of 1944 may at least serve to emphasize one point about this very excellent and valuable series of booklets: the volumes have got steadily better as the series has progressed. The Historical Division of the Department of the Army went on from that first experimental booklet bearing the date 1943 to produce thirteen others, the last of which, appearing in 1948 and entitled *Utah Beach to Cherbourg*, is far more "beautifully produced" than *Bizerte*. It is an impressive production of over 200 pages, splendidly illustrated and selling for a price (\$2.00) which makes *Bizerte* (45 cents) look like a poor relation from the other side of the tracks. (Nevertheless, in justice to that earlier book, it should be said that the best part of it is the part that matters most—the text; and that the only part of the text which is badly outclassed by the more recent titles is that dealing with the Germans. As was inevitable in 1943, it contains hardly any detail about the enemy.)

Surveying the series as a whole, one notes that it is of course very far from telling, even in outline, the whole story of the U. S. Army in the late affair with Germany and Japan. Four volumes on Italy deal only with early episodes of the long peninsular campaign (the present writer has often regretted the lack of a volume on Sicily); three on North-West Europe, all of superior quality, do not carry that story beyond 20 July 1944; and

\*Director, Historical Section, Canadian Army.

<sup>1</sup>AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION SERIES. By Historical Division, Department of the Army. (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1943-1948.) *To Bizerte with the II Corps*, pp. viii, 80; 45 cents. *Papuan Campaign*, pp. viii, 108; 55 cents. *Salerno*, pp. viii, 96, 60 cents. *From the Volturno to the Winter Line*, pp. viii, 120; 35 cents. *Merrill's Marauders*, pp.

viii, 120, 40 cents. *Fifth Army at the Winter Line*, pp. x, 118, 35 cents. *Omaha Beachhead*, pp. viii, 168; \$1.75. *The Admiralties*, pp. viii, 152; 40 cents. *Guam*, pp. viii, 136; 45 cents. *The Capture of Makin*, pp. viii, 136; 35 cents. *Small Unit Actions*, pp. xii, 212; \$1.25. *St.-Lô*, pp. viii, 128; \$1.25; *Anzio Beachhead*, pp. viii, 122; \$1.50. *Utah Beach to Cherbourg*, pp. xii, 216; \$2.00.

many incidents of the Pacific war are not touched at all. It was necessary to suspend this series in order to clear the way for work on the official history whose volumes are already beginning to appear. However, it will be some time yet before that history is complete, and in the meantime the American people have available clear, simple and authentic summaries of some of their army's most important operations. They have shown their appreciation by buying more than 170,000 copies of these booklets; and sales would doubtless have been even larger if the series had had the publicity which official publications never seem to get.

This is evidence that the staff of the Historical Division have grappled successfully with a fundamental problem: the writing of history in a form acceptable to the public at large. History becomes really important only when it is widely read, yet the professional historian of today rarely commands a really large audience. (Quite often, be it said, he does not deserve such an audience.) The success of *American Forces in Action* is due in part, of course, to its subject matter, in which the public is naturally deeply interested; but it also owes much to the clarity and simplicity of the presentation and the attractiveness of the illustrations and the general format.

To satisfy the public is one thing; to satisfy the scholar is another. And the scholar in the past has tended to be suspicious of the practitioners of contemporary history, who try to tell of events which are still matters of recent memory. The question is a serious one, for documents come to hand only gradually, reading and analyzing them is a still slower process, and there is such a thing as perspective, which undeniably improves with the passage of time. Is the historian justified in working from obviously incomplete source material when the lapse of a few years would both make his task easier and render the re-

sult more definitive? These fourteen booklets provide a good answer, and thoroughly justify the U. S. Army's historians in their decision to put the needs of the public before the theoretical demands of traditional scholarship. They demonstrated that a trained and competent historian can apply his techniques to incomplete sources and produce a very sound though not a final result.

The ability to produce satisfactorily comprehensive and accurate studies at such early dates is closely related to the active historical work done while the war was still in progress. This did not merely mean that more, more relevant and better organized information than ever before has been available; narratives were produced which could serve as a basis for published accounts. Thus we find that the booklet *Makin* is "based upon a first narrative prepared in the field . . . by Lt. Col. S. L. A. Marshall," though it also incorporates later information. Other booklets, among them *Anzio Beachhead*, are products of the same procedure.

These booklets are primarily *tactical* studies, and as such they are first-rate. The picture which they give of American operations on the corps and lower levels may be modified by later research, but it will probably only be in matters of detail. (*Utah Beach* is able to correct the earlier *Omaha Beachhead* on at least one such point.) Although these studies are not documented, it is immediately apparent that they are founded upon careful investigation of the records. It is difficult to find errors—so difficult that it is almost with a sense of minor triumph that one catches the author of *St-Lô* crediting the Panther tank with an 88-mm gun, the author of *Anzio Beachhead* calling the hospital carrier *St. David* H.M.S. *David*, or the author of *Omaha* suggesting that only one brigade of the 6th Airborne Division dropped in Normandy on D Day. On the higher levels of command, of course, the books have less to

say, for the documents were hard to come by at the time they were written. *St. Lô* would have been improved by quoting the terms of General Montgomery's directive which set the offensive going, but for this the reader must wait for the larger history. Nor do the booklets tell the full story of the enemy side. The earlier ones, as noted above, say very little about it; the later ones give us much more, but still mainly on the basis of documents captured during the hostilities. (The great standby in the Northwest Europe volumes is the war diary of the Seventh German Army, picked up by the Polish Armoured Division during its tremendous fight in the Falaise Gap; fortunately, this document is a host in itself.) An exception is *Anzio* which has profited by an exhaustive study of German documents.

The series has other recommendations besides accuracy. It has the true scholar's judicial approach, and one never finds it being unfair to the allies of the United States. It is sober in its presentation, but frequently contrives to be absorbingly interesting. And it has set a new high in the matter of photographic illustrations. Here again the earlier volumes are not much, but the later ones are magnificent. The photographs in *Utah Beach* tell more about the German beach defenses in Normandy than could be achieved by pages of type. All the recent volumes contain particularly remarkable air photos.

This brings me to the question of the maps, and here I confess my feelings are mixed. They are numerous and excellent; their quality, like so much else in the series, improves in the later volumes. From the point of view either of the soldier or the military historian, they are almost beyond criticism. But what of the "general reader"? The text of the

book is, as a rule, quite comprehensible to him (an exception perhaps is the determined use of the military 24-hour clock system, which to most Anglo-Saxon civilians is mystifying); but he must, I think, find the maps a bit difficult. There are many civilians who simply cannot read a contoured map. There must be many more (even in the U. S.) who do not understand the U. S. Army's conventional map symbols for military units; yet these are used throughout, and no explanation of them is ever supplied. Thus, to a considerable extent, the text is General Public but the maps are General Staff. (In a few cases in the earlier volumes, even the G.S. would be stopped; for instance, there is a map on page 6 of *Merrill's Marauders* which designates Allied divisions only by numbers and leaves the reader to figure out whether they are U. S., British, Indian, Chinese or what-have-you.) This difficulty was I think at the bottom of my original comment on *To Bizerte with the II Corps*, and the feeling has never quite left me, though I am prepared to admit that it is unfair, for historically the maps are splendid and (whatever General Public may say) they are one of the major glories of the series.

All told, the discriminating reader can have nothing but praise and admiration for the Historical Division for the job they have done in this series. It is a distinguished contribution to the history of the war—one that will have a definite permanent value, in addition to serving as a useful "dry run" for the History proper and giving the public something solid to chew on while waiting for that History. Taking these booklets in conjunction with the similar series being produced by the Marines, one may, indeed, congratulate the American people on being so well served by their official military historians.



## REVIEWS OF BOOKS

*Crusade in Europe*, by Dwight D. Eisenhower.  
(Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1948. 564 pages. \$5.00.)

Of all the participants in the Allied victory over Germany none is better qualified than General Eisenhower to discuss the long drive toward VE-Day. As commander of the western assault on the Axis' Mediterranean ramparts and then as commander of history's greatest alliance in the assault through and beyond Nazi Germany's West Wall, he made the telling decisions, he more than any other military man held the Grand Alliance together through good times and bad, and he set examples in command which can profitably be studied by soldiers and statesmen for generations to come.

It is fortunate that the man whose actions were so large a part of victory has given thus early his own chronicle of those World War II events which he did so much to shape, and that he has done it in just this way. It is a history not primarily for the professional student but for the general reader, as the author intended it to be. In that popular quality it is particularly useful, for it has much to say upon matters which continue to concern the citizen, rather than the soldier, in a world where the citizen now is in possession of large powers and in dire need of guidance in their exercise. In his knowledge of these matters General Eisenhower's book reveals qualities of statesmanship comparable to his proven qualities as a soldier.

The general readability and wide distribution of the book are fortunate, further, in that thereby a great many readers, puzzled by the conflicting accounts of many aspects of the war, have early and easy access to a discussion of certain momentous differences on which numerous lesser authorities have done rather badly. The merits of those controversies General Eisenhower was in an excellent position to judge. Beyond that, he now surveys them, as he surveyed them at the time, with tolerance and restraint and wisdom as well as with impressive authority, and this is a timely achievement in a world too much given to envy and pettiness and exaggeration.

Many of these controversies once revolved about the Allied commander himself, such as that surrounding his employment of Admiral Darlan. In distant America there was in December 1942 a good deal of anguish over the large use which General Eisenhower made of this notorious ex-

disciple of Vichy France. With more pressing responsibilities than his critics' for the lives of his men and the success of his mission, the invasion commander had small choice; he used Darlan for purposes which nobody else could attain and the results justified the decision. The "slapping" incident which for a time made so much trouble for General Patton (it now should be embarrassing to remember) could easily have been snowballed into something which would have ended that spectacular soldier's career short of its climactic achievement; thanks to the far-seeing judgment of his superior officer, the slapping and other errors of impulse were viewed in correct perspective and as a result General Patton remained in Europe to lead his Third Army in feats of unforgettable splendor, to the glory of American arms and the immeasurable profit of the Allied cause.

Those minor controversies long ago faded to the obscurity they deserved at the time, but there is abiding interest in General Eisenhower's remarks upon others which have not yet faded. One of course is the dispute over the decision of 1944 when the Allies' triumphant race across France was slowing down for lack of supplies and it was necessary to decide how the assault should be continued. The controversy has remained alive because of continuing feverish assertions that, in one case, all necessary resources should have been entrusted to Montgomery, to permit him to plunge across the lower Rhine and somehow force the German surrender; or, in the other case, it is trumpeted that all these scant resources should have been given to Patton to permit him to do much the same thing by a thrust further south. The hotter advocates of each proposal have insisted that thereby early success would have come but, significantly, each group is still incredulous of the other's claims. To both opinions General Eisenhower is as much in opposition now as in 1944, and for the identical reason. In his judgment (increasingly supported as the evidence is examined) the single thrust would have failed and, against a foe still capable of the resistance later encountered, there was necessity of the sure, massive assault along the entire front which sought to destroy the German Army west of the Rhine and which in fact succeeded.

On the issue of who "failed" in the Ardennes and thus exposed the thin American line to Rundstedt's December assault, General Eisenhower writes simply and directly. He accepts full respon-

sibility for the decision. The continuous and necessary pressures which the Allies were maintaining at half a dozen points on the long German front could not be maintained in volume without a conscious weakening of other points. The thinness of the line in the American First Army sector was well known and for a long time had been the cause of uneasiness. Opposite that weak spot German skill and boldness permitted a swifter concentration than could be readily countered but while Rundstedt's thrust toward the Meuse gained him a dazzling temporary success it brought him also permanent ruin, for in the resultant fighting he lost irreplaceable divisions and equipment. That the Allied command had its anxieties is sure, but the risk which had been consciously taken was amply justified by the ultimate reward.

To these and other controversial discussions the author brings the candor and simplicity which have always marked his analyses, and also the loyalty and generosity of spirit which endeared him throughout the war to his subordinates, to his superiors, and to his colleagues. They are admirable qualities, not universally encountered in military memoirs, and they are particularly valuable when combined with General Eisenhower's maturity of judgment and its attendant sense of perspective. It was these virtues, as much as his military merit, which won for him and retained for him the leadership of the Great Alliance. They are visible too in his postwar observations upon the problems of the nation, which constitute some of the book's most enduringly valuable chapters. He is more aware than most that victory on the battlefield does not end the victorious nation's responsibilities. His discussion of World War II as he saw it (and largely made it) and of the world which it left so badly distorted constitutes one of the few memorable books in this category.

MARK WATSON,  
Washington, D. C.

**United States Army in World War II. Okinawa: The Last Battle,** by Appleman, Burns, Gugeler and Stevens. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948. Pp. 474. \$6.00.)

*Okinawa: The Last Battle* is the work of combat historians assigned to the Tenth Army. It concerns one of the greatest battles of World War II, in which Army, Navy and Marine Corps all played vital parts. It was truly a unified command operation, beginning with the Navy in over-

all control, followed by the transfer of all forces ashore to Army command and concluding with the Tenth Army having operational control of a Navy task force, and a Marine, General Geiger, commanding during the interval between the loss of General Buckner and General Stilwell's assumption of command.

After the strategic isolation of Okinawa by land- and carrier-based air, the amphibious force was to move to its objective. Naval forces were to destroy enemy defenses by gunfire and air strikes, clear the waters of mines and obstacles, cover the landing and support the land operations. The Tenth Army, consisting of the XXIV Army Corps, the III Corps of Marines, the 27th and 77th Infantry Divisions, the Tactical Air Force and the 2d Marine Division as a diversionary force, all under command of Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner, was to capture Okinawa and adjacent islands as a base of operations against the homeland of Japan.

The Japanese plan called for intensively fortifying Okinawa and defending it to the last man in order to delay its occupation while they attempted to destroy the supporting Naval forces, principally with their kamikaze planes.

The book vividly describes the terrific bombardment of the Hagushi beaches, and the amazement of the men when no opposition was encountered; the unopposed advance across the island, the occupation of the northern sector with little opposition until the 6th Marine Division encountered and overcame determined resistance on Motobu Peninsula, while the 77th Infantry Division secured the Kerama Islands and Ie Shima.

Meanwhile the XXIV Corps had brought up against the main Japanese defenses in the south, to overcome which eventually required the services of all the American forces, land, sea and air, in many days of bitter fighting.

The American attack was supported by ample artillery, unlimited Naval gunfire and every type of missile at the disposal of the Air. "Literally the Japanese were enveloped by fire power from the ground in front, from the air above them and from the water on both flanks—firepower the like of which had never been seen in such concentrated form." Even so the enemy was not destroyed or rendered incapable of resistance. In spite of "rockets, napalm, mortars, smoke, aerial bombing, strafing, naval bombardment and all others in the way of American weapons," the enemy was never driven from his fortified positions until the ground troops were able to advance



and evict him. The infantry-tank team was the deciding factor in the battle. And when "General Mud" took over, bogging down all motorized vehicles, the footsoldier had to go it alone.

The fighting is described in great detail; actions of platoons, squads and even individuals are included in the narrative. The reasons for many important decisions are shown and an insight is given into high-level planning and the stupendous logistics problems involved in a great amphibious expedition. The unyielding endurance, grim determination and stark heroism of the soldiers of both armies stand out throughout the narrative.

The deaths of four Generals are recounted, Buckner and Easley of the American Army, and Ushijima and Cho of the Japanese. The manner of their going exemplifies the diverse philosophies of the two Nations. The Americans, in the best traditions of their service, both met their end while directing troops in action: the Japanese, after conducting a gallant and brilliant defense, by suicide, following the ancient code and ritual of the Samurai.

The price of Okinawa was high. Final victory came after eighty-three days of constant fighting at a cost of 49,151 battle casualties, of which 12,250 were fatal. The Navy's losses in killed in action exceeded those of either the Army or Marines: 36 ships were sunk and damaged, most of them the result of air action; 763 planes were lost. Approximately 110,000 Japanese were killed and 7,400 captured. The enemy lost 7,800 airplanes, 16 ships sunk and 4 ships damaged. The Americans gained a base sufficiently large to mount great numbers of troops, a fleet anchorage and numerous airfield sites close to the Japanese homeland.

The history is fully illustrated. The maps are excellent and ample in number to enable the reader to follow the operations with ease and understanding. The material is drawn from personal observation, interviews with participants, and official reports. The III Corps accounts are drawn principally from Marine Corps manuscript histories, preliminary in character, and are by no means as complete as the accounts of Army units. In all other respects the book is well documented, accurate and fair of interpretation. It is indeed an interesting authentic work of reference for the military and civilian student.

JULIAN C. SMITH,  
Lieut. Gen. U.S.M.C. (Ret.),  
Alexandria, Va.

*A History of the United States Navy*, Revised Edition, by Dudley W. Knox, Commodore, U.S.N. (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1948, pp. xxiii, 704, \$7.50.)

The United States Navy owes much to the author of this book. In the early years of this century the potentialities of the newly developed destroyer were not, at first, fully understood. While on the staff of Captain W. S. Sims in 1913-1914, Dudley Knox played a leading part in the creation of the first sound doctrine for the use of destroyers in war. During the first World War, as a member of the Planning Section at London Headquarters, Knox was one of the intellectual leaders in the planning of the U. S. Naval effort in European waters. Upon his return to this country he taught at the Naval War College until his retirement in 1921.

In the course of his distinguished active career he served in two wars and established for himself, in peace, the reputation of an imaginative student. He was, in fact, one of those unusual officers who, at a time when the Navy under the impact of technological advance was changing from a relatively simple calling into a relatively complicated profession, contributed steadily to its intellectual development.

In retirement Commodore Knox continued to serve, as Chief of the Historical Section of the Navy. Under his administration, and especially in the recent war, the documents upon which the students of naval history must base their narratives and conclusions have been collected and organized. This continued intelligent devotion to the record of the U. S. Navy from its origins until today commands, as it should, the respect of students and naval officers alike. For the latter, especially, whose morale depends in such large part upon their understanding of their own heritage, Commodore Knox has performed a distinguished service.

From his own study and experience he first produced, in 1936, *A History of the United States Navy*. Now he has extended his narrative to include a description of the momentous naval events of the past twelve years. The new and extended work is, as was its predecessor, the best one-volume history of the United States Navy.

It is a history that never takes one very far from the sound of gunfire at sea. The book, devoted as the author says, mainly to naval operations, is a precise, clear description of action taken. From the commissioning of the schooner *Hannah*



to the signing of peace on the deck of the *Misouri*, we follow the rising fortunes of a service that has always appeared at its best when engaged in the great end of action. Commodore Knox is at all times equal to the expanding requirements of the task he has set for himself. He can handle the excitement of a boarding action in the days when no Captain could go very far wrong if he laid his ship alongside of the enemy, and equally he can organize and control the narrative of a great developing action such as the battle for Leyte Gulf. By a frequent use of the data of naval operations—place names, ships' names, officers' names, times, positions, ranges, and speeds—Commodore Knox provides a relatively stable framework within which the shifting events of any particular battle may be contained and followed by the lay reader. Nor in his accounts does he fail to relate the single action to the larger strategy.

The smoke of battle dims but never quite obscures those other factors in the naval service upon which efficiency in battle depends. Commodore Knox notices significant changes in forms of naval administration, describes briefly the nature and influence of technological advances, sets forth the development of professional naval training at Annapolis and the War College, and provides brief accounts of the Navy's trials and achievements in time of peace. He has, in short, given the interested but uninformed reader an admirable account of the end products of our naval experience.

It is the mark of a good book that when one sets it down one wishes there were more. Such is the case with the present volume. There is a feeling of regret that Commodore Knox has not reached farther into his storehouse of available knowledge and experience to give us a more rounded report on the United States Navy. It is true that his main business, as he states, is with naval operations, but as he also says logistics is "the very foundation of all operations." To this subject, one of the controlling factors in modern naval warfare, little attention is paid. This history of the U. S. Navy includes the names of officers commanding the torpedo boats that escorted Shafter's expeditionary force in the voyage from Tampa to Daiquiri, but the name of the officer presiding over the organization charged with planning and furnishing the logistic support of the Navy in the last war is not given, nor is the nature of his duty and responsibility defined. In an account of a conflict that was frequently described as a war of logistics, the absence of logis-

tical considerations is a matter for regret.

One wishes, too, that Commodore Knox had permitted some of the attractive warmth with which he dismisses the views of Brigadier General William Mitchell to pervade more of his pages, and that his willingness to evaluate the combat actions of brave and successful officers had been extended to other actions by other officers. Since the days of sail there have been, inevitably, differences of opinion within the Navy itself in such matters as the use of air power, ship design, methods of promotion, the value of the War College, and the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations, the state of naval preparedness, and the wisdom of certain strategic or tactical decisions. Of these and other differences in service opinion, and of the issues over which they arose Commodore Knox says little.

The result is that this book remains a clear account of victories at sea. It never searches very far beneath the surface to discover and analyze the development of the means by which victorious action was achieved. Such a task the author did not set for himself, well equipped as he is by training and understanding to undertake it. What he set out to do, and what he wished to do, has been well done.

ELTING B. MORISON,\*  
Cambridge, Mass.

*Persuade or Perish*, by Wallace Carroll. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948. 392 pp. \$4.00.)

The author of this account of our psychological warfare against the Continent arrived in London September 10, 1942, as Director of the Office of War Information, and remained in a high policy and operations post throughout the war. Carroll had been head of the London bureau of the United Press in London, and had been through the *blitz* with the British people in 1940 and 1941. Ambassador Winant had endorsed him.

Unlike many books about the war, this one is written with an eye to the future. Carroll is deeply concerned about American policy. For him the great lesson of the war is that a nation lacking the means of political defense invites political attack. "There were many reasons why the Soviets chose to wage a war of wills against us, but I wonder whether they would have taken the decision so lightly if they had not seen since the days of Vichy that we did not know how to defend ourselves

\*Dr. Morison is Professor of English in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

against hostile propaganda." Therefore: "When we show [the men in the Kremlin] that we can defend ourselves against political attack and can strike back effectively at our assailants, the Soviet attacks will abate." (P. 389.) Can there be any doubt of the gravity of the issues which the writer of this book has in mind?

The volume is not to be dismissed as another polemic against *Our Vichy Gamble*. Carroll's point is deeper. He believes that we had a powerful case when we tolerated Vichy and dealt with Darlan. Our mistake, he concludes, was that we failed to carry our case to the peoples of the world, and to persuade them that America stands for freedom and not reaction. The theme of the book is that the confusion and distrust about American motives was self-induced by us. Instead of speaking out through all the channels of mass communication, we were too often defensive, mute, belated and unconvincing. In short, we made ineffective use of the psychological warfare weapon because our top policy makers did not take a clear line and stick to it.

Stating the same point a little differently, we "entered the war without a clear national policy and without clear political objectives. North Africa brought the inevitable result. Military success became an end in itself. 'Victory' became all-important." (P. 75.) President Roosevelt had no understanding or sympathy with *organized* propaganda. Carroll relates a tell-tale story of his initial interview with the President, in which Roosevelt spoke only of censorship although OWI had nothing to do with censorship. Secretary Hull and most of the top officials of the State Department are said to have adopted a resentful attitude toward the public criticism to which they were subjected for their so-called "Vichy policy." They overlooked the fact that they neglected to give an intelligible explanation to the American public, to say nothing of the world at large.

In the absence of firm political goals, Carroll explains that the military moved into the vacuum created by the failure of civilian leadership. For instance, Roosevelt proposed to make Robert Murphy his personal representative and to give him a status which would have left him independent of the military. Marshall argued that the authority of the theater commander had to be untrammelled. We are told that after some hesitation the President yielded, and "the representative of civilian authority became a mere officer on the staff of the theater commander without whose permission he could not communicate with the government in

Washington." "This was a most fateful decision," pursues Carroll, "for it set the pattern for all theaters and made theater commanders who had never had political training, the custodians of political as well as military power. Wherever American armies went in the Second World War, the representatives of the civil authority went along as camp followers." (P. 75.)

The British, in contrast, sent a representative of the war cabinet to accompany the generals to make sure that the generals accomplished their proper mission, which was to attain the objectives of the "master plan which laid down their political objectives in every theater of war." (P. 76.) Among the several concrete situations described by Carroll the handling of the Italian peace arrangements is particularly instructive. (Pp. 171ff.) The Italian problem led to the creation of a Committee to sit in London as the supreme authority over Allied propaganda in emergencies like the Mussolini resignation. The Committee was authorized to issue directives binding upon theater commanders and the propaganda agencies of the two governments. Reports Carroll: "The meetings of this Committee, which began on October 13, added little to the effectiveness of Allied propaganda and served mainly to bring out the vagueness of American foreign policy, its subservience to short-range military objectives, and the contrast between the smooth-working machinery behind the British representatives and the creaking administrative machine on which the American side was dependent." (P. 181.) The Committee passed out of existence early in 1944, presumably on account of this weakness.

The reader will find an illuminating commentary on most of the principal decisions touching the most important campaigns conducted by our psychological warfare in Europe. Concerning the tactical facility of the Americans, Carroll suggests that the root of the matter may be the superficial resemblance to advertising. "You did your 'market research' by studying the intelligence reports on the morale of the enemy units facing you. Then you wrote your copy describing the merchandise you had to sell—humane treatment, good food, a chance to live and return home after the war. If the advertisement brought results, you continued to run it. If it failed, you questioned prisoners until you found out what was wrong with it, and then you tried again." (P. 158.) To the degree that the problem was "political," the Americans showed up badly in relation to the British.



Besides providing a wealth of data there are many incidental generalizations about the theory of effective psychological warfare. Carroll would puncture the fallacy that the propagandist's choice is primarily between truth and falsehood. Often the "real difficulties come over a choice between giving the news and withholding it, between the practices of journalism and the dictates of war, between the urge to inform and the passion to save lives, between common honesty and plain humanity." (P. 237.)

There are no exaggerated claims about the impact of psychological warfare. He dismisses with a shrug the tendency to repeat Admiral Cunningham's "pleasantry" which exaggerated its role (P. 174), and gives searching examination to the assertion that "unconditional surrender" prolonged the war, registering a "minority" opinion that "there is no good reason to believe that it did." (P. 333.)

I think it is obvious that Carroll has produced a book of great weight and enduring importance for the practice of democracy, as well as the management of psychological warfare. Nothing the author says can be brushed off lightly: there is scarcely an over-statement in four hundred pages. That many aspects of the subject are scantily handled goes almost without saying. For instance, there is very little about the relation between types of skill and personality in the conduct of psychological warfare. And there is little of the smell of operations at the tactical level: this book is definitely "top level stuff." Besides, it has left the wisecracks and the merely personal chit-chat to others. For Carroll is thinking and writing like one of those figures whom he found missing from the cast of American characters in psychological warfare, namely, a seasoned political mind.

HAROLD D. LASSWELL,\*  
New Haven, Conn.

*Report of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, to the Secretary of the Air Force.* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948. Pp. 112. \$60.)

This is the story of the Air Force since the end of the war, and particularly since its establishment as a co-equal service within the National Military Establishment. But it is more than a report on what has happened to the air service since V-J

Day, for it sets forth the future policies of the Air Force and attempts to tell what are the potentialities of air power. As Secretary of the Air Force Symington says, in his introduction to General Spaatz' report: "In publishing the report, the Department of the Air Force hopes to give the citizens of the United States a better understanding of the Air Force and its mission in contributing to national security." This is not therefore a report, in the usual sense of the word.

General Spaatz begins his story in the days of demobilization, when the world's most powerful air force fell from its wartime peak of 218 effective combat groups to an obsolescent force of 55 groups, of which only 2 groups were deemed effective. At the same time, in late 1946, the technically trained maintenance personnel in the Air Force numbered only eight per cent of the strength less than two years earlier, and these men are the ones who actually keep the combat craft in the air. The pages of the next chapter relate the program developed to reorganize the Air Force, or what was left of it, into a combat organization capable of performing limited missions and of serving as the nucleus of a new peacetime organization. This reorganization was based on General Arnold's "seven-point" plan, as executed by his successor and the present Chief of the Air Staff, designed to reorganize the Air Force as a separate service, establish an effective "Air-Force-in-Being," organize the civilian components, and provide for extensive scientific research and development and for plans for industrial preparedness.

The final three chapters take up in detail the program for the implementation of General Arnold's seven-point program. The report also relates this program to future plans and policies, as well as to the newly-forming strategic and tactical air doctrines. Of particular interest to the military student is the map and discussion (pp. 106-7) of "The World of a Strategic Air Force," as it relates to the concept of air power set forth in the report.

In connection with this map, two points in the report seem especially conspicuous to one not at present a member of the Air Force. First is the continuing emphasis, throughout the report, on the 70-Group plan as the *sine qua non* of security. And second, almost as a corollary of the first, is the constant preoccupation with strategic bombardment, to the near-neglect of tactical and reconnaissance operations. True, the latter do receive attention from time to time, but only as second-

\*Dr. Lasswell is Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University.



dary weapons, or as supplements to the strategic arm. To those convinced that Douhet and Severisky have the "light," it will appear that the report is a balanced presentation of what an air force ought to be, but to those not so convinced the question immediately arises as to whether the Air Force has actually learned the lessons of close support and observation so well high-lighted by the early campaigns of the German Army and by the campaigns in France involving our own Army and Ninth Air Force.

Despite these issues, this report is a conspicuously successful job of showing what an Air Force is, how it operates, what its problems in training and development are, and what its supporters think it can do. The photographs which accompany the text are especially fine.

BYRON S. MARTIN,

*Historical Division, Department of the Army*

**Lord Wavell (1883-1941): A Military Biography**, by Major General R. J. Collins. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1947. Pp. 488. \$7.50.)

It would be difficult to find a more highly qualified officer than Major-General R. J. Collins to write the Military Biography of Viscount Wavell. General Collins is himself a distinguished soldier with a varied career which, in addition to three major wars, included seven years in the Egyptian Army (1904-11), the command of Britain's experimental "mechanized force" (1927-28), the command of a division in India (1934-38), and finally his selection as Commandant of the Staff College (1939-41). At present he is Editor of *The Army Quarterly* published in London, England.

In the general layout of the book the author has wisely given equal emphasis to Wavell's activities in both peace and war, and in this way the reader gains an insight into Wavell's character which might not be possible if the excitement of war colored every page. However, in his treatment of Wavell's many virtues, both as a man and as a general, it is felt that General Collins has perhaps tended to lay undue stress on his better qualities and to rather gloss over any failings which, being human, Wavell must surely possess. The result is a form of hero-worship which, although it will not mar the reader's enjoyment, may be inclined on occasion to leave a saccharine sweet taste in an otherwise spartan atmosphere.

To a student of the art of war there is much of value to be learned from a study of this book. Perhaps the two outstanding lessons which the

author brings out are first, Wavell's moral courage and sense of duty which sustained him during the military twilight of the 1920's and, secondly, his ability in war to accomplish so much with so little. How any nation can expect to obtain efficient armed forces when, against all expert advice, successive governments continue to cut military expenditures to below danger level is perhaps best left to the politicians who do the paring—but the wonder of it all is that in spite of the lethargy which results from lack of funds certain Marshalls, Eisenhowers and Wavells rise clear above their fellow officers and by hard work, purposefulness and moral courage prepare themselves against the day when they will be most needed. For instance, to read of Colonel Wavell, age 43 (he had been a Brigadier-General at age 35) being placed on half pay "for want of employment" only thirteen years before he became Commander-in-Chief, the Middle East, and only seventeen years before being appointed Viceroy of India, must surely warm the hearts of all who applaud deserved success and must act as a tonic to the most dispirited of officers.

As a corollary to the period between wars, the author ascribes much of Wavell's success in accomplishing so much with so little to his knowledge of administration, his political sagacity and his military foresight and sense of timing, all of which were acquired by study and hard-won experience—and not by a lucky chance or shortcuts. And the author is to be congratulated on the way in which he has captured and set down for his readers the desperate story of the early summer of 1941 when with his limited resources Wavell conducted the five simultaneous campaigns in Crete, the Western Desert, East Africa, Iraq and Syria.

Amongst the many other interesting facts brought out in the book is the 1939 agreement between the United Kingdom and France that the latter should be responsible for Military Intelligence in the Mediterranean area. The resulting problems following the collapse of France should be an object lesson to military planners of all nations.

In the preface the author makes apology for the scale of map he has been forced to use and also for any factual inaccuracies which have been allowed to remain in the book. With regard to maps, it is a pity that General Collins did not use a larger scale of map and also did not make use of direction arrows and other aids which prove so useful in books of this kind. With regard to inaccuracies, there are a few small ones. For instance,

Albania was not invaded by Italian troops on October 28, 1940, nor is Canada's General Crerar a "Sir." But such errors are of small consequence and do not detract from a readable and valuable book.

GEORGE KITCHING,  
*Brigadier, Canadian Army*

*Gettysburg*, edited by Earl Schenck Miers and Richard A. Brown. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1948. Pp. xviii, 308. \$3.50.)

General studies, biographies, diaries and novels relating to the Civil War, well known to the student of military history, have indeed become voluminous. Even the literature of the Battle of Gettysburg alone, in the eighty-five years since that great event, has reached extensive proportions. Yet the subject continues to call forth renewed study, revised evaluation of data and resulting new interpretation, and new approaches in the presentation of the battle story.

In the volume *Gettysburg*, Mr. Miers, who provided the editorial passages, and Mr. Brown, who undertook the research, have not contributed something new to the literature of the subject. Their accomplishment is rather the presentation, from a wide choice of diaries, letters, reminiscences and official reports, of a fairly comprehensive and vivid picture of the campaign and battle through careful arrangement of documents and well-written explanatory notes. Instead of the more usual approach of strategy and tactics, which has been accomplished so admirably by the Comte de Paris in the third volume of his *History of the American Civil War*, the editors have tried to bring together from eye-witnesses — forty-two in all — a kind of historical writing which adds vitality and the human touch to the battle story. Thus, real contributions are the narrative of the British observer Fremantle, of Haskell's gripping story, or of the more factual accounts of men in command, such as Longstreet, and of his chief of Artillery, Alexander; the appraisal of J. E. B. Stuart, as his men knew him; of John Dooley, foot soldier of Pickett's Division who spoke the feeling of the men in the ranks; or of Sally Broadhead, Gettysburg school teacher, whose diary so vividly recorded the anxiety and apprehension of Gettysburg citizens as the war clouds approached that village.

In a source book so ably compiled and compacted, and fashioned into a story of realism and suspense, it is unfortunate that certain glaring

errors have crept into the text and maps. In the Gettysburg campaign, for instance, no part of the Confederate Army passed through Emmitsburg, as Early's Division marched from Chambersburg through Gettysburg to York (p. 4). Ewell, not Longstreet, should be indicated as leading the advance on Harrisburg (map, p. 6). In the approach of the Confederate Army to Gettysburg on the morning of July 1 (map, p. 47), Rode's Division was in the vicinity of Biglerville, seven miles north of Gettysburg, instead of approaching Carlisle; and Early's Division, returning from York, was then at Heidlersburg, ten miles northeast of Gettysburg. On the morning of July 1, Archer's Brigade advanced on the right and Davis' Brigade on the left of the Chambersburg Pike instead of the reverse order, as stated on page 46. Seminary Hill, on two maps of the battlefield (pages 94 and 100), should be shown as Oak Ridge. Gen. Solomon Meredith, not Gen. John Gibbon, commanded the Iron Brigade at Gettysburg (p. 32). John B. Hood was a Major General, not a Brigadier (p. 118).

While the many inaccuracies of fact are disconcerting to the careful student, the general reader will find an arresting, swiftly moving story of emotions, impressions and deeds which fills a real gap in the story of Gettysburg.

FREDERICK TILBERG,\*  
*Gettysburg, Pa.*

*The German Generals Talk*, by Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart. (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1948. Pp. 300. \$4.00.)

The unsuspecting reader of Captain B. H. Liddell Hart's "exposé" of German military leadership in the recent war deserves a warning. I undertake this public service since my copy of the book is apparently one of a limited edition which is distinguished by the presence of a near-invisible subtitle: *An Exercise in the Use of Multiple Mouthpieces*.

Captain Hart's ostensible purpose as stated in the preface is an exploration of "the inside of the 'enemy camp'—to find out what had gone on behind the opposing front, and in the opponent's mind." No one can gainsay that that is a rather large, if unclear, order. Undaunted by the size of the task and unencumbered by scholastic dicta, Captain Hart manages in just 300 pages to create the impression of a successful job. This is a real indicator of his skill with the pen.

\*Dr. Tilberg is Historian of Gettysburg National Park.



His felicity of expression, however, is not matched by his concern for the fact, nor by the rigorosity of his logic, nor by the fullness of his treatment, nor even by the honesty of the evidence he submits. It is patently impossible in a review of this length to itemize all my objections (nearly 100) under these headings. A few generalities, a few samples, and caveat emptor!

Captain Hart worked, in this case, under two serious limitations. First, he had available only a fairly small number of knowledgeable German officers. A loose count totalled 13 generals, plus unnamed members of Rommel's staff, and 4 admirals who are quoted directly. (This does not include one indirect "quotation" (pp. 169-170) from General Halder, with whom Liddell Hart never spoke in the preparation of this book). The second burden under which the author labored was his delusion of personal infallibility and of the universal, if belated, acceptance of his doctrines.

The narrowness of the vein which Liddell Hart worked for his nuggets is most apparent when one lays the framework of this book over the panorama of the war. Because of the varying assignments and tenures of the German officers, the account of each campaign is on a now-you-see-it-now-you-don't basis. Furthermore, the story is not consistently told at any level, neither Hitler's nor a division commander's. (It is quite possible that this approach was desirable; at the same time any other approach was impossible with the sources at hand.) If one can, for literary or other reasons, condone the episodic treatment, how can one overlook the huge gaps where the story is blank on every level? There is, for example, no real examination of the entire complex of Mediterranean-Balkan strategy. There is no account of fighting in Norway, in the Balkans, in Sicily, in Italy, in Finland, in large parts of Russia for long periods of time, or in Western Europe between Normandy and the Ardennes and in 1945. Of course, a detailed treatment of all this would run the book to unconscionable length, but Captain Hart set his terms of reference, not I.

Besides the gaps, there are errors of fact arising from the limited circle of sources. Thus Rommel's anonymous staff officers misled the author into attributing to the Field Marshal the crucial, unsuccessful attempt to move Fifteenth Army troops to the invasion front. Again, von Kleist's claim that the Germans did not underrate the Red Army is certainly not borne out by the contemporary documents nor by the weight of German officer opinion. It is instructive to note the

salutary effect on credibility of the two documentary footnotes which the author chose to provide.

These weaknesses which grow out of insufficient sources are really minor, to my view, when compared to the pernicious effect of Captain Liddell Hart's propensity for putting his own words in other mouths. Not only did I find it extremely irritating but even destructive of the book's validity when virtually every German is made to utter unctuous phrases to the effect that the author's books had taught them all they knew about warfare. The variation on this theme was that the Germans' experience had fully substantiated Liddell Hart's theories on the superiority of the tactical defense and the transcendent value of "indirection." These avowals, I submit, are spurious. (For examples, see pp. 23, 39, 51, 66, 91, 100, 113, 116, 185, 192, 210, 280, and 292.) Some of the fanciest footwork I ever saw occurs around page 39 where the author, discussing the "subtlety" of strategy, concludes that the German campaign in France, 1940, owed its success to *defensive* tactics!

There are many other faults—terminology, logic, German titles—which can and must be passed over. At the end of a rather unfavorable review, I'm afraid, any words of kindness usually indicate an uneasy conscience. More than that, however, prompts me to recommend this book. Captain Liddell Hart, whatever his faults, is a stimulating, progressive military thinker. Additionally, he writes with an easy grace that makes for pleasant reading. The real trouble with *The German Generals Talk* is: They don't talk that way.

FRANK C. MAHIN,\*  
Washington, D. C.

*Dunkirk*, by A. D. Divine, DSM. (New York: Dutton, 1948. Pp. 311. \$4.50.)

The Dunkirk evacuation is becoming one of the better documented episodes of the Second World War. While the war still raged, we got Lord Gort's dispatches and John Masfield's eloquent little book *The Nine Days' Wonder*; the incident received some attention (still based on incomplete information) from Theodore Draper in *The Six Weeks' War*; and now we have Admiral Ramsay's dispatch (*London Gazette Supplement*, 17 July 1947) and this book by Mr.

\*Captain Mahin is Chief, Foreign Studies Branch, Historical Division, SSUSA. For two years after the war while a member of the Army's Historical Division in Europe he conducted interrogations of some 500 German generals and staff officers.



Divine. The author, a civilian naval writer of note, has special qualifications for writing about Dunkirk, for he was there—and has the Distinguished Service Medal to prove it. (He is too modest to tell about it; but by digging in the valuable appendices we discover that he went over in a craft called *Little Ann*—and that although he was lucky enough to come back, *Little Ann* stayed behind.)

This book does not improve our knowledge of the military events of the 1940 campaign, though it has something to say about them. What it does do is give us an authentic record, and a singularly vivid picture, of the actual lifting of the troops from Dunkirk and the beaches: the purely marine task with its travail and its almost incredible triumph. On this it is probably the last word. As Mr. Divine says, "It will never be possible to gather the record of every ship in this incredible armada"; but he has collected a great number of such records written in the simple words of the men who did the job, and it is mainly these, skillfully worked into the narrative, that give the book its character and make it a valuable contribution to the history of the war. No one with the faintest interest in that history, in the sea, or in the behavior of humanity under stress, can fail to find in it some fascination.

One could quote indefinitely. The reader remembers, for instance, one man's story of how he waded ashore calling "I want sixty men!" He proceeds: "I sighted a causeway about eight feet wide heading out into the water. To my surprise I found it to be a perfectly ordered straight column of men about six abreast, standing as if on parade. When I reached them a sergeant stepped up to me and said, 'Yes, sir. Sixty men, sir?' . . ." One reads with recurring astonishment the record of the "little ships," the tiny pleasure craft with names like London suburban villas—*Bonny Heather* and *Carama* ("15-foot punt!"), *Eothen* and *Esperanza*, *Liebestraum* and *Ma Joie*—which brought so many thousands of men off the deadly beaches. There are even flashes of wry comedy—such as the story of the improvised raft which *Killarney* found floating in the Channel, carrying one French officer, two Belgian soldiers, two tins of biscuits, six demijohns of wine, and a bicycle.

Mr. Divine has not aimed to write a controversial book, but controversial points inevitably arise. He makes it abundantly clear that the Luftwaffe was constantly active and did very great damage; and it is fairly evident that he feels that the R.A.F. could and should have provided more

effective cover. Ramsay says so pretty bluntly (but the historian should not overlook the Air Ministry's reasoned comment upon his complaint). Divine is somewhat less guarded in dealing with allegations that the British deserted the French at Dunkirk, and his marshalling of facts is effective. Few people realize that the naval effort went on for more than 24 hours after the signal "B.E.F. evacuated" was sent at midnight 2-3 June; that in the later hours of that same night French embarkation arrangements broke down and ships sailed empty; that 27,000 troops were withdrawn the following night; and that Admiral Abrial came with the last vessels to Dover and reported there that further evacuation was impossible. The policy from 31 May had been to give British and French equal chances of evacuation in British vessels. Ramsay states that 123,095 French troops reached England, over 100,000 of them in British ships. Others went to French ports.

The remaining gaps in our knowledge of Dunkirk are chiefly on the German side, although some official French information would also be helpful. Mr. Divine's figures of German air losses are the contemporary R.A.F. estimates, which may be as inaccurate as those for the Battle of Britain. And one would like to know whether the German documents support Rundstedt's statement that Hitler refused to allow him to use his armored divisions against Dunkirk—a statement of which Divine had not heard when his book was written.

*Dunkirk's* weakest point is the absence of an adequate map. Apart from this there is little to be said against it. It is a good book.

C. P. STACEY,  
Ottawa, Canada

*Alexander the Great*, by W. W. Tarn. (Cambridge: University Press, 1948. Volume I. Narrative. Pp. xi, 161, folding map. \$3.50. Volume II. Sources and Studies. Pp. xiii, 477, folding map. \$6.50.)

An American scholar has recently made the somewhat surprising statement that no one now was interested in Alexander as a person, though there was some interest in the historical results of Alexander's conquests. Curiously enough, that scholar ended his volume with Alexander's burning of Persepolis, and has much to say about his personality, while the continuing flood of Alexander biographies hardly supports his premise. Certainly the present publication is a denial of it.

Tarn's first volume is a reprint with some re-writing of his chapters in the Cambridge Ancient

History. The second volume deals with a variety of special problems, the source tradition, Alexander's military side, his political ideas, and his relation to religion, sex, and the brotherhood of man. The former is in some ways the most brilliantly written appreciation of Alexander which we have. The latter deals with more or less fundamental matters of considerable importance and much interest. Both are primarily concerned with Alexander the Man, and not with Alexander the historical figure.

The picture which Tarn has formed of the world-conqueror is in many ways original, and is based on a thorough knowledge and long study of the sources. It is an attractive picture, of an Alexander who was no barbarian, drinking and whoring, with fantastic ideas of his own divinity. Stories of his excesses, of his cheating or lying or massacring, are untrue because they are impossible. No one after Alexander's death invented good stories about him, so the bad ones must be late. It is certain that this overplays the English virtues of the son of Philip, that hard riding, hard drinking scion of the Macedonian nobility. We may wonder whether Alexander, reading these volumes in the Old Soldiers' Paradise, will recognize himself.

On the other hand, there is no one who has done more to bring out the military qualities of Alexander than Tarn, and his account of the military antiquities, materiel and tactics, is masterly. This was, without doubt, the phenomenal in the man. He dazzled his soldiers, his contemporaries, and his admirers of all generations, because of his military dash and unflinching success. He was less of a strategist, less of a diplomat, than his father Philip. He needed neither quality. He constantly exposed himself on the field of battle. He was frequently wounded, several times in great danger. He settled each engagement with a charge which he personally led. He never outgeneralled an opponent, always fought him in his own way and on his own ground. But his unflinching grasp of the required tactics, whether the battle was to be on a river line against cavalry or a river line against infantry, on a plain against combined forces spearheaded by knived chariots, or against light cavalry or against elephants, or in the hills and forests against mountaineers, or whether there was a fortress impregnable by art or nature to be captured, his unflinching use of the right tactics and the right arm, and his unflinching leadership of his mixed troops of varying blood and speech, made all his successes seem easy.

These are features in Tarn's portrait which receive their proper emphasis. Officers who wish to study the greatest leader of them all will read these volumes with profit and pleasure.

C. B. WELLES,\*

Lt. Col., MI Res., New Haven, Conn.

*Utah Beach to Cherbourg (6-27 June 1944), American Forces in Action series*, by R. G. Ruppenthal, Historical Division, Department of the Army. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948. Pp. xii, 213. \$2.)

This is an excellent study of the westernmost Normandy landing, of the drive to close off the Cotentin peninsula, and of the seizure of Cherbourg by overland attack. It is in every respect a worthy companion to the *Omaha Beachhead* and should be read in conjunction with that 1946 publication in the same *Series*. *Utah Beach* begins with a short analysis of the planning phase, and concludes with the fall of the principal objective of this particular landing, a port logistically essential to the subsequent sweep across France.

The operation was brilliantly planned and well executed. Opposition was less than anticipated, and the Germans were unable accurately to estimate either their own or American capabilities. These failures were fortunate for the Americans, since clouds and flak dispersed the drops of both the 82nd and the 101st Airborne Divisions, and since the terrain was ideally suited to defense. Three of the four infantry divisions employed, the 4th, 9th, and 79th, displayed thorough training and were aggressively commanded. Leadership of the 90th Infantry Division, on the other hand, broke down; and, interesting to note, its commanding general was relieved about a fortnight before a similar occurrence on Saipan shocked the American people.

It developed that the 90th Infantry Division contributed little to the operation as a whole; but the reader would appreciate a longer analysis of the faults of that division, and at least a summary of its early history. In so far as a conclusion can be reached, Brigadier General Jay W. MacKelvie was relieved for much the same reasons as Major General Ralph Smith, that is faulty training and poor field leadership; although in the latter instance, Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, USMC, continues to fill the public ear with other and more serious charges.

Fortunately for the clarity and objectivity of *Utah Beach*, interservice rivalries offer no obstacle

\*Professor of Classics at Yale University.



to an understanding of what actually took place. The simple truth seems to be that general and flag officers of all services, while qualified for other tasks, sometimes fail as field or fleet commanders. Some of the command shifts of the Army are well known. Navy enthusiasts should be asked to remember the early fighting in the southeastern Solomons. As for the Marines, Admiral Halsey noted in his memoirs that the commanding general of the First Marine Amphibious Corps was discharged amid such an odor that the lingering scent "still makes me cough."

Since the Army Historical Division is doing a splendid job in almost every other respect, one hopes that it will attempt to contribute largely toward the development of a more precise English terminology for writing military history. *Utah Beach* is well organized and simply presented without recourse to hackneyed phrases, is couched in a language comprehensible to the layman, and is profusely illustrated with maps and pictures; but when considered as a part of World War II, the terminology used sometimes becomes meaningless.

For example, although the troops crossing the beach met virtually no opposition of any character, this operation is repeatedly referred to as an "amphibious assault." Certainly it was amphibious. Likewise and correctly, the troops were trained and the plans premised on the assumption of beach-head opposition; but it is at this point that the brilliance of the overall direction becomes most evident. The attack was against a large land mass. Strategically the Germans were caught off balance, and the tactical aspects of crossing the beach were relatively simple. As General Vandegrift observed of the Guadalcanal operation, "landings should not be attempted in the face of organized resistance if, by any combination of march or maneuver, it is possible to land unopposed and undetected at a point within striking distance of the objective." If either Guadalcanal or the landing on the Cotentin peninsula was an "amphibious assault," what was Iwo Jima?

JETER A. ISELY,\*  
Princeton, N. J.

*A Union Officer in Reconstruction*, by John William De Forest. Edited by James H. Croushore and David M. Potter. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948. Pp. xxx, 209. \$3.75.)

Among the thousands of Americans who are taking part in the military occupation and reconstruction of various parts of the world today, there

ought to be, for the sake of future historians, at least one John W. De Forest. There will not be many, for the breed comes rare in any generation. To qualify for De Forest's role one must scorn stereotypes, despise intellectual fads and fashions, emancipate his mind from the shackles of partisanship, bureaucracy, race dogma, and nationalism, and write what he sees and see that clearly. De Forest did all that in this account of his experiences as an agent of the Freedmen's Bureau at Greenville, South Carolina, in 1866 and 1867. A young Union army officer who had written a couple of good novels and some history, he brought to his task a superior literary talent and an intellect of high order. His duties as a Bureau agent combined functions that, in the second great American effort at post-war reconstruction, have been performed by UNRRA and military government. His experience did not extend into the period of radical, carpetbagger Reconstruction, nor did it embrace duty in the Black Belt. Greenville is in the up-country. The bulk of the sketches that make up this book appeared originally in magazines during the late sixties. In spite of the fact that his account of post-war conditions in the South stands head, shoulders, and torso above the sensational "quickies" of such journalists as Whitelaw Reid, Sidney Andrews, and John T. Trowbridge, it has never before been published in book form. It has been almost unanimously ignored by historians of both Northern and Southern schools—perhaps because it did not flatter the prejudices of either. The editors have written an illuminating introduction of thirty pages, and done their job with exemplary competence.

C. VANN WOODWARD,  
Baltimore, Md.

*A History of Military Music in America*, by William Carter White. (New York: The Exposition Press. 1944. Pp. 272. \$3.00.)

This book was written some years ago by a director of music at the United States Army Music School, Washington, D. C. It brings together the author's technical knowledge of military music with his deep interest in the history of American bands. The volume traces the development of martial music in this country from the fifes and drums of the Continental Army to the WAC Band of the present day. Since the old state militia bands were actually civil in character,

\*Dr. Isely is a co-author in the Princeton-Marine Corps Historical Project (see *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, XII, 4, "Headquarters Gazette").



the study includes mention of many of the prominent bands and leaders of the past.

Mr. White's volume is filled with interesting lore and a great deal of information not readily obtainable elsewhere. It is a popular, readable treatment and not a profound work of research. There are several gaps in both the historical and musical sections. For example, there are records in the National Archives of the West Point Band prior to the date the author gives for its establishment. In another direction, the author gives scant mention of the impact of French military

music upon our bands via the American Legion drum corps. No matter how one feels about the musical qualities of a drum corps, the Legion band has been a prominent part of our street parades since the 1920's and cannot be easily ignored.

The volume is well illustrated with photographs of bands, bandmasters and instruments. Because of these, and because of its usefulness for reference, this volume deserves a place on the shelf of all students of American military history.

FREDERICK P. TODD,  
*Historical Division, U. S. Army*

## OTHER RECENT BOOKS

*Persimmon Hill: A Narrative of Old St. Louis and the Far West*, by William Clark Kennerly, as told to Elizabeth Russell (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1948, Pp. 273. \$3.75). The narrator was a nephew of Gen. William Clark of Lewis and Clark fame and tells much about the later years of the explorer. Also included is an account of Sir William Drummond Stewart's journey in the trapper period. In the Mexican War Kennerly made the longest march ever made by horsed artillery with the battery of Doniphan's campaign. He served with Price in the Civil War. Its down to earth pictures of "the social side of war," as one chapter is entitled, make this an interesting commentary.

*Here Rolled the Covered Wagons*, by Albert and Jane Salisbury (Seattle: Superior Publishing Company, 1948, Pp. 256, \$6). An excellent guide book of the Northwest with many photographs of sites and monuments of the pioneer and Indian wars periods.

*Yankee Arms Maker: The Story of Sam Colt and His Six-shot Peacemaker*, by Jack Rohan, revised edition (New York: Harper & Bros., 1948, Pp. 305, \$3.50). Few authentic biographies have been more entertainingly written and this revised edition of a book that has been much sought by gun enthusiasts since its original publication in 1935 should be welcomed by a host of new readers.

*Prescott's The Conquest of Mexico*, designed for modern reading by Marshall McClintock. (New York: Julian Messner. 1948. pp. 360. \$5.00). The first of W. H. Prescott's great works edited to emphasize the exciting exploits of Hernando Cortes and the adventure and drama of his campaign.

*The Colonial Wars In America: A Brief History From 1607 to 1775*, by Herbert T. Wade. (New York: Society of Colonial Wars. 1948. Pp. 120. \$1.00). Activities of the early American patriots before the Revolution.

## SELECTED PERIODICAL LITERATURE

COMPILED BY MISS LUCY WEIDMAN, *Editorial Board*

### HISTORIOGRAPHY

"Historical Reporting of Ground Operations," by Howard L. Oleck, in *Armored Cavalry Journal*, January-February 1949 (LVIII, 54-56).

Ideal organization and procedures for field historical units discussed in detail.

### INSTITUTIONS

"The Defence of Democracy," by Commander Stephen King-Hall, RN, in *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, November 1948

(XCIII, 519-532). A former naval officer wonders what we are trying to defend, from whom, and how. Scholarly.

"Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands," by Vice Admiral Carleton H. Wright, USN (Ret.), in *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, November 1948 (74, 1333-1341). A stimulating survey by the former Deputy High Commissioner.

"The United States Navy and the Open Door Policy," by Captain Lucius C. Dunn, USN (Ret.), in *US Naval Proceedings*, January 1949 (79, 53-65). China and the Navy since 1845, in a scholarly discussion.

### NATIONAL WARFARE

"Operation SEALION," by General Guenther Blumentritt, in *An Cosantoir, The Irish Defence Journal*, January 1949 (IX, 644-650). Detailed account of the German plan for the invasion of Britain in 1940.

"Allied Grand Strategy in the Defeat of Germany, 1939-45," by Col. C. P. Stacey, in *Canadian Army Journal*, October-November 1948 (2, 6-10). The second and final article in a series discussing not only military planning but the conferences attended by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin.

"America's African Beach-head," by Major Guy Richards, USMCR, and Major J. L. Zimmerman, USMCR, in *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, November 1948 (74, 1387-1395). What part would Africa play in another war, and how useful would it be?

"High Command—A Comparison," by Colonel Robert Alan, USAF, in *Antiaircraft Journal*, January-February 1949 (LXXXII, 49-51). A comparison between British and American command organizations.

### LAND WARFARE

"The Role of Land Forces in Future Warfare," by Major General Charles L. Bolte, USA, in *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, January 1949 (75, 21-23).

"Armored Warfare: Considerations of the Past and Future," by General Heinz Guderian, in

*Armored Cavalry Journal*, January-February 1949 (LVIII, 2-7). An account of German experiments with tanks, and of their use in the breakthrough at Sedan, by the German armored forces commander in that operation.

### SEA WARFARE

"Who Has the Best New Submarines?," by Fletcher Pratt in *Harper's*, February 1949 (63 ff.). Development and post-war disposition of the famous Type XXI "schnorkel" submarines. Other German developments in submarine design were even more novel, and may yet revolutionize naval warfare.

"Surveying Ships," by Rear Admiral Leo O. Colbert, USCG, in *The Military Engineer*, January-February 1949 (XLI, 16-18). Vessels used by the US Coast and Geodetic Survey from 1835 to the present.

"Ancient and Modern Aspects of Sea Power," by Captain W. D. Puleston, USN (Ret.), in

*US Naval Institute Proceedings*, November 1948 (74, 1351-1365). An excellent summary of the subject.

"Seventy-five Years of Progressive Naval Thinking," by Lt. Comdr. W. H. Russell, USNR, in *US Naval Proceedings*, October 1948 (74, 1251-1261). An interesting review of articles that have appeared in the *Proceedings* through the years.

"The Big Bear Wets His Paws," by Lt. Comdr. J. Burke Wilkinson, USNR, in *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, October 1948 (74, 1225-1232). Well written remarks on the Russian Navy.

### AIR WARFARE

"TIGER FORCE: Its Conception, Planning, and Fate," by "Aquila," in *The Royal Air Force Quarterly*, October 1948 (IV, 216-221). Brief account of the British Strategic Bomber Force that was about to go to the Far East when V-J Day occurred.

"Glossary of Guided Missile Terms," in

*Antiaircraft Journal*, January-February 1949 (LXXXII, 33-47). Basic information on a subject of rapidly increasing importance. This is apparently an appendix to "Operational Aspects of Guided Missiles," by Lt. Colonels Hudiburg and Thomas (same issue, Pp. 13-17). A very technical discussion.

## ESTABLISHMENTS

"Establishment of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps," by Lt. Col. M. E. Treadwell, USAF (Res), in *Military Review*, February 1949 (XXVIII, 3-16). The planning period of the WAAC prior to the passage of the Rogers Bill (14 May 1942).

"Building the Reserve Forces," by the Editor, in *Army Information Digest*, December 1948 (3, 7-9). The National Guard and ORC: their present status and strength, and their place in the army of the future.

"Department of the Army Reorganized," by Col. Kilbourne Johnston, in *Army Information Digest*, December 1948 (3, 31-34). Short, factual article, including a useful organization chart.

"Adam to Atom," by Dr. Roger Shaw, in *The Military Engineer*, January-February 1949 (XLI, 24-31). Continuing an interesting chronological series, Part IX covers French conscription in the 19th Century, and Part X, the beginnings of

War by Machine in the same period.

"Our Duty Lies Before Us," by Lt. Comdr. Edward L. Beach, USN, in *US Naval Proceedings*, January 1949 (75, 79-83). A plea for greater unification from top to bottom of the armed services.

"National Defense Academies," by General Carl Spaatz, USAF, in *Newsweek*, 21 February 1949 (P. 24). This proposal to make identical the curricula of West Point and Annapolis, and to allocate some of the graduates of each to the Air Force, would further unification.

"The Structure of Naval Appropriations Acts," by Rear Admiral J. N. Furer, USN (Ret.) in *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, December 1948 (74, 1517-1527). An important historical survey.

"Fifteen Months of Unification," by James Forrestal in *Army Information Digest*, February 1949 (4, 8-25). First report of the Secretary of Defense.

## OPERATIONS AND BIOGRAPHY

"Prelude to Offensive Action in the Pacific," by Dr. John Miller, Jr., in *Military Review*, December 1948 (XXVIII, 3-12). The planning period prior to the Guadalcanal landing is discussed at length.

"An Answer and Rebuttal to 'Smith Versus Smith: The Saipan Controversy,'" by Robert Sherwood, in *The Infantry Journal*, January 1949 (LXIV, 14-28).

"St-Lo Breakthrough," by Lt. Col. Howard P. Persons, Jr., in *Military Review*, December 1948 (XXVIII, 13-23). Excellent short description of Operation COBRA, executed in July 1944 to keep the Normandy invasion from bogging down.

"Sixth Army Communications," by Colonel Harry Reichelderfer, in *Signals*, November-December 1948 (3, 5-9). Technical problems encountered when an Army CP must direct a cam-

paign by radio alone, with practically no wire communications whatever. Examples from four Pacific operations.

"Destroyer Dust," by Rear Admiral J. G. Coward, USN (Ret.), in *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, November 1948 (74, 1373-1383). Destroyers in the night battle of Surigao Strait.

"A Connecticut Soldier Under Washington: Elisha Bostwick's Memoirs of the First Years of the Revolution," by William S. Powell in *The William and Mary Quarterly*, January 1949 (VI, 94-107). Some details on transfers from Provincial to Continental units.

"Sidelights on Mahan," by Captain J. M. Elliott, USN (Ret.), in *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, October 1948 (74, 1247-1249). Amusing and enlightening recollections of the naval historian.

## CUSTOMS AND ANTIQUITIES

"Report on the Military Papers of Field Marshal Sir George Nugent, Bart., in The Royal United Service Institution Library," in *The Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, May-November 1948 (XXI, 225-232). For some years of the late 18th Century, the files of this most methodical soldier are virtually complete.

"Fort Wayne—A Century of Service," by James

R. Irwin in *The Quarterly Review of the Michigan Alumnus*, Autumn 1948 (LV, 68-79). This account stresses the founding and early years of the installation.

"Evolution of the Gun," by Tenney L. Davis, in *Ordnance*, November-December 1948 (XXX III, 180-1). Traces the ancestry of modern projectile weapons back to the ancient Chinese.



## DEVELOPMENT OF WAR DEPARTMENT VIEWS ON UNIFICATION\*

BY RAY S. CLINE AND MAURICE MATLOFF

PROPOSALS FOR unification of the War and Navy Departments in a Department of National Defense go far back in the history of the military policy of the United States. Since the end of the First World War numerous bills have been introduced in Congress with this objective, but until almost the beginning of World War II both the Army and Navy vigorously opposed such a reorganization. General Douglas MacArthur, when Chief of Staff, voiced the general sentiment of the whole anti-consolidation group in the War Department. In a letter to Congressman C. H. Martin dated 18 February 1932, he wrote: "No other measure proposed in recent years seems to me fraught with such potential possibilities of disaster for the United States" as one that would alter the alignment of the "proven agencies which have successfully conducted this country through six wars in a period of one hundred and twenty-five years." He referred to a fundamental difference between land and sea combat, and spoke of the "ponderous bureaucratic control" that a common defense department would impose upon the two services.

\*This article was prepared in the course of writing a history of *The Operations Division of The War Department General Staff*, one of the forthcoming volumes of the official *The U. S. Army in World War II* series to be published by the Army Historical Division. This study illustrates interesting characteristics of some of the administrative volumes in that history, which deal with men at work in large agencies or staffs, particularly with the origins and fate of ideas that lead to decisions, policies, or actions. It was derived from the records of the War Department, largely from the files of the Operations Division, General Staff (OPD). In describing the staffwork behind the Army's support of the

The question arose in the War Department immediately after the First World War as a result of a memorandum by Col. John McA. Palmer, one of the members of the Harbord Board, suggesting that the best solution to the practical problem of joint national defense could be the establishment of a Ministry of National Defense having control over the Army and Navy. About the same time, in March 1921, a private research organization called the Institute for Government Research proposed a consolidation of the War and Navy Departments. Shortly afterwards the War Plans Division (WPD) set the pattern of War Department opinion for the next twenty years with a long memorandum dated 21 April 1922, opposing the consolidation. Despite the creation by Congress of a Joint Committee on Reorganization of the Administrative Branch of the Government, which recommended the creation of a common defense department, and the introduction in Congress of numerous bills to bring about this consolidation of the War and Navy Departments, the War Department position remained unchanged.

move for unification, this study frequently mentions officers by name, whether they were well known at the time or not.

The facts are presented as they appear in the written record, but their presentation naturally reflects the views of the Army officers working on the problem. This study does not try to analyze the validity of these views, or the merits of any particular plan for unification, but simply spells out the steps by which the Army came to advocate this great change in our national defense organization. Although presented here without footnotes, a manuscript copy with complete documentation is on file in the General Reference Section, Historical Division, Department of the Army. — THE EDITOR.

As World War II approached closer and closer to the United States, something of a change of heart took place in both the War Department and the Navy Department. In 1941 the Navy formally recommended the creation of a unified command organization of the armed forces, consisting of a joint Army-Navy General Staff with a chief of the joint General Staff responsible directly to the President. WPD studied the matter for the Chief of Staff and prepared a memorandum indorsing the idea as fundamentally desirable despite practical difficulties, if it were acceptable to the President and both service departments. General Marshall had already become convinced of the desirability of some measure of unification. However, between June 1941, when the Navy General Board submitted its memorandum to the Secretary of Navy, and January 1942, the Navy reverted to its old position of opposition to the consolidation of the two departments in any system more binding than the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) committee system, just then beginning to operate. On 27 February 1942 the Joint Planning Committee, acting under directive of the Joint Board, submitted a report on the proposal to create a command organization of the armed forces. This report stated that "the views held on this subject by the Army and Navy members, respectively, are so divergent as to prohibit possibility of agreement."

The formal administrative status of the armed services did not change during World War II. The JCS committee system met the more urgent requirements for co-ordination of military actions, and Army and Navy officers bent every effort to make that system work. Nevertheless General Marshall and his staff officers continued to press for the study and discussion of unification as a matter of paramount importance in long-range plans for national defense.

### *Early Wartime Proposals for Unified High Command*

Late in 1942 and early in 1943, among their many other planning tasks, the Army members of the Joint U. S. Strategic Committee (JUSSC) turned their attention to the need for a "unified high command" that would provide the maximum co-ordination and concentration of the power of the armed forces of the United States. In mid-January 1943, they presented to General Wedemeyer of OPD, specific proposals reflecting their conception of the proper relation between air power and naval and ground forces. They advocated the establishment of a separate air arm to gather into one organization the strategic air force of the United States. To direct forces composed of two or more services (Army, Navy, Air), they would set up a new type of staff organization, "separate and distinct from any armed service," to be known as the "High Command." The JCS organization would form the nucleus of the new staff, which would embrace all theater and task force commanders and their immediate assistants. Personnel assigned would be separated from their services, wear a distinctive uniform, and remain permanently with this high command. The senior officer would be the President's Chief of Staff for the armed forces and immediately and solely responsible to him for the direction of the military operations of the land, sea, and air forces. To give the Air Force an agency comparable to the offices of the Secretaries of War and Navy, an Administrator for Air would be appointed. To co-ordinate Army, Navy, and Air Force activities at the Cabinet level, a Coordinator for National Defense also would be designated.

Similar proposals for a unified high command and staff organization were presented on 25 February 1943, in an unofficial study

prepared on their own initiative by Col. W. W. Bessell, Jr., Lt. Col. P. W. Caraway, and Lt. Col. D. P. Armstrong, all members of the Strategy Section of OPD. Convinced that "all of our U. S. war experiences (from Pearl Harbor to the present date) point to the necessity for unity of command on all levels," these three officers outlined a plan for the early establishment of a "United States General Staff," as the first step in the unification of command for the armed forces of the United States. This staff, to be a "permanent supporting agency" to the JCS, was to consist of an approximately equal number of Air, Navy, and Ground officers constituting a separate Staff Corps and wearing a distinctive uniform to signify their belonging to a joint service. Similarly, theater and joint task force commanders and their staff officers would be members of the United States General Staff. This new joint staff would in large measure replace, the planners believed, the current "inadequate committee system" in use on the joint planning level. From the chief of the United States General Staff, single channels of command and responsibility would extend to Army, Navy, (Air), theater, and task force commanders. The chief of the new staff would need two deputies, one for Operations and one for Requirements, and a permanent planning and operating staff. Within the recommended framework, the Strategy Section planners indicated, a separate Air Force could be organized at any stage.

The principle of a Joint General Staff, upon which the Joint Board had been unable to agree in March 1942, and which in effect the Army studies of early 1943 sought to revive, received some slight attention in the joint committees during the course of the reorganization of the JCS system in the spring and summer of 1943. Though the reorganization movement stopped far short of the

actual establishment of a new type of general staff, further study on the joint level followed. The Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC), one of the joint agencies established in the reorganization of 1943, recommended in October 1943 that the JCS accept the "principle" of a Joint General Staff and initiate a gradual transition to it. The Joint Staff Planners (JPS) deferred action on the JWPC proposal pending further study.

Though no action developed on a unified joint staff at the level of high command, the JCS agreed on 20 April 1943, on a system of unified command for American joint operations, in effect simply the task force part of the JWPC recommendations. Joint and combined commands had been in existence for more than a year, but without adequate provision for joint staff procedures. This precedent, however restricted in application, became an important landmark, from the Army's point of view, on the road to over-all unification. In subsequent debates between the services, War Department leaders as well as civilian authorities frequently pointed to the experiences of the armed forces in overseas operations under unity of command as a compelling argument for unification of the high command of the armed forces. An example is President Truman's message to Congress of 19 December 1945.

#### *Mid-war Disagreement on Service Roles and Missions*

Part of the inability of the Army and Navy to agree on the proper organization of the armed forces stemmed from their differences over the even more fundamental question of the basic roles and missions of each of the armed forces. In connection with joint discussions of a proposed revision of the Navy aircraft program in May 1943, General McNarney (Acting Chief of Staff, U. S. Army) advised the JCS on 7 June 1943



that firm agreements probably could not be reached until the respective basic missions or combat roles of the Army and Navy, including their air arms, were explicitly defined. In line with this suggestion, the JCS in June 1943 set up an *ad hoc* committee, under the guidance of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC), to submit recommendations on the roles or missions of the Army and Navy "in various types and phases of military operations." The committee was instructed to aim at eliminating unnecessary duplication and applying with maximum effect the available means, particularly aircraft, for the prosecution of the war. Officers from Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and OPD were the Army members originally appointed to the committee. This *ad hoc* committee twice submitted to the JSSC separate reports by the Army and Navy members, expressing widely divergent views. Concurrent and related efforts by another Army-Navy *ad hoc* committee to bring up to date and revise the basic prewar joint agreement of 1935, "Joint Action of the Army and Navy" (JAAN), also made little progress. Colonel R. T. Maddocks was OPD's representative assigned to both committees. In neither committee could Army and Navy members reconcile their different interpretations of the basic missions of the armed services, particularly of their combat air arms.

The trend of thinking of the Army officers on both of these joint *ad hoc* committees was summed up in the separate Army report submitted to the JSSC on 21 August 1943. It stated that certain duplications of administrative and operating functions might be reduced by a clear definition of the war missions and roles of the Army and Navy. The Army members observed, however, that duplication and overlapping would continue to exist in any mutually acceptable statement of

missions and roles. They stated:

As long as the Army and Navy retain their present independent status with separate service elements, ground force elements and air forces, there will be inevitable duplication of functions and conflict for materiel and personnel. . . . To get at the true source of duplicated effort and to apply most effectively available resources for the prosecution of war, requires that the two services as now organized, either be consolidated into a Department of National Defense consisting of an appropriate commander and staff and four forces, land, sea, air, and service, or that a joint general staff of the armed forces be evolved with complete authority to direct administration and operations of the Army and Navy.

The Army members of the committee on roles and missions put the weight of their recommendations behind the evolution of an "authoritative Joint General Staff of the Armed Forces of the United States" to secure more effective employment of American resources and more efficient conduct of operations. In early October 1943 the Army members again submitted a separate report, containing detailed recommendations similar to those in their report of August 1943, and the JSSC found itself still unable to reconcile the divergent Army and Navy views.

#### *War Department Studies of Demobilization and Postwar Requirements*

Further interest in unification in midwar came about from another source. General Marshall, who saw the need for demobilization planning long before the Army was fully mobilized, on 14 April 1943 charged General Somervell (Commanding General, Army Service Forces) with the responsibility for exploratory studies on demobilization. To initiate broad plans on this subject, General Somervell set up a Special Projects Division under Brig. Gen. W. F. Tompkins in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Serv-

ice Commands (Maj. Gen. George Grunert). In its preliminary definition of its problems, this division reported on 18 June 1943 that, whereas demobilization planning depended upon plans for the permanent postwar military establishment, these latter plans could not be formulated prior to determination of the War Department's attitude on such issues as a single department of national defense.

Study of the national defense organization was one of the priority tasks bequeathed by the Special Projects Division to its successor, the Special Planning Division (SPD). SPD, established 22 July 1943 as a special staff division of the War Department, was charged with planning for "post-war military and related industrial demobilization." General Tompkins was transferred from Army Service Forces and appointed as director, SPD. As General Handy (Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD) promptly observed to General Tompkins, SPD blueprints of a permanent postwar military establishment would have to include some definite assumption as to the nature and degree of unification, "if any," which might exist among the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Air Forces.

SPD continued its study from August to October 1943. Before submitting its report to the Chief of Staff, General Tompkins forwarded a preliminary draft to General Handy for review. General Handy suggested several changes and concurred in both the conclusions of the study and the proposed action for the Chief of Staff, which was to submit the conclusions to the JCS. Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney (Deputy Chief of Staff) and Brig. Gen. J. McA. Palmer, special adviser to SPD, also concurred.

The revised version of the study, submitted to General Marshall on 11 October 1943, pointed out that the ultimate solution

of demobilization problems depended a great deal on the size, nature, and organization of the permanent postwar military establishment. It emphasized that, though the final solution would be made by Congress, the War Department, the JCS, and the President should clarify their respective attitudes in the near future as a guide to demobilization planning. SPD expressed its view that lack of "real unity of command" had handicapped the successful conduct of World War II and that co-ordinating committees were not a satisfactory substitute. It called for unified command from the level of the high command of the three armed services down to the commander of a small joint task force. "A permanent single department, with combined staffs in habitual operation not only at the top level, but also in overseas garrisons and on all other occasions where co-ordination of the basic forces is necessary," it affirmed, "would provide the remedy" for deficiencies in both economy and national security.

SPD suggested, more specifically, establishment of a Department of War, headed by a Secretary of War with four under secretaries, each responsible for one of the four major subdepartments: Ground Forces, Air Forces, Navy, and a general Supply Department. The Supply Department would provide centralized control of procurement, supply, and service functions for the three combat forces. A Chief of Staff, assisting the President to exercise his functions as Constitutional Commander in Chief of the armed forces, would be the single head of a compact Joint General Staff including the Chiefs of Staff of the three armed services and the Chief of Staff for supply. SPD recommended, on the basis of this study, that the "War Department take a positive stand in favor of a single Department of War."

In forwarding this study to General Mar-

shall, General Tompkins observed that many advantages, especially in the field of industrial demobilization, would accrue from the establishment of a single department. Since many industrial matters, such as policies for the disposition of War Department facilities, equipment, and material, had to be determined in the near future, General Tompkins urged an early attempt to get the JCS to approve, for planning purposes only, the basic idea of a single Department of War in the postwar period. General Tompkins stated his opinion that nearly all the ranking officers of the Army then favored a single department and that many ranking Navy officers agreed. On the grounds that the idea was "so inevitable" and that so many "thoughtful officials" favored it, General Tompkins concluded, the "War Department might well take the initiative in advancing it."

General Marshall approved the SPD study with slight revisions on 22 October 1943. Accordingly, OPD prepared a copy of the study for consideration by the JCS, and sent it forward in the name of the Chief of Staff on 2 November 1943. At this point the Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army was clearly on record as supporting the principle of a single department of war for the postwar period.

Admiral King stated on 7 November 1943 that he agreed in general with the need for improving co-ordination of the armed services in the interests of efficiency, and approved General Marshall's suggestion that the JSSC conduct studies to that end. He pointed out, however, that the results of those studies might or might not lead to a single Department of War. In any case the JCS referred the whole question, including recommendations by General Marshall and Admiral King, to the JSSC on 7 November 1943.

### *JSSC Conclusions and Recommendations of 8 March 1944*

The JSSC, still confronted with the separate reports submitted by the Army and Navy representatives in the *ad hoc* committee on roles and missions, undertook to examine this issue along with the positive recommendations of the Chief of Staff for a single department of war. On 8 March 1944 the JSSC submitted a report to the JCS recommending that these two separate lines of study be merged. Both had a common major factor, the aim to eliminate unwarranted duplication. The JSSC declared that ultimate solution of this problem would come only in a thorough reorganization of the national defense. The committee concluded, first, that any reorganization should recognize the principle of three services (ground, sea, and air) and, second, as recommended by the War Department, that the JCS should approve the idea of a single military organization. Finally the JSSC urged the appointment of a special committee, consisting of two Navy officers and two Army officers (one of the latter from the Army Air Forces) to study for the JCS the most efficient and practicable organization of national defense.

During the next two months the JCS debated these JSSC conclusions. General Marshall informed Admiral King on 17 April 1944 that he favored JCS approval, for purposes of planning and study, of the "principle of three services within one military organization." He also pointed out that further committee study of the broad problem of whether there were to be one, two, or three defense departments, such as Admiral King had suggested earlier, had been under study for years by civilian and military committees and boards and that another committee for that purpose would add little, if anything, new. General Marshall stated that in his



opinion solution of secondary defense problems, like duplication of facilities and functions, confusion of missions and roles of the Army and Navy, and unsystematic air organization, depended upon a "sound organization at the top." He observed: "In the Army we experienced the same difficulties over a period of years which we are now experiencing in the over-all military organization. We never achieved a satisfactory solution to many questions of organization, functions, etc., until we settled upon a military head to the Army in the Chief of Staff, supported by a General Staff." Furthermore, General Marshall added, a Congressional committee had already begun to explore the possibility of creating a single department of national defense, and if the War and Navy Departments could not solve the problem between them before the end of hostilities, it probably would be solved for them.

### *The Woodrum Committee*

The Select Committee of the House of Representatives on Postwar Military Policy, called the Woodrum Committee, to which General Marshall had referred, held hearings during April and May 1944 on unification. Senior officers and high-ranking officials of the War and Navy Departments appeared before the Woodrum Committee to testify on a proposal to establish a single department of the armed forces. In general, the Army representatives favored the establishment of a single department at an appropriate time, while the Navy witnesses were reluctant to give their support without further study of the subject.

Among the Army witnesses endorsing the idea of a single department of armed services were General Palmer, Secretary of War Stimson, Under Secretary of War Patterson, and General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff. General McNarney went into consid-

erable detail and presented a chart with a proposal for the unified organization. He pointed out that the problem of reorganization of national defense was a "national as well as a military problem." Stressing the necessity of a single department, for the armed forces to secure the advantages of unity of command, he also recommended a JCS organization headed by a Chief of Staff to the Constitutional Commander in Chief (the President), and including the Chief of Staff for the Army, the Chief of Staff for the Navy, and the Chief of Staff for the Air Forces. He also would include in this group the director of Common Supply Services, though this officer would occupy a position subordinate to that of the other Chiefs of Staff. Emphasizing the principle of the three armed services operating within the framework of a single department, he urged a single Secretary for the Armed Forces, with an Under Secretary for the Army, an Under Secretary for the Navy, and an Under Secretary for Air.

Hon. James Forrestal, then Under Secretary of the Navy, testified on the proposal for a single department: "I think it is a challenging idea and I think it should be studied and examined by this committee. . . . I am not prepared to say that the Navy believes that the consolidation into one department is desirable." Other witnesses for the Navy agreed in general with Mr. Forrestal, except Admiral Yarnell, who endorsed the idea of a single department.

The Woodrum Committee agreed with the almost unanimous view of the witnesses that no fundamental or over-all reorganization could be made during a critical operational stage of the war, and merely filed a report urging that the matter be kept under continued study. It did give its hearty approval to the action of the JCS in establishing a special committee to pursue the study of na-

tional defense organization, and requested that the conclusions of this study go to Congress, as well as to the JCS.

*Special JCS Committee on Reorganization of National Defense*

The JCS approval, 9 May 1944, of establishing a special committee to study the reorganization of national defense as a whole ushered in the last phase of wartime study of unification. The basic instructions upon which the committee was to proceed, as evolved by the JSSC and the JCS between 9 and 19 May 1944, represented a compromise of Army and Navy views. The JCS did not restrict the committee to acceptance of the principle of a single department of national defense, but instead directed it to a thorough examination of the relative advantages and practicability of *three systems* of organization, two departments (War and Navy), three departments (War, Navy, Air), and one Department of War (or Defense). The objective was to devise measures to insure the efficiency and integration of effort of ground, sea, and air forces.

The special committee, of which Admiral J. O. Richardson (retired) became chairman, included as Army representatives Maj. Gen. H. L. George, Commanding General, Air Transport Command, and General Tompkins, SPD director. They and the other Navy member, Vice Admiral J. S. McCain, set to work in earnest in early June 1944, and conducted hearings over a period of ten months both in Washington and in the theaters of war. To obtain the views of the commanders in the field, their immediate subordinates, and their staffs, in November and December 1944 the special committee visited the European and Mediterranean Theaters of Operations and the Southwest Pacific and the Pacific Ocean areas. On 11 April 1945 it submitted its conclusions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The special committee reported that, with the exception of the senior Navy member, Admiral Richardson, it was unanimously in favor of a single department of the armed forces. It indicated that Generals of the Army MacArthur and Eisenhower, Admiral Nimitz, Admiral Halsey, and many other commanders in the field supported this view. The committee recommended that legislative steps be taken without delay and that the reorganization be effected by the President not later than six months after the war. To co-ordinate national policies with military preparedness in the postwar period, the special committee also recommended that a council composed of representatives of the projected Department of the Armed Forces and the Department of State be established.

Between April 1945 and the close of hostilities in September 1945 the JCS carried on another round of debate on the unification question, this time in connection with the findings of the JCS committee. General Marshall and General Arnold (Army Air Forces) called for the acceptance of the recommendation of the majority report of the special committee. Admiral King argued against the approval of that recommendation and expressed himself in favor of the minority report of Admiral Richardson. General Marshall took the position in September 1945 that the time had come for the basic differences within the JCS, along with the special committee's report, to be presented directly to the President. On 2 October 1945 the JCS finally agreed to this course of action. On 17 October the special committee report and the separate Army and Navy reactions to it, as expressed by their respective leaders in the JCS, were forwarded to the President.

*Postwar Action on Unification*

While the President and his advisers were studying these divergent JCS proposals, the

Senate Military Affairs Committee held hearings on the unification question. Technically the hearings of this committee from October through December 1945 were held on two bills in connection with the proposed establishment of a single department of the armed forces. As the hearings progressed, however, the discussions centered around a War Department outline plan for the organization of the single department of the armed forces, presented in the testimony of Lt. Gen. J. L. Collins, Chief of Staff, Army Ground Forces, on 30 October 1945. The basic characteristics of the War Department outline plan submitted by General Collins were: (1) a single executive department headed by a civilian secretary, a civilian under secretary, and civilian assistant secretary; (2) a Chief of Staff of the armed forces who was to be the senior military adviser to the President and the secretary; (3) three coequal arms — Army, Navy, and Air — with their own commanders, each charged with operations in its own sphere; (4) a Chiefs of Staff organization to make recommendations on military policy, strategy, and budget.

Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, Admiral King, and other naval officers opposed unification of the armed services, Secretary Forrestal presenting an alternate plan for "Proposed Organization for National Security." This plan was based on suggestions of Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt, who, at the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, had made an independent study of the organization for national security. The Eberstadt Report was placed before the Senate Military Affairs Committee, and Secretary Forrestal argued along its lines that the plan for unification of the armed services into a single department failed to provide for the larger and more important relationships, such as the integration of the armed forces with the State Department and other governmental

and civil agencies concerned with national security. He called for the establishment of a National Security Council headed by the President and a National Security Resources Board. Further study of the whole question of national security, Secretary Forrestal concluded, should be made by a nonpartisan commission.

In these postwar Washington hearings, high-ranking Navy officers who previously had testified in the field before the special JCS committee on reorganization in favor of a single department of the armed services, reversed their position. The upshot of these Senate hearings, 17 October to 17 December 1945, was to emphasize to Congressional leaders the current cleavage in Army and Navy views on unification which had been referred by the JCS to the President. Action on the issue of the reorganization of the executive branch of the government concerned with national defense clearly would have to await the receipt of the President's views and further debate in Congress.

The President soon gave his answer. In his message to Congress of 19 December 1945, President Truman recommended that the Congress "adopt legislation combining the War and Navy Departments into one Single Department of National Defense," with the Air Forces entirely coequal with the other services. The broad lines of the structural reorganization of the armed forces which he proposed were substantially the same as those contained in the majority report of the special JCS committee and the War Department outline plan presented at the Senate committee hearings by General Collins. In presenting to Congress his stand on unification he recapitulated the familiar arguments which service and civilian advocates of unification had presented during the period of hostilities and in the early aftermath of hostilities. The President's declaration put the problem of



unification before the Congress for action. The services continued their debate in and out of Congressional hearings from early 1946 down to the passage of the unification act (The National Security Act of 1947) in the summer of that year. Evidence of the need for unification in the posthostilities period mounted steadily as it became apparent that the Army, the Navy, and the Army Air Forces could not agree on a plan for the peacetime size and composition of the armed forces. This latter problem had been referred to the JCS by President Truman on 21 August 1945, just prior to the close of hostilities. In turn, the JCS referred this problem to the JPS who found themselves unable to prepare a comprehensive joint plan. The Army side, sparked by the Special War Department Committee on the Permanent Military Establishment set up in October 1945 and headed by General Bessell of OPD, considered that the question of unification was vital in evolving such a joint plan. In submitting a separate Army report to the JCS in early January 1946 as the basis for the Army part in such a comprehensive plan,

General Eisenhower, then Chief of Staff, proposed, and the other members of the JCS agreed, that the JSSC should prepare a statement of service missions and roles to guide the planners in their joint study. On 26 February 1946 the Army and Navy members of the JSSC sent up a split report to the JCS on roles and missions, and on 7 June 1946 the JCS agreed once more to defer further consideration of that thorny question. Unification or lack of unification had to come first.

The War Department remained steadfast in its support of complete unification, but it eventually had to make concessions to Navy views. The chief sacrifice of what the Army considered essential was with respect to a single military head of the armed forces. The compromise steps finally worked out by the services were embodied in a settlement approved by Congress in the form of the National Security Act of 1947. This agreement on some kind of unification of the armed services opened a new phase in the story of American interservice relationships.

# CLAUSEWITZ AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY LINE A PRONOUNCEMENT BY STALIN

INTRODUCTION AND TRANSLATION BY PAUL M. KOBER

The following correspondence was published in *Bolshevik*, 1947 No. 3, about a year after the exchange of letters took place. Like any chief of state, Stalin receives many letters from all kinds of people on all possible subjects, and a good many of them are published. Colonel Razin's letter is in a somewhat different category, as he addresses Stalin formally as the Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and specifically states that his subject is "political." The Central Committee is responsible for decisions on political policy (synonymous with Party policy in Russia) and operates under Stalin's direct supervision. Colonel Razin's letter may possibly have been outside the proper channels, but it went to the right place.

This correspondence illustrates the considerable freedom of expression that exists in Russia on non-political subjects. A non-political subject, for practical purposes, may be defined as one on which the Communist

Party has not yet laid down a policy. Once the Party has expressed an opinion about it, any subject becomes political. This applies notably to scientific theories and historical evaluations, such as are here at issue.

It should be clearly understood that Stalin's letter, despite its informality, is an authoritative policy document, and that no military theories are now being taught in Russia that in any way conflict with the ideas here expressed. Publication of this correspondence in a non-professional periodical implies that there is considerable popular interest in military theory in the USSR, and that the government recognizes its importance. By contrast, this correspondence was very briefly mentioned in *The New York Times* (March 9, 1947) in an article that dwelt upon Stalin's distaste for fulsome compliments.

Finally, this exchange illustrates the Marxist frame of reference that shapes Soviet thought, and gives a clue to the critical methods of modern Russian scholarship.

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## COLONEL RAZIN'S LETTER

DEAR COMRADE STALIN:

May I respectfully ask if you could shed light for me upon the following questions:

- 1) Have Lenin's theses in his appraisal of Clausewitz grown obsolete?
- 2) What should be our attitude with regard to the military and theoretical heritage of Clausewitz?

I lost my bearings in these questions when I read an article in our leading military-theoretical magazine *Military Thought*, No. 6-7 for 1945: "Clausewitz and the German Military Ideology."

(Lt. Col. Meshcheryakov.) In 1944 in the Voroshilov Supreme Military Academy I had occasion to protest a declaration by the Deputy Political Commander of the Academy, Col. Baz, to the effect that, in this respect, it was necessary to revise Lenin. The article in *Military Thought* seems to reaffirm Col. Baz's thesis. Was the editor right in publishing such an article?

The basic evaluation of Clausewitz' work in the article can be summarized in the following quotations:

"Predominance of reactionary opinions in Clausewitz' works" (p. 93).

"He did not understand the character and essence of war" (p. 110).

"He was below the level of the military and theoretical thought of his time." (p. 113).

Now, it is known that Lenin considered Clausewitz one of the most penetrating authors on military affairs, one of the great military writers, one of the most distinguished writers on the philosophy of war and the history of warfare whose basic ideas have been appropriated in our time by all thinking men. (Lenin, *Works*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 197, 249, Vol. XXII, p. 511, Vol. XXX, p. 333).

Thus Lenin's evaluation of Clausewitz directly contradicts the appraisal given in the article in *Military Thought*.

If Meshcheryakov and not Lenin is right in his appraisal of Clausewitz, then the authority of the writer of the article is so slight that he should not have come forward with a statement on this kind of an issue. He does not even contradict Lenin openly! In this case the article only disorients our officers and generals—which can be harmful to the Red Army. If, however, Meshcheryakov's opinions are not right, then his article cannot be described as other than an assault on Lenin which must be repelled.

On these grounds the article is, in my opinion, politically harmful. It is thus not a "narrowly military-theoretical question," but a political issue, for which reason I have decided to turn to the CC of the AUCP(b),<sup>1</sup> to you, dear Comrade Stalin.

A detailed set of suggestions on this issue is of great importance for the fulfillment of the ordinance in which you drew attention to grave inadequacies in the military-theoretical magazine *Military Thought* and in which you pointed out to its editors several great concrete tasks. For our progressive Soviet military science in general and for military-historical science in particular, our relationship to the theoretical heritage of the past is of utmost importance. In the classics of Marxism-Leninism we can find clear and open assertions on this subject: "... a complete appropriation of everything that science has developed up to the present time, a critical reworking of what was created by human thinking and tested in practice." (Lenin, Vol. XXV, p. 387) "Proletarian culture must be a legitimate development of those

stores of knowledge which mankind has accumulated under the oppression of a capitalistic society, of a landowner society, of an officeholders' society." (Lenin, *ibid.*) This, in general, applies also to military culture. We do not reject the results of bourgeois culture just because, for example, these results have been used by the Fascists for the performance of the most brutal acts of barbarism. We utilize the results of bourgeois culture for the construction of a socialist structure, for the building of a communist society. With this purpose in mind we do not take over mechanically all the notions of bourgeois science but we rework them critically and advance knowledge on a new socio-economic and political basis. In general there are two basic forms of criticism: (a) the lower form—in which distortions, idealism, mechanism, reactionary opinions, etc. are sifted out and everything is thrown on one and the same heap; and (b) the higher form—in which the area is critically reworked, in which grains of positive content are found in non-correct forms, are picked out and further developed.

It is much easier to discover total inadequacies (idealism, metaphysics, mechanism) which, of course, have a significant positive function in the initial stage of criticism. It is much harder, however, to engage in a critical reformulation and sift out, preserve, and further develop latent traces of rational thought. "Goldminers will dig up much earth and find but little gold." (Heraclitus.)

Our theoretical military thinking should advance toward precisely this higher level of criticism. Meshcheryakov's article, however, draws us back. By doing so it is, in my opinion, theoretically harmful.

Am I right in assuming that the author of the article does not understand Clausewitz and for this reason recommends that we repudiate his heritage? Surely Engels is right when he says that "he who judges a philosopher not by his contribution to knowledge, not by what was progressive in his activity, but by what was necessarily transitory and reactionary—judges his own system and would do well to keep silent." (Engels, *Letter to Conrad Schmidt*, July 21, 1891.) Is it correct to reject together with idealism, metaphysics, etc., also all that is positive in Clausewitz' analysis of military theory? Does not Meshcheryakov repeat the mistakes of Pokrovsky whose errors were condemned by the CC of the AUCP(b)?

Or is it perhaps necessary to re-evaluate the entire military and theoretical work of Clausewitz

<sup>1</sup>Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.



in the light of the experience of the Great Patriotic War,<sup>2</sup> and view it differently than did Lenin?

A correct understanding of this question is important for those who are working in the field of the History of Military Art. For almost 15 years now, I have been preparing for publication an eight-volume work of which the first five volumes are to a large extent finished. The first two volumes, published before the war, have been thoroughly revised, partly along the lines of suggestions by Marshal Shaposhnikov.

The enclosed outline of Volume I and the Preface to the entire work will reveal my basic assumptions. It is evident that erroneous initial data, if they are wrong, can invalidate my whole work, which, I have been told more than once, is needed for the Red Army.

It is for this reason, dear Comrade Stalin, that I respectfully ask you to clarify these questions for me.

PROFESSOR COLONEL E. RAZIN

January 30, 1946.

### STALIN'S REPLY

DEAR COMRADE RAZIN:

I received your letter of January 30th regarding Clausewitz and your brief theses about warfare and the art of war.

(1) You ask: Have not Lenin's theses in the appraisal of Clausewitz grown obsolete? In my opinion the question is not correctly phrased. When the question is raised this way, it gives the impression that Lenin had studied Clausewitz' military theory and his military works, that he had evaluated them from the military point of view, and that he left us a set of directives to be followed concerning military problems. The phrasing is not correct for, actually, such tenets of Lenin on Clausewitz' military theories and his works do not exist.

Unlike Engels, Lenin did not consider himself a military expert. He did not consider himself an expert in military affairs either before the October Revolution, or after it, from the October Revolution down to the end of the Civil War. During the Civil War Lenin urged us, at that time as yet young comrades in the Central Committee, "to study military science thoroughly." As for himself, he told us openly that for him it was already too late to study military science. This explains why in his remarks about Clausewitz and his book Lenin does not touch on purely military matters such as questions of war strategy or tactics and their mutual relationship, the relation between offense and retreat, defense and counter-offensive, etc.

What then in Clausewitz was of interest to Lenin and why did he praise him?

He praised Clausewitz primarily because the non-Marxist Clausewitz, who in his time enjoyed the authority of a military expert, confirmed in his works the well-known Marxist tenet that there is a direct connection between war and politics, that war is a product of politics, that war is a continuation of politics by violent means. Lenin had here to fall back on Clausewitz to expose the social-chauvinism and the social-imperialism of Plechanov, Kautsky, and others.

Furthermore he praised Clausewitz because the latter in his works confirmed the thesis, correct from the Marxian standpoint, that retreat under certain unfavorable conditions is as legitimate a form of war as the offensive. Here Lenin had to use Clausewitz again to refute the "left" communists who did not recognize retreat as a legitimate form of warfare.

Lenin then did not approach Clausewitz as a soldier but as a politician and was interested in those aspects of Clausewitz' work which clearly show the connection between war and politics.

Thus, in criticizing Clausewitz' military doctrine, we, the successors of Lenin, are not bound by any of Lenin's suggestions which would limit our freedom of criticism. From this, however, follows that your interpretation of Comrade Meshcheryakov's article in *Military Thought* as "an assault on Lenin" and as a "revision" of Lenin's evaluation, misses the mark.

(2) Should we criticize the very basis of Clausewitz' military theory? Yes, we should. From the point of view of the interests of our cause and the

<sup>2</sup>Russian designation for Russia's participation in World War II.

military theory of our time, we must subject to criticism not only Clausewitz, but also Moltke, Schlieffen, Ludendorff, Keitel, and other representatives of the German military ideology. In the course of the last 30 years Germany has twice forced the bloodiest kind of wars upon the world, and both times she was defeated. Is this a coincidence? Of course not. Does this mean that, not only Germany as a whole, but also its military ideology, has failed to stand the test? There is no doubt of it. Everybody knows with what respect the military men of the whole world, including our own Russian commanders, used to look up to the military authorities of Germany. Is it necessary to put an end to this undeserved respect? It is necessary. Well, for this we need criticism, and especially from our own side—from the conquerors of Germany.

As regards Clausewitz in particular, he of course has grown obsolete as a military authority. Clausewitz, strictly speaking, was a representative of the *hand-manufacturing phase* of warfare. Now, however, we live in the *machine phase* of warfare. It is more than clear that the machine phase requires new military ideologists. It would be ridiculous to take lessons from Clausewitz today.

We cannot progress and advance knowledge without subjecting to a critical analysis obsolete theories and pronouncements of well-known authorities. This applies not only to authorities on warfare, but also to the classics of Marxism. Engels once said that of the Russian commanders of the 1812 campaign the only one deserving attention was General Barclay de Tolly. Engels, of course, was mistaken for Kutuzov as a commander stood head and shoulders above Barclay de Tolly. And yet, one still may find people who will indignantly defend this mistaken pronouncement of Engels.

In our criticism we must be governed not by individual tenets and statements of the classics, but by that excellent advice which Lenin once gave us: "We certainly do not look upon the theory

of Marx as something eternal and inviolate; we are convinced on the contrary that this theory has merely laid the cornerstone of that science which socialists must elaborate in all directions if they do not wish to be overtaken by life itself. We consider it particularly necessary for Russian socialists to elaborate independently on Marx's theory, for this theory offers only general guiding principles which, in particular instances, must be applied in a different manner in England, in France, in Germany, and in Russia." (Lenin, Vol. II, p. 492). Such a procedure is even more obligatory when we deal with authorities on military matters.

(3) As to your brief theses on warfare and the art of war, I can, because of their schematic character, make only general observations. They contain too much philosophy and too many abstractions. Clausewitz' terminology regarding the rules and logic of war grates upon the ear. Very primitively phrased also is the treatment of Party-principles in military science. Equally painful to our ears are the panegyrics to the glory of Stalin—simply, it is uncomfortable to read them. What is missing is a chapter upon the counteroffensive (not to be confused with counterattack). I speak of a counteroffensive after a successful offensive by the enemy in which, however, decisive results have not been achieved, and during which the defender gathers his forces, goes over to a counteroffensive and inflicts upon the enemy a decisive defeat. I hold that a well-organized counteroffensive is a very interesting kind of offensive. You, as a historian, should be interested in this matter. Even the ancient Parthians understood such a counteroffensive when they lured the Roman commander Crassus with his armies into the interior of their country, then went over to the counteroffensive and destroyed him. This was also very well known to our great Commander-in-Chief Kutuzov who destroyed Napoleon by a well-prepared counteroffensive.

J. STALIN

February 23, 1946.

# THE PAPERS OF THE BRITISH COMMANDERS IN CHIEF IN NORTH AMERICA, 1754-1783\*

BY HENRY P. BEERS

## *The Office of Commander in Chief*

In the British colonies in America prior to the French and Indian War, the colonial governors and assemblies had the responsibility in time of peace in Europe for the defense of their frontiers.<sup>1</sup> During the inter-colonial wars that had been fought previously, British troops had been provided and withdrawn upon the conclusion of hostilities. The inability of the British Government, however, to induce the colonies to cooperate for their defense had forced it to keep small garrisons of regular troops in New York and South Carolina during the eighteenth century.

The defense of the colonies became a problem for the British Government in 1754 following the defeat of the Virginia forces under George Washington by the French at Fort Necessity. Governor Robert Dinwiddie of Virginia had taken the lead in opposing the French intrusion on the Ohio. He communicated with the governors of neighboring colonies in an effort to obtain succor, and appealed to London for military aid. The decision was reached in July 1754 by the British ministry to replace Dinwiddie by Governor Horatio Sharpe of Maryland as temporary commander in chief and to appropriate funds for an expedition to the Ohio.<sup>2</sup> Sharpe's appointment was dated July 5, and he received it on October 7, 1754, but he was not destined to hold the command long.

Even before Sharpe had received his commission, a British officer had been selected to fill on a permanent basis the position of Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Forces in North America. The officer designated was Major General Edward Braddock, a professional soldier and a favorite of the Duke of Cumberland, the captain general of the British land forces. At the time of his appointment on September 24, 1754, General Braddock was aboard ship en route from Gibraltar to Marseilles, and he did not reach America at Hampton Roads, Virginia until February 1755. He was instructed to assume command not only of all the forts and military forces but also to take control of Indian relations and to secure the cooperation of the colonial governments in raising men, obtaining supplies and arms, and furnishing transportation.<sup>3</sup> Braddock's headquarters during the few months that he held command were with his army in the campaign against Fort Duquesne.

<sup>1</sup>George L. Beer, *British Colonial Policy, 1754-1765* (New York, 1907), 10; Lawrence H. Gipson, *Zones of International Friction North America, South of the Great Lakes Region, 1748-1754* (New York, 1939), 290.

<sup>2</sup>Beer, *op. cit.*, 27; Lawrence H. Gipson, *The Great War for the Empire, the Years of Defeat, 1754-1757* (New York, 1946), 50-55; Ella Lonn, "Horatio Sharpe," in *Dictionary of American Biography*, ed. by Allen Johnson, Dumas Malone and Harris E. Starr (New York, 1928-1944, 22 vols.), XVII, 25-26; Herbert L. Osgood, *The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1924-1925, 4 vols.), IV, 339.

<sup>3</sup>Osgood, *op. cit.*, IV, 342-343; Clarence E. Carter, "The Office of Commander in Chief: a Phase of Imperial Unity on the Eve of the Revolution," in *The Era of the Revolution; Studies Inscribed to Evans Boutell Greene*, ed. by Richard B. Morris (New York, 1939), 175.

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After General Braddock's death in July 1755, following his defeat in the battle with the French on the Monongahela River, the post of commander in chief devolved temporarily upon William Shirley, who was Braddock's choice for the succession.<sup>4</sup> Governor of Massachusetts since 1741, Shirley had become the most prominent military figure in the colonies, having led a successful attack upon Louisbourg in 1744-1745. At the time of his appointment as commander in chief, he was leading the British forces against Fort Niagara. Because of circumstances beyond his control, he was unsuccessful in this campaign and in the operations of 1756. He was replaced largely as a result of the representations of his enemies to the British Government.<sup>5</sup>

A general in the British army, John Campbell, Fourth Earl of Loudoun, was picked to succeed Shirley. James Abercromby, a close friend of Loudoun, was designated as second in command and Colonel Daniel Webb as the next in line. Since Loudoun could not proceed immediately to America, a temporary commission as commander in chief was issued to Colonel Webb.<sup>6</sup> On reaching New York early in June 1756, however, he waited there for the arrival of General Abercromby. They proceeded together to Albany where Abercromby relieved Shirley on June 25, 1756. His com-

mand was of short duration, for near the end of the next month he was followed by Lord Loudoun, who had received a permanent commission as commander in chief in March 1756.<sup>7</sup> Loudoun made considerable progress in organizing the army but suffered defeat in battle; a letter of recall was addressed to him on December 30, 1757.<sup>8</sup> General Abercromby, who had remained as second in command, was sent an appointment as his successor on the same date. Abercromby took over command in New York in March 1758.<sup>9</sup> His was actually only a partial command, for the successful expeditions against Louisbourg under Amherst and against Fort Duquesne under Forbes were planned by William Pitt. The disastrous defeat of Abercromby at Ticonderoga in July 1758 led to his recall to England.

Major General Jeffery Amherst, the next commander in chief, proved to be an outstanding military leader. He had already gained fame as the captor of Louisbourg when chosen by William Pitt for the top military command in America. After receiving his appointment at Halifax in November 1758, Amherst went to New York where he thenceforth maintained his headquarters when not commanding operations in the field.<sup>10</sup> The campaigns of 1759 and 1760 resulted in the conquest of Canada. The office of commander in chief was continued thereafter in order to protect British interests in North America. The new acquisitions of territory, including the eastern half of the Mississippi Valley and the Floridas as well as New France, had to be occupied, garrisoned,

<sup>4</sup>Osgood, *op. cit.*, IV, 361; Gipson, *Great War for the Empire*, 180-181; Charles H. Lincoln, ed., *Correspondence of William Shirley* (New York, 1912, 2 vols.), II, 215, 241.

<sup>5</sup>Gipson, *Great War for the Empire*, 180-188; Osgood, *op. cit.*, IV, 381; Lincoln, *op. cit.*, I, xxvii, II, 425; John R. Alden, *General Gage in America, being Principally a History of His Role in the American Revolution* (Baton Rouge, 1948), 32-36; James T. Adams, "William Shirley," *Dict. Amer. Biog.*, XVII, 122; Gertrude S. Kimball, ed., *Correspondence of William Pitt when Secretary of State, with Colonial Governors and Military and Naval Commissioners in America* (New York, 1906, 2 vols.), I, xxvii.

<sup>6</sup>Stanley M. Pargellis, *Lord Loudoun in North America* (New Haven, 1933), 74; Lincoln, *op. cit.*, II, 425.

<sup>7</sup>Pargellis, *op. cit.*, 42 ff.; Gipson, *Great War for the Empire*, 188, 193; Lincoln, *op. cit.*, II, 483 nl.

<sup>8</sup>Osgood, *op. cit.*, IV, 410; Kimball, *op. cit.*, I, 134; Pargellis, *op. cit.*, 336-351.

<sup>9</sup>Stanley M. Pargellis, "James Abercromby," *Dict. Amer. Biog.*, I, 29.

<sup>10</sup>John C. Long, *Lord Jeffery Amherst, a Soldier of the King* (New York, 1933), 79-80, 119-122, 139, 153; Kimball, *op. cit.*, I, 354, 430.

and governed. These activities were directed by the commander in chief from New York. Upon General Amherst's return to England in November 1763, he was succeeded by Major General Thomas Gage, who had seen service throughout the war in the colonies.<sup>11</sup>

General Gage served on an acting basis until September 1764 when he was given a regular commission after Amherst decided not to return to America. For almost ten years General Gage devoted himself to the duties of the position of commander in chief before he took leave of absence to visit England. His place in New York was filled by Major General Frederick Haldimand from June 1773 to May 1774.<sup>12</sup> Upon his return to America in May 1774, General Gage landed at Boston, having been appointed vice admiral, captain and governor in chief of Massachusetts. He journeyed to New York in the summer of 1774, but during the rest of his command in America he was stationed at Boston overseeing the rebellious colony of Massachusetts. Further consideration of the situation in the colonies led the British cabinet to decide upon the dispatch of additional generals. General Gage was continued in command, but three younger major generals, William Howe, Henry Clinton, and John Burgoyne, were chosen to assist him.<sup>13</sup> These officers and a fleet of troop transports reached Boston in May 1775.

Not long after the outbreak of hostilities in Massachusetts and the receipt of the news of Bunker Hill in England, the recall of Gage was decided upon. His departure in

October 1775 made way for Sir William Howe, who was placed in command of the British forces south of Canada. Sir Guy Carleton was given charge of operations on the St. Lawrence. Howe commanded the British forces opposing General Washington until May 25, 1778. Henry Clinton, who had been with Howe since 1775, then filled the chief command. Not more successful than his predecessor, General Clinton resigned in May 1782 and returned to England. By this time Cornwallis had been defeated at Yorktown, and there was little for the next commander in chief, Guy Carleton, to do but to await at New York the conclusion of peace negotiations. On November 23, 1783, over two months after the signing of the treaty of Paris, General Carleton evacuated New York.

For military affairs in British North America the most important manuscripts are the papers of the commanders in chief. These are more significant than the documents in the British Public Record Office, for they contain not only communications to and from the British Government but also communications with correspondents in North America as well as other types of records. It was the custom for the generals to retain their papers upon the termination of their service in America and to carry them off to their own estates in England. Most of these collections have survived the passage of time and are among the most important documentary sources for the history of colonial America. Though they remained in private hands, these papers are more official than personal in character.

#### *List of Commanders in Chief*

The commanders in chief are listed below in chronological order. Tenures are reckoned from assumption of command to assumption of succeeding command, ignoring dates of

<sup>11</sup>Carter, *loc. cit.*, 177; Clarence E. Carter, ed., *The Correspondence of General Thomas Gage with the Secretaries of State and with the War Office and the Treasury, 1763-1775* (New Haven, 1931, 1933, 2 vols.), II, 9 n48, 259; Alden, *op. cit.*, 61.

<sup>12</sup>Carter, *Correspondence of General Thomas Gage*, I, 353, 355, II, 158 n45, 159, 640; Alden, *op. cit.*, 192.

<sup>13</sup>Alden, *op. cit.*, 236; Troyer S. Anderson, *The Command of the Howe Brothers during the American Revolution* (New York, 1936), 43.

appointment. Military rank is given as of date of assumption of command. Amherst and Howe became lieutenant generals while in office. Governor Dinwiddie is omitted from this list because of insufficient information.

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|   |                                    |                       |
|---|------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Governor Horatio Sharpe of Maryland . . . . .       | (Temporary)                        | Oct. 1754 - Feb. 1755 |
| Maj. Gen. Edward Braddock . . . . .                 |                                    | Feb. 1755 - July 1755 |
| Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts . . . . . | (Temporary)                        | July 1755 - June 1756 |
| Maj. Gen. James Abercromby . . . . .                | (Temporary)                        | June 1756 - July 1756 |
| Maj. Gen. Lord Loudoun . . . . .                    |                                    | July 1756 - Mar. 1758 |
| Maj. Gen. James Abercromby . . . . .                |                                    | Mar. 1758 - Nov. 1758 |
| Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Amherst . . . . .                 |                                    | Nov. 1758 - Nov. 1763 |
| Maj. Gen. Thomas Gage . . . . .                     |                                    | Nov. 1763 - June 1773 |
| Maj. Gen. Frederick Haldimand . . . . .             | (Temporary)                        | June 1773 - May 1774  |
| Maj. Gen. Thomas Gage . . . . .                     |                                    | May 1774 - Oct. 1775  |
| Maj. Gen. Sir William Howe . . . . .                | (For area <i>excluding</i> Canada) | Oct. 1775 - May 1778  |
| Lt. Gen. Henry Clinton . . . . .                    | (For area <i>excluding</i> Canada) | May 1778 - May 1782   |
| Lt. Gen. Sir Guy Carleton . . . . .                 |                                    | May 1782 - Nov. 1783* |

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\*After Gen. Carleton evacuated New York on 23 November 1783, the title of Commander in Chief in North America pertained to Canada only.

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### *The Papers of Governor Dinwiddie*

The early military efforts of the British in the Ohio country are documented in the papers of Robert Dinwiddie. As Governor of Virginia from 1751, he energetically pushed the British claim to that region and urged action on the part of the British Government. Ill health forced his return to England in 1758. His papers were in London in 1829 in the possession of a J. Hamilton.<sup>14</sup> They passed into the hands of an American dealer in London, Henry Stevens, who in 1881 sold them to William W. Corcoran of Washington, D. C. By the latter they were presented to the Virginia Historical Society in Richmond, and that institution soon published them.<sup>15</sup> This collection comprises letters, addresses, reports, commissions, and in-

structions. Many of the letters addressed to William Trent, George Washington, the governors of other colonies, British ministers, the Board of Trade, and to General Braddock related to Virginia activities connected with the upper Ohio. Though one of the principal sources on this subject, these papers must be supplemented by other official documents.

### *Governor Horatio Sharpe*

Further record of the early years of the French and Indian War is to be found in the papers of Governor Horatio Sharpe of Maryland. With a temporary appointment as British commander in chief, Governor Sharpe continued Dinwiddie's activities during the second half of 1754 and later cooperated with General Braddock. Upon his retirement from the governorship in 1769 he established a home near Annapolis, but in 1773 he was recalled to England on family affairs and never returned to Maryland. His

<sup>14</sup>Justin Winsor, ed., *Narrative and Critical History of America* (Boston, 1884-1889, 8 vols.), V, 572.

<sup>15</sup>R. A. Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie . . . 1751-1758* (Richmond, 1883-1884, 2 vols.).



Maryland home was thereafter occupied by John Ridout, who had come to America with the governor as his secretary, and when Sharpe died in 1790 the place was bequeathed to Ridout.<sup>16</sup> Governor Sharpe's papers were eventually given by one of Ridout's sons to Robert Gilmor of Baltimore, by whom they were presented to the Maryland Historical Society.<sup>17</sup> The Gilmor collection of Sharpe papers relates to the whole of the governor's administration and includes letters from a number of military officers and correspondence with the governors of the neighboring colonies. The Maryland Historical Society also became the depository by a resolution of the state legislature of 1846-1847 of two letter books of Governor Sharpe for 1754-1756 and 1767-1771.<sup>18</sup> Both collections of Sharpe papers in the society, the Calvert papers, and other state records were drawn upon for the Sharpe correspondence which was published in the *Archives of Maryland*.<sup>19</sup> Other letters of Governor Sharpe can be found in the published papers of Robert Dinwiddie and in the colonial records of Pennsylvania.

#### General Edward Braddock

For documents pertaining to General Braddock's ill-fated command resort must be had to various archival and manuscript collections, for no group of his own papers exists. Papers of Braddock captured by the French at the time of his defeat revealed the plans of the British.<sup>20</sup> In an effort to show

that the British were the aggressors in the war, the French published in 1756 a collection of French and British documents which included Braddock's captured papers.<sup>21</sup> There were two sets of instructions, both dated November 25, 1754, one secret<sup>22</sup> and the other general.<sup>23</sup> The French also captured letters and a plan of Fort Duquesne sent to Braddock by Major Robert Stobo, a Virginia officer held by the French as a hostage following Washington's defeat at Fort Necessity.<sup>24</sup> Communications from Braddock and subordinate officers to Robert Napier, Adjutant General to the Duke of Cumberland, are in the Cumberland papers.

laghan and Berthold Fernow (Albany, 1856-1887, 15 vols.). (Hereafter cited as *N. Y. Col. Doc.*). X, 311-312.

<sup>21</sup>Jacob N. Moreau, *A Memorial Containing a Summary View of Facts, with Their Authorities, in Answer to Observations sent by the English Ministry to the Courts of Europe* (Philadelphia, 1757). Several editions of this publication appeared in French and English in Paris, London, and New York. Braddock documents published therein include his general instructions of November 25, 1754, a letter of the same date written by Robert Napier, and a number of letters to the British ministers taken from a copybook.

<sup>22</sup>*N. Y. Col. Doc.*, VI, 920-922; Stanley M. Pargellis, ed., *Military Affairs in North America, 1748-1765; Selected Documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle* (New York, London, 1936), 53-54.

<sup>23</sup>Pennsylvania (Colony), *Pennsylvania Archives*, ed. by Samuel Hazard and others (Philadelphia and Harrisburg, 1852-1907, 6 series in 91 vols.), 1st ser., II, 203-207; Winthrop Sargent, ed., *The History of an Expedition against Fort Duquesne, in 1755, under Major-General Edward Braddock* (Philadelphia, 1855), 393-397; Quebec (Province) Archives, *Rapport de l'Archiviste de la Province de Quebec, 1932-1933* (Quebec, 1933), 310-314; Israel D. Rupp, *Early History of Western Pennsylvania, and of the West, and of Western Expeditions and Campaigns . . .* (Pittsburgh, 1846), 53-57.

<sup>24</sup>The letters were written to Colonel Innes, of the Virginia forces, and were sent by two Indians to Aughwick, Pa., where George Croghan opened them and made copies which he forwarded to Governor Hamilton of Pennsylvania. The letters were published in the *Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania* in 1851 (vol. VI, 141-143) and the map in *Pennsylvania Archives* in 1852 (vol. II, 146), and in Sargent, *op. cit.*, 182. Both appeared in Neville Craig, *Memoirs of Major Robert Stobo, of the Virginia Regiment* (Pittsburgh, 1854). Cf. G. M. Kahl, "Robert

<sup>16</sup>Matilda Edgar, *A Colonial Governor in Maryland, Horatio Sharpe and His Times, 1753-1773* (London, New York, 1912), 250, 268, 278-280.

<sup>17</sup>Maryland Historical Society, *Catalogue of the Manuscripts . . .* (Baltimore, 1854), 10.

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*, 5-7.

<sup>19</sup>William H. Browne, ed., *Correspondence of Governor Horatio Sharpe, 1753-1771* (*Archives of Maryland*), vols. VI, IX, XIV, XXXI (Baltimore, 1888, 1895, 1911).

<sup>20</sup>New York (Colony), *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York; procured in Holland, England and France*, by John Romeyn Brodhead, Esq., Agent, . . . ed. by Edmund B. O'Cal-

These are preserved in Windsor Castle, the principal royal residence near London. The American documents in the Cumberland papers have been published.<sup>25</sup> The Loudoun papers also contain material relating to the Fort Duquesne expedition, including a number of pieces by Braddock himself. Additional letters of the general are in the Nead collection in the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. For the purpose of publication a collection of the papers of General Braddock has been initiated by Professor Alfred P. James of the University of Pittsburgh.

Orderly books covering Braddock's march kept under the direction of George Washington found their way into the hands of Peter Force. After their acquisition by the Library of Congress upon the purchase of the Force collection, the orderly books were printed.<sup>26</sup>

The sources pertaining to Braddock's defeat are extensive and have been subjected to different interpretations.<sup>27</sup> The official story was presented in a series of letters written by Captain Robert Orme, Braddock's aide de camp, following the general's death. Telling the same story, these were addressed to the officials in England, to Commodore Augustus Keppel, and to the governors of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania.<sup>28</sup> A journal which Captain Orme kept for the whole expedition was sent with a set of maps

to the Duke of Cumberland. These became part of the King's MSS. in the British Museum,<sup>29</sup> and they were obtained and published by the Historical Society of Pennsylvania upon the hundredth anniversary of the battle on the Monongahela.<sup>30</sup> Young George Washington wrote an account which was not of a professional character; he had joined to gain experience with professionals. In the British Museum are two copies of the same letter written by Adam Stephen, a Virginian with the rear guard, to different persons.<sup>31</sup> The officer in charge of the vanguard, Thomas Gage, communicated his explanation of the rout to Admiral Keppel, who commanded the British fleet off the Virginia coast.<sup>32</sup> In the Cumberland papers are other descriptions, including that sent by Sir John St. Clair, who commanded the working party which followed the vanguard, to Robert Napier; a letter by Harry Gordon, an engineer, to his brother; and by an anonymous officer who served as an amanuensis to St. Clair.<sup>33</sup> Parts of a letter by Horatio Gates, who captained a New York independent company under Gage, to Robert Monckton were copied in a letter of Major Hale, which is in the Loudoun papers. In the fall of 1755 after

<sup>28</sup>Orme's letters to Robert Napier and Henry Fox, the Secretary at War, are published in Pargellis, *Military Affairs*, 98-101. For references to the places of publication of his other letters, see *ibid.* 101 n1 and the same author's "Braddock's Defeat," 254, n3.

<sup>29</sup>Sargent, *op. cit.*, 281; Charles M. Andrews and Frances G. Davenport, *Guide to the Manuscript Materials for the History of the United States to 1783, in the British Museum, and in Minor London Archives, and in the Libraries of Oxford and Cambridge* (Washington, 1908), 28.

<sup>30</sup>"Captain Orme's Journal," in Sargent, *op. cit.*, 281-358.

<sup>31</sup>Pargellis, "Braddock's Defeat," *Amer. Hist. Rev.* XLI, 255-256.

<sup>32</sup>This is printed in Thomas Keppel, *The Life of Augustus Viscount Keppel* (London, 1842, 2 vols.), I, 213 ff. Commodore Keppel upon the arrival of Admiral Boscawen carried the news of Braddock's defeat to England.

<sup>33</sup>Pargellis, "Braddock's Defeat," 256. These are published in Pargellis, *Military Affairs*.

Stobo," in *Dict. Amer. Biog.*, XVIII, 35-36. The copies that fell into French hands apparently found their way into the French archives—cf. Nancy M. Surrey, comp., *Calendar of Manuscripts in Paris Archives and Libraries Relating to the History of the Mississippi Valley to 1803* (Washington, 1926, 1928, 2 vols.), II, 1249.

<sup>25</sup>Pargellis, *Military Affairs in North America*.

<sup>26</sup>"Major General Edward Braddock's orderly books, from February 26 to June 17, 1755," in William H. Lowdermilk, *History of Cumberland, (Maryland) from the Time of the Indian Town, Caiuctuc, in 1728, up to the Present Day* (Washington, D. C., 1878).

<sup>27</sup>Stanley M. Pargellis, "Braddock's Defeat," *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, XLI (Jan. 1936), 253-269. This article presents a critical evaluation of the sources.

the remnant of the army reached Albany, the officers held a court of inquiry on the battle.<sup>34</sup> At the command of General Shirley maps were prepared by Patrick Mackellar, an engineer with the expedition, showing the formation of the troops on the march and their disposition during the battle.<sup>35</sup> Several accounts by contemporaries who were not eyewitnesses have been published in various places.<sup>36</sup> Among these was the "Journal of the Proceedings of the Seamen (a Detachment) Ordered by Commodore Keppel to Assist on the Late Expedition to the Ohio."<sup>37</sup>

### *Governor Shirley*

Less than a year of William Shirley's long career in America was spent as commander in chief of the British army. No collection of Shirley's letters has survived. Some original letters written by him to Colonel John Stoddard are in the Massachusetts Historical Society which also has copies in the Parkman transcripts. William Alexander, known during the Revolutionary War as Lord Stirling, served during the early years of the French and Indian War as commissary, aide, and secretary to General Shirley. His correspondence for this period is preserved in the New York Historical Society and includes letters of Shirley and others which are valuable for Shirley's command.

<sup>34</sup>Printed in Lincoln, *Correspondence of William Shirley*, II, 311-213.

<sup>35</sup>These maps are printed in Pargellis, "Braddock's Defeat," 258-259 and in his *Military Affairs*, 114. They had previously been published by Francis Parkman in his *Montcalm and Wolfe*. The original maps are in the Cumberland papers, and other sets are in the Public Record Office and the Public Archives of Canada.

<sup>36</sup>The writers were James Burd, John Rutherford, William Johnston, Matthew Leslie, and Dr. Walker. Cf. Pargellis, "Braddock's Defeat," 254. Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia wrote the Earl of Halifax an account on October 1, 1755, based on information obtained from officers he had seen. This is published in his *Official Records*, II, 220-226.

When the publication of Shirley's correspondence was undertaken by Charles H. Lincoln for the Colonial Dames of America in 1910, he was obliged, for lack of a collection of Shirley papers, to draw upon other archival and manuscript collections.<sup>38</sup> He found, however, an abundance of material in the British Public Record Office, the British Museum, the Massachusetts Archives, the Library of Congress, the historical societies of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, the William Johnson papers, and other places. The publication that resulted is comprised chiefly of selected letters and other documents sent out by Shirley hitherto unpublished and a smaller number of incoming letters. The portion of the second volume covering the period when Shirley was commander in chief (July 1755 to June 1756) contains letters to and from the governors of colonies, officials of the British Government, military officers, and William Johnson.<sup>39</sup> His earlier correspondence is also important for military affairs, for he had been commander of the New England forces engaged in fighting the French.

<sup>37</sup>This journal was given by Captain Hewitt, R.N. to Captain Henry G. Morris, R.N., and a copy of it was obtained from the latter's son, the Rev. Francis-Orpen Morris of Yorkshire, by Joseph R. Ingersoll, who presented it together with maps and plans of the route of Braddock's army to the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. This journal was published by Sargent, *op. cit.*, 359-389. Subsequently Archer B. Hulbert published extracts from another version obtained from the Royal Artillery Library at Woolwich, to which it had been presented by a Colonel Macbean. (A. B. Hulbert, *Braddock's Road* (Cleveland, 1903), 83-107). Hulbert believed the Morris journal to be the work of Harry Gordon, an engineer on the expedition, impersonating a sailor. He did not ascertain the authorship of the other journal. Pargellis, however, considered that the author of the Morris journal was the midshipman who had been left behind in the hospital at Will's Creek, but that Gordon may have contributed to it.

<sup>38</sup>Carnegie Institution of Washington, Department of Historical Research, Correspondence Files, Correspondence between Lincoln and J. F. Jameson, 1910-1912.

<sup>39</sup>Lincoln, *op. cit.*, II, 215-468.



### Lord Loudoun

The papers of Lord Loudoun remained in the possession of the family until their sale in 1923 to Mr. Henry E. Huntington. A nephew of Collis P. Huntington of Southern Pacific Railroad fame and his successor as the president of that line, Henry E. Huntington became in the first quarter of the present century one of the foremost American private collectors. Specializing in English literature and Americana in both printed and manuscript form, he purchased whole libraries gathered by others in both the United States and England, and in 1920 opened his treasures to the public in the Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery in San Marino, California.<sup>40</sup>

The bulk of the 10,000 pieces in the Loudoun collection relate to the general's service in America during the French and Indian War.<sup>41</sup> Among these papers are 1500 dealing with the period from 1740 to 1756, and, with the exception of a group in the 1740's relating to French and Indian affairs, are largely copies of papers of Braddock and Shirley which were handed over to Loudoun. Besides over 1200 letters written by Loudoun, there are many letters and reports from governors, military officers, Indian superintendents, and naval officers. Records of various types pertaining to the British Army include returns, lists, accounts, orders, and warrants. Over a hundred communications from Loudoun to the Duke of Cumberland have been printed.<sup>42</sup>

The Huntington Library also possesses the papers of James Abercromby for the period of his service during 1758 as British commander in chief in North America. These were purchased from Lathrop C. Harper, a New York dealer, in 1923.<sup>43</sup> Numbering approximately 1,000 documents, these are similar in variety and subject matter to the Loudoun papers. Communications sent by Abercromby and retained for his files in copies made by his secretaries number 446. Other Abercromby letters are to be found in the Loudoun papers.

### General Amherst

Upon General Amherst's departure for England, his brother, William, who had served with him in America, attended to the packing of the general's records and their shipment to England. These voluminous papers remained undisturbed in the cellar of the country home of the family, Montreal House, in Sevenoaks, Kent, until brought to light by the approaching sale of the house in 1925.<sup>44</sup> Lord Amherst's long service of over five years in America is well recorded in his papers comprising over 85,000 items. More than 80,000 of these in 250 packages are concerned with public affairs. This portion of the collection has been loaned to the British Public Record Office where it is classified as *War Office 34*. Of the private letters which remained in the possession of the family, the Public Archives of Canada has prepared an index. The manuscripts include the journals of both the general and his brother.<sup>45</sup>

Reproductions of many of the Amherst

<sup>40</sup>Carl L. Cannon, *American Book Collectors and Collecting* (New York, 1941), 302-317.

<sup>41</sup>Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery, *American Manuscript Collections in the Huntington Library for the History of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, comp. by Norma B. Cuthbert (San Marino, 1941), 37.

<sup>42</sup>Pargellis, *Military Affairs in North America*, xiii, passim.

<sup>43</sup>Huntington Library, *op. cit.*, 3.

<sup>44</sup>John C. Long, *Lord Jeffery Amherst, a Soldier of the King* (New York, 1933), vii-ix, 327.

<sup>45</sup>The journal of General Amherst has been published: J. C. Webster, ed., *The Journal of Jeffery Amherst, Recording the Military Career of General Amherst in America from 1758 to 1763* (Toronto, 1931).

papers have been obtained by institutions in the United States and Canada. The Library of Congress has photostats of the most important correspondence volumes.<sup>46</sup> Amherst College, which derived its name from the British general, has photostatic copies of the bulk of the Amherst papers. Extensive copying from this collection has also been executed by the Public Archives of Canada. The University of Michigan Library has a microfilm copy of the Amherst correspondence. A calendar of the papers prepared by John C. Long in five volumes is in the William L. Clements Library. Copies of an index to the papers prepared by the same biographer are in Amherst College Library, the British Public Records Office, the Library of Congress, the New York Public Library, and the Public Archives of Canada.

Certain correspondence and other papers relating to unfinished business were turned over to Gage when he succeeded General Amherst in 1763. Though purchased by the William L. Clements Library with the Gage papers, these are bound and classified separately in two portfolios and seven volumes.<sup>47</sup> The collection includes letters and petitions addressed to Amherst, letters from Amherst to Gage, letters to Amherst received after his departure, and letters between Amherst and various correspondents. The last named series is composed particularly of correspondence with subordinate officers and contains letters from Major Henry Gladwin of Detroit and other post commanders relating to

Pontiac's War. The inclusive dates for the group are 1758 to 1764.

Letters of General Amherst exist in other places.<sup>48</sup> In various collections in the Division of Manuscripts of the Library of Congress are some 500 letters. A folio in the "additional manuscripts" of the British Museum contains others. The original letters from Amherst to Haldimand, Bouquet, Monckton, and William Johnson exist in the collections of the papers of those men. Numerous letters from Amherst to William Pitt have been published.<sup>49</sup>

### *General Gage*

General Gage took home to England with him in 1775 the papers accumulated during his long service as British commander in chief in North America. They were deposited and remained for 150 years in the country seat of the Viscounts Gage, Firle Place, in Lewes, Sussex.

The discovery of the Gage papers resulted from combined English and American interest. Dr. Clarence E. Carter of Miami University, historian of the British period in Illinois, had been collecting copies of Gage's correspondence for publication for some years when he learned in 1926 through correspondence with Dr. J. F. Jameson of the Carnegie Institution of Washington that the papers of General Gage had been deposited in the British Public Record Office by the Viscount Gage, in order that a report could be prepared upon them by the British Historical Manuscripts Commission.<sup>50</sup> Dr. Carter finally

<sup>46</sup>Grace G. Griffin, *A Guide to Manuscripts Relating to American History in British Depositories Reproduced for the Division of Manuscripts of the Library of Congress* (Washington, 1946), 82-83. The Force transcripts in this library also contain Amherst correspondence for 1759 to 1764.

<sup>47</sup>Howard H. Peckham, *Guide to the Manuscript Collections in the William L. Clements Library* (Ann Arbor, 1942), 12; S. Morley Scott, "Material Relating to Quebec in the Gage and Amherst Papers," *Canadian Hist. Rev.*, XIX (Dec. 1938), 385.

<sup>48</sup>A volume of correspondence between Amherst and Colonel John Bradstreet presented to the New York State Library by the Rev. William B. Sprague in 1851 was lost in the Capitol fire of 1911. Winsor, *op. cit.*, V, 233; Letter from Edna L. Jacobsen, Manuscripts and History Section, New York State Library, September 21, 1948.

<sup>49</sup>Kimball, *op. cit.*

<sup>50</sup>Carnegie Inst. Wash., Correspondence between Carter and Jameson, 1915-1928; A. E. Stamp, Secretary of

got to London in the summer of 1928 and spent several months examining the Gage papers. Upon his return to the United States he informed Mr. William L. Clements of the great value of the papers. Negotiations were opened for Mr. Clements by Randolph G. Adams and in 1930 the papers were purchased from the Sixth Viscount Gage, brought back across the Atlantic, and deposited in Mr. Clement's home at Bay City, Michigan.<sup>51</sup>

A graduate of the University of Michigan, William L. Clements had begun early in his life the collection of Americana. A successful business career as a manufacturer and a banker brought him wealth and enabled him to build up an extensive library of Americana for the years before 1800. He presented the collection in 1922-1923 to the University of Michigan together with a building to house it. The acquisition of the papers of Lord Shelburne<sup>52</sup> in 1922 turned his attention to the manuscripts relating to the British side of the War of Independence. Continuing his quest of manuscripts, particularly after his retirement in 1924, Mr. Clements acquired in subsequent years the papers of a number of British statesmen and generals of that period. These collections were purchased from the estate of Mr. Clements by the University of Michigan in 1937 for \$300,000 and moved from Bay City to the William L. Clements Library at Ann Arbor.<sup>54</sup>

the Hist. MSS. Com., to Jameson, Nov. 20, 1924, appraising him of the fact that the Viscount Gage had consented to the deposit; Jameson to Stamp, April 6, 1926, informing him of Carter's interest.

<sup>51</sup>Randolph G. Adams, "A New Library of American Revolutionary Records," *Current History*, XXXIII (Nov. 1930), 238; Peckham, *op. cit.*, 85. Adams became custodian of the Clements Library in 1923.

<sup>52</sup>Randolph G. Adams, "William L. Clements," *Dict. Amer. Biog.*, XXI, 180.

<sup>53</sup>William Petty Fitzmaurice, Earl of Shelburne and First Marquis of Lansdowne, served as Secretary of State for the Southern Department, 1766-1768.

<sup>54</sup>The acquisitions by Mr. Clements included papers of the following men: Henry Clinton, Thomas Gage,

The Gage papers constitute the most important collection for the general's career in America and for the operations of the British Army during the period when he was commander in chief.<sup>55</sup> The 21,000 pieces have been bound into 175 three-quarters red morocco bindings. Thousands of documents not available elsewhere are to be found in the collection. The major part of the correspondence relates to the years 1763-1775 when Gage was commander in chief.

The correspondence, reports, and financial papers in the Gage papers document not only the administration of military affairs, the operations of the British Army, and Indian affairs, but also political events in the colonies. A voluminous correspondence was carried on by the general with British ministers, colonial governors, Indian superintendents and agents, and army officers attached to military districts and posts throughout the British domain. By means of these letters and of the returns, lists, vouchers, warrants, and other documents can be derived a knowledge of occurrences at the posts in the West and in the Floridas. Communications from officers commanding at Fort Pitt, Detroit, and Fort Chartres disclose much detailed information. The occupation of St. Augustine and Pensacola, and other points, military administration, and the disputes with civil officials are some of the subjects treated in the voluminous correspondence with the military commanders in the Floridas.<sup>56</sup> Since the

George Germain, William Howe, William Knox, Lord Shelburne, John G. Simcoe, and John Vaughan. Mr. Clements had intended to present the remaining collections to the William L. Clements Library, but financial reverses suffered after 1929 rendered this difficult and the University arranged for their purchase.

<sup>55</sup>Alden, *op. cit.*, 299.

<sup>56</sup>Howard H. Peckham, "Military Papers in the Clements Library," *Military Affairs*, II (Fall 1938), 126-130; Charles L. Mowat, "Material Relating to British East Florida in the Gage Papers and Other Manuscript Collections in the William L. Clements Library," *Fla. Hist. Quar.*, XVIII (July 1939), 46-60.



deputy quartermaster at Montreal was responsible for provisioning the western posts, the correspondence with the officers filling that position is useful for the history of the posts and for shipbuilding, transportation, and communication on the lakes and in the adjacent country.<sup>57</sup> Numerous maps will enlighten the geographer as well as the historian.

During the 20 years that he served in America, General Gage wrote many letters to relatives and friends. Some of these and other documents relating to his military commands are still preserved at the Gage home at Firie.<sup>58</sup> Few papers of this character are found in the Gage papers in the William L. Clements Library; the mass of them once existing has still to be located.

While the Gage papers were still in England, photostatic reproductions of over 4,000 items were obtained by Dr. Carter for the Library of Congress.<sup>59</sup> Dr. Carter's published selections from Gage's correspondence with the British officials comprise the major portion of the general's reports to London and of the letters received from the British ministers.<sup>60</sup>

In the papers of a number of the correspondents of General Gage are preserved the original letters received by them and in some cases copies of letters written to the general. Both types as well as orders are represented in the Haldimand papers and in the papers of Colonel Henry Bouquet in the British Museum. Letters sent by Gage to Colonel John Bradstreet and Sir William Johnson were collected by William B. Sprague and presented to Harvard College Library.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>57</sup>For appraisals of the Gage papers see Clarence E. Carter, "Notes on the Lord Gage Collection of Manuscripts," *Miss. Valley Hist. Rev.*, XV (March 1929), 511-519; Scott, *loc. cit.*; Peckham, *loc. cit.*; Mowat, *loc. cit.*

<sup>58</sup>Alden, *op. cit.*, 301. Enquiry by Mr. Alden has failed to disclose other personal letters.

### General Haldimand

During nearly 30 years of service in North America, Frederick Haldimand systematically filed away his papers, forming a collection of great value for the history of the period. The general's grandnephew, William Haldimand, a member of Parliament, presented the papers to the British Museum in 1857. By that repository they were assigned the numbers 21631-21892 in the series of "additional manuscripts," and they are listed in detail in the museum's catalogue.<sup>62</sup> Inasmuch as General Haldimand served for only a year during 1773-1774 as British commander in chief, only a minor portion of his papers are devoted to that service. Besides correspondence, the papers include instructions, a cash account, a receipt book, warrants, and orders.

For earlier years the Haldimand papers form a useful supplement to the papers of the various British commanders in chief for data pertaining to military affairs. Haldimand had previously served in the campaigns of 1758-1760 for the conquest of Canada and subsequently at Montreal and Three Rivers, and from 1765 to 1773 in Florida. His papers include correspondence with Abercromby, Amherst, and Gage, with the officers in charge of the other military districts in Canada, viz., James Murray and Ralph Burton, with Indian superintendents William Johnson and John Stuart, with provincial governors, and with other officers and officials. Other types of documents in this ex-

<sup>59</sup>Griffin, *op. cit.*, 232-233.

<sup>60</sup>Carter, *The Correspondence of General Thomas Gage*.

<sup>61</sup>Winsor, *op. cit.*, V, 233, VIII, 463. A volume of transcripts of these letters was acquired by the Library of Congress in the Peter Force collection.

<sup>62</sup>British Museum, *Catalogue of Additions to the Manuscripts in the British Museum, in the Years MDCCCLIV-MDCCCLX* (London, 1875, 2 vols.), I, 494-554.

tensive collection include reports, account books, regimental returns, commissariat statistics, general orders, instructions, military rules and directions, journals, diaries, plans, bills of exchange, naval and military commissions, warrants, maps, invoices of cargoes, letters of appointment, statistics of trade, memorials, speeches, addresses, inventories, advertisements, and valuations.

One of the early tasks undertaken by the Archives Branch of the Canadian Government following its establishment in 1872 was the transcription of the Haldimand papers. The Dominion Archivist, Douglas Brymner, visited London in 1873 and before his departure arranged with the British Museum for copying both the Haldimand papers and the Bouquet papers.<sup>63</sup> A comprehensive calendar prepared by Dr. Brymner and published in his annual reports of 1884-1889 furnishes the scholar with a more useful finding aid than the list in the British Museum catalogue.<sup>64</sup> The Historical Society of Montreal also has some transcripts of Haldimand correspondence. A small number of copies from the Haldimand papers made by the Illinois Historical Survey are in the University of Illinois Library. The University of Chicago Library has some copies of the copies in Canada. Photostatic copies of extensive selections from the Haldimand papers have been procured by the Library of Congress.<sup>65</sup> Copies of the Haldimand transcripts in the Canadian Archives Branch were published not long after their procurement in the *Wisconsin State Historical Society Collections*.<sup>66</sup> These relate to the period of British domina-

tion in the Old Northwest from 1763 to 1814. A much larger quantity of Haldimand documents from the same depository was published in the *Michigan Historical Collections*.<sup>67</sup> Covering the British regime from 1762 to 1790, these contain a great amount of information regarding Indian relations, military affairs, and navigation on the lakes. Included in this compilation are letters from commanders at Detroit, Mackinac, and Fort Pitt.

### General Howe

Historians and biographers interested in William Howe have searched in vain for any considerable collection of his papers. Certain of his papers were transferred to his successor, Sir Henry Clinton, upon his departure from America in May 1778.<sup>68</sup> A further transfer brought the documents into the possession of Sir Guy Carleton. The collection is chiefly comprised of correspondence with British ministers, officials in the Floridas, and General Washington. The orderly books of General Howe have been brought to light at different times and are partly in print.<sup>69</sup> The Howe material in the Carleton papers

<sup>66</sup>"Papers from the Canadian Archives," *Wis. State Hist. Soc. Colls.*, XI (1888), 97-212; XII (1892), 23-132.

<sup>67</sup>"The Haldimand Papers, Copies of Papers on File in the Dominion Archives at Ottawa, Canada," *Mich. Hist. Colls.*, IX (1908), 343-658; X (1908), 210-675; XI (1908), 319-656; XIX (1911), 296-700; XX (1912), 1-295.

<sup>68</sup>For information concerning these see Great Britain, Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Report on American Manuscripts in the Royal Institution of Great Britain* (London, 1904-1909, 4 vols.), I, vi, and index.

<sup>69</sup>*Ibid.*, I, ix, 41; Benjamin F. Stevens, ed., *General Sir William Howe's Orderly Book at Charlestown, Boston and Halifax June 17, 1775 to 1776 26 May* (London, 1890); M. V. Hay, "The Missing Howe Order Books, 1776-1777," *Americana*, XVIII (April 1924), 85-101; the order books of 1775-1778 are printed in Stephen Kemble, *The Kemble Papers* (N. Y. Hist. Soc. Colls., 1883, 1884), (New York, 1884-1885, 2 vols.), I, 251-603.

<sup>63</sup>Douglas Brymner, "Canadian Archives," *Amer. Hist. Asso. Pap.*, III (1899), 397-398; David W. Parker, *A Guide to the Documents in the Manuscript Room at the Public Archives of Canada* (Ottawa, 1914), 198.

<sup>64</sup>For Haldimand's correspondence as commander in chief see Canada, Archives, *Report on Canadian Archives*, 1885, 210-221.

<sup>65</sup>Griffin, *op. cit.*, 129-138.

can be supplemented by his correspondence to be found in other collections of personal papers such as that of Haldimand. Since Clinton came to America at the same time as Howe, the early portion of his papers contains a great deal on Howe's command. In answer to a demand from the House of Commons General Howe prepared a defense of his command in America which was published.<sup>70</sup>

### *General Henry Clinton*

After Cornwallis's surrender Clinton waged a controversy with him over the responsibility for the failure of the campaign in the southern colonies. Six pamphlets that were published contained official correspondence or extracts thereof. When Clinton's library was sold in London in 1882 and 1884, Benjamin F. Stevens purchased Clinton's own copies of the pamphlets containing his manuscript notes and other books which had been annotated by the general. In searching for the complete text of the 183 documents printed in the pamphlets, Stevens located about 3,456 other papers constituting the official correspondence of Clinton and Cornwallis during 1780-1781. Stevens then published the six pamphlets, the complete texts of the documents found therein, Clinton's notes, extracts from the House of Lords journals, the correspondence of Lord George Germain, and a catalogue of the additional correspondence.<sup>71</sup> The depositories searched for correspondence included the British Museum, the Royal Institution, Public Record Office, various French archives, and private collections. These volumes, besides throwing

new light on the controversy, afforded in the catalogue a guide to much additional manuscript material.

Certain other items purchased by Stevens at the sale of the "library of the late Colonel Henry Clinton" in 1882, comprising some of the headquarters papers of Sir Henry Clinton, were resold by him in New York in the same year. At this sale the well-known collector, Thomas Addis Emmett, bought two small manuscript volumes, one recording private intelligence received by the British and the other information obtained from deserters and others. The secret private intelligence record, containing entries for January to July 1781, was soon afterwards published.<sup>72</sup> An atlas of maps relating to Clinton's campaign in New Jersey was obtained by the Library of Congress. Some letters from General Washington went to an historical scholar of New York. For some years longer, however, the bulk of Sir Henry Clinton's papers remained in the hands of the family.

The headquarters papers taken to England by Sir Henry Clinton in 1782 were purchased in 1926 by Mr. Clements from a great great granddaughter and later deposited in the Clements Library at Ann Arbor.<sup>73</sup> These papers begin in 1775, but they are most numerous for the years 1778 to 1782 when Clinton was commander in chief. The 260 volumes contain 18,500 pieces, including letters, orders, memoranda, war council minutes, military returns, intelligence reports, intercepted material, ledgers, warrants, and Clinton's own three-volume history of the war. Of great value for following the campaigns of the war is a group of 350 maps

<sup>70</sup>William Howe, *The Narrative of Lieut. Gen. Sir William Howe, in a Committee of the House of Commons, on the 29th of April, 1779, relative to His Conduct, during His Late Command of the King's Troops in North America* (London, 1780).

<sup>71</sup>Benjamin F. Stevens, *The Campaign in Virginia 1781; an Exact Reprint of Six Rare Pamphlets on the Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy* (London, 1888, 2 vols.).

<sup>72</sup>Edward F. DeLancey, ed., and Thomas A. Emmett, contrib., "Sir Henry Clinton's Original Secret Record of Private Daily Intelligence," *Mag. Amer. Hist.*, X (Oct.-Dec. 1883), 327-342, 409-419, 497-507; XI (Jan.-June 1884), 53-70, 156-167, 247-257, 342-352, 433-444, 533-544; XII (July, Aug. 1884), 72-79, 162-175.

<sup>73</sup>Adams, "American Revolutionary Records," 235.



and sketches which are largely in manuscript.<sup>74</sup> Clinton correspondence is also to be found in the Carleton papers and in the Haldimand papers.<sup>75</sup>

### *General Carleton*

Sir Guy Carleton became Lord Dorchester in 1786 and hence his papers are called both the Carleton papers and the Dorchester papers. Because they also contain some of the papers of Gage, Howe, and Clinton, the Carleton papers are also referred to as the British Headquarters Papers. Carleton's secretary, Maurice Morgann, gave the papers in 1798 to John Symmons who in 1804 presented them to the Royal Institution of Great Britain in London.<sup>76</sup> A list of the collection prepared by an agent of the Canadian Archives Branch was published in one of its early reports.<sup>77</sup> An extensive calendar prepared by Benjamin F. Stevens and Henry J. Brown and published in 1904-1909 by the British Historical Manuscripts Commission affords the investigator an excellent finding aid to this important group of papers.<sup>78</sup>

Ownership of the Carleton papers was transferred in 1929 by purchase from the Royal Institution to Dr. A. S. W. Rosenbach, prominent Philadelphia dealer in rare books and manuscripts. John D. Rockefeller, Jr. acquired the collection in 1930 and deposited it in the New York Public Library. In 1935 he presented it to Colonial Williams-

burg, Inc., and it was removed in the following year from New York to Williamsburg.<sup>79</sup>

At the time of their acquisition by Rockefeller, the Carleton papers were in worn bindings in 58 quarto and four folio volumes arranged according to subjects originally selected by Maurice Morgann. The New York Public Library broke up the volumes, rearranged the papers in chronological order according to the Stevens and Brown calendar, and rebound them with interleavings of rag paper in bindings of half red chrome leather and cream du Pont washable fabricoid. The motif of the new binding was the color scheme of the British redcoats' uniform. The rebinding produced 103 volumes, which are kept in solander cases, two special boxes, and two long cylinders. A bound photostat set has also been made.

The Carleton papers consist of 10,434 documents in 28,052 pages. The papers date from 1747 to 1783; one volume covers the years prior to 1776; 34 volumes cover 1776-1781, and for 1782-1783 there are 65 volumes. The collection is made up of correspondence, warrants, muster rolls, lists of officers, orders, inquisitions, record of negroes registered and certified, returns of clothing, provisions, prisoners, and Loyalists, affidavits, memorials, and petitions from Loyalists, commissary general accounts, and letters patent.

Transcripts had been obtained of some of the Carleton papers prior to their transfer to the United States. Jared Sparks located the Carleton papers during a visit to England in 1840 and made selections for copies. The Canadian Archives has copies of those documents relating to Canada. A smaller number of facsimiles was purchased by the Library of Congress from Benjamin F. Stevens.

<sup>74</sup>Randolph G. Adams, *British Headquarters Maps and Sketches Used by Sir Henry Clinton while in Command of the British Forces Operating in North America* . . . (Ann Arbor, 1928).

<sup>75</sup>For a calendar of the Clinton-Haldimand correspondence see Canada, Archives, *Report on the Canadian Archives*, 1887, 536-563.

<sup>76</sup>Great Britain, Hist. MSS. Com., *op. cit.*, I, v.

<sup>77</sup>H. A. B. Verreau, "Report of Proceedings Connected with the Canadian Archives in Europe," Canada, Agriculture Department, *Report*, 1874 (Ottawa, 1875), 184 ff.

<sup>78</sup>Great Britain, Hist. MSS. Com., *op. cit.*

<sup>79</sup>Letter from Lester J. Cappon, Archivist, Colonial Williamsburg, Inc., and accompanying report on the British Headquarters Papers, Jan. 25, 1949.

The personal papers of Lord Dorchester were burned by his widow following his death in 1808.<sup>80</sup>

### *Other Sources*

The activities of the British commanders in chief are documented not only in their own papers but also in a number of other classes of manuscripts and archives. Papers exist for subordinate officers, some of whom held important commands. More or less correspondence occurred between them and the commanders in chief, and hence letters of the latter are to be found in these officers' papers. No papers of Brigadier General John Forbes survived, but a collection derived from various archival and manuscript sources has been published.<sup>81</sup> This compilation concerns Forbes's successful campaign against Fort Duquesne in 1758. Brigadier General Robert Monckton came to America in 1752 and served in Canada, New York, and Pennsylvania during the next ten years. An extensive collection of Monckton papers presented to the Canadian Archives has been catalogued.<sup>82</sup> In the New York Public Library are two additional volumes of Monckton papers concerning the Pennsylvania frontier. By far the most important group of papers for Pennsylvania is that of Colonel Henry Bouquet, who served in that colony from 1756 to 1765. The original manuscripts are in the British Museum, but reproductions have been obtained by both the Canadian Archives and the Library of Congress. The Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, which has already issued a mimeographed edition of most of the Bouquet pa-

pers, is planning to print them.<sup>83</sup> For two of Bouquet's predecessors in the Pennsylvania command, Brigadier Generals John Stanwix and Robert Monckton, Captain Horatio Gates served as brigade major or military secretary. English by birth, Captain Gates arrived in America in 1754 and continued in service there until 1761. He emigrated to a Virginia plantation in 1772 and fought throughout the War of Independence on the colonial side. After his death in 1806 his papers were carefully preserved by his wife and eventually came into the possession of the New York Historical Society.<sup>84</sup> In the period of the French and Indian War, one of his most frequent correspondents was General James Abercromby. Letters of Dinwiddie and Gage and of the later British commanders in chief are to be found in the manuscripts of George Washington. As superintendent of Indian affairs in the Northern Department from 1755 to 1774 and as a military officer during the French and Indian War, William Johnson had frequent occasion to correspond with the British commanders in chief.<sup>85</sup> The journal of Stephen Kemble, deputy adjutant general under Gage, Howe, and Clinton, is in print.<sup>86</sup> Extensive collections of the papers of Benjamin Franklin containing letters from Gage and Shirley and other officers are preserved in several depositories.<sup>87</sup> The published

<sup>80</sup>Sylvester K. Stevens, et al., eds., *The Papers of Col. Henry Bouquet* (Harrisburg, 1940-1943). The *Report on Canadian Archives, 1899* contains an extensive calendar of the Bouquet papers, and in the British Museum's *Catalogue of Additions* . . . (London, 1875), I, 476-494 is a descriptive catalogue.

<sup>84</sup>N. Y. Hist. Soc. Proc., 1847, 60; Samuel W. Patterson, *Horatio Gates, Defender of American Liberties* (New York, 1941), 430.

<sup>85</sup>James Sullivan, et al., eds., *The Papers of Sir William Johnson* (Albany, 1921-1939, 9 vols.).

<sup>86</sup>Stephen Kemble, *The Kemble Papers* (N. Y. Hist. Soc. Colls., 1883, 1884) (New York, 1884-1885, 2 vols.).

<sup>87</sup>Carl Becker, "Benjamin Franklin," *Dict. Amer. Biog.*, VI, 598.

<sup>80</sup>Arthur G. Bradley, *Lord Dorchester* (London, Toronto, 1926), xi.

<sup>81</sup>Alfred P. James, ed., *Writings of General Forbes Relating to His Service in North America* (Menasha, Wis., 1938).

<sup>82</sup>Canada, Archives. *The Northcliffe Collection* (Ottawa, 1926).

colonial records of Pennsylvania, New York, Maryland, North Carolina, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Virginia contain correspondence with the British commanders in chief and other material relating to their operations.

The commanders in chief in America carried on a voluminous correspondence with officials of the British Government in London. The records of the British ministries preserved in the Public Record Office and the papers of numerous officials preserved in the British Museum are, next to the papers of the commanders in chief, the most important sources for the history of the operations of the British Army in America. But these sources are too voluminous for consideration here, and they will eventually be treated elsewhere.

#### *Opportunities for Research*

The exploitation of the papers of the British commanders in chief in North America by American historians and writers has hardly begun. Only a few biographies and monographs have been based upon them. While the various groups of papers were still in England, most of them were inaccessible and few were much used by historians. The collections in the original or in reproduction

have become available in the United States largely during the present century. Students of the colonial period will find these papers fruitful sources not only for biographies of the generals and others, but also for numerous other topics. Too much of the writing on military affairs has been of battles and too little has been of military operations in other areas and of the far-flung activities of peace time. The administrative history of the British Army in North America in both war and peace is yet to be written. The history of Indian affairs is still incomplete, particularly in the Northern Department. There is still room for the study of Indian trade. Research can be done on communication and transportation by land, by river, and on the Great Lakes. Contributions to the cartography of the West by British officers were considerable and have never been presented in an integrated account. Regional and local historians can profitably delve into these collections. Editors of documentary compilations will find in them an extensive variety of material. These papers are exceedingly valuable acquisitions for the study of American life, and the institutions and individuals responsible for their availability in the United States have performed an outstanding service to American history.



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## NOTES AND DOCUMENTS

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### MILITARY AND NAVAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE PHILIPPINES DURING THE WAR SCARE OF 1907

BY LOUIS MORTON

During the summer of 1907, tension between the United States and Japan, which had begun with the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 and the San Francisco School Board segregation order in 1906, reached the proportions of a war scare. The American attitude toward Japan, which had traditionally been one of friendliness up to that time, changed after Japan's successes in the war with Russia and her later demands at Portsmouth. The decision of the San Francisco School Board in October 1906 to enforce the segregation ruling, ordering all Chinese and Japanese pupils transferred to the Oriental Public School, together with "children of filthy or vicious habits, or children suffering from contagious or infectious diseases," created a furor. War seemed imminent, and the protection of American interests in the Far East, especially of the newly acquired Philippine Islands, became an urgent problem.

On June 14, 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt asked the Assistant Secretary of War, Robert S. Oliver, what plans had been made by the Joint Board of the Army and Navy, and by the War and Navy Departments "in case of trouble arising between the United States and Japan." The General Board of the Navy and the Army War College had already been studying this question for some months. A few days later, the Joint

Board, consisting of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Assistant Chief of Staff, the President of the Army War College, Admiral of the Navy, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and three other members,<sup>1</sup> met in Washington, and on June 18th recommended that the American fleet should be sent to the Orient as soon as possible and that Army and Navy forces in the Philippines should be immediately deployed in such a manner as to protect the existing naval base in the Islands, then located at Olongapo in Subic (Subig) Bay, at the northwest extremity of Bataan.<sup>2</sup>

The conclusions of the Joint Board were sent to the President who asked that representatives of the War and Navy Departments come to Oyster Bay, where he was then staying, to discuss the recommendations. The meeting took place on June 27th, and

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<sup>1</sup>Members of the Joint Board were: Maj. Gen. J. F. Bell, Chief of Staff; Admiral of the Navy George Dewey; Brig. Gen. W. P. Duvall, Assistant Chief of Staff; Brig. Gen. Arthur Murray, Chief of Artillery; Lt. Col. W. W. Wotherspoon, Acting President, Army War College; Rear Admiral Willard Brownson, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation; and Capts. Richard Wainwright and William J. Barnett, Navy General Board.

<sup>2</sup>The Joint Board recommendations and the steps leading to them are summarized in a letter written by The Adjutant General, F. C. Ainsworth to Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood on July 6, 1907 (AG 1260092, National Archives). These measures are also covered by O. J. Clinard, *Japan's Influence on American Naval Power, 1897-1917* (University of California Press, 1947), p. 54.

was attended by the Secretary of the Navy, Victor H. Metcalf, the Postmaster General, George von L. Meyer, Captain Richard Wainwright, U.S.N., Navy General Board, and Lt. Col. W. W. Wotherspoon, Acting President of the Army War College. There was no stenographer present, but on his return to Washington Colonel Wotherspoon prepared a memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, summarizing the conclusions of the meeting.

... The President opened the discussion by stating that whilst he had no idea or belief that there would be a war between the two countries, he was satisfied with the report of the Joint Board and concurred in its conclusions.

The discussion was informal and lasted about an hour and a half, the President basing his inquiries on a memorandum of the Secretary of the Navy, and the study of the question prepared at the Army War College.

As regards the Navy, he instructed the Secretary of the Navy —

1. To arrange to have a large supply of coal sent to Subig Bay in the immediate future.

2. To have the advance base material now stored at Cavite<sup>3</sup> moved without delay to Subig Bay, and to have the guns which compose part of this advance base material mounted by the Marines as a temporary protection to the bay from a sea attack, according to plans said to have been prepared for that purpose; the guns to be mounted in such a way as not to interfere with work on the permanent emplacements for guns to protect the bay.

3. To order the four armored cruisers now in the Orient to return at once to the Pacific Coast of the United States.

4. To order the two monitors and five torpedo boats now at Cavite, P. I., to Subig Bay.

5. To arrange to have the entire fleet of battleships transferred from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean some time in October of this year.

In the discussion of this last subject, the President stated that he wanted the movement of the fleet of battleships to partake of the character of a practice march, and added that such a movement would have a strong tendency

to maintain peace. Some remarks were made as to the number of ships to be sent. The President stated that he wanted them all to go; if the Navy had fourteen ready, he wanted fourteen to go; if sixteen, eighteen, or twenty, he wanted them all to go. The Secretary of the Navy asked if he could announce that the battleship fleet would be transferred to the Pacific in October. The President stated that he could do so. Whether this will be done at once or not, the writer does not know.

The above are the main features of the instructions given to the Secretary of the Navy and as understood by the writer.

As regards the recommendations of the Joint Board relating to the Army, the President stated that he desired the following action taken.

1. That the mine cases, explosives and necessary apparatus for operating the submarine defense of Subig Bay be sent to Subig Bay at once and that a torpedo company of the coast artillery be sent to Subig Bay to be ready to plant and operate the mines, should a necessity therefor arise.

2. That all guns and gun carriages now completed in the United States and pertaining to the defenses of Subig Bay, for which emplacements are completed, be sent to Subig Bay at once and put in place, and that hereafter as fast as the emplacements at Subig Bay approach completion, the guns be sent to that place and mounted.

3. That field rations for ten thousand men for 5 months be sent to Subig Bay and held there to be ready for use in case it becomes necessary to concentrate the troops in the Philippines Division for the defense of Subig Bay.

4. That the permanent defenses of Subig Bay be pushed to completion as rapidly as possible.

5. That the material for the operation of the Coast Defenses of the Pacific Coast be placed on that coast as rapidly as it is completed.

6. That the regular army be gradually increased to the 100,000 men authorized by law, by adding to it 10,000 men at a time; the increase to be made in the cavalry, field artillery and infantry, and no increase to be made at present to the coast artillery, beyond keeping

<sup>3</sup>On the south shore of Manila Bay.

organizations at their authorized strength, as now provided for by law and regulations.

7. That the Commanding General, Philippines Division, be fully informed as to conclusions of the Joint Board, the action of the War Department in connection therewith, and directed to make all plans necessary to carry the same into effect, should a necessity therefor arise. . . .

As regards the desire of the President to have the regular army increased gradually to the 100,000 authorized by law (Act of Congress approved February 2, 1901), the expression of this desire arose as follows: The matter of the land defense of the Pacific Coast forts from an attack by a raiding army was under discussion, when the small number of men belonging to the regular army available for this duty was noted by the President. He stated that he thought now was the time to increase the Army to the 100,000 men authorized by law. He stated that he did not wish this done all at once, and doubted if it could be done rapidly in view of the fact that the Army was from some cause or causes below its authorized strength. He asked what were supposed to be the principal causes for this. It was stated in reply that the two principal causes which were alleged to operate to that end were understood to be dissatisfaction with the small pay of the soldier as compared with the pay given men, of the class from which soldiers mainly come, in civil employments, and dissatisfaction on the part of the men with the operation of General Orders, No. 44, War Department, 1906,<sup>4</sup> the men being apparently unwilling to take frequent practice marches with the load required. The President stated that he desired the General Staff to take up the question of annulling or modifying the provisions of General Orders, No. 44, War Department, 1906, with a view to checking any tendency to avoid service in the Army which might arise from the operations of that order.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup>This General Order distinguished between garrison and field trainings, and specified exactly the activities required for each.

<sup>5</sup>Memo, Lt. Col. W. W. Wotherspoon for Chief of Staff, June 29, 1907, sub: Report of Meeting . . . at Oyster Bay, AG 1260092, National Archives. This letter has been condensed to omit irrelevant paragraphs, but the exact wording has been retained.

A summary of the President's instructions, together with the recommendations of the Joint Board were sent to the commander of the Philippines Division in Manila, Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, on July 6, 1907, by The Adjutant General. He was instructed to make all plans necessary to carry out the President's wishes "as quietly as possible and without ostentations, so as to avoid it being inferred either at home or abroad that preparations are being made for war." General Wood was also enjoined to avoid exciting comment by negotiations with civilians "unless you conclude to concentrate munitions and supplies, which, if done, must be given a color of excuse not connected with the concentration of troops."<sup>6</sup>

The Army opposed the mission assigned General Wood, for instead of concentrating the defense around Manila, the most valuable prize in the Islands, it required the defense of the naval base at Olongapo, which, in the Army's opinion, could not be defended in any case against attack from the land side. In view of the doubts raised by the Army as to its ability to defend Olongapo, the President directed the Joint Board, late in October 1907, to reconsider the suitability of Subic Bay as a naval base, and ordered work on permanent installations there suspended until the Joint Board reached its conclusions.<sup>7</sup> The objections to the use of Subic Bay as a base were vigorously stated by General Wood on November 1st, and fully supported by the Secretary of War, William Howard Taft, who was then in Manila. Wood pointed out that

. . . this matter has been well considered for last six months and was reported upon by carefully selected officers; land defence of Subic Bay is entirely impracticable with means on hand or liable to be on hand. To be effective

<sup>6</sup>Ltr, F. C. Ainsworth, TAG, to General Wood, July 6, 1907, cited above.

<sup>7</sup>Cable, Ainsworth to Wood, October 28, 1907, AG 1260092, National Archives.





tive requires very large force and most elaborate and extensive system of defensive works of a character and extent which would be far greater and more expensive than would the works necessary to cover Manila, Luzon, effectively. Subig Bay is most vulnerable to land attack on at least three main lines. It is believed here that Subig Bay will be adequately defended except against land attack by the mines, the 20 6" and 4.7" guns now in position, excepting those on east side of entrance which are being mounted as rapidly as possible, plus the two 10" guns of main battery on Grande Island. This opinion is concurred in by the Secretary of War and instructions have been given to push forward mounting of the two 10" guns on Grande Island with all possible speed. As soon as these are installed no more work is to be done on entrance to Subig Bay, but all materials and energy concentrated on defence of entrance of Manila, Luzon, Bay. These conclusions are approved by the naval and military authorities here and by the Secretary of War.<sup>8</sup>

While the Joint Board was considering the question of the location of the naval base in the Philippines, two officers from the War Department, Lt. Col. F. V. Abbott (CE) and Capt. Stanley D. Embick (CAC), arrived in Manila. Their mission was to study the ground and propose sites for the location of defensive positions. On November 4th, they reported to General Wood and Secretary Taft, and by the end of the month had completed their survey. Their report, submitted first to General Wood, recommended that the main defenses in the Islands be concentrated in and around Manila Bay. This report was the first systematic plan for the fortification of Corregidor and other small islands at the entrance to Manila Bay.

We have located in Manila and Subic Bay guns, mortars and carriages for which Congress has furnished funds. Of these two 10" guns, four six inch guns, and eight 15 Pdr. guns have been assigned to Grande Island,

Subic Bay. Of the balance six 12" guns, one 10" gun, twelve 12" mortars, three six inch guns, and 4-15 Pdr. guns have all been assigned to Corregidor Island, Manila Bay, and two 14" guns to Carabao Island, Manila Bay. Funds in hand will not be sufficient to do much construction work on the 14" gun emplacements on Carabao, but plant, wharf and materials that require time for delivery will be provided, so that as soon as Congress gives additional funds work thereon can be pushed vigorously.

For torpedo structures, except primary stations, work is now well in hand. At Subic Bay they will be completed in about a month, and at Corregidor in perhaps the same, probably in six weeks at the latest.

All fire control stations and mine primary stations have been located in a most satisfactory manner, as the terrain at Corregidor, Carabao, and Grande Islands<sup>9</sup> lends itself admirably to the purpose.

At El Fraile<sup>10</sup> the best has been made of an exceptionally difficult site. The casemate excavation in solid rock is nearly completed and arrangements are all made for building the 4 primary mine stations needed there.

For both fire control stations and mine stations the plans are ready, in outline, and on a number excavation is in progress.

On the recently located Corregidor Mortar battery and 10" battery work has actually begun, clearing and detailed studies for the 6" and 15 Pdrs. transferred from Subic Bay will begin within a day or so.

At both Corregidor Island and Grande Island the force of laborers has been nearly doubled, arrangements for night work are nearly completed, utilizing the portable search light outfits, and no time is being lost.

We have twice visited Subic Bay and once Silangan Bay.<sup>11</sup> We have thoroughly gone over the ground and studied the question of sites at Macmany Point<sup>12</sup> and are a unit in the view that no permanent Army emplacements for either guns or mortars should be built there. The entire site is ill-adapted to

<sup>9</sup>Grande Island is at the entrance to Subic Bay; Corregidor and Carabao at the entrance to Manila Bay.

<sup>10</sup>El Fraile is located near Corregidor in Manila Bay.

<sup>11</sup>Silangan Bay is to the west of Subic Bay along the South China Sea.

<sup>12</sup>Macmany Point is on the west coast of Subic Bay, opposite Grande Island. Just south is Sueste Point.

<sup>8</sup>Cable, Wood to TAG, November 1, 1907, AG 1260092, National Archives.

battery location and construction, is within easy range of field artillery from commanding sites in rear, and if captured any armament placed there would aid in the reduction of Grande Island.

At Sueste Point we have after careful inspection of the whole terrain found sites on which two 14" guns and eight 12" mortars could be built so as to sweep the waters of Subic Bay as far as Grande Island, and for some distance further to the interior, while covering the sea approaches in a satisfactory manner.

They would be commanded from a ridge close in the rear, at an elevation of over 1000 ft. but not from the more distant and higher mountains in the rear except by indirect fire. This 1000 ft. ridge might be held for a short time by a strong infantry force, but would irretrievably fall if attacked by a force superior in numbers to the defensive.

We are a unit in recommending against putting any heavy permanent guns or mortars on the main shore of Subic Bay.

In order that the batteries on Corregidor Island may be readily accessible to the garrison the post must be situated on the high plateau on the main part of the island which is admirably adapted to the purpose. In the plan proposed, full advantage has been taken of the natural features of the ground. The Officers quarters and barracks are developed along crests which command fine views and are open to the prevailing winds. To provide communication between the post and the wharf and torpedo structures, a trolley line should be provided. The trolley line should be connected with the present Engineer tracks to form a belt line running around the top of the island to all the batteries.

We have looked carefully into the question of infantry defenses of Corregidor Island against enemies attempting to land in force and would suggest as an immediate matter the slashing and burning before the end of the dry season of all timber and brush now standing in [certain] areas. . . . It would take about 1000 men at least six weeks and probably two months to do this; other slashing should be done but it is not such an immediate matter.

Three regiments are a minimum to hold the whole island against determined but minor at-

tacks and five would be the minimum in case of serious attempts. The long narrow part of the Island east of the native village San José is the most accessible to landing parties, and is so situated with reference to the main land to the northward as to invite selection for an attack by an enemy holding the north shore of the bay. It is cut off from the main body of the Island by a steep and narrow hill 380 feet high, which can be scaled in only a few places from the eastward, and in those only with difficulty.

It commands all land to the eastward except the extreme bottom of a few steep ravines. It should be strongly held by infantry and field artillery, and lines of intrenchments and redoubts should be thrown out in front of it as indicated. . . .

The circular form of the main body of the Island, together with the fact that its sides are precipitous for long distances makes it possible to defend it by a comparatively small force near its center, from which radiate the only wide ravines up which an attacking force could advance.

The slope of the main body toward San José is comparatively gentle, and must be slashed and entrenched with a view to sweeping both beaches of the latter village where landing is easy and safe, and the northeastern shore of the main body of the Island, this line should also be regarded as a second line to be held strongly against an attack which had succeeded in passing the defenses of the 380 foot hill.

Good paths should be made for patrols, etc., in advance of the 380 ft. hill and good communication between the camps of the troops on the top of main body and the various ravines and trenches which they defend. All available field and siege guns should be utilized where they can best reinforce the infantry.

An indefinite number of good artillery positions are available.<sup>13</sup>

On 23 December 1907, after studying the report of Colonel Abbott and Captain Embick, General Wood presented his views on

<sup>13</sup>Ltr, Abbott and Embick to General Wood, November 27, 1907, AG 1260092, National Archives. Portions of the letter dealing with the details of construction and installation have been omitted. The wording has not been changed.



the local defense of Subic Bay and the location of a naval base in the Philippines to The Adjutant General. This letter, with the report, are of great interest for they established the basic scheme of defense for many years and shifted the emphasis from Subic Bay to Manila Bay. Some of the recommendations made at this time were later revised in the light of the development of air power and Japan's control of the mandated islands, but many of the conclusions were as valid in 1941 as when they were first written. General Wood's analysis proved conclusively that the defense of Subic Bay was impossible.

Heretofore we have been without sufficiently accurate information concerning this country; the Spanish charts and maps, except as indicating the coast line and a few principal peaks, are so inaccurate as to be of little value for military purposes.

The topographical work completed demonstrates fully the impracticability of defending Subig Bay with any means at our disposal, or likely to be at our disposal, unless it is proposed to maintain here a force of at least 80,000 men, and build most extensive and permanent fortifications covering the approaches to the Bay. Without such works 125,000 men will be the minimum required.

The shortest line of defense necessary to properly cover Subig Bay will be over thirty miles, probably in the vicinity of thirty-five or thirty-six miles, and to be held it must be covered by permanent works, many of them detached and provided with facilities for large reserve supplies, including water.

It is the opinion of practically all officers here who are familiar with the country referred to, including Admiral Hemphill, Generals Weston, Bliss, Mills, and Pershing, Commander McLean, officers of the General Staff and staff corps, and myself, that the successful defense of Subig Bay is impracticable except under the conditions and with the force above referred to. The terrain is such that if any portion of the crest commanding the west side of the entrance is lost, Grande Island and the lateral batteries fall, and with them, eventually, the naval station, dry dock, and shipping.

The same holds true in case of the loss of the east side of the entrance.

In short, we have to deal with a situation which involves securely holding all this difficult country requiring works about three times as extensive as those at Port Arthur,<sup>14</sup> in a country which lends itself much less readily to the defense and is much more favorable to the attack. An enormous amount of road making and clearing would have to be done in order to establish communications over this great extent of rough and difficult country.

The Bay, while much larger than Port Arthur Harbor, is not large enough to render the ships and docks secure if either side is in the hands of the enemy. Consequently we have vastly increased difficulty on the side of land defense with little additional advantage, except from a purely marine standpoint, in the way of anchorage, etc., on the water side.

The mere holding of the entrance against naval attack is a simple problem, for it is not believed that an enemy would risk sending his ships in over a mine field and against defenses which, even now, exist at the entrance. He certainly would not unless the urgency was very great and the objective of vital importance.

There can be no serious attack on Subig Bay (by this I mean general attack by land and sea) until our Asiatic fleet is crippled or destroyed. It would be too dangerous to move troops by sea until this had been done, hence the real defense of Subig Bay to which we must give our attention is the land defense. The defense of the entrance, so long as we are not confronted with an attack by land, will always be a comparatively simple matter.

If this serious attack comes from Japan it will come in great force and with startling rapidity. Formosa is just outside our waters, and our enemy will have the advantage of knowing when and where he is going to strike. There will be practically no time for us to get ready. The attack will not be made unless there is a valuable objective in Subig Bay worth the risk and sacrifice, and cannot be made until our fleet is disposed of. The situation will promptly resolve itself into one

<sup>14</sup>On the Liatung Peninsula in South Manchuria, facing the Shantung Peninsula. The Japanese took Port Arthur in January 1904 from the Russians.

similar to that at Santiago de Cuba,<sup>15</sup> but on a larger scale, for the force sent will undoubtedly be large enough to envelop and smother our resistance, absorb and reform the Government, and occupy Manila preparatory to meeting such reinforcements as we may have to send to these waters.

Eliminating Subig Bay as impossible with the means at hand or likely to be at hand, which is the firm opinion of at least 90% of those who have gone over the ground and studied the question from the standpoint of exact information based on personal knowledge of the terrain, we have two alternatives:

First. Establish the naval base at Manila and include its defense in that of Manila by land and sea.

Second. Select a naval base remote from Manila, so situated as to be difficult of access by land and capable of being held by such force as is always available here.

I believe that the first proposition is the sound and logical one, and that Manila should be adopted as the site of the naval station or base, with possibly a fortified rendezvous or secondary base at Dumanquillas Bay, Malam-paya Sound, or other suitable place.<sup>16</sup>

While the land defenses are entirely separated, the entrances to Manila Bay and Subig Bay are sufficiently close together to enable the blockading fleet to cover them both. In other words, the enemy would have the advantage of being able to cover both our important ports without dividing his fleet, while we are compelled to divide our land forces to meet his attack.

With reference to your query as to the possible feasibility and advisability of constructing a basin and station at Manila, north of the Pasig River.

The officers named in my despatch of November 1st agree that this is far more advantageous than Subig Bay, as it has at hand in the way of labor and supplies the resources of a large city, and is based on the fertile valley of Luzon, capable in an emergency of furnish-

ing food for a hundred or more thousand men. Moreover, Manila Bay is so large that the possession of a portion of the shore or even of all the shore would not, provided we hold Manila and the entrance, jeopardize either the fleet or dry dock, which could be easily placed out of range.

It is believed that there will be no special difficulty in constructing the navy yard and basin by excavating on the north side of the mouth of the Pasig River. The excavated material can be used to construct the sites for shops and buildings, as has been done with great success in the construction of the commercial port just to the south of the mouth of the Pasig River. This port now furnishes an excellent basin for anchorage and protection against bad weather and would obviate the necessity of a large naval basin, for the present at least.

With the naval basin and docks at this point, the fleet would have the use, not only of its own basin but also, as stated above, of the large commercial basin on the south side of the river. The entire establishment would be approximately in the center of the coast line enclosed by the proposed line of the land defense of Manila, and distant about six miles from the main line of works. This would insure protection from indirect fire so long as this line is held. In case of danger from indirect fire the ships could be moved out into the bay.

This arrangement would give us our navy yard practically in the center of our defense zone, based upon the center of population and supply, with a large bay (30 by 30 miles) immediately adjacent, and would enable us to hold Manila while protecting the naval station and dry dock, a matter of the greatest political importance, for if, as stated above, Manila is lost we shall lose not only all prestige but also very largely the support and confidence of the Filipinos.

We cannot afford to abandon Manila; it must be held.

Serious land attack cannot be made, as stated above, upon Subig Bay or Manila until after the destruction or thorough crippling of our power at sea. If, on top of such a disaster, we were to abandon Manila and concentrate at Subig Bay, it would, in the eyes of

<sup>15</sup>This reference is to the landing at Santiago de Cuba in June 1898 when the U. S. Fifth Corps landed 16,000 men and eventually defeated the Spanish garrison.

<sup>16</sup>Both places were in the southern Philippines, the first on Mindanao, in Zamboanga Province, the second on Palawan.

the world and the natives, mean the surrender of the islands to the enemy, and in effect it would be placing ourselves in a position where we should be absolutely cut off from supplies and, on account of the nature of the terrain, vastly handicapped in our defense.

In short, the defense of Manila is cheaper, easier, more secure, and of infinitely more military and political importance than that of Subig Bay.

If we lose control of the sea we shall probably eventually lose both Subig Bay and Manila unless we receive strong reinforcements within a reasonable time, but a much stronger and longer (which is the important thing) fight can be put up at Manila, and with much better chance of success in the end than at Subig Bay.

Moreover, we shall have the majority of the people with us and in the eyes of the world will not have lost the Philippine Islands.

With reference to Cavite as a site for the naval station, while it presents many advantages from the purely marine side, its occupation for this purpose would mean practically doubling the length of our line of defense, for, in order to protect Cavite against fire from large caliber mortars and from powerful field pieces, the line of defense would have to be at least five miles out, and even if not connected with the Manila defenses it would involve the detachment of a large portion of the small force which would probably be available for the defense of Manila.

An extremely strong line has been selected for the land defense of Manila, and the site of permanent works, infantry positions, etc., are now being laid down. This line will be approximately 15 miles long, and will require 20,000 infantry and, in round numbers, 1,800 artillery.

In addition to the defenses at the entrance of Manila Bay, a strong secondary line of defense should be established on artificial islands in the shallow waters off Manila, so placed as to cover the flanks of the main line of defensive works, and the water front. These islands should be furnished with as heavy armament as the works at the bay entrance, as they will constitute one of the most important elements of the defense. They should be placed sufficiently far out, in case the entrance is forced,

to be able to prevent the bombardment of Manila by ships using extreme elevation at a distance which renders them difficult to hit with guns situated at or near the target (the naval basin, docks, etc.). With such a line of secondary defense there would be little object in a hostile squadron forcing the entrance unless it had been effectually silenced and occupied, especially if our fleet or any portion of it is in Manila Bay, as they would have a live line behind them and a strong secondary line, and ships fighting under its cover, in front of them. On the other hand, holding the bay and the entrance, and being hard pressed by land attack, with the ships in the bay and these strong outlying fortifications in our possession, the occupation of Manila by an enemy would be extremely difficult, even if they gained possession of its defenses. This secondary line of defenses, in view of the difficulty of closing the wide channel, is, in my opinion, vital to the defense of Manila, the naval station, and to ships in the bay, and its existence will render the forcing of the entrance fruitless unless, as above stated, it is silenced and occupied, a procedure impossible for a fleet, especially so far as Corregidor is concerned.

This arrangement promises, I believe, the best chance of successful resistance, certainly the best for a prolonged one, as it involves, before the procedure is complete, the capture of the strongly fortified land position, supported by ships and outlying sea works, and if this is taken the capture of Corregidor (which is to be converted into a fortress of the first-class) a procedure which would certainly require time, sufficient for the arrival of reinforcements from home.

I desire to urge my previous recommendations that the fortifications at the entrance of the bay be located on islands to the greatest possible extent.

I also desire to urge the construction of a first-class fortress on Corregidor, with ample provision for a long siege. This (the defense of Corregidor) should be done at once, and as we have no guns sufficiently powerful to cover the entire entrance, we should expedite with all the means in our power the construction of batteries for two 12" rifles (or 14" if they will be available) on Carabao Island, and a group of at least four 12" mortars. I believe that at



least one heavy battery should be placed on the tail of Caballo with an all around fire.

Carabao Island, like Grande Island, is a weak position, as it is commanded from the neighboring coast, but there is a natural scarp which can be made to give good cover against everything but indirect fire; this we shall have to provide against as best we can. I believe that it can be largely, but not wholly, counteracted, and we shall have to count upon eventually losing Carabao Island in case of an attack resulting in the adjacent bay shore falling into the possession of the enemy.

An artificial island should be constructed inside of and to the northeast of Fraile. There is a favorable location in 12 to 14 fathoms of water. This island should be large enough for a battery of four 14" rifles and lighter guns to cover the adjacent mine field. Without this island we cannot consider the entrance securely closed, in view of the possible loss of Carabao, unless we are prepared to build a submarine barrier across the distant portion of the south entrance, leaving about from two to three fathoms of water over it. This is probably a matter for the future and, while it seems a great work, is not as great or difficult as it appears at first thought. It would certainly solve in a definite and satisfactory way the question of the south entrance. It is believed, however, that the construction of the artificial island above referred to will do this.

In connection with all this work it should be remembered that the really all-essential thing is a strong Pacific Fleet, based on these Islands, for unless we are superior at sea or are willing to maintain a very large force in these islands, we must eventually lose them. A naval station with an inadequate fleet is of little value. An adequate fleet can, as did the Japanese in the recent war, establish a temporary naval base wherever it sees fit.

In this connection it may not be improper to refer to the necessity for the immediate fortification and proper garrisoning of the Sandwich Islands;<sup>17</sup> this should be insisted upon. If we lose these Islands all our work in the Philippines will be of little value.

At the risk of repetition I desire to call attention to the following in considering the

defensibility of Subig Bay: it is the question of land defense which principally concerns us, as no dangerously strong attack (land and sea) can be made until we have lost sea control in these waters. Once sea control is lost, the enemy can move troops in force and the question then becomes one of time. Manila, in addition to the political reasons given, gives by far the best chance of a prolonged resistance, and that is what we must have to get reinforcements out here. Subig Bay gives us no such chance except with most extensive works and a garrison of great strength.<sup>18</sup>

The threat of war with Japan, fortunately, did not materialize. The U. S. Fleet made its cruise the next year, and was well received in Japan. In November 1908, the two countries pledged themselves to maintain the *status quo* in the Pacific, and to respect each other's territorial possessions. But the military preparations ordered during the summer months of 1907 led to important consequences. The Army's opposition to the defense of Subic Bay resulted in a reconsideration of defense plans and the reexamination of the most desirable location for a naval base. The Subic Bay project was finally dropped, except for minor installations, and the Navy gradually built its base at Cavite, on the south shore of Manila Bay. The fleet's major base in the Pacific was established at Pearl Harbor in 1908, as a result of the Joint Board's study, and the base in the Philippines was relegated to a secondary position in the strategy for the Pacific. Finally, the decision to fortify Corregidor and the surrounding islands in Manila Bay, and to concentrate on the defense of Manila was the direct result of the military preparations made in the summer of 1907 for the possibility of a war with Japan.

<sup>18</sup>Ltr, Wood to TAG, December 23, 1907, AG 1260092, National Archives. This letter, like the others quoted above has been condensed by the omission of irrelevant material and unnecessary detail.

<sup>17</sup>Old name for the Hawaiian Islands, annexed to the U. S. 7 July 1898.

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## HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

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### NEW PRESIDENT OF THE A.M.I.

As the result of an election last May, Brig. Gen. Carl A. Baehr became President of the American Military Institute. An artilleryman, General Baehr graduated from West Point in 1909. Space permits mention of only the high points in his distinguished and varied career. In the First World War, he served with the 2d F.A. Brigade in the Meuse-Argonne, and after the Armistice at GHQ, AEF, attaining the temporary rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He graduated from the Command and General Staff School in 1923, and the Army War College in 1926. Ten years later he was Director of The Field Artillery School, which is very close to the top of the ladder for an artilleryman in peacetime. He was Chief of Staff of the Philippine Division 1938-40, and then commanded one large field artillery unit after another in rapid succession in the rush of mobilization. He became a Brigadier General in December 1941. General Baehr finally managed to get overseas early in 1944, and within two months received the Silver Star in a field presentation for combat service while commanding the VI Corps Artillery in Italy. For service in France in January-May 1945 he earned a Distinguished Service Medal. General Baehr's last command was the XXXVI Corps Artillery, and he was retired from the service in 1946. His home is in Chevy Chase, and he takes an active interest in military education at the nearby campus of the University of Maryland. His service included half a dozen tours of duty for Reserve Officer Training at various colleges. His very considerable knowledge of military education will be invaluable to the A.M.I.

We have not completely lost the services of our former President, Colonel Joseph I. Greene. Although his own undertakings in the field of military publication take up most of his time, he has consented to continue with the Institute in the capacity of Vice President.

### EDITORIAL BOARD CHANGES

A change in our Editorial Board has been made necessary by a routine transfer within Headquarters, Marine Corps. Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Heintz, Jr., Officer-in-Charge of the Marine Corps Historical Section, has been transferred to the Marine Corps School at Quantico, Virginia. He and his staff initiated monographs on Marine campaigns at Guadalcanal, Saipan, Palau, Okinawa, and the close air support operations which Marine Air units provided in the Philippine Campaign. Col. Heintz's final act in the Marine Historical Section was to submit the Guadalcanal historical monograph for printing.

Lieutenant Colonel Heintz's successor, Lieutenant Colonel Gordon D. Gayle, USMC, has been elected to the Editorial Board of the American Military Institute. Colonel Gayle, a graduate of the Naval Academy and of the Army's Command and General Staff School, served during most of the war with the 1st Marine Division. Thereafter he was assigned as an instructor to the Amphibious Warfare School (Senior Course) at Quantico.

Dr. Hugh M. Cole, Chief of the European Section, Army Historical Division, is temporarily replacing Dr. K. R. Greenfield on the Editorial Board. He is concerned with the Military Library section of **MILITARY AFFAIRS**.

## AUSTRALIAN OFFICIAL WAR HISTORY

The plan for the writing of the Australian Official War History is under the general editorship of Mr. Gavin M. Long, formerly war correspondent for the *Sydney Morning Herald* in France, Libya, Greece and New Guinea, and son of Bishop Long the Director of Education in the original Australian Imperial Force. It provides for the publication of fifteen volumes, of which six are devoted to the Army, two to the Navy, three to the Air Force and four to economic, political and industrial subjects. There will also be a concise one-volume work embracing the whole field, and a volume of photographs. The series covers the operations of the three Services in all theatres—North Africa, Syria, Greece, Crete and the Pacific, and of the R.A.A.F. over Europe. The Medical Editor, Colonel Allan S. Walker, is responsible for the four-volume medical history.

The scheme is financed by an annual appropriation from the Treasury; the cost of compilation is thus met partly from Government funds, so that the published price of the volumes will not be beyond the means of the average purchaser. The selection of writers is made, on the recommendation of Mr. Long, by a committee consisting of the Prime Minister, three of his senior Ministers and the Leader of the Opposition. The persons selected are men who, while they have some first hand experience of the events which they will record, are not so closely involved in making leading decisions that it will be necessary for them to write about their own work. The present staff consists of one senior research officer, five literary assistants, one cartographer, one secretary and two typists.

The object is to establish an accurate account of events as they occurred, which will carry conviction in all countries and satisfy

the men and women who took part that the history is an adequate memorial to their efforts and sacrifices. The writers are working under the same freedom from censorship which applied to the compilation of Bean's history of Australia's part in the War of 1914-1918, subject to reservations respecting military secrets. It is anticipated that the manuscript of all volumes will be completed in 1954.

The Official War Historian and his assistants use war records that are controlled by other agencies of the Australian Government. These are located as follows: Political, Administrative and General records are in the Australian National Library, Canberra. Army records are in the Australian War Memorial, Canberra. Air Force records are in the R.A.A.F. War History Section, Air Force Headquarters, Melbourne. Navy records are in the Naval Historical Section, Victoria Barracks, Melbourne.

### MILITARY HISTORY SOCIETY OF IRELAND

The Military History Society of Ireland has been recently formed in Dublin. Its object is to promote research into the history of warfare in Ireland, and of Irishmen in warfare.

Its principal function will be the publication of a Journal. This Journal will be issued free to its members. The subscription to the Society is Ten Shillings per annum.

Hon. Correspondence Secretary is Diarmuid Murtagh, M.A., LL.B. Address: Oaklawn, Athlone, co. Westmeath.

### NATIONAL ARCHIVES ACQUISITIONS

Among military records recently received by the National Archives are those of the Selective Service System, 1940-47, including especially policy directives to local boards and the dockets of the Presidential Appeal Board. Microfilm copies of the papers of General Wilhelm Groener, 1877-1938, are now available and should be most illuminat-



ing on the beginnings of German mobilization. The National Archives has just published a useful 31-page booklet, *Materials in the National Archives Relating to World War II*.

#### "GUADALCANAL: THE FIRST OFFENSIVE"

The fourth volume of the U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II series will probably be published in the next few weeks. The author, Dr. John Miller, is himself a Marine veteran of the Solomon Islands campaigns, but his writing was done entirely in a civilian capacity, and within the Army Historical Division. Thus, *Guadalcanal* will give the public its first opportunity to see and judge a work produced entirely in accordance with the Historical Division's ideas on military historical presentation. Incidentally, the confusion that prevailed in all matters concerned with administration and documentary records in the earliest phase of the war made Dr. Miller's task extraordinarily difficult. Without the benefit of perspective, he was forced to use the reconstruction techniques of classical historical research.

#### MONCADO FUND COMPETITION

The General Secretary has supplied some additional information regarding competition for the Moncado Fund Award.

No entry form is needed. Each manuscript submitted in the contest should be accompanied by a letter from the contributor containing the following information:

1. Name and address.
2. Title of the manuscript.
3. A statement that the manuscript is submitted for entry in the contest; that it has not been published in book form; and that the author is not under contract for its publication.

Contestants may submit more than one manuscript. Manuscripts written by two or more authors are eligible. Manuscripts that

have already been published in foreign languages are not eligible. Manuscripts previously published in serial or installment form in newspapers or periodicals are not eligible. However, papers or essays that have been published separately may be incorporated into manuscripts for submission.

Contestants may be of any nationality.

#### OBITUARIES

##### *Brig. Gen. James T. Kerr 0-61 USA (Ret.)*

James Taggart Kerr was born at Martin's Ferry, Ohio, April 22, 1859. He was graduated from West Point with the Class of 1881, and appointed 2d Lieutenant, 17th Infantry. He joined his regiment in Dakota Territory, and accompanied it to Wyoming in 1886, where he served at Forts Bridger and D. A. Russell. Promoted 1st Lieutenant, 17th Infantry, 30 August 1890, he was appointed Regimental Adjutant the same day and served as such until 1894. He was with the 17th Infantry during the Sioux Campaign in the winter of 1890-91 in South Dakota. He went to the Infantry and Cavalry School in 1895, and was an Honor Graduate in the class of 1897.

He served in the Campaign of Santiago de Cuba, June to August 1898, as Acting Adjutant General of Chaffee's (3d) Brigade, 2d Division, 5th Army Corps. Promoted Captain, 17th Infantry, as of April 1898, he went with the regiment via the Suez Canal to the Philippines and saw active service in the Insurrection, March 1899 to November 1900, when he was appointed Major and Assistant Adjutant General. He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in April 1902, and returned to the U. S. the following August for service in Washington. Detailed to the General Staff in August 1903, he served four years being promoted Colonel, A.G.D., in June 1905. After another tour of duty in the Philippines 1908 to 1910, he returned

to Washington, and was retired for disability in line of duty, August 16, 1914.

He was recalled to active duty in the office of The Adjutant General in July, 1917, and was appointed Brigadier General National Army, October 5th of that year. He was restored to the active list July 1, 1920, and appointed Brigadier General Assistant Adjutant General, Regular Army, and was retired as Brigadier General 15 August 1922, at his own request after over forty years' service.

He twice earned the Silver Star for gallantry in action: against the Spaniards at El Caney, Cuba, 1 July 1898; and against the Philippine Insurgents at Magalang, Luzon, 5 November 1899. He also received the D.S.M. for conspicuously meritorious service in the Adjutant General's Department in World War I.

After his retirement, General Kerr resided in Washington, D. C., until his death on 13 April, 1949. In 1892 he had married Margaret, daughter of General Joseph H. Eaton, U.S.A., who survives him. She resides at 2122 California St., N. W., Washington, D. C.

At the time of his death, General Kerr was Commander of the Order of Indian Wars of the United States,\* and the President of the Society of the Army of Santiago de Cuba. He was a charter member of the AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE, and a member of the Army and Navy Club of Washington.

### *Walter Livingston Wright, Jr.*

The sudden death of Walter Livingston Wright, Jr., on 16 May 1949 deprives both the academic world and the world of affairs of a specialized experience and balanced judgment literally irreplaceable. Dr. Wright's

career began upon graduation from Princeton in 1921. It ended at Princeton where in 1946 he was called to become Professor of Turkish Language and History, and to direct Princeton's Near Eastern Program of Study. In the intervening quarter-century, Dr. Wright had served on the faculties of Princeton and Beirut and had been President of Robert College, Istanbul (1935-1944). In all he did he combined learning with public service, making them mutually interdependent. Dr. Wright's ready understanding of the Turkish Republic (he was writing a book on it at the time of his death for the Harvard Press American Foreign Policy Library) made him an influential and representative, if unofficial, American voice at Istanbul, and his influence was enlarged through his directorship in the Near East College Association.

The war brought him into direct public work in the Office of the Co-ordinator of Information and later as the first Chief Historian of the Army. In this post (held from November 1943 to June 1946) Dr. Wright designed and organized the program to produce the historical series called *The U. S. Army in World War II*. For this work he was decorated by General Eisenhower on 5 February 1948 with the Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service.

After returning to Princeton in 1946 Dr. Wright was for a time connected with the College of the Armed Forces. As a member of the Advisory Committee of the Historical Division, SSUSA, he maintained to his death a guiding influence upon the Division's work. Fortified with a creative imagination never run away with by enthusiasm, blessed by a keenly analytical mind, possessor of an inexhaustible store of anecdotes, Dr. Wright was equipped to shape and guide American information and opinion as only a born teacher can do. His mark is on the histories the Army is writing, and in the minds and hearts of his many disciples.

\*He has been succeeded by Maj. Gen. Guy V. Henry, U.S.A. (Ret.), the former Senior Vice Commander of the Order of Indian Wars of the U. S.

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## THE MILITARY LIBRARY

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### FRENCH PUBLICATIONS RELATING TO THE ACTIVITIES OF THE FRENCH FORCES DURING THE PERIOD NOVEMBER 1942-MAY 1945

BY MARCEL VIGNERAS\*

With World War II history-writing well along the road of realization in this country—if one considers the current production of American official and unofficial publications—it may be of interest, by comparison, to look briefly into the corresponding state of affairs outside our own borders.

The following notes deal with the present situation in France.<sup>1</sup> They include a few observations on the difficulties now experienced by the French and the efforts of the latter in overcoming them; a list of the various agencies engaged in historical research and writing; a bibliography of the most important publications dealing with the French participation in the war for the period 1942-1945; and finally a brief review of the most noteworthy publications.

#### *French Historical Writing Today*

The French themselves paint a gloomy picture of the present state of historical research and writing in their country.<sup>2</sup> Even the visitor from abroad cannot fail to recognize that

this picture is not exaggerated. Of the many difficulties facing French historians today, two appear to assume the proportion of stumbling blocks which need to be removed before any comprehensive work of lasting value can be undertaken in France.

Although gradually recovering from their war-time disorganization, French historical agencies still lack the essential material means to carry on the heavy and expensive burden of collecting, classifying, storing and cataloguing records. They have little money, inadequate storage space and almost no equipment. Their personnel, although competent, is far too small in number.<sup>3</sup> Quite naturally, they look for the day when French authorities will take their plight into serious consideration and furnish them with the means to overcome their present physical handicaps. More serious than the material deficiencies is the fact that records are still dispersed or in a state of insecurity.

On V-E Day, the French had archives in London, Algiers, Paris, Vichy and other places. Their armies, combat units and service troops likewise held important stocks of records. Normally one would have expected these records to be turned over, as rapidly as possible, to the central agencies regularly entrusted with the safekeeping of military ar-

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\*During 1945, Dr. Vignerass, as a member of the Historical Section of ETOUSA, was engaged in writing a history of the French Resistance. He is now in the Historical Division, SSUSA, making a study of French units under U. S. command in World War II.

<sup>1</sup>As of December 1948, at which time the writer was collecting historical material in Paris and elsewhere on the continent for the Historical Division of the Department of the Army.

<sup>2</sup>See "Les principales sources françaises de l'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale," by H. Michel, in *Revue Historique*, Paris, Oct.-Dec. 1948, p. 207.

<sup>3</sup>The entire staff of *Service historique de l'Armée*, including historians, typists, helpers, etc., does not exceed two dozen officers and civilians, and the scope of their activities covers a century and a half of military history!



chives.<sup>4</sup> That such centralization has only partially materialized cannot be charged solely to the inadequacy of storage space or lack of funds, although it is not unlikely that some former commanders, viewing with concern the paucity of means at the disposal of the regular agencies, may have been reluctant to part with their records for fear that these might receive inadequate care and remain unexploited for a long time to come.

One must look elsewhere for a satisfactory explanation of the present dispersion. Important considerations, political and personal, seem to account for the fact that, although the greater part of records have now been "repatriated," they have failed to reach their most logical destination.<sup>5</sup> Whatever the real motives of former commanders or staffs in storing, for the present at least, records of their units in "safe" places of their own choosing, these officers have been in a position to engage in the writing of historical studies. Three works of particular importance have thus been made possible: (1) a history of the 1st French Army in the campaigns of France and Germany,<sup>6</sup> (2) a history of the campaign of Tunisia,<sup>7</sup> and (3) a history of the French Expeditionary Corps in the campaign of Italy.<sup>7</sup> These three studies are now complete and will be published within the coming months.

<sup>4</sup>The present director of *Service historique de l'Armée*, Colonel Jean Carlier, certainly did and still does.

<sup>5</sup>Most of the 2d Armored Division archives are in St. Germain-en-Laye. The bulk of the "FFL" (Free French Forces) records are held by an agency located just a stone's throw away from *Service historique*, but there seems to be little cooperation between the two services. As for the former 1st Army, Army and Corps records are in the Inspector General's office; G-1 records are still in Baden-Baden; only part of Division files have reached *Service historique*.

It is also well to note that, in the course of transfer or repatriation operations, a number of records have altogether disappeared. Commenting on the fact that Admiral Darlan's papers are no longer to be found, "Sources françaises" ironically remarks: "Some papers are so 'hot' that they seem to burn themselves up." *Sources françaises*, op. cit., p. 208.

<sup>6</sup>Prepared by Colonel Philippe de Camas, formerly on the G-3 Staff of 1st French Army.

## Official Historical Agencies

Conscious of the complex and delicate problems now confronting the regular historians who, by reason of the dispersal of records, find themselves deprived of the firsthand data which they need if they are to undertake an exhaustive study of the French participation in the Allied victory, Government officials have considered and devised means to cope with the situation. Their first step has been to set up an over-all committee, known as the Committee on the History of the War,<sup>8</sup> whose task is to coordinate individual efforts, to effect a saving of available means, and, if possible, to bring about an improvement in results.

The principal agencies concerned with historical research and writing on military matters are of two kinds.

1. *Official services*, all located in Paris except for the Air Force:

a. The three services of the Ministry of the Armed Forces, namely:

The Historical Service of the Army  
(soon to be moved to Vincennes).

The Historical Service of the Air Force  
(located in Versailles).

The Historical Service of the Navy.

b. The Historical Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

c. The Historical Service of the Ministry of War Veterans and Victims.

2. Government-sponsored *committees* have recently been created for the purpose of collecting information and preparing historical studies on various phases of World War II:

a. *The Commission on the History of the Occupation and Liberation of France*,<sup>9</sup> es-

<sup>7</sup>Prepared by Lt. Gen. Marcel Carpentier, former C/S of the French Expeditionary Corps.

<sup>8</sup>*Comité d'histoire de la guerre*, 12 Rue Guénégaud, Paris, VIe. This Committee is attached to the Premier's office.

<sup>9</sup>*Commission d'histoire de l'occupation et de la libération de la France*, 12 Rue Guénégaud, Paris, VIe.

tablished in 1944, deals with German activities in France and French resistance to the occupant. Its functions are as follows:

To collect, in order that they be preserved in official archives, all documents relating to the period 1940-1945;

To conduct interviews, results of which will, "for obvious reasons," remain secret for the next fifty years;

To publish certain important documents.<sup>10</sup>

One of the long-range objectives of the Committee is to prepare a full history of the Resistance and of the French Forces of the Interior. In this connection, it is interesting to note that the most comprehensive analysis and single collection of basic documents dealing with the FFI is, and will likely be for some time to come, the study prepared in 1945 by the Historical Section, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army.

b. The *Advisory Commission on War Damages and Reparations*<sup>11</sup> is now preparing three extensive statistical reports dealing with Japan, Italy and Germany with a view to establishing the French share of reparations from the three Axis countries.

c. The *Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry on the Events of 1939-1945*<sup>12</sup> deals with the responsibilities for the defeat of 1940 and with cases of collaboration with the enemy. Its main task is to track down guilty persons.

d. The *Committee on the War Crimes Black Book*<sup>13</sup> has undertaken an extensive study of German crimes committed in France during the war.

Of these services and committees, *Service historique de l'Armée* is logically the one agency expected to carry the heaviest burden in the field of research and writing on the military operations of the French forces for the period concerned. At present, however, its staff is primarily busy assembling and cataloguing records. Until such a time as file collections are complete, its own writers will find it difficult to engage in serious research and will have to limit themselves, as they do now, to the study of the campaign of 1940 and to the writing of short articles dealing with specific phases of the 1942-1945 period.

A number of official reports and technical studies were printed in 1945 and 1946. They were the work not of *Service historique* but of G-3 Staffs, Army or Corps Headquarters, especially of 1st French Army Headquarters.

The greater part of French post-war publications have been semi-official writings<sup>14</sup> such as unit histories, campaign studies and reports, and unofficial writings. Nearly all are available in bookstores today. As a rule, they contain few, if any, footnotes, no references and no indexes. In good French fashion, first names are never indicated and last names, even of French generals, are frequently misspelled. Illustrative material is abundant and in some instances highly artistic. In the case of unit histories, the presentation tends to be eye-catching and the language flowery or bombastic. But this is to be expected since such works are intended more for the proud veteran than for the sober-minded historian.

### Bibliography

The following bibliography includes the most important publications relating to the French participation in the Allied victory:

<sup>10</sup>Such as the Minutes of the French Delegation to the German Armistice Commission, of which Vol. I came out in 1948.

<sup>11</sup>*Commission consultative des dommages et réparations de guerre*, 172 Rue de l'Université, Paris, VIIe.

<sup>12</sup>*Commission parlementaire d'enquête sur les événements de 1939-1945*.

<sup>13</sup>*Comité du Livre Noir des crimes de guerre*, 48 Rue Paul-Valéry, Paris, XVIe.

<sup>14</sup>Semi-official in the sense that they have not been authorized by, or prepared under the direction of, official historical agencies. Rather they are the work of individuals, generally former G-3 officers, and have received the blessings of former commanding officers.

1. *Reviews*

Revue historique de l'Armée<sup>15</sup>

Revue de la Défense nationale<sup>16</sup>

Informations militaires<sup>17</sup>

Revue d'Information des Troupes françaises d'occupation en Allemagne<sup>18</sup>

Tropiques (formerly, Revue des Troupes coloniales)<sup>19</sup>

Revue du Génie militaire<sup>16</sup>

Revue des Transmissions<sup>20</sup>

Forces aériennes françaises<sup>21</sup>

L'Armée française<sup>22</sup>

France-Amérique Magazine<sup>23</sup>

Revue politique et parlementaire<sup>24</sup>

2. *Official reports* (After-action reports, G-2 and G-3 reports).<sup>25</sup>

## I Corps:

*Le 1er Corps d'Armée — Septembre 1943-Mai 1945*

## II Corps:

*Rapport d'opérations* 6 vol.

*Le 2e C.A. dans la bataille pour la libération de la France (Rapport d'opérations)*

*Le 2e C.A. en Allemagne (Rapport d'opérations)*

## 2d Moroccan Infantry Division:

*Rapport d'opérations*

## 3d Algerian Infantry Division:

*Rapport d'opérations de la 3e DIA en Italie (3e Bureau)*

*Recueil de synthèses sur les opérations ennemies devant le front de la Division (12 mai 1944-31 janvier 1945)*

*La 3e DIA dans la bataille de Provence*

## 4th Moroccan Mountain Division:

*Rapport d'opérations*

## 5th Armored Division:

*Rapport d'opérations*

## Detachment of the Atlantic:

*Opérations du Détachement de l'Atlantique*

3. *Official technical studies:*

## Artillery:

Maj. Gen. Paul Devinck, *Etude sur les enseignements tirés des campagnes 1943-1945*, Besançon, 1945.

## Engineers:

Maj. Gen. Robert Dromard, *Le Génie dans la campagne d'Italie*<sup>26</sup>

Maj. Gen. Robert Dromard, *Le Génie dans les campagnes de France et d'Allemagne, 1944-1945*<sup>26</sup>

Maj. Gen. Robert Dromard, *Le Génie dans le franchissement du Rhin, mars-avril 1945*<sup>26</sup>

## Base 901:

Maj. Gen. Henri Coudraux, *La Base d'opérations 901 dans la bataille pour la libération de la France*, Paris, 1947.

## Signals:

Maj. Gen. Lucien Merlin, *Les transmissions en A.F.N.*, Paris, 1947.

## Air Force:

Col. Pierre Pasquier and members of "Service historique de l'Armée de l'Air," *Les Forces aériennes françaises de 1939 à 1945*, Paris, 1949.

4. *Unit histories:*

1st Motorized Infantry Division (also called 1st Free French Division):

*La 1ère D.F.L.: Epopée d'une reconquête*, Paris, 1946.

## 2d Moroccan Infantry Division:

*Victoire en Italie*, Paris, 1945.

*Face aux Marocains*, Paris, 1945.

## 3d Algerian Infantry Division:

*La Victoire sous le signe des Trois Croisants*, 2 vols., Algiers, 1946 and 1948.

## 4th Moroccan Mountain Division:

*Avec la 4e Division marocaine de montagne*, Mulhouse, 1945.

## 9th Colonial Infantry Division:

*Histoire de la 9e DIC*, Lyon, 1945.

## 1st Armored Division:

*La 1ère Division blindée au combat*, Paris, 1947.

<sup>26</sup>Publication of the Corps of Engineers.

<sup>15</sup>Published by Service historique de l'Armée. Office: 231 Boulevard St. Germain, Paris, VIIe.

<sup>16</sup>Editions Berger-Levrault, 5 Rue Auguste-Comte, Paris, VIe.

<sup>17</sup>Office: 231 Boulevard Saint-Germain, Paris, VIIe.

<sup>18</sup>Edition de la Revue des T.O.A. Address: S.P. 79-531 (B.P.M. 510), French Zone of Occupation, Germany.

<sup>19</sup>Office: 10 Rue Saint-Roch, Paris, Ier.

<sup>20</sup>Les Grandes éditions françaises, 35 Rue de la Boétie, Paris, VIIIe.

<sup>21</sup>Editions Charles-Lavauzelle, 124 Boulevard Saint-Germain, Paris, VIe.

<sup>22</sup>Office: 10 Rue de Châteaudun, Paris, IXe.

<sup>23</sup>Office: 9 Avenue du Président Roosevelt, Paris, VIIIe.

<sup>24</sup>Office: 10 Rue Auber, Paris, IXe.

<sup>25</sup>Obtainable only through former Commanders or Staff officers.



## 2d Armored Division:

*La 2e DB—Général Leclerc—Combattants et combats en France*, Paris, 1945.

5th Armored Division:<sup>27</sup>

## Moroccan Goums:

*Les Goums mixtes marocains de l'Atlas au Danube*, Constance, 1945.

## 2d Moroccan Tabor Regiment:

*De l'Atlas au Tyrol (Journal de marche du 2e GTM)*, Rabat, 1946.

## 4th Moroccan Tabor Regiment:

*Journal de marche du 4e GTM*, Constance, 1946.

## Shock Battalion:

*Le Bataillon de Choc en action*, Paris, 1947.

5. *Studies on the 8 November 1942 Episode:*

Pierre Barjot: *Le débarquement du 8 novembre 1942 en A.F.N.*, Paris, 1948.

Richard & de Sérigny: *La Bissectrice de la guerre*, Algiers, 1946, Paris, 1947.

Crusoé: *Vicissitudes d'une victoire*, Paris, 1946.

Pierre & Renée Gosset: *Pourquoi le sang a coulé sur nos plages*, Paris, 1948.

6. *Campaign studies and reports:*

General H. Adeline: *La Libération du Sud-Ouest (Bordeaux-Royan-La Rochelle)*, Algiers, 1948.

René Chambe: *Le 2e Corps attaque*, Paris, 1948.

Y. de Daruvar: *De Londres à la Tunisie (Car-net de route de la France Libre)*, Paris, 1945.

Colonel Jean Goutard: *Le Corps expéditionnaire français dans la campagne d'Italie*, Paris, 1947.

Colonel François Ingold: *Historique des troupes du Général Leclerc dans la libération de la Tunisie*, Ebolowa (Cameroun), 1943.

7. *General:*<sup>28</sup>

Reboul & Dupuy: *L'Armée française de la Libération*, Paris, 1946.

Chef de bataillon Rocolle: *L'arme aéroportée clé de la victoire*, 2 vols., Paris, 1948.

J. Revol: *Chroniques de guerre (1939-1945)*, Paris, 1945.

The following publications, taken from the above bibliography are among the most noteworthy that have come out since the war:

*Le débarquement du 8 novembre 1942 en*

*Afrique du Nord*, by Pierre Barjot (Paris, 1948. pp. 210). Even though Rear-Admiral Barjot (then Captain) took an active part in the fateful events leading to the Allied landing in North Africa, his study is remarkably objective and untainted with the political bitterness so often present in other French publications on the same subject. Rising to the strategic level, above personalities and individual squabbles, the Admiral undertakes to assess, on the basis of abundant information, the contribution of the French Resistance to the speedy and successful Allied landing. However, considering its total lack of references and, more important, in view of other information recently come to light<sup>29</sup> or yet to be published,<sup>30</sup> Admiral Barjot's book, valuable as it is, can only serve as a basis for further study.

*Le Corps expéditionnaire français dans la*

*campagne d'Italie*, by Colonel Jean Goutard. Introduction by General Juin; preface by General de Monsabert (Paris, 1947. pp. 260). This is an excellent although not definitive study of the operations of the French Expeditionary Corps which fought in Italy as part of the Fifth U.S. Army from December 1943 to July 1944. The author, then in command of the 3d Moroccan Tirailleurs (of the 3d Algerian Infantry Division), has been in a position to examine the records of the various components of the CEF and to obtain additional information from commanding officers. The result is a scholarly, well-documented, comprehensive report, free from bombast, in which the author relates in detail the operations of this U.S.-equipped and

<sup>27</sup>No unit history. However, the Division publishes an excellent monthly review: *La revue de la 5e DB*. Address: SP 70.135 (B.P.M. 415-B), French Zone of Occupation, Germany.

<sup>28</sup>A French translation of General Eisenhower's Report on Operations in Europe has recently been published, with a preface by General Pierre Koenig, under the title: *Les opérations en Europe des Forces expéditionnaires alliées*, Paris, 1948.

<sup>29</sup>Such as *Télégrammes secrets* published by A. Kammerer, Paris, 1949.

<sup>30</sup>Shortly before his death, General Giraud disclosed to the writer that he was working on his memoirs.

U.S.-trained French corps, the first, since 1940, to push forward and break through in most difficult terrain and against stubborn enemy resistance, thanks to the combined use of tactics and modern equipment.<sup>31</sup>

*Face aux Marocains* by Jean Duroc-Danner (Paris, 1946. pp. 280). This unusual publication is the work of a former G-2 officer of the 2d Moroccan Infantry Division which played a brilliant part in the campaigns of Italy, France and Germany. The author's aim was to recreate retrospectively the activities of the German units which faced the 2 DIM throughout the war. The narrative is based entirely on German documents (operation orders and reports, maps, photos) and on prisoners' interrogations. Brief marginal notes relate the corresponding activities of the "enemy," in this case the 2d DIM or other French and Allied formations. Two-thirds of the illustrations are from German sources, especially as regards the campaign in Italy when German propaganda services were still very much alive. Prefaced by Generals Alphonse Juin, de Lattre de Tassigny and François de Linarès,<sup>32</sup> this book—although admittedly not a history in the full sense of the word—nevertheless contains much valuable first-hand and pertinent data on the tactics of German units and is especially to be commended as an objective study of the obstinate and stiff resistance put up by the Germans, particularly in Italy. Indirectly, it is of course a fine tribute to the fighting qualities of the 2d DIM since, as the author rightly words it, "to assess the valor of an enemy is to pay homage to his victors."

*La Victoire sous le signe des Trois Croissants*, by Captains Heurgon and Moreau (2 vols., Algiers, 1946 and 1948). Probably no other Unit history, whether American, French or other, is as elaborately presented as this account of the operations of the 3d Algerian Infantry Division in Italy (Vol. I), France and Germany (Vol. II). Undertaken in March 1944 at the instigation of the Division Commander, General de Monsabert, and at a time when the Division was fighting in Italy, the narrative was pre-

pared from day-to-day on the basis of journals from the component units, accounts from eye-witnesses and participants, and personal notes. The result is a "glorified *Journal de marche*" and, as pointed out in the Foreword, a basic document rather than a history. Vol. I is prefaced by Generals Juin and de Monsabert, and Vol. II by Generals de Tassigny and Guillaume. The remarkable feature of this work is its illustrative material. Each of the 600 pages contains delicate drawings, some in color, all taken from life and sketched by an officer who followed the Division in its march from Naples to the Neckar. An annex to Vol. I contains a set of fine action sketches and map reproductions. This is a valuable document for historians of the Fifth Army, Seventh Army and Sixth Army Group, and a rare specimen of superb craftsmanship for art lovers.

As can be seen from the above, even though a great number of publications have appeared since 1945, not a great deal of scholarly, comprehensive work has yet been accomplished by French military historians for the period 1942-1945. Too many obstacles have been in their way. The most important historical agency, *Service historique de l'Armée*, entertains great hopes, however, that with the slow but steady return to the fold of records still stranded, with increased material means and, last but not least, a projected move to more adequate quarters, its historians will be in a position to get down to real work and prepare a history of the operations of the French Forces for 1942-1945 which will come up to the fine studies produced for so many years by this distinguished group of scholars.

<sup>31</sup>Lt. Gen. Carpentier's forthcoming work on the CEF will deal with the top-level aspects of the French participation in the campaign in Italy, thereby supplementing, not replacing, Col. Goutard's study.

<sup>32</sup>The third and last Commanding General of the 2d DIM. His predecessors were Maj. Gen. André Dody and Maj. Gen. Marcel Carpentier.

## REVIEWS OF BOOKS

*Their Finest Hour (The Second World War, Vol. II)*, by Winston S. Churchill. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1949. Pp. xviii, 751. \$6.00.)

The theme of *Their Finest Hour* is the extraordinary period in World War II from May 1940 to January 1941 when the British, "alone, but upborne by every generous heartbeat of mankind . . . defied the tyrant in the height of his triumph," while the author was head of the National Coalition Government. This second volume continues the narrative which opened with *The Gathering Storm*. Much of it is written with the same rich eloquence of which Mr. Churchill is an unquestioned master but at least as much consists of reprinted documents, largely memoranda and messages originating with the author in his official capacities contemporaneous with the events which he is now relating. If the documents lack the sonorous phrasing of the narrative style, and often shift the scale of attention from matters of broad significance to minutiae, their total effect nonetheless is that of heightened authenticity. They give an impressive demonstration of the Prime Minister's leadership in matters military. His finger was not only on the nation's pulse; it was constantly in the ribs of his major subordinates.

Mr. Churchill's estimates, explanations, and contemporary documents modify previous impressions of many events. At the outset, perhaps unnecessarily, he furnishes statistical data to show that the British Empire's participation throughout the war was that of a major belligerent, with more divisions in actual contact with the enemy than those of the United States prior to 1 July 1944, and with a total effort in air and sea warfare, and especially in losses of personnel, "commanding fair-minded respect." In the remaining great portion of the book, hardly a chapter fails to add details, correct perspective, or otherwise illuminate the days when the brunt of the war fell on Britain alone. One must indicate some of these contributions rather than attempt to list them all.

The war-time organization of the British Government under the coalition, the actualities rather than the appearances, is set forth. The War Cabinet, with its Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Ministry of Defence, and the three administrative departments for sea, ground, and air components of the armed forces, functioned under the Prime Minister's close control, and operated in a manner

to avoid World War I's clashes between the brass and the men of politics.

Direct personal relations between President and Prime Minister are explained with full recognition of what they became, a means of vital importance in the actual conduct of the war, even prior to the full belligerency of the United States. A few examples are given of a correspondence which came to 950 messages from Mr. Churchill and about 800 from President Roosevelt. These examples include the lengthy letter dated 8 December 1940 which reached the President while on a vacation cruise in the Caribbean in circumstances well described in Sherwood's *Roosevelt and Hopkins*. It enables us better to comprehend the origins of what eventually became "Lend-Lease."

In the lamentable story of the loss of France to the Germans in 1940, the author has met the highly controversial issues of national and personal roles among the Allies. That the coordination of British, French, and Belgian operations should require the transmitting of messages through the political chiefs indicates the insufficiency of communications and military direction at all levels. It is a pathetic incident which the author relates, when M. Reynaud and M. Daladier were roused from sleep to rejoice in a British decision to send ten squadrons of fighter planes to the critical point in the Sedan breakthrough on 17 May. The failure of the French to have in hand a mobile reserve, the delay in ordering the northern armies to fall back, and the delay in the execution of Gamelin's orders while Weygand came to conclusions much like Gamelin's, the unsuccessful efforts at a British-French counterattack south and southeast of Arras on 21-22 May, the German relaxation of armored pressure toward Dunkirk, the imminent breakdown of Belgian resistance, Lord Gort's decision on the evening of 25 May to abandon the Weygand plan and instead to defend a bridgehead around Dunkirk and withdraw to the coast, his plans in concert with the French commander (Blanchard) for that movement, and the final execution of Operation DYNAMO (the first evacuation from the continent) are all set forth without recrimination. That 336,427 men were brought to England from 26 May to 4 June, including many thousands of French troops, is rightly shown to have resulted fundamentally from anticipation of such grim possibilities and the preparation of plans well in advance. Dunkirk was no simple, gigantic improvisation.



The incompatible requirements of loyally supporting France and of rebuilding an effective British army to man adequate home defences in the British Isles are traced through the final month before the French armistice with the Axis powers. The only two fully-formed divisions in England were sent to France after Dunkirk. One other, the 51 Highland Division (fighting south of the Somme after service in the Maginot Line), was caught by German armor before it was allowed to retire into Le Havre to withdraw by sea. About 136,000 British and 20,000 Polish troops were finally evacuated, 17-18 June, from western ports. All aviation except the 25 fighter squadrons deemed absolutely necessary to defend Britain from invasion were committed.

Americans will welcome the added information in *Their Finest Hour* concerning the exchange of "over-age" United States destroyers for long-term leases of air and naval bases in the Atlantic. As early as 15 May 1940, Mr. Churchill took the initiative and sought the destroyers then so desperately required pending completion of British vessels under construction.

The tragic sea battle near Oran and the miscalculated attempt to seize Dakar are described with judicious balance, as is a highly interesting chapter on British and Axis relations with Vichy and with Franco Spain.

One of the most interesting phases of the volume is the discussion of that tense period of inexorable decisions when, with France out of the war, and a German invasion of England in prospect, the Italian pressure on Egypt was thwarted by sending from the threatened homeland an armored force with guns and ammunition to Gen. Wavell. "The decision to give this blood-transfusion while we braced ourselves to meet a mortal danger, was at once awful and right. No one faltered," writes historian Churchill. With a triumphant note, the volume ends in a chapter describing the brilliant operations with which the British used this reinforcement to shatter Graziani's army. "We may, I am sure," concludes the author, "rate this tremendous year as the most splendid, as it was the most deadly, year in our long English and British story. . . . This small and ancient island, with its devoted Commonwealth, Dominions, and attachments under every sky, had proved itself capable of bearing the whole impact and weight of world destiny."

GEORGE F. HOWE  
Washington, D. C.

**Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy**, by Sherman Kent. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1949. Pp. 220. \$3.00.)

Strategic Intelligence, Professor Kent considers in this well heralded book to be ". . . the kind of knowledge our state must possess regarding other states in order to assure itself that its cause will not suffer nor its undertakings fail because its statesmen and soldiers plan and act in ignorance . . . the knowledge upon which we base our high level national policy toward the other states of the world."

Strategic Intelligence is indeed, as the author says, the *knowledge vital for national survival*, perforce it is a subject of vital import to us all whether we are the citizens in the street, the lawmakers on the Hill, the higher civilian executives of the National Government, or the military who must be ready to execute the national strategies of force when, as, and if, the national strategies of peace are terminated.

Such a vital element of National Government should be better understood—the citizen, the lawmaker, the government executive must realize that it is no Lanny Budd science of espionage. It is rather a sober professional discipline where painstaking scientific research, wide understanding of international matters, large and small, thorough knowledge of foreign countries, and the highest type of controlled creative imagination replace the crystal ball and derring-do of popular imagination. Any book, or other medium of expression, which gives the thoughtful citizen this correct view performs a great public service. Such general understanding by the public and the lawmaker is the *sine qua non* for the development of ever-improving Strategic Intelligence service for our nation.

Six years of intelligence experience, and such posts as Director Europe-Africa Division, O.S.S., Acting Director, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, and resident civilian lecturer at the National War College, give Dr. Kent, who is a professor of History at Yale, an impressive background for his survey of this essential strategic intelligence in the U.S. Time, given him through a Guggenheim fellowship, afforded additional opportunities for thoughtful discussions about strategic intelligence problems with many of the nation's present experts in the field. From such discussions his book undoubtedly gained, and lost, as will be mentioned in a later paragraph of this review.

The basic concept of the book is clear. One can almost hear Dr. Kent ticking off the points of his original conception about as follows:

First: Strategic Intelligence is a most important new branch of the science of statecraft, there has been all too little written for the public about it, and the general public should have some notion about it, the taxpayer should be afforded at least the general outline of and the necessity for the costly strategic product and organization.

Second: Our lawmakers and national executives ought to be told how the nation's present sprawling strategic intelligence organizations should be integrated and organized by laws and by executive orders.

Third: Those who are presently directing the nation's strategic intelligence efforts should be told how better to accomplish their duties.

From these three concepts spring the three parts of the book. Part I deals with the "substantive" content of strategic intelligence; Part II considers the nature and relationships of the many agencies, from the Central Intelligence Agency down, which are concerned with strategic intelligence; and Part III gives guidance on method and mental approach to the practitioners of strategic intelligence within those agencies.

The chapters of Part I purport to offer the careful lay reader his first real opportunity to learn the nature and stupenduous scope of that body of exact knowledge, skillful inference and interpretation, induction and deduction which is strategic intelligence. By hypothetical example—the mythical state of Great Frusina—the author illustrates at least part of that high-level foreign positive intelligence which our nation's high command should have to steer our national course most effectively in those seas of international relations which break on the shores of both Great Frusina and ourselves. Unfortunately much of the knowledge which Dr. Kent suggests to be strategic intelligence is in reality of a lesser order, if that term may be used; it bears to true strategic intelligence little more relationship than an encyclopedia or a dictionary bears to a text book. Also, unfortunately, Dr. Kent does not clearly indicate the nature of national grand strategy which is the management of the economic, military, sociological, political and all other potentials of a nation in such a way as to give the greatest possible chance for success in international relations, and to minimize the penalties of a possible failure. He also evidences a somewhat limited understanding of the more military aspects of strategic intelligence, as

may be witnessed by his remarks about armed services staff organizations. As a consequence, the lay reader of this chapter is apt to receive far less than a complete or accurate picture of true high-level foreign positive intelligence.

Part I of the book also indicates in a smaller way a confusion which grows, almost geometrically throughout the book, and which stems from the effort to serve the three quite divergent ends indicated by the author's three underlying concepts. The sphere of strategic intelligence is so vast that it requires what might be termed a "basic philosophy" about which the experts, civilian and military, are in disagreement between and inside groups. Dr. Kent has, and is entitled to, his own definite views in the matter. However, to interject, as he does, more or less oracular pronouncements on matters about which equally experienced people disagree serves further to confuse the lay reader and to antagonize certain of the experts.

The sections labeled *Intelligence is Organization*, and *Intelligence is Activity* exhibit other interesting phenomena. Seemingly those strategic intelligence experts with whom the author consulted so thoughtfully had, like most experts, their own "gripes" against the slings and arrows of the official bureaucratic life. Some of the gripes are large, some are small, some are petty, many of them reflect conditions which were purely local, or have long since been corrected, and some of them are "special pleading," but all are of more interest to the professional intelligence worker than they are to the lay reader. Dr. Kent has worked these various "thoughts" quite ingeniously into his text in the evident hope that some one in Legislative or Executive circles will read them and "do something about them." As a result, the lay reader is liable to even greater misconception of the true strategic intelligence picture—a danger which the author tacitly recognizes by saying, for example, at the opening of Chapter 8: "The general reader will perhaps forgive this sortie into shop talk; but if he prefers he may turn immediately to Chapter 9 and resume his way."

The third section of the book, dealing with *Intelligence as an activity*, seems designed both to show the lay reader the correct mental processes and organizational procedures which go, or should go, on within the heads and organizations of "working strategic intelligence specialists," and also to serve as a *vade mecum* for the working practitioners themselves. As a consequence, the lay reader is again exposed to the inevitable confusion of "dual purpose writing," and the prac-



itioner is exposed to discussions on method and semantics. Some practitioners may feel that these discussions reflect a level of thought and basic intelligence philosophy which the intelligence business has fortunately gone beyond, other practitioners may find them in part incomprehensible.

The text concludes with an Appendix entitled *Kinds of Intelligence* in which the author seeks to draw together the essential thread of his discourse in the interests of that general reader who reads only for information.

Without question the subject of Strategic Intelligence needs more literature; it is, in effect, a new social science which can grow effectively only as it is given epistemological study. Dr. Kent has bravely made the first real effort in the field to be generally published. There is much in his volume which merits great consideration, but it is to be hoped that future writers will exhibit somewhat more singleness of purpose in treatment of this subject!

NEWCOMB WALSHINGHAM,  
Washington, D. C.

*The Second World War 1939-1945*, by Major General J. F. C. Fuller. (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1949. Pp. 431, with 61 maps and diagrams. \$5.00.)

In concluding his "Influence of Sea Power on History," Mahan distinguished between the objects of the belligerents and the military objectives by which they are compassed. Upon this skeleton, General Fuller, who is to the British Tank Corps what General Mitchell was to our Air Corps, has constructed a provocative history. Thus, the object of Hitler was *lebensraum*, which though unjust, was sane and possible. That of Japan was the sane but impossible "Asiatic Co-prosperity Sphere," for the attack on Pearl Harbor galvanized a people who did not want a war behind a leader who did and thus vanished any prospect of a negotiated peace consequent to a strategy of exhaustion. Had Germany employed this form instead of Clausewitzian annihilation, her object might have been obtained. To support this argument, the author asserts that the Atlantic Charter was pronounced as a pretext for American intervention as mediator rather than belligerent, should Russia fall.

England's object was the extirpation of Nazism, the consequence of which was the destruction of Germany and of a European balance of power, heretofore the British polestar. Lacking a politi-

cally sane and strategically possible aim, for bullets cannot eliminate ideas and strategic bombing is militarily fallacious, she was forced into a moral crusade—to be accomplished amorally by devastation. Later the German people were told that only unconditional surrender was acceptable and the war ended with the victors accepting unconditional responsibilities.

Realistically, Russia intended to win both the peace and the war, her object being her own *lebensraum* in Eastern Europe. In the end, she was the greatest military power, dominating Europe, and "Nazi tyranny was replaced by an even more barbaric despotism." No special mention of the political aims of the United States is made nor is the political situation which the war created in the Far East analyzed.

If the objects were confused, so were the objectives, continues General Fuller. The key to military success is the initiative, which the Allies gained in 1942. However, it was not exploited because of strategic bombing, which is repeatedly condemned as well for its political results as its military effectiveness. Once superiority is achieved, air power should be employed tactically and to increase the efficiency of the ground forces. For example, after the break-out battles in France in 1944, had the potential consumed by strategic bombing created instead an instrument to nourish the armies, Germany could have been quickly occupied and the war ended forthwith. Similarly many strategic opportunities were lost because landing craft were always in short supply.

The author's list of critical decisions is of interest. Among them was the failure of Hitler to continue into North Africa instead of making an armistice with France, which made it possible for England to determine to hold Egypt. Equally, Russia should never have been attacked before liquidating England, for the invasion of Normandy proved that "had Hitler allotted but a fraction of the resources at his disposal between the years 1933 and 1939 to solving the problem of the English Channel, he would have won the war." Though Allied leadership was ironmongering instead of generalship, Americans may take comfort in their military and naval strategy in the Pacific and pride in the creation of a superior naval force so quickly after Pearl Harbor. The Russians, too, were quick to learn after their initial mistakes and the account of the war there is penetrating. The reader is aided by clear and abundant maps and an index.

In this bi-polar world, force has supplanted the



post-Wilsonian ideology of arbitration, security and disarmament. Force need not in itself be immoral; it only is, says Fuller, if applied in the spirit of "cadocracy." Therefore, should not we, who possess so much of it, ponder its intelligent employment? An able advocate presents persuasive arguments against much of our current military thinking.

ADOLPH G. ROSENGARTEN, JR.  
*Philadelphia, Pa.*

***Salerno to the Alps: A History of the Fifth Army 1943-1945***, edited by Lt. Col. Chester G. Starr. (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1949. Pp. 529. \$6.00.)

This book is a condensed version of the *Fifth Army History* (Florence, Milan and Washington: 1945-1947. 9 Vols.) which was published in 500 copies as General Clark's operational report of the Italian campaign. On the army level it is comparable to an after-action report and while it is the fruit of more research than the monthly narratives of regiments and divisions it can not be called either objective in approach or history except in a narrow sense. With little change Colonel Starr has incorporated the bulk of *Fifth Army History* into this new book for the general public.

The reader will find here a great many non-controversial facts about the Italian operations; he will search in vain for an interpretation of those facts which would make them intelligible or cause them to hang together in any meaningful pattern. From his foreword and the text of the book it is clear that Colonel Starr does not believe in generalizations or interpretation. He belongs to the old school of historians who would let the facts speak for themselves and leave entirely to the reader to judge the wisdom of tactics and strategy.

The point is that Starr's volume is not a satisfactory history of the Italian operations at any level of command. In the foreword the editor disclaims any intention of covering the Fifth Army's campaign at a higher level than the Army. Yet it is precisely at the Fifth Army level where the shortcomings of this volume are most serious. No real effort has been made except in the Anzio operation, the Gothic Line battles and a few other cases, which are well written and seek to get at the "why" of the campaign, to go behind the surface facts of Army Field Orders and Operational Instructions. On many important tactical phases of the campaign, it is clear that Starr does not know what the Fifth Army High Command, notably

General Clark, General Brann, the G-3 or General Gruenther, the Chief of Staff, thought or why General Clark adopted certain courses of action. In large measure this failure to know the "big picture" at Fifth Army is due to the fact that Starr did not conduct searching interviews with the Army commander and did not get access to much of the top-level documentary material such as the important messages and memoranda in the Secretary of the General Staff Files, the top secret message files of Fifth Army, material in the Army G-3's office, as well as General Clark's own message files.

The failure to secure much of the important material at the Army level may account for the fact that Starr is either unaware or ignores the significance of major tactical decisions which are controversial but which influenced the operations greatly. In his volume there is no recognition, for example, of the significance of the decision to shift the axis of the Beachhead attack in May 1944 from the Valmontone axis to the Alban Hill Line or of the major difference between General Clark and General Alexander over the best axis for the break-out from Anzio.

On the lower levels of corps, divisions and regiments Starr's volume utilizes the unit reports and the unit journals, but fails to exploit those materials fully. In some cases it is apparent that the lower-unit journals have not been consulted, or if they have, the evidence they contain has been ignored. For instance the 3rd Division and 1st Special Service Force Journals prove conclusively, contrary to Starr's account, that in the break-out of the Anzio Beachhead Fifth Army troops did not cut Highway 6 around Valmontone and that the Germans continued to use it for evacuation of troops from the southern front until 1-2 June 1944. Other valuable records at the lower levels which Starr did not use were the VI Corps CP Journal in May-June 1944; the *Journaux de Marche* of the French divisions and the War Diaries of British and British-equipped units in the Fifth Army. A major shortcoming is the failure, except in the cases of the Anzio operation, the 10th Mountain Division's operations in the spring of 1945 and of five small-unit operations, to obtain combat interviews of the operations from the division down to the battalion level, which are necessary to supplement the written documents. On the enemy side the capture of the War Diaries of the German corps and armies in Italy at the end of the war has rendered obsolete Starr's cover-

age of the German situation which is based solely on Allied G-2 information.

The only major addition to *Fifth Army History* which Colonel Starr has made in his new volume is a final chapter which includes a number of obvious impressions about the nature of the fighting in Italy and the reaction of the American soldier to the Italian campaign. Since *Salerno to the Alps* and the *Fifth Army History* are not annotated, the source of much information which they contain can be checked, if at all, only with the greatest difficulty. As the only published account of the whole Italian operation which is yet available to the public at large, Starr's volume is useful for a quick survey of surface facts. But it has too many shortcomings to detain the serious military student very long.

SIDNEY T. MATTHEWS\*  
Washington, D. C.

*The Pricing of Military Procurements*, by John Perry Miller. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949. Pp. xv, 292. \$4.00.)

This is an excellent study of the pricing policies of the armed services. The author, a member of the Department of Economics at Yale University and consultant to the Navy Department, has achieved a high mark in the field of applied economics.

In a masterful statement of the overall military pricing problem, the author explores the closely-knit relationship between national policy, economic potential, and the achievement of the socio-political objectives which have long been characteristic of the American scene. Using for a springboard a brief description of the functions of the price system, Miller launches the reader into a discussion of the special considerations surrounding military procurement, points out the pitfalls ever-present in periods of large purchases for the armed services, and arrives at provocative recommendations for developing a sound purchase policy in keeping with modern standards of efficient business operation.

Most interesting is the author's assessment of the pre-war approach of the services to the basic factors conditioning the supply of a modern military establishment. Although he recognizes some

extenuating circumstances, he levels criticism at the War and Navy Departments for their almost complete lack of requisite pricing information when war broke out, especially taking the War Department to task for the vacillation and indecision on price and purchase policy so evident in its industrial mobilization plan. A more rational procurement procedure arose through the successful cooperation of the War Production Board, the Office of Price Administration, and the armed services. The author makes it clear that such cooperation, despite the often conflicting objectives of military necessity and the maintenance of a sound civilian economy, is basic to the successful prosecution of war.

Other sections of the book show equal devotion to the facts as they are now known, and equally fine analytical power. Particularly well thought through are the sections given over to the problem of statutory renegotiation. The author's praise of its achievements is tempered, however, by a rather searching exploration of its failures. This reviewer's experience confirms Miller's criticism that as renegotiation became increasingly removed from procurement, and to the extent that it served to dampen incentive, this technique lost much of its effectiveness.

The reader will quickly identify certain weaknesses in the book. The author repeatedly refers to the employment of indirect "monetary and fiscal controls" as devices necessary to forestall the imposition of direct controls in an economy characterized by a high level of employment and a large volume of military expenditures. Yet he fails to do more than merely mention "monetary and fiscal controls" without any explanation worthy of the term. Again, Miller constructs a most compelling argument for the use of the negotiated contract, even in peacetime. However, after arriving at the point where he has convinced the reader of the worth of his logic, he waters down his position to a most unsatisfactorily weak-kneed conclusion.

Miller's analysis of the problems implicit in the pricing of military procurements leads to an extensive series of recommendations. Although some are avowedly difficult of accomplishment, most of them could quickly serve as a framework around which sound purchase policy could well be constructed. Among the most challenging are his proposals to develop a program for control of sub-contract prices, to require certain industries to file with the services price and cost information even in peace-time, and to give to the services the re-

\*A member of the Historical Section, Fifth Army, during the war, Mr. Matthews is now writing a volume in the *U.S. Army in World War II* series which will cover the Italian operations during the spring and summer of 1944.

sponsibility of controlling the prices of specialized military goods in times of emergency or war. This book, easily absorbed by the reader of contemporary affairs, is highly recommended to procurement personnel, both military and civilian. For them, it is "must" reading.

JULIAN F. ROSS,  
Washington, D. C.

***Iran: Past and Present***, by Donald N. Wilber.  
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1948. Pp. xi, 234. \$3.00.)

American foreign policy has been more clearly defined in Iran than elsewhere in the Middle East. President Roosevelt considered Iran a testing-ground for the UN. American military missions are still active there. Since the crisis of 1946 several publishers have launched introductions to Iran. This latest, by a recognized authority on Iranian culture and antiquities, is very good indeed in those fields. Otherwise, the book's usefulness is hampered by its deliberate exclusion of "details of controversial subjects." Nearly everything in Iran today is controversial. Without details the reader cannot evaluate the bare statement that after Reza Shah's accession "British interference in Iranian affairs was no longer apparent." The implications of the American war effort in the Persian Corridor are ignored, the effort itself barely noted. The author's intention to "Present Iran from the Iranian viewpoint" sometimes blurs the picture, as where he mentions the "vigorous . . . but always unsuppressed" debates in recent parliaments, without noting that debate has been prevented by forcible exclusion of members from the building. The publisher's claim on the dust-jacket that this book will serve the specialist in economic, governmental and labor matters is exaggerated. There is one paragraph on trade unions, three on the Labor Ministry, less than a page on the Foreign Ministry.

VAIL MOTTER,  
Washington, D. C.

***Vive Petain, Vive De Gaulle***, by Lucien Galimand. (Paris: Editions de la Couronne, 1948. Pp. 260.)

Some of the complexities of modern French politics are exhibited in Lucien Galimand's recollections of and comments on the Phony War, the first years of the Vichy regime, the Resistance, and the Liberation. Almost as intriguing as the title is M. Galimand's record as one-time Radical-Socialist

deputy, officer in de Gaulle's division in 1940, internee in Spain, official in FFI headquarters in London, historian of the Resistance, and now an employee of the Ministry of the Interior.

M. Galimand's thesis is fairly simple, although some of his arguments are complex. He believes that de Gaulle and Petain were trying, each in his own way, to aid France. One gathers that he would have preferred the de Gaulle program to that of Vichy, but that he prefers the character of the Marshal to that of the General.

Despite service in de Gaulle's division and two decorations bestowed by the General, M. Galimand finds many errors in the political record of the leader of the French Resistance. In his strictures on the political activities of de Gaulle in 1943-44, the author shares the view expressed by many Allied officials that the General was more interested in establishing his political regime than in aiding the Allied victory in France. The author agrees that Mr. Churchill and General Eisenhower were right in expecting from the Resistance movement only one thing—the perfecting for purely military purposes of a system for neutralizing the German army at the time of the invasion. They often felt, he notes, that this essential element was secondary in the eyes of the London French Committee whose concern was to substitute its political power for that of Vichy.

Disillusioned by the postwar scene, perhaps as a result of his defeat in the 1946 elections for the Chamber of Deputies, Mr. Galimand is bitter concerning the "political exhibitionism" of France since 1944. The Allies, he notes, were aghast at the parading and political confusion that followed the end of the war. They wondered how France, in spite of its misery, could enjoy continuous political campaigns and elections.

De Gaulle, as head of the Provisional Government, is flayed for a "stupid" foreign policy made up of "childish grimaces at the United States and friendship pacts with Russia." M. Galimand is particularly incensed at de Gaulle's dealings with the Communists. Thorez, once a deserter, was brought back, rehabilitated, decorated, and given power by the government headed by de Gaulle. Thus, the General "handed power over to the Communists at a time when he could easily have kept it."

M. Galimand's book, while largely a political tract based on his frustrations as a Radical Socialist in a period of chaos, is valuable for its provocative generalizations many of which were drawn from first-hand observations. Study of all the



records and later publications of memoirs of the individuals concerned may well contradict many of M. Galimand's theses. Even then his book will still be of interest to the student of the Resistance because of his observations on the fight to liberate France. To add to our knowledge of his subject, M. Galimand promises soon to publish a volume on the French Resistance movement, a task for which he is especially fitted as former chief of a French historical group assigned to the U.S. Army's Historical Division in Europe in 1945 to prepare a history of the Resistance.

FORREST C. POGUE  
Washington, D. C.

*Jane's Fighting Ships, 1947 - 1948.* (New York: Macmillan, 1948. Pp. 498. \$20.00.)

The Jubilee Edition of *Jane's* is a volume of unique value to the naval historian. *Jane's* appearance is always an event, but on this occasion the editors have surpassed themselves to produce a volume of rare utility and value. Here are "Silhouettes of the World's Ironclads, 1860-1945." If the *Monitor* and *Merrimack* have for some reason been omitted, the *Comanche* class monitors of 1863 are present. All the other great names of modern naval history are here in silhouette: *Lion*, *Tiger*, *Princess Royal*, *Malaya*, *Warspite*, *Hood*, *Von der Tann*, *Goeben*, *Graf Spee*, *Kongo*, *Yamato*, *Maine*, *Oregon*, *Arizona*, *South Dakota*, *Svent Istran*, *Retvisan*; some were lucky ships, some just served as means for a luckier man than their skipper to win fame and another stripe on his sleeve, but here they are all between the covers of one book. With them is an index of the major warships described in *Jane's* between 1897 and 1947, with their class, flag, and fate, from the mysterious *Abdel Kader* which was often reported under construction by the Turks in 1897-1899 to the well-remembered *Zuikaku*, so well and truly sunk in 1944 by Halsey's men. The editors even give the pre-launching nomenclature of German warships, both Imperial and Nazi, throwing light on an often puzzling subject.

Among the other unique features are a summary of British warship construction by yards during the war years, followed closely by a list of all the ubiquitous "Hunt" class of small destroyer. There is an essay on the *Yamato* and her ill-fated sisters *Musashi* and *Shinano*, and the *Addenda* include three good profiles of Russian heavy cruisers. The essential feature of *Jane's*, the information on the world's warships, is as complete

as ever, and recorded in a new and attractive typeface. One notes that the Royal Navy is proceeding steadily and methodically with the modernization of its destroyer flotillas by the commissioning of new construction. They are big ships, the smaller class of 1,980 tons, which was ample for destroyer leaders before the war, and the *Daring* class of 2,610. Very probably the demand for heavier antiaircraft and more ammunition, plus greater sturdiness and better habitability have joined to produce ships with the power of a 1914 light cruiser. The Soviets continue to augment their fleet with every ex-Axis hull that comes into their possession, but appear to devote their own ship-building resources to the construction of a formidable submarine fleet. The U. S. Navy being currently in a phase of development and experiment, it will be some months before the ship-builders have their new wares ready for display. Of the minor navies, the Swedish seems to take the palm for enterprise, with two new light cruisers in commission, and two new destroyers under way. For whatever reason, pictures of Swedish warships do not show the maze of radar antennae so typical of British and American warships. Nevertheless, if the Swedes can solve the problem of providing fighter cover, and have kept abreast of modern tactics and technique they have a fleet able to dispute control of the Baltic while its bases stay in Swedish hands.

RILEY SUNDERLAND,  
Historical Division, Department of the Army

*Thomas: Rock of Chickamauga*, by Richard O'Connor. (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1948. Pp. 378. \$4.00.)

*Rock of Chickamauga, The Life of General George H. Thomas*, by Freeman Cleaves. (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1948. Pp. 307. \$3.75.)

It is an uncommon thing for two books on the same subject to come into being simultaneously. But this is what almost happened in the case of these two biographies of General George Thomas, as their dates of publication were separated by only a week.

Perhaps the spacing of their advent is a bit too great to call them twins, but they're more alike than many sets of twins. They both have *Rock of Chickamauga* in their titles, they drew from virtually the same sources, they quote the same anecdotes, and their estimates of Thomas and his associates are strikingly similar. Despite the stodgy character of their subject, both writers achieve a

high degree of readability in their narratives, a circumstance which must be credited to the fact that both have a journalistic background.

Both authors consulted unpublished papers of Thomas, but use of the manuscripts of Thomas' principal associates appears not to have been as extensive as the passing of judgment upon those associates would seem to merit. Cleaves, whose narrative is obligingly documented with footnotes, gives evidence of a wider range of sources, both manuscript and printed, than does O'Connor. His reference to personal narratives of lower ranking officers and to regimental histories tends to give his account better balance than that of O'Connor, as between activities on higher and lower levels. Cleaves' treatment on the whole is restrained, straightforward and devoid of embellishment. O'Connor is inclined to soar occasionally and sometimes to digress (as for example, when he writes at some length about Shiloh only to tell the reader in the end that Thomas was not there); but he knows how to get the most out of a story.

Both works are sprinkled with anecdotes, but they disagree as to what Thomas said and did at the celebrated conference held by Rosecrans near Murfreesboro, December 31, 1862. When the question was put to Thomas of holding on or falling back, Cleaves has it that: "Without a word of reply, Thomas slowly rose to his feet, buttoned his greatcoat from bottom to top, faced his comrades and stood there . . . and said, 'Gentlemen, I know of no better place to die than right here,' and walked out of the room into the dripping night." O'Connor's version is this: "Retreat—Thomas raised his leonine head and stood up, drawing himself erect, the lamp casting shadows on his face that made it look like the enlargement of a Roman coin . . . slammed his fist on the map table and boomed: 'This army does not retreat.'"

The Thomas that emerges from these books is an admirable character, an accomplished tactician, a careful planner, a thorough administrator, a considerate commander and an incomparably tough and determined fighter. His soldiers liked him, as did most of his fellow generals, but he was in no sense glamorous, and he could not be called brilliant without stretching the word far beyond its usual meaning. He was more the plodding type; but he was solid, dependable and as unyielding in combat as his hard-won nickname suggests. It was said in tribute of him that "he was the only leading General of either side who never lost a battle nor a war."

But despite his remarkable accomplishment, he has had relatively little attention. The reasons for his neglect are fairly obvious. In the first place he was under a cloud during the war because of his Virginia birth and upbringing. Then, he died not long after the war; he published no memoirs; and his personal papers were scant. Of more moment, perhaps, was the fact that he competed for fame with Grant, Sherman, Sheridan and Schofield, all of whom held high position after the war, and who knew how to make the most of their good fortune in furthering their reputations. Finally, Thomas' personality was not the sort to attract biographers.

In pointing up Thomas' true greatness, Cleaves and O'Connor have served the cause of history well, for there can be no doubt that his record merits for him far more recognition than has been generally accorded him. But it seems to this reviewer that in building up Thomas they have gone out of their way to belittle his competitors for fame. So imbued have they become with their man that they appear to have made his enemies their enemies. They are especially hard on Sherman and Grant, who come off almost as villains in the play. This is not to argue that Sherman and Grant were as free of selfishness as they should have been, nor that their conduct toward Thomas was exemplary. But it is quite possible that some of their unfavorable actions toward him sprang from sincere doubt of his fitness for the job at hand, rather than from a mean desire to hold him on the second team that they might better shine.

BELL I. WILEY  
Atlanta, Ga.

*Warpath and Council Fire: The Plains Indians' Struggle for Survival in War and Diplomacy, 1851-1891*, by Stanley Vestal. (New York: Random House, 1948. Pp. 338. \$3.50.)

*Fighting Indians of the West*, by Martin F. Schmitt and Dee Brown (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948. Pp. 362. \$10.00.)

Sometimes I have been critical of Stanley Vestal's books on the ground that he has not always exhausted the possibilities of investigation before writing his story. That criticism certainly does not apply to *Warpath and Council Fire*. It is a result of years of study of the warfare on the plains, particularly a great many first-hand accounts he has himself collected from Indian and white survivors.



However, it is not a critical and fully documented account, but rather a straightforward narrative, telling the story as it appears to him. He does not discuss the various controversies connected with almost every Indian fight, but gives the version that seems to him to conform most fully with the facts. It is evident that he has studied the evidence before reaching conclusions. The result, in my opinion, is the most authoritative account we have yet had of most of this warfare.

He starts with the Fort Laramie Council of 1851. In limiting himself to Plains tribes he omits the Minnesota Sioux outbreak, the Navajo and Apache wars in the Southwest, the Rogue River, Modoc, and Nez Percé, Bannock and Sheepeater campaigns in the Northwest, and other fights. But for the Plains tribes the story is almost complete.

And, knowing Indians, he views the scene with unusual detachment; admitting that warfare was natural to them, he does not defend their every act as is the modern custom, but finds there were many wrongs on both sides. Thus we seem, for once, to have fair treatment for Sand Creek and other outrages down to Wounded Knee—although there is apparent a little prejudice against the 7th Cavalry on the latter occasion.

As for some of the many debated points: In his "Kit Carson" he rejected Gen. Bisbee's version that Carrington did not warn Fetterman against going beyond the Lodge Trail Ridge. He decides that Buffalo Bill was out of the fight at Summit Springs, guiding Royall's column. He is certain that Reynolds attacked Two Moons' Cheyennes, not Crazy Horse's Sioux. His accounts of the Rosebud and of the Dull Knife fight are notable, although Slim Buttes is somewhat slighted.

The verdict is top rating as the best general account yet written of the wars of the Plains.

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*Fighting Indians of the West* is primarily "a picture history of the Indian wars, with 270 photographs, sketches and paintings." The few sketches and paintings are used to fill out the story, especially with battle scenes—probably no action photo ever was taken of an Indian battle. There are the expected Remingtons and unexpected numbers of Schreyvogels; among so few, omissions of Zogbaum, Waud and Russell are understandable.

But the photographs are superb. One can scarcely think of a notable Indian who is not represented—even to an unusual picture of Geronimo at the wheel of an automobile! There are pictures of the Fort Laramie treaty, of the peace lodge

just after Gen. Canby was slain, of Lt. Von Leutwitz on a horse litter just after he was wounded at Slim Buttes, of the Miles expedition setting out in the snow, of the dead at Wounded Knee, of the Sun Dance and the Ghost Dance, and of Smoholla with his priests in ceremonial. There are army camps—Custer's, 1874; Crook's, 1876; in the Modoc War Lava Beds, for example.

The preface mentions the assistance of Elmo Scott Watson, professor of Journalism, Northwestern University, an authority on Indian pictures, with whom I have conferred in writing this review. There were many points on which he was not consulted, for example: Little Wolf, page 39, and Little Chief, page 214, are probably vice versa; "Sitting Bull" in the group on page 119 is the unimportant Ogala, not the great Hunkpapa; Reno's crossing, page 150, was taken at the reunion in 1886; "The Pursuers," page 268, was not taken during the Nez Percé campaign; Sitting Bull and Squaws, page 344, according to Stanley Vestal may be his mother and daughter; "Before the Battle," page 351, was actually taken in January after Wounded Knee and shows in the background the Indians coming in to surrender; Left Hand, page 222, is probably the Arapahoe, not the Cheyenne. The group picture on page 340 could readily have been keyed.

The text also proves disappointing at times. The Washita chapter is virulently anti-Custer, adopting the point of view of Van de Water and Brill. Lt. Bascom is assigned to the 7th Cavalry, page 90; that abused regiment was not in existence in 1861; it is correctly given 7th Infantry in the caption, page 102. There is much inconsistency in the use of brevets; the generals, including Custer, are demoted to colonels; the captains retain their brevet eagles; result, all colonels.

A few chapters are carefully written. Despite the Custer prejudice, that on the Little Big Horn, presenting an Indian point of view, is fair and noncontroversial. Those on Dull Knife's flight, and on Wounded Knee are judicious history where many writers slop over into sentimentalism. Had the standard set by these chapters been maintained we might have hailed the book as popular history at its best. A brief bibliography of uneven merit offers further evidence that some of the work was done hastily and carelessly. This is a book every student of the Indian wars will want because of its excellent collection of pictures. But the publishers have erred in demanding a story when there weren't pictures to tell the story. And why? When a book sells for \$10 surely a considerable per-



centage of purchasers, including libraries, want it for its historical and reference value, however decorative or entertaining it may be. Serious readers must use it with extreme caution.

DON RUSSELL,  
Elmhurst, Illinois

**Captain Dauntless**, by William Bell Clark.  
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1949. Pp. 317. \$4.50.)

William Bell Clark has long been the outstanding authority on our Navy of the Revolution, in which field he has done monumental research through many years among badly scattered source materials. We are now greatly indebted to him for piecing together the heretofore obscure story of Nicholas Biddle, and bringing in clear focus some of the Navy's finest traditions, created by this outstanding Captain of the Revolution.

Like so many others of his generation Biddle was weaned from the land in his early teens, first making a voyage from Philadelphia to Quebec, and return, as a cabin boy in a merchant ship. By 1770, at the age of 20 he had experienced several voyages to Europe and risen to the rank of mate in the ship *Crawford* of 200 tons. When war between England and Spain seemed imminent Biddle took passage for London, and with Franklin's aid obtained a warrant as midshipman in the Royal Navy. After an uneventful cruise to the West Indies aboard the two-decker *Portland*, the ship was de-commissioned in England, and Biddle paid off. In May, 1773, a Polar Expedition sailed from England under Commander Phipps, R.N. On board the brig *Carcass* were two persons destined for fame. Horatio Nelson was a Midshipman and Nicholas Biddle was rated as a coxswain, having kept secret his Midshipman's warrant in order to enlist for the adventure. There was adventure aplenty. Having orders to go to the North Pole, Commander Phipps brashly went into the ice north of Spitsbergen and barely escaped being frozen in for the winter.

Upon returning to England, Biddle learned of the Boston Tea Party, which he correctly concluded would lead to war, and consequently sailed for home in 1774. Among the first to enter active naval service, he made a secret voyage in a small schooner to bring scarce and indispensable powder from Santo Domingo. Then followed command of the row galley *Franklin* (Pennsylvania State Navy) guarding the river approach to

Philadelphia. Service in the Continental Navy began with command of the brig *Andrew Doria*, a unit of the pioneer American fleet under Hopkins that raided New Providence, Bahamas, and returned to New London deeply laden with invaluable cannon and munitions, after a brush with the British frigate *Glasgow* off Block Island. The fleet's arrival in New London unexpectedly coincided with that of Washington's army, on its move towards New York, partly by water through Long Island Sound. This situation called for immediate scouting against British naval interference, and the task fell to Biddle since his vessel was the readiest after the arduous voyage.

Further services in the *Andrew Doria* continued until late 1776, and consisted mainly of commerce raiding in the North Atlantic. Biddle set a fine example of boldness, enterprise and efficiency that won him command of the new Continental frigate *Randolph* (26 guns). She was an unlucky ship, continually in need of repairs, and only one short cruise was made in 1777. But that cruise resulted in the capture of four armed merchantmen from a single convoy, which were brought into Charleston, S.C. The Governor of South Carolina had fitted out four small vessels in a forlorn attempt to raise the blockade of his chief port. Placed under Captain Biddle's command, these formed a squadron of sorts, and as the British had disappeared, he took them out on a commerce raid.

Off Barbados on 7 March 1778, six sail were sighted bearing down on the Americans. One was easily identified as a two-decker—later disclosed as H.M.S. *Yarmouth* (64), compared with only 26 guns on the *Randolph*. It was late enough in the afternoon for the Americans to escape. But not so for Nicholas Biddle. With superb boldness he hove to his little squadron, to allow the obviously much more powerful enemy to catch up.

By moonlight, after an exchange of hails at close quarters the *Randolph* got in the first broadside, and damaged the *Yarmouth* severely. For more than 15 minutes heavy broadsides were exchanged, with the range so short that hand-grenades were thrown from the tops of each ship to the other's deck. Near the end Biddle was wounded and had himself propped in a chair on deck, further to direct a bitter fight which seemed to be going favorably despite the great odds against him. Then suddenly the *Randolph's* magazine blew up, completely destroying the ship and all but 4 of her crew.

This unhappy turn of fate cheated Biddle of a richly deserved place in our history equal to that

of Paul Jones. Two years before the dramatic fight off Barbados Biddle had written his brother: "I fear nothing but what I ought to fear. I am much more afraid of doing a foolish action than of losing my life. . . ." In the taking of calculated risks he well proved himself to be dauntless.

DUDLEY W. KNOX  
Commodore, U.S.N. (Ret.)

*The Book of The Garand*, by Major General Julian S. Hatcher. (Washington: Infantry Journal Press. 1948. Pp. 292. \$6.00.) This excellent book describes in detail the origin, development, construction, and use of the familiar U.S. M1 rifle. The historical background of this technical triumph is especially interesting, extending over more than two decades. The record includes repeated failures and disappointments, clashes of personality, bureaucratic fumbling, and a truly appalling outlay of both public and private cash. The repeated service tests of the competing models are described in detail, and emphasize the wide difference between a satisfactory sporting firearm and an acceptable combat weapon. Even greater is the difference that separates an inventor's model from quantity production. This is a problem in the field of industrial engineering, and its solution is outside the scope of this book. But the dimensions of the problem are clearly indicated, and it appears that John C. Garand has distinguished himself in that field even more than in weapons design. The author is himself a distinguished specialist in ordnance development, and here is one of those rare cases where a more liberal use of the personal pronoun might have been an improvement. The travails and complications attending the birth of this comparatively simple Ordnance item should do much to inform the average reader of the tremendous difficulty of technological research and development for modern warfare.

*The Autobiography of Benjamin Rush*, edited by George W. Corner; Introduction and Appendices by the Editor. (Princeton: University Press, 1948. Pp. 399. \$6.00.) Doctor Rush (1746-1813) never intended that his *Autobiography* should be published. A brief narrative written for his children, it is necessarily selective and emphasizes his own boyhood and education. Even with these limitations, some of the omissions are surprising. A member of the Continental Congress, Rush made a medical inspection of Washington's Army late in 1776. This visit coincided with some famous military operations. As an informal volunteer, he treated the wounded during the battles of Trenton, Princeton, and the Brandywine, but the fact is mentioned casually in these memoirs, without significant comment. Early in 1777 he accepted a commission as "Physician General of the Military Hospitals." Apparently this made him subordinate to the "Director General," Dr. William Shippen, Jr., but he never actually says so. Possibly the omission was deliberate, for Shippen had been a rival in medical practice in Philadelphia, and within a few months Rush denounced him bitterly for maladministration of the military hospitals. The letter to General Washington containing this denunciation is the only significant military item in the book. It describes the medical organization of the Revolutionary Army, at least on the higher levels, and discusses its faults. It is unfortunate that there is no description of medical organization at the tactical level, nor even a mention of military medical practice as a special technique. This book cannot be recommended to the reader seeking military information, but it gives an interesting account of a very distinguished Eighteenth Century physician and statesman.

## SELECTED PERIODICAL LITERATURE

### HISTORIOGRAPHY

"What Happened?" by Lt. Col. Walter T. Kerwin, in *Military Review*, July 1949 (57-62). A critical appraisal of the historical activity of the U. S. Army in World War II, with some constructive comment on the most recent developments in this field.

"An Approach to Military History," by Maj. R. G. S. Bidwell in *Canadian Army Journal*, February 1949 (14-15). The author pleads for a more searching analysis of effective expedients, and less emphasis on formal strategy and theory.

## INSTITUTIONS

"The Changing Military Obligation of the Citizen," by Lt. Col. Bryce F. Denno, in *The Field Artillery Journal*, May-June 1949 (118-121). Will the draft ultimately lead to a denial of the right to volunteer?

"The Implications of the Atlantic Treaty," by J. M. Spaight in *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, May 1949 (269-272). The author points out that although the U. S. Constitution forbids the signing of treaties containing unconditional guarantees, America's vital interests are bound up with the recently arranged pacts. It made plain that America's unique political structure creates real difficulties for her new allies in Western Europe.

"Women Should be Drafted," by Representative Frances P. Bolton in *American Magazine*, June 1949 (34-36). The Congresswoman from Ohio believes the volunteer women's programs

of the armed forces in the last war were "time-consuming, chaotic, and wasteful." Present arrangements are providing trained women leaders, but selective service would insure that, in an emergency, there would be trained personnel for them to lead.

"The Defense of Western Europe: Deception or Blunder?" by James P. Warburg in *Harper's*, June 1949 (34-38). The author believes that no feasible amount of military aid can make the Western European nations self-sufficient. Consequently, arms shipments should be limited to what they need for internal security, and our diplomacy should be modified to recognize this limitation.

"The Impact of Air Power Upon History," by Eugene M. Emme in *Air University Quarterly Review*, Winter 1948 (3-13). A review of the subject that emphasizes its political and diplomatic aspects.

## NATIONAL WARFARE

"The Principles of War," by Rear Admiral C. R. Brown, USN, in *U.S.N.I. Proceedings*, June 1949 (621-633). A discussion of the nine Principles of War taught at Ft. Leavenworth in the light of recent developments in land, sea and air warfare.

"Land and Sea Power in the Air Age," by Stefan T. Possony in *Infantry Journal*, July 1949, (18-21). The author urges that the Armed Forces be "balanced," not in abstract terms, but for the performance of agreed-upon strategic objectives. By logical extension he advocates a single Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to arrange and implement such an agreement.

"One Voice of Command," by Donald Becker in *Signals*, May-June 1949 (35-37). Good example of how Armed Forces unification is being implemented in an important technical field.

"The Men Behind the Intelligence Estimate," by Lt. Col. W. R. Kintner, in *The Infantry Journal*, May 1949 (8-9). Intelligence analysts should be rated for efficiency on a basis of their ability to forecast correctly, and not on their administrative ability.

"New Strength to Old World Ramparts," by Gen. Omar N. Bradley, in *Army Information Digest*, May 1949 (3-5). The Chief of Staff comments officially on the North Atlantic Pact, at the invitation of the State Department.

"Adam to Atom," by Dr. Roger Shaw in *Military Engineer*, March-April 1949 (109-117). Continuing this chronological series, Part XI covers World War I, with its military innovations, and also the military thinking of the years between the First and Second World Wars.

"Nuclear Weapons," by A. W. Betts in *Military Engineer*, March-April 1949 (104-107). A survey of the characteristics of atomic weapons today and in the foreseeable future. Non-technical.

"Should We Go Underground?" by Lt. Col. J. A. Goshom in *Military Review*, May 1949 (33-43). The construction of large-scale underground industrial and storage facilities would be far cheaper than might be expected, but would create grave transportation problems. Also, it would require considerable time for economic readjustment.

## SEA WARFARE

"British Seventeenth Century Claims to the Sovereignty of the Seas," by Lt. Comdr. H. F. Rommel, USN, and Prof. E. H. Clark, in *U.S.N.I. Proceedings*, June 1949 (659-661). Great Britain, having emancipated herself from

Spanish and Portuguese claims to maritime sovereignty by 1600, herself began to develop special claims at the expense of Holland and the Scandinavian countries.



## AIR WARFARE

"Total or Selective Bombing?" by Stefan T. Possony, in *Infantry Journal*, June 1949 (4-10). In theory, the atom bomb can best be utilized for selective strategic bombing. Total destruction through area bombing is certainly wasteful, probably ineffective.

"Air Defense of the United States," by Lt. Col. Floyd A. Lambert, USAF, in *Antiaircraft Journal*, May-June 1949 (31-32). A discussion of the technical implications of Public Law No. 30 of 1949, the so-called Radar Bill.

"The Case for the Aircraft Carrier," by Fletcher Pratt in *Reader's Digest*, May 1949 (53-58).  
 "The Case for Land-Based Air Power," by Francis V. Drake, *Reader's Digest*, May 1949 (59-66).  
 Two extremists advance opposing views on the relative vulnerability and usefulness of carriers, battleships, cruisers, heavy bombers, jet bombers, jet pursuit aircraft and even amphibious assault forces. An interesting example of the extent to which views can differ.

## ESTABLISHMENTS

"Russia's Hidden Army," by Brooks McClure, in *Infantry Journal*, July 1949, (6-12). First of two articles on the organization and activities of Russian Partisans in World War II.

"Teamwork for Defense," by Louis Johnson in *American Magazine*, July 1949 (36-38). The Secretary of Defense describes his plans for increasing military unity. Notable items are the project to make the curricula of West Point and Annapolis identical for the first two years, and specific orders to the three Chiefs of Staff to "vacation together" in order to place inter-service cooperation upon a more personal basis.

"Aid to Turkey," by Lt. Col. T. E. de Shazo, in *The Field Artillery Journal*, March-April 1949 (64-66). An artilleryman discusses the training aspects of U. S. aid to Turkey.

"Canadian Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century," by G. P. Glazebrook in *Journal of Modern History*, March 1949 (44-55). A bibliographical article that covers Canada's relations with various areas of the world. Contains a sub-section on military history.

"The Disintegration of the German Intelligence Services," by Col. Henry J. Sheen in *Military Review*, June 1949 (38-41). German experience indicates that inter-service rivalry is even more disastrous in intelligence activity than in other fields of warfare.

"Turkey Faces the Soviets," by Necmeddin Sadak in *Foreign Affairs*, April 1949 (449-461). Turkey's Minister of Foreign Affairs reviews his country's changing relations with the USSR during the last thirty years.

## OPERATIONS AND BIOGRAPHY

"Préludes aux Invasions de la Belgique," by Capt. Louis Garros in *Revue Historique de l'Armée*, March 1949 (17-57). This re-appraisal of a familiar subject utilizes some new information. In particular, there are interesting details on Marshal Joffre's plan for a preventive occupation of Belgium in 1914.

"The Moscow Offensive, 1941," by General Heinz Guderian in *An Cosantair, The Irish Defense Journal*, May 1949 (214-225). An authoritative account of Hitler's fateful decision to abandon the advance on Moscow, by the tank commander of the Center Army Group.

"Stalin and Hitler: The Pact with Moscow," by Vice Admiral Kurt Assman, German Navy, in *U.S.N.I. Proceedings*, June 1949 (639-651). The former Chief Historian of the German Imperial Navy discusses the military aspects of the famous alliance. First of two articles.

"The Japanese Threat to Australia," by Samuel Milner in *Military Review*, April 1949 (19-28). The defensive phase of the war in the South West Pacific, ending with the unsuccessful Japanese attempt to capture Port Moresby.

"The Raid on Dieppe," by Col. C. P. Stacey in *Military Review*, June 1949 (26-37). Second of two articles on the famous Canadian operation assesses the lessons learned and applied later in the war.

"Auberoche, 1345: A Forgotten Battle," by Lt. Col. Alfred H. Burne in *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, Summer 1949 (62-67). The author believes that the Earl of Derby deserves credit for originating the tactical combination of archers and heavy cavalry that was used so successfully in later battles of the Hundred Years War.

# NELSON AND THE RUSSIAN NAVY

By A. E. SOKOL\*

ON SEVERAL occasions Admiral Nelson came in contact with Russia and its navy, both as friend and ally, and as a potential enemy. To be sure, his appraisal of that country and its navy was colored by his general distrust and scorn of everything not British. Nelson was, above all, an Englishman, for whom the policies and aspirations of Great Britain were good in themselves, while everything that tended to obstruct them was *eo ipso* wrong and suspect. But he could not have been the great leader, the successful diplomat, and the far-sighted statesman that he actually was, if his judgment of others had been too often faulty. As a matter of fact, he often showed a far more correct and penetrating appreciation of conditions than most of his contemporaries. Thus his opinions on the subject of Russia and her navy may still be of value to us today.

## FIRST ENCOUNTER—THE MEDITERRANEAN, 1798

Nelson's first encounter with Russian politics and Russian naval forces occurred in 1798, shortly after his victory over the French in the Battle of the Nile. Chiefly as a result of this victory, a new coalition of European powers formed in opposition to France. In addition to Great Britain, Austria, Portugal and Naples, this Second Coalition also included Turkey and Russia.

At that time the political and strategic situation in the Mediterranean, despite Nelson's victory which gave the British the command of the sea, was as complicated as ever. Although the French fleet had been swept away,

the Republic still held Malta, captured by Napoleon on his way to Egypt, and the Ionian Islands, which France had obtained at the Peace of Campo Formio in 1797. Also, there was still a strong French army in Egypt, which, though cut off from its homeland, nevertheless carried on a successful campaign and constituted a serious threat to both Turkey and British India. Although in the absence of Napoleon the French armies in Italy did not fare too well, most of the country was still in their hands or ruled by puppet republican governments established and controlled by the French.

Naturally, Great Britain's chief concern was to drive the French out of Egypt and the Ionian Islands, a goal which closely paralleled the aims of Turkey, while Austria and Russia were primarily concerned with the eviction of the French from Italy and Germany. For this reason the Russians planned to transport an expeditionary army to northern Italy, where it was to cooperate with the Austrians. But in order to insure its safe passage through the Adriatic, the Russians wished to take possession of the Ionian Islands, which control the entrance to that sea. As these islands also constituted a threat to the Turkish mainland, the combined Russo-Turkish fleet entered upon a campaign for the reduction of Corfu, Cephalonia, and other islands of that group. Moreover, the Czar had just been elected Grand Master of the Order of the Maltese Knights, and he showed a definite interest in their homeland, Malta. At that time most of the island was under British control, but the capital, La Valetta, though blockaded by a British-Portuguese squadron, had resisted all attempts to capture it.

\*Professor Sokol is Head of Asiatic and Slavic Studies, Stanford University.

Thus, in the Ionian Islands as well as in Malta, the interests of Great Britain and Russia were likely to clash. Nelson, foreseeing this possibility, had no desire to let the Russians get ahead of him by establishing their control over any of these strategic points. He was also strongly influenced by another factor: with the elimination of the French Mediterranean fleet, the Russian navy now emerged as the largest and strongest naval force next to that of Great Britain herself. If Russia could establish herself permanently in the Mediterranean, she would not only dominate Turkey, but also constitute a serious threat to British ambitions.

Under these conditions Nelson naturally viewed with apprehension the advance of the Russian fleet into the Mediterranean. His suspicions were in no way allayed when the combined Russo-Turkish squadron, after passing through the Dardanelles and entering the Mediterranean in September 1798, made straight for the Ionian Islands and began to capture one after the other. Nelson wanted these allies to help him against the French army in Egypt, which he considered the main object of the Mediterranean campaign at that moment. But neither Russia nor Turkey was inclined to act according to his wishes. Russia, with that eye on the main chance of which she is often suspected, did not trouble much about Egypt, which she was quite willing to leave to the British, preferring to capture potential footholds for herself, while Turkey probably wished to keep her fleet near that of Russia, in order closely to watch her ally.

Realizing the Russian intentions and possibly converting them in his own mind into sinister plans, Nelson frequently expressed his disgust with the situation in his letters and dispatches, and despite the Admiralty's orders to cooperate with the Russo-Turkish fleets, did his best to counter their moves.

Considering the Turks the lesser threat, he even went so far as to sow distrust between the two allies, in order to prevent their capture of the coveted islands. As soon as he heard of the intentions of the Russian admiral, Ouschakoff, to attack the Ionian Islands in November of that year, he hurried off Captain Troubridge to anticipate their seizure and, if possible, cause trouble between the Turks and the Russians. His instructions to Troubridge leave little doubt as to Nelson's own plans: "You will proceed to sea without a moment's loss of time, and make the best of your way to the Island of Zante; and if the Russians have not taken possession of that island and Cephalonia, you will send on shore by the Priest I shall desire to accompany you, my Declaration. If you can get possession of the islands before named, you will send my Declaration into the Island of Corfu, and use your utmost endeavors to get possession of it. . . . Should the Russians have taken possession of these Islands and be cruising near the Turkish fleet, you will pay a visit to the Turkish admiral, and by saluting him (if he consents to return gun for gun) and every other mark of respect and attention, gain his confidence. You will judge whether he is of sufficient rank to hold a confidential conversation with." The Russian admiral is not even mentioned.<sup>1</sup>

To the Turkish admiral himself Nelson wrote at about the same time: "I was in hopes that a part of the united Turkish and Russian squadron would have gone to Egypt

<sup>1</sup>Among the reference works used in writing this article the following may be specifically mentioned:

J. K. Laughton, editor, *Letters and Despatches of Horatio, Viscount Nelson, K. B.*, London 1886.

A. T. Mahan, *The Life of Nelson*, 2 vols., Boston 1918.

W. Clark Russell, *Horatio Nelson and the Naval Supremacy of England*, New York and London, 1890.

Fred T. Jane, *The Imperial Russian Navy*, London 1899.

G. S. Clarke, *Russia's Sea-Power Past and Present*, London 1898.



—the first object of the Ottoman arms; Corfu is a secondary consideration.” But to John Spencer Smith, Minister at Constantinople, he opened his heart more fully: “I have had a long and friendly conference with Kelim Effendi on the conduct likely to be pursued by the Russian Court toward the unsuspicious (I fear) and upright Turk. The Porte ought to be aware of the very great danger at a future day of allowing the Russians to get a footing at Corfu, and I hope they will keep them in the East. Our ideas have exactly been the same about Russia. . . .” And to Lord St. Vincent, the Commander-in-chief of the British fleets in the Mediterranean, he wrote from Naples on the 6th of December: “I expected dear Hood every moment from Egypt; his provisions must be very short; he deserves great credit for his perseverance. I hope the good Turk will have relieved him, but the Russians seem to me to be more intent on taking ports in the Mediterranean than destroying Bonaparte in Egypt.”

Yet the Russo-Turkish fleets did not budge from the Ionian Islands. Their operations there took much longer, though, than Nelson had anticipated and left them little time for anything else. Corfu did not fall until March 1799, and its reduction seems to have absorbed all the energy of the Russians. Beyond bombarding Ancona in May 1799, an action said to have been attended with more damage to the Russian ships than to the city, they did nothing. Probably some of this inactivity was due to the very poor condition of the ships themselves.

This poor state of the Russian fleet seems to have lessened Nelson’s apprehensions to some degree, yet he did not give up his suspicions of Russian war aims, and only added to them a thorough contempt for the Russian fleet and its commander. His concern regarding the Ionian Islands was soon replaced, however, by an even greater one involving

Malta, whose strategic importance for British sea power he fully realized.

It was well known at that time that the Czar was very much interested in the island as a permanent acquisition for Russia; his election as Grand Master of the Order of Maltese Knights gave him a legitimate concern with its future. From Nelson’s point of view, its control by any large power other than England had to be prevented by all means.

His views are revealed in several letters dated about that time. Thus, on January 21, 1799, he wrote to Captain Sir Alexander John Ball, who was then Governor of the British part of Malta: “We have a report here that a Russian ship has paid you a visit, with proclamations for the island. I hate the Russians, and if she comes from their admiral at Corfu, he is a blackguard.” On another occasions he instructed Ball: “Should any Russian ship, or admiral, arrive off Malta, you will convince him of the very unhandsome manner of treating the legitimate sovereign of Malta [the Order of Knights], by wishing to see the Russian flag in Malta, and also of me, who command the forces of a Power in such close alliance with the Russian Emperor, which have been blockading and attacking Malta for near six months. The Russians shall never take the lead.” And again, on September 5, 1799: “The Russians are anxious to get to Malta, and care for nothing else—therefore I hope you will get it before their arrival.” He sums up his fears concerning Russian aspirations on Malta in a letter to St. Vincent: “You will observe what is said in the despatches of the Consul at Corfu respecting the Russians being ordered to Malta. I know this is a favorite object of the [Russian] Emperor’s, and is a prelude to a future war with the good Turk, when Constantinople will change masters. This is so clear, that a man must be blind not to see it.”

As time passed and the British were unable to reduce La Valetta, while the Russians, even after the capture of Corfu, remained completely inactive, Nelson seems to have lost his fear of them; he even began to complain about their inactivity and mentioned it as one of the reasons why Malta could not be taken. To Rear Admiral Sir John Thomas Duckworth he wrote on September 12, 1799: "When winter gets a little more advanced, all the present ships off Malta must go down the Mediterranean, and some part to England; therefore keep no more ships below Minorca than you think the service requires: for I had plenty of reasons lately to write to the Admiralty, that if a naval force should be wanted for the coast of Italy, that England must find it; for the Russian admiral has told me, his ships cannot keep the sea in the winter; and I see no desire to go to sea in the summer." In a letter of December 8, 1799 to Sir William Sidney Smith, brother of John Spencer Smith, and senior naval officer in the Levant, the following passage occurs: "Our Government naturally look to the Russians for aid here, but they will find their mistake: the Russian ships are not able to keep the sea." And a few days later Nelson wrote to Lieutenant General Edward Henry Fox, who commanded the British troops at Minorca: "The Austrians are calling out for a naval co-operation on the coast of Genoa. They complain that the Russian ships never come near them. Our Government think, naturally, that eleven sail of the line, frigates, etc., should do something: I find they do nothing." A letter dated December 22nd, 1799, to John Spencer Smith: "Admiral Ouschakoff cannot be got to move; and by his carelessness, the fall of Malta is not only retarded, but the island may be lost . . .", while a letter the next day to Lord Spencer, the First Lord of the Admiralty, contains the following passage: "I wish to have a squadron of two or three ves-

sels off Cape Bon, in Africa, and another to assist the Austrians in the Riviera of Genoa; but I absolutely want more than I have for the blockade of Malta. The [French] ships [in La Valetta] are ready to sail, and will probably try to escape as a last effort. The Russians, even if at sea, of which I see no prospect, cannot sail, or be of the least service. I have wrote very plainly to the Russian minister, that in my opinion the Emperor will not be pleased with Admiral Ouschakoff."

Actually, the Russians never came to take part in the blockade of Malta. In November 1799 they got as far as Messina in Sicily, but there they received orders to return to Corfu, both ships and troops. This was in pursuance of a change in Russian policy; the Czar, being enraged at the conduct of his allies, intended to withdraw from the coalition, and was concentrating his forces at Corfu. The final despatch in the series of Nelson's letters concerned with Malta and the Russians was written to Admiral Lord Keith, who was to succeed the Earl of St. Vincent as commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, and is dated January 7, 1800: "The Russians are on the 4th arrived at Messina; six sail of the line; frigates, etc., with two thousand five hundred troops. It is not to be expected that any Russian man-of-war can or will keep the sea; therefore the blockade by sea can only be kept up by our ships."

Malta finally fell to the British in September, 1800, and despite the claims and bitter protests of Paul of Russia, Great Britain insisted on keeping it in her own hands. This conflict of interests, added to Paul's disappointment with Austria in the disastrous land campaigns of 1799, hastened the estrangement between Russia and the allies. The tension existing between the two foremost naval powers of the time is well expressed in a letter written from Egypt in 1799 by the French comptroller, Poussielgue, to the French Direc-



tory: "I am persuaded that the English cannot see without some uneasiness, and without a secret kind of jealousy, the progress of the Russians—a progress much more dangerous for them than our continental power, now that our navy is destroyed and we have lost our maritime conquests."—Russia had taken the place of France as the naval rival of Great Britain.

#### NAVAL DIPLOMACY—THE BALTIC, 1801

As soon as Napoleon had returned to Europe from Egypt, he not only defeated the allied armies one after the other, but also used every means to detach Russia from the Coalition. In this he succeeded chiefly because of Paul's fury at the refusal of the British to surrender Malta to him. The Czar finally expressed his dissatisfaction by seizing all the British merchant vessels then in Russian ports and publishing a declaration that he would keep them till the island was handed over to him. On December 16, 1800, he even went a step further and revived the "Armed Neutrality," first declared in 1780, directed against the British, and persuaded Denmark, Sweden, and Prussia to join him in that move.

Great Britain had to act quickly and decisively to prevent the three Baltic fleets from combining and thus constituting a powerful threat to her control of the sea. On January 14, 1801, Sir Hyde Parker, with a fleet of 53 sail, including eighteen ships of the line, sailed for the Baltic. Nelson was the second-in-command of that fleet.

With the directness of purpose characteristic of his genius, Nelson, recognizing the Russians as the mainstay of the "Armed Neutrality," which would quickly collapse with their defeat, was in favor of attacking them first. On March 24th he wrote to the commander-in-chief: "Supposing us through the Belt with the wind first westerly, would it not be possible to either go with the Fleet,

or detach ten Ships of three and two decks, with one Bomb and two Fireships, to Revel, to destroy the Russian Squadron at that place? I do not see the risk of such a detachment, and with the remainder to attempt the business at Copenhagen. The measure may be thought bold, but I am of opinion the boldest measures are the safest; and our Country demands a most vigorous exertion of her force, directed with judgment."

Nelson's impatience to go to Revel before anything else was done was also partly due to the fact that he wanted to get at the detached squadron lying there before the breaking up of the ice in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland would allow it to join the main fleet at Cronstadt, where it would be comparatively safe from attack.

On March 30 a council of war was held off Cronborg on Parker's flagship, during which, according to the account of Lieutenant Colonel William Stewart, the commandant of the soldiers embarked in the British fleet, "the energy of Lord Nelson was remarked: certain difficulties had been started by some of the members, relative to each of the three Powers we should either have to engage, in succession or united, in those seas. The number of Russians was, in particular, represented as formidable. Lord Nelson kept pacing the cabin, mortified at everything which savoured either of alarm or irresolution. When the above remark was applied to the Swedes, he sharply observed, 'The more numerous the better'; and when to the Russians, he repeatedly said 'So much the better, I wish they were twice as many, the easier the victory, depend on it.' He alluded, as he afterwards explained in private, to the total want of tactique among the northern fleets, and to his intentions, whenever he should bring either the Swedes or the Russians to action, of attacking the head of their line, and confusing their movements as much as possible. He used to say, 'Close with a



Frenchman, but out-manceuvre a Russian!"

It may be noted here that at that time the total number of ships of the line in the three northern fleets was 88, of which, however, only about half were considered ready for action. Russia alone had some 12 or 15 in Revel, with more close by in Cronstadt.

Unmoved by Nelson's arguments, Admiral Parker still preferred to follow more closely the general instructions received from the Admiralty, which called for negotiations with Denmark, using force if necessary, then an attack on Revel and Cronstadt, if it was not too dangerous, and finally a settlement with Sweden, if she still continued to fight. Nelson was overruled, and the attack on Copenhagen followed, in which he gave another example of his genius and fighting spirit. Nevertheless, Nelson continued to disapprove of the cautious procedure followed by Parker.

The Battle of Copenhagen was fought on the 2nd of April. For the next few weeks the British fleet, despite Nelson's urging, remained comparatively inactive. Now that Denmark had been eliminated as a threat to the British lines of communication, he could understand less than ever the delay in going to Revel, where the appearance of the fleet would checkmate not only Russia but all the allied squadrons; for it would occupy an interior and commanding position between the detachments at Revel, Cronstadt, and Carlscrona, the Swedish stronghold.

To gain that favorable position and to eliminate each of these detachments separately, before they could combine into a formidable force, Nelson, after the armistice with Denmark, asked for 16 weeks "in order to allow him time to go and destroy the Russian fleet, and come back again to destroy the Danes if they wanted more. . . ." But before much could be done, news arrived that Czar Paul had been assassinated, and his successor, Alexander I, had no desire to con-

tinue hostilities. On learning this, Parker, instead of exacting guarantees which would have insured preservation of the existing military situation until definite peace agreements had been reached, returned to Copenhagen, leaving the Russian Revel squadron free to go out when the ice allowed. That was what actually happened two weeks later, after which the Russian ships were practically out of reach of the British fleet. Bitterly critical of this dilatoriness on the part of his commander-in-chief, Nelson wrote to St. Vincent: "On the 19th of April we had eighteen ships of the line and a fair wind. Count Pahlen [the Russian Cabinet Minister] came and resided at Revel, evidently to endeavor to prevent any hostilities against the Russian fleet there, which was, I decidedly say, at our mercy. Nothing, if it had been right to make the attack, could have saved one ship of them in two hours after our entering the bay; and to prevent their destruction, Sir Hyde Parker had a great latitude for asking for various things for the suspension of his orders." That is to say, this threat to the Russian Revel squadron gave Parker such a strong bargaining point that he could have exacted great advantages for the British cause. This letter was written after Nelson had been to Revel—finding the Russian fleet gone from there—and had seen the conditions on which he based his opinions.

Finally, on the 5th of May, orders arrived from England relieving Parker, and placing Nelson in chief command of the British fleet in the Baltic. Though in poor health and unhappy over the burden placed on his shoulders, he lost no time in getting under way and making a dash for Revel. At that time Nelson did not know whether the Russian ships were still there or not, and he felt that the change of sovereigns implied a radical change of policy, but he nevertheless realized that an attempt had to be made to establish the most favorable conditions for the British

negotiations. And if, by chance, he could destroy this substantial portion of the Russian naval power, he would not have felt too sorry.

To give his move the external appearance of a friendly visit, he left behind auxiliary vessels, such as bombs and fireships, which would be used in the attack of a hostile fleet in a port. But if, on the basis of the new conditions, he could not attack and destroy the Russian Revel fleet, he would at least prevent it from joining the Cronstadt squadron. "My object," he wrote on the day he took command, "*was to get at Revel before the frost broke up at Cronstadt, that the twelve sail of the line [lying there] might be destroyed. I shall now go there as a friend, but the two fleets shall not form a junction, if not already accomplished, unless my orders permit it.*"

The orders Nelson received asked that he open negotiations with the new ruler, find out what Russia intended doing, and not fight unless he found the Russians bent on it. Nelson obeyed these orders to the best of his ability, but he could not help feeling sorry that this great chance of crippling the second-largest navy in existence should have passed by irrevocably. In several letters he mentioned the subject with regret, as in the one to Henry Addington, First Lord of the Treasury, written on May 8th: "If we could have cut up the Russian fleet, that was my object. Denmark and Sweden deserved whipping, but Paul deserved punishment." At the same time he repeatedly expressed the low opinion which he held concerning the northern fleets, particularly the Russian. Possibly he was influenced in this judgment by what he had seen of it a few years earlier. To his old friend, Captain Ball, he wrote on June 4: "The northern fleets are only formidable in point of numbers; in every other respect they are insignificant; and if our fleet is active in the spring of the year may be got at sepa-

ately; late in summer they have their numerous flotilla, who can join in spite of all our effort to prevent them, for there is a complete navigation inside [the Gulf of Finland], and amongst 10,000 islands."

Nelson's fleet arrived at Revel on May 12th; but the Russian fleet had already left. The conditions which had mainly prompted his visit were thus changed, and the Russian Government was in a position to take a high tone, without fear of consequences. Despite his protestations of friendly intentions, the size of his fleet seems to have given the Czar a fairly clear inkling of his sentiments and a distrust of his plans, while his freely expressed uncomplimentary views of the Russian fleet under Ouschakoff in the Mediterranean were also well known. The Czar declined to see a compliment in the appearance in Russian waters of so formidable a force, commanded by a seaman who was well known for sudden, resolute, and aggressive action. A good deal of correspondence passed between Count Pahlen and Nelson. On the 16th day of May the Czar expressed his astonishment that such a force as Nelson's should be brought to Russian waters in view of the reputedly pacific intentions of the British Government. It looked a great deal like pressure, to an appearance of which the Russians were particularly anxious not to yield—now that the Russian Revel fleet was out of danger.

Nelson's reply was to the effect that it was a mark of friendship, and that his fleet would be of great service in assisting to navigate to England many of the British merchant vessels which had remained all winter in Russian ports—a rather neat hint that the principal business had more to do with the merchantmen Paul had seized than with the now purely theoretical and innocuous "Armed Neutrality." Privately he wrote to St. Vincent and said that had any of the Russian fleet been inside Revel—where he could have got

at them and destroyed them—the Czar would never have taken as strong an attitude as he did now.

However, Nelson complied with the Russian wishes and left the Gulf of Finland, withdrawing to Rostock, while the Czar soon thereafter withdrew the embargo on British shipping. He also invited Nelson to come and visit him, if he would come with a single ship; but acceptance of the invitation was postponed, and as Nelson, seriously sick and despondent, soon afterwards left the Baltic, nothing ever came of it.

Although Nelson had to give in to the Czar's demand, and thus may be said to have suffered a defeat, he at least had the satisfaction that it was not his own blunder, but the wretched dilatoriness of his predecessor in command, that had given the Czar the upper hand, by allowing him to withdraw the Russian fleet to the safety of Cronstadt. In any case, Nelson extricated himself from an unpleasant position with diplomatic skill and sound judgment, and he had gained the main point of the controversy, the release of the British merchant ships. Nelson himself rather prided himself on this result of his diplomacy: "I gained the unconditional release of our ships, which neither Ministers nor Sir Hyde Parker could accomplish, by showing my fleet. Then they became alarmed, begged I would go away, or it would be considered warlike. On my complying, it pleased the Emperor and his ministers so much, that the whole of the British shipping was given up."

#### ALLIES AGAIN—THE MEDITERRANEAN, 1804

The third and final episode of Nelson's relations with the Russian Navy began with the formation of the Third Coalition against France, in which Great Britain was again allied with Austria and Sweden, while Russia, changing sides once more, soon also joined. The alliance was not concluded until 1805, though negotiations among the powers had

been going on during the preceding year. By Nelson, then in the Mediterranean, the prospect of a new period of cooperation with the Russians was not viewed with enthusiasm. His previously formed low estimate of the efficiency of the Russian navy and his doubts as to the sincerity of the Russian policy were as pronounced as they had been a few years earlier, as his letters on the subject indicate. To Sir Hugh Elliot, the British minister at Naples, he wrote on July 7, 1804: "If Russia goes to war with France, I hope it will be her own war, and not joined with us. Such alliances have never benefited our country. If the Emperor of Germany joined against France, something good may arise. If not, Russia's going to war in the way I am sure she will, will cause the loss of Naples and Sardinia, for that court will not send 100,000 men into Italy, and less are useless for any grand purpose. No, Russia will take care of the Ionian Republic, the Morea, and, in the end, Constantinople. The views of Russia are perfectly clear." He wrote a similar letter to the Queen of Naples, while to Sir A. J. Ball he wrote on August 3rd: "My opinion of the view of Russia has long been formed, and to this moment I see everything she does works to the same end—the possession of all European Turkey."

Actually, Nelson's misgivings were not at that time justified, as Czar Alexander I loyally upheld the alliance, his fleet standing to bar any French move toward Egypt in Nelson's absence.

Owing to his preoccupation with the Trafalgar campaign, Nelson had no more opportunity to operate close to or in conjunction with the Russians. On the 21st of October, 1805, his career culminated and ended in the Battle of Trafalgar. It is of some interest to note that several Russian officers were present during that battle on board Nelson's fleet.

The great victory over the combined French and Spanish fleets placed the Medi-



terranean completely under allied control and made possible an Anglo-Russian expedition to Naples such as Nelson had demanded. But shortly afterwards the allied armies were defeated at the Battle of Austerlitz, which made the Naples plan impracticable. The Russian troops in the projected undertaking were thereafter employed in the capture of Cattaro in the Adriatic, while the Russian fleet operated without success against the neighboring port of Ragusa.

There is little doubt that Nelson's consistently low and uncomplimentary opinion of the Russian navy was fully justified by the facts of his own observation and experience. The history of the following century and a half only serves to point out the correctness of his views, *vide*, the Crimean War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the two World Wars. The Russian navy has never showed itself particularly able in fleet operations on the high seas, involving the handling and navigation of individual ships, nor the tactical maneuvering of whole fleets. The Russians are, after all, not a seafaring nation by nature or tradition.

But before accepting the judgment of the great admiral, we must take into consideration a few additional factors: We must not

forget that in his views Nelson was deeply influenced by his suspicions of Russian policy as a whole, and that his own experience had shown him only a part of the story of the Russian navy. Compared to his own fleet, not only the Russian but almost any other fleet of that time would naturally look poor in equipment, training, and leadership. Moreover, Nelson did not consider the comparative efficiency and fighting power of the Russian coastal forces. This is natural enough. All Nelson's training and experience confirmed the theory that naval victories were won at sea. The successes of the Russian Navy against Sweden and Turkey counted as nothing in the face of this. But is such a theory valid today? At present there are not half a dozen capital ships in commission in the whole world, and if employed at all in another war, they would be used for precisely that inshore work at the behest of the Army which Nelson so despised. A modern navy is not a fleet in any sense that Nelson would have recognized. Yet in its own waters, especially within the "10,000 islands," where mines, coastal guns, and shore-based aircraft can give it support, the modern Russian Navy is a truly formidable opponent, which no attacker should underrate.

## THE WAR OF OIL

By J. M. SPAIGHT\*

TO CALL THE Second World War a war for oil would be only a slight exaggeration. Again and again during the great conflict of 1939-1945 both sides turned away from their main military and political objectives to defend their own oil supplies, or to attack those of the enemy. One hesitates to call this a subsidiary war, for on two occasions it brought the European Allies to the brink of disaster. On a third occasion, a decisive victory in the War of Oil was quickly followed by the complete collapse of the enemy. This was inevitable, for oil is the lifeblood of war in our times. Without it a nation cannot fight. It is the basic munition. There is nothing else the deprivation of which would have so damaging an effect upon a country's prospect of achieving victory. The loss of it would mean, indeed, the certainty of defeat. However great the reserve of manpower and machine-power, however ample the armaments that have been amassed, a nation could not hope for victory if it lacked the oil-power without which its men, its machines, and its armaments would be immobilized and powerless. Modern strategy, tactics and logistics are all founded on and presuppose the possession of the internal combustion engine and its oil, the modern counterpart of the horse and its fodder in the wars of the past. This will continue to be so until atomic energy can be used for propulsion, and that day is far

ahead. In the foreseeable future oil will continue to be supremely important, and the new atomic weapons will complicate warfare by making oil supplies more vulnerable.

It is not surprising, therefore, to find oil taking the center of the stage more than once in the great drama of the Second World War. The destruction or dislocation of the enemy's sources or channels of supply of liquid fuel was a principal aim of each of the belligerents. During the war three outstanding attempts were made to accomplish this aim. They are described below. Two of them failed, it will be seen, and one succeeded. The success of the third is of particular interest, especially when considered in connection with the second of the other two attempts to deprive an enemy of his oil supplies. It serves as a sign-post to one of the directions which an Allied offensive is fairly certain to take in a future war between the West and the East.

In the war Britain continued to obtain her oil, apart from a small proportion produced by hydrogenation, from overseas, and the United States also relied upon sea-borne oil from the Gulf ports for the maintenance of its great ship-building yards and other industries in the eastern States. Tankers conveying oil from the western hemisphere were always a primary objective in the German submarine campaign, and when the United States became a belligerent in December, 1941, those plying along the eastern American seaboard were at once marked down for special attention. The Germans crowded their U-boats into that coastal area in January, 1942. In that month they sank 16 tankers of 5,000 to 12,000 tons each off the Vir-

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\*James Molony Spaight, C.B., C.B.E., a former civil servant in the British Air Ministry, has been writing on military subjects for more than three decades. His writings appear frequently in British service journals, and he contributed the article on Aerial Law in the current edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*.

ginia-North Carolina coast. In February they shifted to the Caribbean, the Curaçao area and the Gulf of Venezuela; they sank 25 tankers in that month. The Dutch islands of Curaçao and Aruba were their particular hunting ground about that time. One of the submarines even shelled a refinery on Aruba on 15 February, 1942. In March the Caribbean offensive slackened but that in the northern coastal area flared up again; shipping losses in that month reached a new peak of 500,000 tons, nearly half of the ships sunk being tankers. In May the center of gravity moved into the Gulf of Mexico, where a large number of tankers were sunk in that month and in June; in May alone 41 ships measuring over 200,000 tons were sunk in that area, the majority of them tankers.<sup>1</sup>

Early in April Herr Goebbels proclaimed: "In the U-boat war we have England by the throat." On 14 May Admiral Dönitz reported to Herr Hitler: "In the period from 15 January to 10 May the U-boats had sunk 112 tankers in the American waters, totalling 927,000 tons. Every tanker we sink," he said, "not only means one tanker less for carrying oil, but also represents a direct setback to America's ship-building programme. America will have to depend on transporting her oil by sea for at least another year, and it will take a long time to lay an additional pipe-line overland."<sup>2</sup> A little later Dönitz told a war correspondent: "Our submarines are operating close inshore along the coast of the United States of America, so that bathers and sometimes entire coastal cities are witnesses of that drama of war whose visual climaxes are constituted by the red glorioles of blazing tankers."<sup>3</sup> For days on end clouds

of black smoke darkened the sky over Jacksonville and Charleston. Burning tankers could be seen by the residents in fashionable seaside resorts in Florida. It was a wonderful spectacle for the people on the beaches. For the crews of the flaming tankers it was often stark tragedy. The choice for them lay between drowning and being burnt to death in the layer of blazing oil that covered the sea.

The losses continued throughout 1942, though the rate diminished. Mr. Morison says of that year: "Tanker casualties—3½ per cent per month of the tonnage employed—were so heavy that coastwise shipments of fuel oil for domestic purposes were stopped altogether. The available pool of oil derivatives was so diminished and the transport of them across seas, from the Dutch West Indies and the United States to Great Britain and to American bases in the Pacific, was so cut-into by the heavy loss of tankers, that impending military operations in Europe, Africa and the Far East were threatened."<sup>4</sup> It was not until 1943 that the tide turned in this battle of oil. There were still some heavy losses in that year—in January seven out of nine tankers in a convoy on the Trinidad-Bahia run were sunk—but gradually the submarine menace was overcome and the sea was made safe for the ships that saved the Allies from defeat. But it should not be inferred that a submarine campaign is doomed to inevitable defeat. Later, in the Pacific War, American submarines were notably successful in their operations against Japanese shipping—especially tankers.

It was not only by sea that a great battle for oil was being fought in 1942. On land, too, it blazed into intensity in the second half of the year. The German offensive in Russia which began in the summer had for its objective the oil fields of the Caucasus.

<sup>1</sup>Cf.: S. E. Morison, *The Battle of The North Atlantic, 1939-1945* (Boston, 1947); also Admiral Sir William James, *British Navies in The Second World War* (London, 1946).

<sup>2</sup>A. K. Martienssen, *Hitler and His Admirals* (New York, 1949), p. 135.

<sup>3</sup>Morison, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

<sup>4</sup>Morison, *op. cit.*, p. 199.



They were by far the largest of Russia's sources of supply, and the loss of them would have had a disastrous effect upon her war effort. Ciano records in his *Diary* a conversation which he had with Ribbentrop at Salzburg after the meeting there on 29/30 April, 1942. The German army would move, said Ribbentrop, in the direction of the Caucasus rather than on Leningrad and Moscow. The note goes on: "Principal objective of an offensive—the oil wells. These are objectives which, besides being military, are essentially political, since Ribbentrop considers that Russia, thus deprived of her indispensable source of fuel, may be considered politically strangled and that will have the effect of bringing the conflict to an end."<sup>5</sup>

"The oil of the Caucasus was a major goal of Germany's 1942 campaign in Russia," says the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. "The Baku fields produced two-thirds of Russia's crude oil supply and two and a half times as much as all of Axis Europe. With the defeat before Stalingrad, the Nazis' only hope of obtaining adequate oil resources was shattered. The Maikop fields, with only a tenth of the output of Baku, were captured in August, 1942, but were lost again before any substantial output was obtained."<sup>6</sup> How much store the Germans set upon the capture of the Caucasus and the Russians upon the retaining of it was shown by the fierce battles that raged along and between the great rivers in the autumn of 1942. "Volga called to Don and Don's blue waters thundered in reply." When the guns at Stalingrad became silent the oil fields had been finally saved. The denial of them to Russia and the acquisition by Germany would have had a far-reaching effect

upon the issue of the whole war. It is difficult to see how Russia could have continued to fight effectively if she had lost her main source of oil, while Germany would have been relieved of many of the anxieties caused by her shortage of oil in the winter of 1944-45 (see later).

The battles of oil on sea and land ended in German defeats. The tankers continued to sail, and the oil wells of Baku and the refineries of Batoum to turn out their products. The third battle, that by air, was longer (though intermittent) and in the end more decisive. It began in May, 1940. On the night of the 17th of that month Hampdens of Bomber Command raided oil storage depots at Hamburg and Whitleys struck at others at Bremen. It was the first strategic attack of the war between Britain and Germany. Oil was named as a primary objective in most of the directives issued in the succeeding five years, but the attack upon it was suspended from time to time, other objectives (e.g., submarine building yards) being regarded as of more immediate importance. The early attacks were less damaging than they were imagined to be at the time. It was undoubtedly an overstatement when Mr. Churchill said in a broadcast on 19 May, 1940: "Our heavy bombers are striking nightly at the tap root of German mechanized power, and have already inflicted serious damage on the oil refineries on which the Nazi effort to dominate the world directly depends." That would have been a true presentation of the position in the winter of 1944-45; it was not a realistic picture in the spring of 1940.

The attack on oil became really formidable only in the summer of 1944. In the ten months from June of that year to and including March, 1945, over 200,000 tons of bombs were dropped by the Royal Air Force and the 8th and 15th United States Army

<sup>5</sup>G. Ciano, *The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943* (New York, 1946), p. 481.

<sup>6</sup>U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy* (Washington, 1945). p. 74.

Air Forces on Axis oil targets. The weight dropped on such targets during the whole of the rest of the war was less than one-twentieth of this figure. The result of the 1944-45 oil offensive was catastrophic for Germany. Many statements by German leaders could be quoted testifying to its disastrous effects. It foredoomed Von Rundstedt's offensive in the Ardennes to failure. It put the German air force out of action. "In November many Luftwaffe units were grounded for lack of fuel, and in the spring of 1945 all remaining fuel stocks were exhausted, distribution had stopped owing to the paralysis of transportation, and the Luftwaffe was grounded."<sup>7</sup>

The attack on oil was a conspicuous success beyond any question; the only point at issue is whether, so far as it was a massive attack, it should have been begun earlier. General de Guingand is one of many who think that it should. "Spaatz pressed for an earlier start," he says, "and in view of the great success that was eventually achieved, and remembering the vital effect it had on the German collapse, it would have paid us

well."<sup>8</sup> "If the synthetic oil plants had been attacked six months earlier Germany would have been defeated six months sooner," Field-Marshal Milch said after the surrender. His estimate was more modest than that of Dr. Rischer, head of the Oil Department of the German Ministry of Armaments, who stated: "If the air attacks had been concentrated on industry, particularly oil, chemicals, power and transportation, the war would have been over one year sooner." (These statements were quoted by Mr. John Strachey, Under-Secretary of State for Air, in the House of Commons on 12 March, 1946.) The United States Strategic Bombing Survey also suggested that the attack on oil by the American Air Force should have been begun earlier than it did. Others go further and hold that oil and railways should have been concentrated upon all through. Colonel de Tarle, in an article in *Forces Aériennes Françaises* for September, 1948, asks what would have happened if the whole weight of bombs expended in the Anglo-American air offensive, 2,106,000 tons, had been dropped on two categories of objectives only, *carburants et transportation*. Who now can say?

<sup>7</sup>Lord Tedder, *Air Power in War* (London, 1948), p. 48.

<sup>8</sup>de Guingand, *Operation Victory* (London, 1947), p. 363.

## DU PONT, DAHLGREN, AND THE CIVIL WAR NITRE SHORTAGE

By ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR.\*

In few great wars have the combatants been less prepared to carry on a prolonged struggle than they were in the American Civil War. They gave little thought on either side, even after preparations were begun in 1861, to the problems of availability and supply of critical raw materials. Of these critical raw materials the most important for both North and South was, undoubtedly, potassium nitrate (saltpeter or nitre), the basic ingredient of gunpowder, which at that time came wholly from British India.<sup>1</sup> Not until the spring of 1862 did the Confederate government, forced by the direst necessity, institute a large scale nitre program. The North also acted slowly, and there, where the pressure was not so severe, action was initiated by a few individuals rather than by the general government.

It was in fact largely owing to the efforts of just two men, Henry DuPont, president of E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Company, and Captain John A. Dahlgren, Chief of the Navy's Bureau of Ordnance, that the North was definitely assured of having a large enough supply of powder to carry on an extended war. These men realized that stocks of nitre must be accumulated before the nation was deprived of access to the only regular source of supply by an unfriendly England; or, in any case before speculation drove the price of the scarce material to an exorbitant height. They also saw the need

for developing sources independent of England. In coping with this situation Dahlgren and DuPont met and solved problems similar to those of World War I and II, and their efforts, like similar endeavors in later wars, had important economic and diplomatic effects.<sup>2</sup>

### *Southern Nitre Supply*

The South by not giving the matter immediate attention lost the opportunity to accumulate stocks of nitre, for the Union blockade soon cut her off from the source of supply. Her problem became one of making the most of what she had regardless of the cost. As such her story is less comparable to that of a later day and of less significance than that of the North. Nevertheless, the Southern story is worth at least brief consideration in that it shows forcibly what the situation might have been in the North if England had put an effective embargo on nitre destined for Northern ports. It was this very situation that Dahlgren and DuPont did their utmost to avoid.

Only by tremendous effort and at enormous cost was the South able to keep her armies supplied with sufficient powder. The first attempts to supplement imports of Indian nitre were made late in 1861. They took the form of working low grade nitre deposits found in the large limestone caves of Kentucky and Tennessee. Most of these caves passed into Northern possession in the spring campaigns of 1862, and by April 1862 the

\*Mr. Chandler, a graduate student at Harvard University, is Assistant to the Gardiner Professor of Oceanic History and Affairs.

<sup>1</sup>*Annual Report of Bureau of Ordnance*, 1862 (Washington, 1865) p. 3. The terms saltpetre, niter and nitre were used interchangeably at this time.

<sup>2</sup>Nitrates were again the most critical shortage in World War I. For the problems and effects of this shortage see Haynes, W., *American Chemical Industry*, II, (N. Y. 1945) Chapters 6-11.



total production of domestic nitre in the South was under 500 pounds a day.<sup>3</sup> At the same time the Union blockade was most effectively cutting down importations of Indian saltpetre. To meet this crisis the Confederate Congress in April 1862 passed an act organizing a Nitre Bureau as a separate bureau under the Secretary of War.<sup>4</sup>

Major I. M. St. John was placed in charge of the Nitre Bureau, and he immediately drew up a comprehensive plan of operations. This plan included rapid but systematic exploration of Confederate territory for nitre caves and deposits, importation of Mexican nitre, stimulation of private operation of deposits by every possible means, and large scale production by the government through the Nitre Corps. Large new deposits were discovered, the most important being in Texas, and production was rapidly increased.<sup>5</sup> By August of 1862 the total yield was over 1,200 pounds a day; by October it was up to 2,000 pounds. Between May and October over 200,000 pounds had been collected.<sup>6</sup> Despite losses of deposits to the enemy and despite being cut off from the Texas supply, St. John was able to keep production at the 2,000 pound a day level throughout the war.<sup>7</sup> Almost half the gunpowder used by the Confederate armies was manufactured from nitre produced at home.<sup>8</sup> The South remained dependent on blockade runners for the remainder of her supply, but without the achievements of St. John and his men it is doubtful whether the Confederacy could have carried on until 1865.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>3</sup>The best source for nitrate problem and its solution in the South can be found in the Reports of the Chief of the Nitre Bureau to the Secretary of War, *Official Records*, Series 4, II, 26-30; III, 695-702.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, I, 1054-1055; 594-595.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, II, 29, 122; *Official Records*, Series 3, IV, 583.

<sup>6</sup>*Official Records*, Series 4, II, 222-223.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, III, 695.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, II, 223.

<sup>9</sup>The respective Secretaries of War and President Davis gave the Nitre Corps high praise for its work. *Ibid.*, II, 48, 291, 1007, 1043.

The Nitre Corps accomplished its mission but only at great cost. In May 1862 St. John was paying 75c a pound for nitre and finished gunpowder was costing the Confederate government \$1.08 a pound.<sup>10</sup> By comparison, that same summer the Union government was paying 13c a pound for nitre and 19c to 20c for finished powder. So costly were the Confederate nitre deposits to work that when some of them fell into Union hands neither the government nor private companies felt it was worth the expense to continue operations even at a time when the nitre shortage was serious in the North.<sup>11</sup> In manpower as well as money the cost came high. By October 1864 over four thousand men—men so desperately needed by the Confederate field commanders—were working for the Nitre Corps. Owing to the nature of the work nearly all these were able bodied men. Yet the nitre service was considered so essential that not until the very end of the war were men taken from it for combat duty.<sup>12</sup> It was only at this heavy price and by careful planning and energetic action that the South was able to solve its most critical shortage and keep its armies supplied with powder.

### *Problem for the North: A British Nitre Monopoly*

For the North the problem was to avoid falling into the same situation that confronted the South. The North must prepare for

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, II, I, 1108; VanGelder, A. and H. Schlatter, *History of the Explosives Industry* (New York, 1927) p. 113. These prices are in Confederate currency, but at this time this currency had not yet noticeably depreciated in value. Van Gelder and Schlatter have an excellent chapter on powder making in the South taken from the account of Colonel George W. Rains, commanding officer of the Confederate Powder Works at Augusta, Georgia. Rains did a superlative job in manufacturing the nitre supplied by St. John.

<sup>11</sup>duPont, B. G., E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. A History. (New York, 1920) p. 94; Navy Department, Bureau of Ordnance, *Nitre Book #1*, Ltrs. #81, 82, 83. Unless otherwise indicated all letter books cited hereafter will be those of the Navy Bureau of Ordnance.

<sup>12</sup>*Official Records*, Series 4, II, 222, 223, 228; III, 695, 1164.

the possibility of being cut off like the South from the normal source of supply. Moreover, even if that supply remained opened steps should be taken to avoid being saddled with high costs resulting from scarcity and speculative activity on the saltpetre market. In meeting these problems the Army took little action. It was left to Henry DuPont and later to John A. Dahlgren to initiate the decisive steps.

Shortly after the firing on Fort Sumter, Captain Andrew A. Harwood, Chief of the Navy's Bureau of Ordnance, became concerned about the shortage of nitre and the possibility of its price rising sharply. He wrote to Henry DuPont, president of the largest firm supplying government powder, for information on the world's nitrate situation and at the same time arranged a conference with the Army on the matter.<sup>13</sup> Henry DuPont replied that there was only a six months' supply of saltpetre "in the country, at sea and loading"; that owing to the difficulties of getting credit since the outbreak of the war very few ships were loading in India for the United States; and that speculators in Boston and New York were buying up the present stocks.<sup>14</sup> The Army, however, was more reassuring. It had a stock of 3,800,000 pounds of nitre acquired during the Mexican War which it felt was ample for any possible emergency.<sup>15</sup> With this assurance the Navy Department dropped the matter.

By fall, however, the situation was becoming serious. Bull Run had shown that the war would not be over in a few weeks. The

large army and navy orders had consumed the powder manufacturers' stocks, and importation from India was still very slow. By October the price began to rise rapidly. It was apparent that the Army's reserve stock soon would have to be put into use.<sup>16</sup> From both a military and an economic point of view it was necessary that something be done. Therefore when Henry DuPont sent Lammot DuPont, the youngest member of the DuPont firm, to Washington to urge action, Lammot met with a ready reception and was soon on his way to England to purchase nitre for the government. In order to purchase it at the lowest possible price, William H. Seward, the Secretary of State, instructed DuPont to buy it through the normal channels of trade in the name of his firm.<sup>17</sup>

Lammot DuPont arrived in London on November 19 and immediately went into the saltpetre market buying up all the available stocks and much that was on the way from India. All told he acquired nearly 23,000 bags (2,300 tons) for just under £80,000. DuPont began loading five ships with this nitre as quickly as possible, but on November 27, before the loading was quite completed, news reached England of the seizure of the two Confederate envoys, Mason and Slidell, from the British ship *Trent* by Captain Charles Wilkes of the USS *San Jacinto*.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup>*Miscellaneous Letter Book* #29, Ltr. #74. DuPont Co. to Wise, Nov. 18, 1861. Nearly every letter to the Navy Department signed E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. is in the handwriting of Henry DuPont. *War Department, Ordnance Office Letters to War Department* #13, p. 227. An endorsement dated Dec. 2, 1861 on a letter of the DuPont Co. to the War Department.

<sup>17</sup>DuPont, *op. cit.* p. 79; *War Department, Ordnance Office, Letters to War Department* #13. Possibly there was a defensive purpose for Lammot DuPont's trip; that of forestalling Confederate purchase of a material even more critical to the South than to the North. The Confederate War Department had issued an order for the purchase abroad of over 1,000 tons of nitre in the fall of 1861. *Official Records*, Series 4, I, 555.

<sup>18</sup>*State Department, Miscellaneous Letters*, Dec. 1861. DuPont Company (Henry) to Seward, Dec. 13, 1861; DuPont Company (Lammot) to Seward, Dec. 26, 1861.

<sup>13</sup>*Letters to the Secretary*, #2, p. 31-32. Harwood to Welles, May 11, 1861.

<sup>14</sup>*Powder Book* (Incoming), #1, Ltr. #2; Henry DuPont to Bureau of Ordnance, May 13, 1861. Harwood endorsed this letter, "I respectfully & earnestly request the attention of the Honble. the Sec. of Navy to this letter. The subject is of great importance from both a military and an economical point of view."

<sup>15</sup>Endorsement on above letter of Henry DuPont; *Official Records*, Series 3, IV, 583.

This news brought an outburst of feeling against the North. At once there was a demand to hold up the nitre shipments. The first action taken by the British cabinet in this affair was to have Orders in Council issued placing a ban on the export of saltpetre, sulphur and finished gunpowder—an order which the press highly praised.<sup>19</sup> DuPont returned immediately to this country, conferred with Seward in Washington not later than December 26, and departed again for England on January 1. By mid-January the Orders in Council were lifted, the shipment was released and in February reached America where it was turned over to the War Department.<sup>20</sup>

Although the voluminous literature on the Mason and Slidell affair makes no mention of saltpetre or nitre, there seems little doubt that this vital military material did play a part in the peaceful settlement of that affair. Seward who had authorized DuPont's trip to England knew full well the importance of this nitre stock to the Northern cause. Part of the first news he had from England—news that was so important in forming his conciliatory views—was the information of the embargo on nitre.<sup>21</sup> That he was worried about the embargo can be seen from the fact that he wrote the Navy Department for information on other possible sources of saltpetre outside of British India.<sup>22</sup> In all probability Seward's decision to release the envoys was strongly influenced by the British embargo on DuPont's nitre.

Moreover Seward undoubtedly used the argument that the North's powder supply was in British hands as an effective means of bringing Lincoln and most of the Cabinet to his more pacific way of thinking. The second and deciding Cabinet meeting on the *Trent* affair took place on December 26. In the State Department files there is a letter from Lammot DuPont to Seward dated Washington, December 26, and endorsed as received that same day, in which DuPont briefly sums up his activities of the past few weeks.<sup>23</sup> Now as Seward knew the circumstances from an earlier letter and most probably from conversation with DuPont, it seems quite likely that Seward had DuPont write this letter in order to give the Cabinet first hand information on the nitre purchases and the embargo.<sup>24</sup> In any case, on the afternoon of the 26th, Seward made his statement accepting the English demands to release the envoys and on the same afternoon sent a message to the American Minister in London to take action on the saltpetre shipment.<sup>25</sup>

It was through Seward and the DuPonts that the War Department acquired a large part of its essential stock of nitre.<sup>26</sup> The Army's Ordnance Department took no part in this matter. Indeed the Ordnance Department did not have any idea that a huge amount of powder had been purchased for it until the middle of February when the nitre was about to reach American shores. In an-

<sup>19</sup>*London Times*, Nov. 30, Dec. 1, 1861; DuPont Co. (Henry) to Seward Dec. 13, 1861, cited above.

<sup>20</sup>DuPont, *op. cit.*, p. 90-91.

<sup>21</sup>The first news of the British reaction to the seizure reached Seward December 12. C. F. Adams, Jr., "The Trent Affair," *American Historical Review* XVII (April, 1912), 544. Henry DuPont's letter giving the news of Lammot's situation is endorsed by the State Department as received Dec. 14. Adams also points out the importance of the British reaction in influencing Seward.

<sup>22</sup>*Nitre Book*, #2, Ltr. #1. Dahlgren to Seward, December 26, 1861.

<sup>23</sup>DuPont Co. (Lammot) to Seward, Dec. 26, 1861, cited above. *State Department, Misc. Ltrs.*, Jan. 1862. DuPont Co. (Henry) to Seward, Jan. 2, 1862. Henry mentions Lammot's conversation with Seward but the exact date is not indicated.

<sup>24</sup>It was Seward's method to emphasize his points by reading pertinent first-hand letters on the subject. For his use of letters in this Cabinet meeting see, Beale, H. K., ed. *Diary of Edward Bates* (Washington, 1933), p. 213-217; Bancroft, F., *Life of William H. Seward* (New York, 1900), p. 235-236.

<sup>25</sup>*State Department, Great Britain, Instructions*, Ltr. #149. Seward to C. F. Adams, Dec. 26, 1861.

<sup>26</sup>A small purchase of nitre was made by H. S. Sanford, Minister to Belgium in early 1862. *Official Records*, Series 3, IV, 583.



swer to a letter of Henry DuPont's asking for instructions if the embargo was not lifted (a letter which had been forwarded by Seward to the Ordnance Office via the Secretary of War), Colonel James W. Ripley, head of the Department, wrote, "This office has not other information in regard to the saltpetre than can be gathered by the papers referred to it, and gives, therefore, only a hypothetical opinion as to the answer that should be returned to the Messrs. Dupont & Co."<sup>27</sup> Other letters from the DuPont Company to Seward had been endorsed to be forwarded to the War Department for information, but apparently they had never been passed on to the Ordnance Department. The Ordnance Department, of course, was delighted with its windfall. Its problem concerning the most critical of raw materials was solved. It somewhat optimistically estimated that it now had a three year supply on hand and from that time on never gave the nitre problem any serious thought.<sup>28</sup>

### *Stock Piling and the Search for an Independent Source of Nitre*

It was not, then, until July 1862 that any systematic program was adopted to provide the Union with an assured supply of saltpetre. When Captain John A. Dahlgren, the Navy's brilliant ordnance expert, took command of the Bureau of Ordnance in that month he realized that the shortage of saltpetre was still critical and considered the development of such a plan his first and most

important duty.<sup>29</sup> McClellan's costly Peninsula Campaign had cut into the Army's stocks. Moreover, McClellan's failure before Richmond had vastly increased the Navy's problems. A long war and a prolonged blockade were now certain. England was encouraged by the Northern defeat to be more sympathetic to the South. The English-built Confederate raider *Florida* was already on the high seas; the *Alabama* was soon to be allowed to join her. England in this mood might easily again cut off the nitre supply as she had done in the past December. Indeed, the possibility of war with England was still something that must be planned for.<sup>30</sup> Thus the Navy Bureau of Ordnance, with no nitre of its own and with little chance of drawing on the somewhat diminished Army stocks, had to plan to munition an extended blockading fleet; to arm cruisers to combat Confederate raiders; and even to consider the possibility of war with the power that had a monopoly on the world's nitre supply.

To meet this emergency Dahlgren acted with energy. A stock pile must be procured from abroad for the Navy. Sources of nitre, independent of England, must be found. Within a week after taking office, on July 23 Dahlgren's plans to meet both these requirements were underway.<sup>31</sup> On July 25, a dispatch was sent to the commanding officer of the USS *Wyoming* at Hong Kong ordering him to Yokohama to obtain all possible information as to the availability, quality, and cost of nitre in Japan and to send samples of the nitre to Washington with all possible speed.<sup>32</sup> On the 27th requests for bids to supply the Navy with nitre from domestic

<sup>27</sup>War Department, Ordnance Office, *Letters to the War Department*, 13, 274-275. Ripley to Stanton, Feb. 13, 1862; State Department, Misc. Ltrs. DuPont Co. (Henry) to Seward Jan. 2, 1862.

<sup>28</sup>War Dept. Ord. Off., Ltrs. to War Dept. p. 383. Ripley to Ass't Sec. of Treasury May 22, 1862; p. 378 Ripley to Stanton, May 3, 1862. Annual Report of Ordnance Office, 1863, in House Ex. Docs. 38 Congress 1st Session, 1863-1864, V, 103-104.

<sup>29</sup>BuOrd. Annual Report (Navy) 1862, p. 3; Nitre Book 3#, an unnumbered memorandum in Dahlgren's handwriting; Dahlgren, M. V., *Memoirs of John A. Dahlgren* (New York, 1882) p. 376.

<sup>30</sup>Nitre Book, #2, Ltr. #36. Forbes, Forbes & Co. to DuPont Co., April 29, 1862; Bailey, T. A., *Diplomatic History of the American People* (New York, 1946) p. 370-374.

<sup>31</sup>Dahlgren succinctly outlined his program in an unnumbered memorandum filed in Nitre Book #3.

<sup>32</sup>Secretary of Navy, *Ships and Officers Book* #67, p. 381.

sources were placed in the newspapers.<sup>33</sup> That same day Dahlgren, en route to the Philadelphia shipyards, saw Henry DuPont in Wilmington and on his return to Washington wrote DuPont for an opinion as to the best methods of procuring the desired stocks.<sup>34</sup> Finally on August 1 he requested the Secretary of Navy to make arrangements with the Treasury Department for the storage facilities that would soon be necessary.<sup>35</sup>

Henry DuPont and Dahlgren, by letter and conference, soon worked out a plan to meet the most pressing need—the procurement of nitre from abroad.<sup>36</sup> For both military and economic reasons a method had to be devised to make this large scale purchase as inconspicuous as possible. "It is essential to the purpose," wrote Dahlgren, "that the operations should not be known to be conducted for the U. S.—otherwise they would be interrupted or lead to a highly increased price."<sup>37</sup> DuPont thought that the purchasing should be done through the normal channels of trade and strongly advised against sending anyone abroad even from his own firm. It was finally arranged that the purchases would be made through the DuPont Company's agents, Forbes, Forbes & Company in London and Ashburner & Company in Calcutta. The buying was to be done gradually so as to keep the price down to 13c a pound exclusive of duty. The two

agents were to keep the Bureau informed as to prices current so that this average price could be adjusted if necessary. To pay for these purchases each of the agents was authorized to draw a total of £10,500 gradually from Baring Brothers "without giving any account to the Barings showing the object of the expenditures."<sup>38</sup>

The orders were mailed to the agents on August 25.<sup>39</sup> Forbes, Forbes & Company filled their order by the third week in September purchasing 3,163 bags (316 tons). This nitre, loaded at once on the ship *Crescent City*, reached Philadelphia in early November.<sup>40</sup> The shipment from Calcutta of 3,586 bags arrived in April.<sup>41</sup> In the meantime Dahlgren had purchased from the DuPont Company two shiploads of Calcutta saltpetre totaling 3,585 bags which that firm had ordered the previous spring for its own use.<sup>42</sup> By the end of 1862 the Navy had on hand or en route over two million pounds of nitre. By purchasing inconspicuously through the regular channels of trade, Dahlgren had not only been able to acquire this supply during a period of extreme tension with England, but had been able to do so at a good saving to the government; for in August the market price of saltpetre, which he had purchased for 13c, was 14½c to 15c a pound, and by the end of the year it was up to 17c.<sup>43</sup> Thanks in large part to the efficient coopera-

<sup>33</sup>*Letter Press Book*, #21, p. 284-285 Dahlgren to Henry DuPont, Aug. 1, 1862; *Nitre Book*, #1, Ltr. #21, Dwight to Dahlgren, Aug. 15, 1862.

<sup>34</sup>*Powder Book*, #1, (Outgoing), p. 1, Telegram to Henry DuPont Aug. 1, 1862; Dahlgren to Henry DuPont, Aug. 1, 1862, cited above.

<sup>35</sup>*Letter Press Book*, #21 p. 286-287. Dahlgren to Welles, Aug. 1, 1862. Storage became and remained one of Dahlgren's greatest problems. *Nitre Bk.* #1, Ltrs. #42, 45, 47, 50, 65, show this problem; also *BuOrd. Annual Report* 1862, p. 3-4; 1863, p. 4, 20-21; 1864, p. 34-36.

<sup>36</sup>*Nitre Book*, #1, Ltrs. #1,3. DuPont Co. to Dahlgren, Aug. 2, 9, 1862, Dahlgren to DuPont Co. Aug. 12; *Letter Press Book*, #22, p. 143 Dahlgren to Henry DuPont Aug. 8, 1862.

<sup>37</sup>Dahlgren to DuPont Co. August 12, 1862, cited above.

<sup>38</sup>*Idem*; *Nitre Book*, #1, Ltrs. #8, 11, DuPont Co. to Dahlgren, Aug. 15, 19, 1862, #12, Dahlgren to DuPont Co. Aug. 21, 1862. The Barings had long handled the Navy's account in London.

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid*, Ltrs. #16, 17, DuPont Co. to Dahlgren—both Aug. 25, 1862.

<sup>40</sup>*Ibid*, Ltrs. #38, 41, 52, DuPont Co. to Dahlgren, Sept. 19, 24, Oct. 11, 1862; Ltr. #70 Commandant Philadelphia Navy Yard to Dahlgren, Nov. 13, 1862.

<sup>41</sup>*Powder Book*, #1 (Outgoing) p. 139, 189, Dahlgren to DuPont, Feb. 12, April 3, 1862.

<sup>42</sup>*Nitre Book*, #1 Ltrs. #35, 43, DuPont Co. to Dahlgren, Sept. 15, Oct. 3, 1862.

<sup>43</sup>When Dahlgren turned down in August an offer for 219 tons of nitre at 14½c, the firm making the offer expressed surprise for they pointed out they were offering well below market price. *Ibid*, Ltrs. #7, 30, Cryder to Dahlgren, Aug. 14, Sept. 4, 1862.



tion of the DuPont Company, for which the firm neither asked nor received payment, Dahlgren's procurement program was an unqualified success.<sup>44</sup>

The attempt to open up an independent supply of foreign nitre was less successful. After sending his dispatch to the USS *Wyoming*, Dahlgren contracted with the firm of Wetmore, Cryder and Company of China for 300 tons of Japanese nitre at 13c a pound plus a five per cent commission.<sup>45</sup> Their first samples, however, were not up to the Bureau of Ordnance standards, and the firm apparently found it impossible to meet the prices set by the contract.<sup>46</sup> In January the reply of the Commanding Officer of the *Wyoming* was received. He reported that nitre was available in Japan but that the price was high owing in part to large shipments to China since the opening of the ports three years previously but even more because with the coming of modern civilization the local Japanese princes themselves had begun large scale stocking of nitre.<sup>47</sup> The samples forwarded were not too satisfactory.<sup>48</sup> All things considered Dahlgren decided not to pursue plans to open up new foreign sources of saltpetre.

#### *A Domestic Nitre Industry Is Established*

The major reasons for dropping these plans was not, however, the difficulty and cost of getting Japanese powder, but rather that the program to develop a domestic source of saltpetre had proved eminently successful.

<sup>44</sup>Dahlgren had the DuPont Company purchase the Navy's sulphur stocks in the same manner. *Ltr. Press Bk.* #22, p. 198, #23, p. 131, Dahlgren to DuPont, Aug. 9, 25, 1862.

<sup>45</sup>*Nitre Bk.* #1, Ltrs. #2, 6, Cryder to Dahlgren Aug. 7, 14, 1862. *Ltr. Press Bk.* #21, p. 290, #22, p. 251-254. Dahlgren to Cryder, Aug. 1, 14, 1862.

<sup>46</sup>The samples were tested by the DuPont Co. *Nitre Bk.* #1, Ltr. #16, Aug. 25, 1862.

<sup>47</sup>*Nitre Book*, #2, Ltr. #3, Comdr. Douglas to Welles, Nov. 16, 1862 (Rec'd Jan. 15, 1863). The several enclosures show Douglas did a thorough job.

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid*, Ltr. #5, DuPont Co. to Dahlgren, Jan. 16, 1863.

Through Dahlgren's efforts along these lines a new chemical industry was begun in this country and the dependence of the United States on British India for its most critical military raw material was forever ended. Only two firms, Charles W. Copeland & Company of New York City and the New Haven Chemical Company, John W. Dwight, president, answered Dahlgren's advertisement for supplying the Navy with nitre from domestic sources. Both proposed to manufacture potassium nitrate from sodium nitrate and potash.<sup>49</sup> Sodium nitrate deposits were available in the United States, but the best came from Chile where they had a high potash content. Potash being a wood product was readily obtainable in the United States. Samples of this manufactured nitrate tested by the DuPont Company at the end of August proved excellent.<sup>50</sup> Dahlgren in early September put in an order for a test lot of 10,000 pounds. Only the New Haven Chemical Company was able to meet the demands of large scale production and accepted the order.<sup>51</sup>

Dwight's firm went right to work. By the middle of October the test lot was on its way to the DuPont Company to be manufactured into gunpowder.<sup>52</sup> Henry DuPont reported that it was satisfactory for processing and by the end of the year the first run of gunpowder made from manufactured saltpetre was completed. It easily met the Navy's specifications.<sup>53</sup> The total cost of the test run had been 25½c a pound—14½c to Dwight

<sup>49</sup>*Nitre Book*, #1, Ltrs. #9, 39, 21, Dwight to Dahlgren, Aug. 15, 19, 27, 1862. Ltrs. #14, 20, Copeland to Dahlgren, Aug. 22, 26, 1862.

<sup>50</sup>*Nitre Book*, #1, Ltrs. #18, 22-24, DuPont Co. to Dahlgren, Aug. 25, 28, 29, 1862.

<sup>51</sup>*Ibid*, Ltr. #30, Dwight to Dahlgren, Sept. 5, 1862.

<sup>52</sup>*Ibid*, Ltrs. #57, 60, Dwight to Dahlgren, Oct. 15, 20, 1862.

<sup>53</sup>*Nitre Book*, #1, Ltrs. #67, 78, 90, DuPont Co. to Dahlgren, Oct. 28, Nov. 3, Dec. 29, 1862. *Powder Book* (Outgoing) #1, p. 134, Dahlgren to Dwight, Feb. 6, 1862.



and 11c to DuPont.<sup>54</sup> This was about three cents above the current price for finished powder, but it was a difference worth paying for powder obtained from a source independent of England. Moreover, by 1864, the price of Indian nitre had risen so sharply that the cost of powder made from manufactured domestic nitre was the same as that made from the imported raw material.

The Navy Department now gave Dwight a contract for 500 tons of manufactured nitre to be completed by October, 1863.<sup>55</sup> By spring production on this order was well under way and arrangements were completed with the other powder makers, Hazard, Union, and Schaghticoke, to make gunpowder at 11½c a pound from Navy-supplied domestic nitre.<sup>56</sup> There were, of course, problems to be solved. The crystals of manufactured nitre were at first too large for the standard powder mill machinery, the normal cask was found to be unsatisfactory, and the conservatism of some of the manufacturers had to be overcome.<sup>57</sup> Costs, such an uncertain factor in a new industry and especially in wartime, were also a problem. Dwight wanted the price of his finished product to be adjusted automatically to the changes in the cost of his raw materials. The Department compromised by setting a price only on small lots and readjusting it as each new lot was begun.<sup>58</sup> By the summer of 1863 all difficulties had been ironed out and produc-

tion was in full swing. Dwight completed his order in December, a little behind schedule, and was given a second order of 500 tons.<sup>59</sup> The manufacturing of saltpetre in the United States was now well begun. India had lost her monopoly; Chile now replaced her as the primary source of this basic ingredient of military explosives and was to remain so until the next great war again caused a major shift in the source of nitrates.

John Dahlgren must have been well satisfied with the excellent results of his nitre program when he left the Bureau of Ordnance in the summer of 1863. Having found the Navy without nitre and with its only available source in hostile hands, he had acquired over 1,000 tons at low cost and in spite of the severely strained relations between the United States and England. At the same time he had developed a domestic source that was supplying fifty tons a month—some twenty tons a month more than the four thousand men of the Confederate Nitre Corps could produce. In carrying out his program Dahlgren relied heavily on the assistance of Henry DuPont. The efficient cooperation of these two men and the rapid and effective results they achieved are in marked contrast to the confusion and ineffectiveness that prevailed in Washington in the early part of the Civil War. Their work stands as an example of what cooperation and understanding between government and business can accomplish for the Nation in a time of crisis.

<sup>54</sup>*Ibid*, An unnumbered memorandum filed with Ltr. #57 summarizes cost.

<sup>55</sup>*Powder Book* (Outgoing) #1, p. 67, 76 Dahlgren to Dwight, Nov. 23, Dec. 4, 1862.

<sup>56</sup>For correspondence on this matter, see *Ibid*, pp. 171, 173, 194, 211, 234.

<sup>57</sup>*Nitre Book*, #1, Ltr. #90, DuPont Co. to Dahlgren, Dec. 29, 1862. *Nitre Book*, #2 Ltr. #13 Union Powder Co. to Dahlgren, March 31, 1863; Ltrs. #37, 62, Hazard Powder Co. to BuOrd. May 16, July 7, 1863; #42 Dwight to Dahlgren June 3, 1863.

<sup>58</sup>*Nitre Book*, #1, Ltrs. #74, 81, Dwight to Dahlgren, Nov. 7, Dec. 24, 1862; *Powder Book* #1 (Outgoing), p. 67, 168. Nov. 23, 1862, March 30, 1863. On these problems of production and cost of the new manufactured powder Dahlgren regularly consulted DuPont. For example *Nitre Book* #1, Ltrs. #75, 78, 90, DuPont to Dahlgren. Nov. 3, 17, Dec. 29, 1862.

<sup>59</sup>*Nitre Book*, #2, Ltr. #92, 108 Dwight to Wise, Nov. 5, 1863, Feb. 20, 1864.

# AMPHIBIOUS SCOUTS AND RAIDERS

By R. C. WILLIAMS, Jr.\*

THE SUBJECT OF Amphibious Scouts and Raiders deals in terms of units small enough to be counted on the fingers, and yet a Theatre Staff, to do its job well, must know the capabilities and limitations of these tiny units as well as it knows those of the divisions, corps, fleets and air forces that come under its cognizance. During World War II the requirement for the use of these specialized units varied with every operation, while conditions, and therefore requirements, were different in each theatre and even within the various areas of one theatre

## AMPHIBIOUS SCOUTS

Amphibious scouts had the mission of gaining information that could not be obtained by other methods. On the face of it, this statement might indicate that the operations of amphibious scouts were strictly a concern of the intelligence section of a staff. Such was not the case. Not only were the operations and logistics sections of a Joint staff vitally concerned with the information obtained by amphibious scouts but it was these sections (operations primarily) which had to make available the means to put the scouts where they could obtain the information, at a time when the information obtained could be used to the greatest advantage.

The types of information collected by amphibious scouts included hydrographic information in the vicinity of beaches, condition of beaches and beach exits, and the nature

of terrain in the rear of beaches. If it could not be obtained by other methods, they also had to collect information as to the location and type of underwater and beach obstacles, enemy defensive positions and the location and size of enemy reserves. As an example of the need for hydrographic information in the vicinity of beaches, consider the requirements for beaching an LST. LST's became a standard tool in all amphibious operations. In planning for their use the operations section of a Joint staff had to know exactly what part of each beach to assign to their unloading. The logistics sections had to know the exact tonnage to be loaded, and what fore and aft trim of the vessel would yield the best beaching for the unloading. These questions could be answered only by accurate knowledge of the underwater gradients. Such information, if it was to be entirely accurate, oftentimes had to be obtained by scouts.

Information which could be obtained by amphibious scouts fell into two general classifications: first, information required for planning purposes, which therefore had to be obtained well in advance of amphibious operations; and second, information needed for tactical purposes immediately preceding and during a landing. The use of scouts to obtain information required for planning purposes was usually a responsibility of the theater staff, since it is this level which initiated the advance planning. The methods of scouting for planning purposes have varied in each operating area.

In the North Pacific there was a group, organized and trained by the G-2 of the Alaska Department, known as the Alaska Scouts. This organization was composed en-

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\*Colonel Williams, now in the Plans and Operations Division, Army General Staff, was concerned with staff planning for amphibious operations in both the Mediterranean and Pacific Ocean Areas.

tirely of men who had spent most of their lives in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands. They were all competent in the use of small boats in heavy surf and familiar with the peculiarities of terrain and weather in that area. They were accustomed to operating alone or in very small groups, and their military training had consisted primarily in the operation and maintenance of portable radio equipment. During our occupation of the Aleutians, and prior to our landings on Attu and Kiska, the use of these Alaska Scouts was standard operating procedure.

In the South Pacific, during the New Georgia operations, a group of approximately twenty-five officers and men was put ashore two weeks in advance of the main landing. This group included engineer officers and representatives of various staff sections and constituted a technical reconnaissance in force. The purpose was to make last-minute plans and obtain information that could not be obtained from aerial reconnaissance. The party members were not trained as scouts but were guided and transported through the area by a group of natives who had been organized by the local coast watcher.

Although the coast watcher organization to which the latter belonged does not come within the precise definition for amphibious scouts, it was an intelligence agency that played a major role in operations in the South Pacific area. The coast watcher organization in this area, later known as the Allied Intelligence Bureau, was originally established by the Australians and was composed of men who before the war had lived, traveled or traded in the islands of this part of the Pacific. Initially, this organization was established as a defensive measure. When we assumed the offensive the same organization took over the role of getting information for, and guiding our reconnaissance patrols in, enemy-held territory prior to our amphibious

attacks. It was controlled by the G-2 of General MacArthur's staff.

In the Pacific theater, prior to our entry into the war, little or no information was available concerning the operational areas of our amphibious assaults. For planning purposes it is obvious, therefore, that such information had to be collected weeks or months in advance of actual operations. In many cases dependence for detailed information had been placed to a major extent on aerial reconnaissance, particularly aerial photography. The present high development of aerial photography and interpretation made possible the accurate evaluation of a great range of enemy information, including the estimation of underwater conditions. Amazingly dependable though it was, however, aerial photography was not yet the final answer to all amphibious intelligence problems. It could not furnish reliable negative information of enemy dispositions, nor always penetrate camouflage or jungle foliage, nor could it produce all the details of hydrography, soil composition or beach exits which might be essential to precise plans for an amphibious landing. The dangers of relying on photographic interpretation alone for the evaluation of swamps was exemplified at Tanahmerah Bay.

These drawbacks emphasized the need of personal reconnaissance. Experience proved that scouts should be used to obtain only and specifically those essential items still lacking when all other sources had been exhausted. Their missions, in other words, had to be pared to the bone. This simplified their objectives, minimized the danger of compromise by their discovery or capture, and yielded more reliable, if less voluminous information. Further, such scouting, especially for planning purposes, had to be done as long as possible before target dates.

Amphibious scouts could also be used for tactical scouting, as distinguished from



scouting for planning purposes. Tactical scouting was that directed by the local commander immediately prior to and during a landing operation. This form of scouting included such objectives as the detailed location and marking of reefs, bars, underwater and beach obstacles, and reports on the location and movement of enemy reserves. An important item in this classification was that of beach identification for night landings. Although this was primarily a naval responsibility, it was of such vital interest to the landing force as to require joint planning and execution by small units drawn from both the naval and the landing force. Until the landing on the northern coast of France, all major Allied landings in Europe and Africa had commenced at night. As a result of experience, particularly in the Mediterranean area, accurate methods of beach finding which approached an exact science were developed. In all of these major landings, beginning with those on North Africa in the Torch operation and continuing through Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio, amphibious scouts preceded the assault waves and marked the beaches.

The statement oftentimes has been made, rather loosely, that there have been no night landings in the Pacific campaigns. This is true if, by "landing," a major landing is meant. However, many of the major landings in that theater were preceded by smaller forces landing in advance of H-Hour, and under cover of darkness. In the Kwajalein operation, the scout company of the 7th Infantry Division had the mission of landing on two small islands to secure an entrance to Cecil Pass prior to daylight on D-Day. The planning used to such good effect at Anzio was lacking here, with the result that part of the scout company was put ashore on the wrong island and didn't discover the mistake in the dark until it had been ashore for nearly an hour. Luckily, this mistake was

rectified before any serious damage had been done.

If a landing was to be made in daylight, on beaches clearly distinguishable from seaward by their terrain features, the detailed arrangements for beach finding employed at Anzio naturally would not be necessary. It is possible, however, to miss a beach in broad daylight. Even when terrain features are distinct, fog, tactical smoke, or the fumes and dust resulting from intense naval and air bombardment of a beach may completely hide it from the eyes of men in assault craft. This condition was reported from a number of the beaches in the Normandy landings.

#### UNDERWATER DEMOLITION TEAMS

Because of man-made obstacles in Europe, and both man-made and natural underwater obstacles in the Pacific, additional reconnaissance and demolitions units known as UDT's—that is, Underwater Demolitions Teams—were introduced into later operations. These teams were small and were usually composed of Navy and Army personnel, or Navy and Marine Corps personnel, who had been given highly specialized training both in scouting and in the technique of underwater demolitions. Such teams in some instances performed both tactical scouting and demolitions, and in others worked with amphibious scout teams who executed the reconnaissance while the UDT's carried out the demolitions. In the later Pacific operations the demolitions activities were all carried out in broad daylight prior to landings. As a result of protective curtains of fire from supporting combat ships and aircraft, plus the disinclination of the Japs to give away their positions by firing on these teams before D-Day, these UDT operations were accomplished with remarkably light casualties. Nevertheless, such activities, if not masked, are a dead giveaway to the enemy of the beaches we intend to assault.

The Marianas' campaign affords several interesting examples of the use of both scouts and UDT's.

The landing on Tinian, which was a shore-to-shore movement from Saipan, was preceded by very thorough amphibious scouting accomplished at night two weeks before D-Day. The selected beaches, known as White Beaches 1 and 2, were southwest of Ushi Point. While the White Beach reconnaissance was underway, a diversionary reconnaissance was conducted south of Asiga. The White Beach reconnaissance was not discovered by the enemy. On D-Day itself, a diversionary effort was made in Tinian Harbor and a UDT was sent in to blast a reef in the vicinity of Tinian Town. The main landing on D-Day, at White Beaches, was accomplished without casualties.

The reconnaissance of the White Beaches on Tinian was the subject of detailed study and preparation by the highest echelons involved in the operation. Detailed plans and orders were issued, and the reconnaissance teams and UDT's which carried out the job conducted two careful rehearsals at night in Magicienne Bay, Saipan.

The reconnaissance units were coached to the proper landing beaches by a destroyer using radar and radio. Five rubber boats with swimmers and paddlers and one "drone" rubber boat carrying a wire radar window were towed by landing craft to a point nineteen hundred yards off White Beach No. 2. Changes in course were given by radio.

At nineteen hundred yards the rubber boats were cast off and the destroyer continued to guide them by radio. All men in the landing craft had steel helmets and all boats as they were paddled shoreward covered less than a fifty-yard area. This arrangement, together with the radar window, gave a good clear radar pip and enabled the ship to guide the boats to a point four hundred yards to seaward and one hundred

yards south of White Beach No. 2. Twelve UDT swimmers and ten reconnaissance battalion swimmers reached their assigned areas without difficulty.

The reconnaissance in general confirmed the findings made by air and photographic coverage. There was evidence of enemy personnel in the vicinity of this beach. All swimmers and rubber boats were picked up without incident and the reconnaissance was accomplished without being detected. The reconnaissance unit brought back precise details regarding the depth of water on the reef, the location and nature of obstacles on the beaches, the location and characteristics of the reef, heights and characteristics of cliffs, character of the vegetation behind the beach, type of craft that could land on each beach, type of vehicles which could cross the reef and move inland, and an estimate as to whether or not infantry could climb the cliffs without ladders or cargo nets.

The landing at Guam was preceded by nearly two weeks of naval and air bombardment. On W-Day simultaneous landings were made southwest of Agana and in Agat Bay. From W-7 through W-5 amphibious reconnaissance was conducted on the selected beaches, and diversionary reconnaissance was conducted on the flanks of the selected beaches. No diversionary effort was made on the north, east, or south beaches of the Island. From W-4 to W-Day underwater demolition teams conducted daylight operations on the selected beaches only.

During the reconnaissance missions, personnel from UDT-3 landed on the reefs during the night and approached the actual shore line. Their operations were covered by the four LCI gunboats close-in on both flanks. Flanking the LCIs were two destroyers. Cruisers and battleships backed up the destroyers. With this formidable array of support only a small amount of enemy fire was delivered against the reconnaissance par-

ties. As soon as an enemy machine gun or artillery piece would open up, it would be smothered by a deluge of 40 mm, 5-inch, 6- and 8-inch, and major caliber fire.

Admiral Connolly paid high tribute to the demolition and reconnaissance teams and stated that it would have been impossible to have made the landings without their work. Later reports from the landing forces show that, as at Saipan, the enemy's mobile artillery and mortars were massed and concentrated on the selected beaches at H-Hour.

A similar procedure was followed in the Palau operation. There was absolutely no question as to the necessity of these pre-H-Hour reconnaissance and demolitions activities. However, it could not be overlooked that surprise was still one of the most powerful factors in war. If the amphibious planners persisted in following a set pattern, deliberately marking only the beaches they intended to land on, and then gave the enemy ample time to prepare to receive them—it was conceivable that future landings might be extremely costly, or even repulsed. The Marianas landings illustrate the point. At Saipan and Guam there was little attempt at deception; we pointed out to the Jap where we were going to land; the beaches were bloody. At Tinian reconnaissance was secret, excellent diversionary operations were carried out, and the first casualty was sustained 1,500 yards inland from the beaches.

#### PROBLEMS OF TRAINING

In our meager peacetime amphibious training, the matter of scouting was largely ignored. Consequently, after the outbreak of war, it became necessary to train and to develop a technique. The proper selection of men for this work was an essential requisite to successful results. The elements and principles of land scouting and patrolling had to be so ingrained in these men as to be instinctive. The aggressive type of action involved combined with the strain of maintain-

ing secrecy necessitated exceptionally high physical condition and agility. Since the accuracy of the information to be obtained was of an importance which might determine the success or failure of a landing, it was advisable in most cases to strengthen the patrol by officer leadership. Reports from scouts of necessity were brief, and usually an estimate by a patrol leader had to be accepted in lieu of a detailed report. Scouts also had to receive thorough training in radio operation and procedure, and be equipped with radios adequately waterproofed and sufficiently portable to accompany them wherever they went.

Both in Army and Marine Divisions, it was the normal practice to train division reconnaissance troops and scout companies, as well as personnel of the division, regimental, and battalion intelligence sections for this specialized job of scouting. This met the need for tactical scouting, and in those cases where a division was in an operating area sufficiently in advance of D-Day, these same divisional units could be used to scout for long range planning. However, the exact troops to be used for this purpose were not always available by the time the initial planning got underway. In such cases, the area commander had to have his own unit of qualified amphibious scouts—units such as the Alaska Scouts in the North Pacific, or the special reconnaissance and coast watcher organizations in the Southwest Pacific.

Selected men, specially trained and equipped, were not the entire solution to the problem. Besides the proper tools, there was the requirement of proper planning by the directing agency and an understanding by this agency of the capabilities and limitations of amphibious scouts.

#### CORRECT EMPLOYMENT OF SCOUTS — PLANNING

First, a command decision had to be made as to whether scouts would or would not be



used on a hostile shore prior to an operation. This was not an easy decision to make, because there was always the danger that the scouts might be captured and the enemy tipped off as to coming operations. General Bradley, the Corps Commander in Sicily, would not permit scouts to land there ahead of time for fear of giving away the show. His decision was based on the fact that six different parties of British scouts had been discovered trying to make such landings. Enemy prisoners at Salerno stated that they had watched our scouts on the beaches prior to D-Day, but had not molested them so as to prevent our learning that the Germans knew we were coming. On the other hand, there have been numerous occasions in the war where scouts have been successful in landing on hostile beaches, operating within the enemy's lines, and returning, without alerting the enemy.

One means to such security was to scout so long before the operation, and in so many different areas, that discovery or capture of the scouts would not automatically disclose the projected locale or date of the assault. Immediately after the Marianas Operations, for example, would have been an excellent time for any scouting in connection with the preliminary planning for our eventual landings in Japan. Our enemies did much of their scouting before 1939; must we always wait until D-5?

Such preliminary planning had to be done on a high echelon. It was, therefore, that high echelon which had to brief these scouts as to what was wanted of their missions. This emphasized the statement that high echelons had to know more than they did then about the detailed amphibious problems of the lower echelons who executed their plans. The answer, many believed, was joint intelligence on the high level which included experienced amphibious intelligence personnel. They would know what data the scouts

should seek, even at such an early stage.

Experience has proved that careful briefing of scout parties before their missions is essential. Of course it is pre-supposed that they have been most thoroughly trained and practiced in their operating methods and the use of their equipment before selection for a mission. First, they should be given aerial photographs and available source material on the objective area, for intensive study. Second, they should be told exactly what to look for and where to look for it. Their objectives should be kept to an absolute minimum. If a scout party is given three items to report on, it will probably produce correct answers to all. If it is asked to report on a dozen, the chances are that no answer will be entirely complete or correct. If many items are essential, it is far better to get them in several missions. Third, and most important from a security standpoint, they should be told nothing whatsoever about the operation for which they are getting the information.

#### AMPHIBIOUS RAIDERS

Complementing amphibious scouts were those various types of organizations which might be given the all-inclusive title of amphibious raiders. Amphibious raiders were not a new development of this war; but they were brought into the limelight by the exploits of the British Commandos. In the United States forces we have had Marine Raider Battalions, Army Ranger Battalions, and one composite U.S.-Canadian organization known as the First Special Service Force. All of these forces were organized and equipped as light infantry with emphasis placed on speed and mobility rather than on staying power.

A common mission assigned to these units was that of landing on hostile shores, destroying hostile installations, and retiring. Such units have also been successfully used in connection with major landing operations,

when a specially trained light force was required to make a surprise landing to seize and hold an important tactical area pending the arrival of heavier and larger forces. In this respect, the tactical employment of amphibious raiders was very similar to that of parachute troops.

American Ranger Battalions, it will be recalled, were successfully used for this type of mission in connection with the landing of American forces on North Africa, in Sicily, Salerno and Anzio. These Battalions made night landings and seized and held critical terrain and tactical features prior to the arrival of the main body.

A similar mission for the Kiska operation in the Aleutians in August, 1943, was given to the First Special Service Force. This unit had a total strength of 2,400 officers and men, of which approximately one third were Canadians and the remainder U.S. Army troops. The three regiments of this Force were organized along the lines of regiments of parachute infantry. In addition to parachute training, the force had extensive amphibious training, operating both day and night from all types of landing craft, and rigorous commando training in hand-to-hand fighting. They also spent six months in Montana, being trained in winter and mountain warfare.

At Kiska, two regiments of the First Special Service Force were given the mission of making a night landing, six hours prior to H-Hour, and of being on certain ridge lines at H-Hour, and holding their position until the arrival of the main body. They were landed in rubber boats launched from LSTs four to five hundred yards off shore. In the case of the northern landing, the route led to a little spit of land where the rubber boats were carried across and then launched again in a lake. The regiment re-embarked in the rubber boats and paddled through the lake and then proceeded overland to its objective.

Although the Japs had evacuated Kiska prior to our landing, this fact wasn't known until after the landing and thus the raider units made their landing under combat conditions. Each unit was on its correct objective at the time called for. This highly trained organization, ideally suited for amphibious operations, was later used as infantry in Italy and more than 50% of the original force were killed. It appeared again for the specialized type of job for which it was organized and trained when our forces invaded Southern France.

#### PROPER EMPLOYMENT OF RAIDERS

When raider units are available, there appears to be a universal tendency to employ them as ordinary reinforcements, even in minor emergencies. Colonel Darby and his Rangers were many times used as infantry troops on both offensive and defensive missions in situations for which normal infantry battalions would have been more suitable. The final result was that his three battalions were wiped out during the fighting at the Anzio beachhead. The 1st Special Service Force, used as ordinary infantry, spearheaded the final attack on Rome. These units were not organized with either the strength or the fire power to be kept in the lines as infantry. By using them in this way we lost the services of highly trained and experienced units which would have been invaluable in future amphibious operations. In Europe a direct result was the fact that inexperienced Ranger units had to be utilized for the Normandy landing. Owing either to inexperience or poor planning, or a combination of both, one of these Ranger battalions suffered extremely heavy casualties in the Normandy landing. This battalion had the mission of capturing, in daylight, a German coastal battery located on a cliff overlooking the flank of one of the main landing beaches. There was no element of surprise; they were met by heavy point blank fire, and suffered about 75% casualties.

They did take the enemy battery; but only by means of the high courage of the individual soldiers, and some unexpected fire support from the Navy. The lesson here is that raider units are organized and equipped for speed and mobility rather than staying power; and that they must therefore be used as a surprise agent if full advantage is to be taken of their capabilities.

In all types of raider operations certain similar characteristics appeared: First, the necessity of stealth in the approach. Second, the necessity of proper deployment. Third, the necessity of the most detailed planning and preparation. And fourth, the necessity of having intelligent and agile personnel.

#### ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

Since our entry into the war there has been a change in thought as to what type of personnel and units should be assigned these raider missions. Initially it was felt that special organizations, composed of volunteers, were required for such jobs. As a result our original units were activated on this basis; that is, the Marine Raider Battalions, the earlier Army Ranger Battalions, and the First Special Service Force were all specially selected volunteers. At the time of the Mariannas Campaign experienced people in the field indicated that although selected units were required, they did not need to be specially activated and should not be composed of volunteers. This change of thought was brought about by two factors. First, existing limitations of our manpower had a definite limiting effect on the creation of extra-curricular organizations. Second, as we graduated from our amateur soldiering days and, by virtue of battle experience, created professional line organizations, we could depend more and more upon the ordinary man being able to do all the things that a professional soldier was supposed to be able to do.

The Marine Corps disbanded its Raider Battalions, in the opinion that any Marine Infantry Battalion, if specially pointed and equipped for a raider job, could be expected to carry it out. Colonel Darby has stated that if he had the job to do again he would not have a unit of volunteers, but would select a unit for a particular job, and give it the special training and equipment for that particular job. Both Colonel Darby and the Marine Corps arrived at the same conclusion with regard to volunteers: they were unsatisfactory because they were too reckless, and often careless of camouflage and similar precautions; they became egotistical and felt themselves apart from the ordinary soldier, and that they did not have to comply with the normal requirements of discipline, dress, and sanitation; and finally, the use of volunteers did not meet the requirements of the replacement system of either the Army or the Marine Corps, it being obviously impracticable to maintain a pool of specially trained volunteers to meet the loss replacement factor of raider units.

There has been no change of thought, however, as to the necessity for these special jobs. And it was further agreed, by all those who had the needful experience in the field, that regardless of the type of unit selected for these operations, they had to be given special training for the particular job, and would probably have to be specially equipped. Above all was the requirement for proper planning by the directing agency.

In the past, both amphibious scouts and raiders achieved great success whenever their employment has been directed by people on high echelon who took the trouble to learn the capabilities and limitations of these small units. The future will undoubtedly see similar units used again. And again, it will be a combination of services which will insure success in this highly important phase of offensive warfare.



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## NOTES AND DOCUMENTS

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### THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN MEXICO CITY

BY EDWARD S. WALLACE

In April, 1846, spontaneous hostilities on the Rio Grande began our war with Mexico. Some 17 months later, just as dawn broke over the volcanoes to the east of Mexico City on the morning of September 14, 1847, Major General John Quitman of Mississippi led his battle-scarred division cautiously through the streets of the capital to the Grand Plaza where the troops formed into line on the east side before the old viceroy's palace. It was a unique entry for a triumphant army. Quitman and Brigadier General Persifor F. Smith marched at the head of the column on foot, Quitman limping along with only one shoe, and behind them, carrying their arms at all angles, wearily plodded Smith's brigade of volunteers, a detachment of Marines, the New York volunteers, and a battery of field artillery. All were in rags and covered with mud, crude bandages, and the red stains of battle, for they had literally fought their way through one of the city gates the previous evening, and, before that on the same day, had victoriously stormed Chapultepec Castle.<sup>1</sup>

The sidewalks, balconies, windows, and housetops were jammed with people who watched in silence the despised *gringos* filling the vacuum left by General Santa Anna's evacuation of the city during the night.<sup>2</sup>

The American officers took their positions before their men and, as Captain Roberts

hoisted a tattered American flag on the flag pole of the palace, the battered bands played "The Star Spangled Banner," while the men presented arms and the officers saluted.<sup>3</sup> This was the first and only time that our flag and ours alone has been raised over the capitol of a conquered enemy country.

A few minutes later the sound of approaching cheering was heard and the commanding general, Winfield Scott, galloped into the plaza escorted by a detachment of dragoons with drawn sabres. Scott cut a truly magnificent figure, even in his 61st year, being six feet four inches in height, wearing an immaculate blue dress uniform with gleaming gold epaulets and a cocked hat with flowing white plumes, and mounted on a tall and heavy bay charger, he looked every inch the handsome and superb soldier he was; his resplendent aura typifying the dirt covered glory of his army. Even the hostile Mexicans had cheered him as he dashed by. Uncovering, he rode down the line of his men and the bands played in succession, "Hail Columbia," "Washington's March," "Yankee Doodle," and "Hail to the Chief"; the men presenting arms as he passed and then breaking into such cheering and hurrahing that it almost seemed as if another perennial earthquake was shaking the Hall of Montezuma.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Justin H. Smith, *The War with Mexico* (New York, 1919), II, 163.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, II, 164.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, II, 164; Winfield Scott, *Memoirs of Lieut.-General Scott* (New York, 1864), II, 537.

Thus ended the real hostilities of the war; a conflict in which the American troops set a standard for courage and intelligent initiative against overwhelming odds which has never since been surpassed in our military history. West Point, reorganized after our military fiascoes during the War of 1812, had paid off in large dividends and the roster of the junior officers in this war, to whom a great part of the success was due, foreshadowed the desperate struggle of our later Civil War. Grant, Beauregard, McClellan, Meade, Hooker, Joseph Johnston, Stonewall Jackson, Lee, Jefferson Davis, and others received their baptism of fire on the battle-fields of Mexico and learned each other's weaknesses and strengths for future reference.

A possible gauge of the achievement is, that while it took General Scott about six months to fight his way into Mexico City from Vera Cruz with an army never exceeding 10,000 men, at least a half of whom were untrained volunteers, some fifteen years later in 1861-1863 it took an army of 30,000 French regulars, including the famous Foreign Legion, some 18 months to cover the route, during which time they suffered a decisive defeat at the Battle of Puebla on May 5, 1862; today celebrated as one of the great national holidays of Mexico. And the evidence inclines to the fact that the Mexicans were neither as well prepared nor armed during this later invasion.

Some interesting comments on the dash and *élan* of the Americans, as well as the lack of military formality among the volunteers, were made in a diary kept by Captain Otto Zirckel of the 4th Infantry, Ohio Volunteers. Captain Zirckel had formerly served as a lieutenant in the 3rd Royal Prussian Hussar Regiment, and publishing his diary in German after the war, he dedicated it to his former Brigadier-General, Prince Albrecht of Prussia. Zirckel said that, for example, the old colonel of a Mississippi regiment had

no military knowledge whatsoever and would simply shriek to his men before a battle "At 'em boys"; and that Colonel Jack Hays of the Texas Rangers would point with his finger at the enemy and yell "Give them hell"; both of which unconventional commands, however, seemed to have had the desired effect for Captain Zirckel noted that "the Americans are brave—brave as lions," and always swept the enemy off the field.<sup>5</sup>

The American army, in proportion to its numbers, was about the "fightingest" crowd we have ever assembled, and its excess pugnacity, when not united into common action against the enemy, vented itself in internecine quarrels. President Polk disliked and squabbled with his two ranking generals, Scott and Zachary Taylor. The general officers wrangled among themselves and preferred charges, demanded Courts of Inquiry, and conducted courts martial with ferocity and abandon. The Southerners hated the Yankees, and vice versa.<sup>6</sup> Zirckel gives an account of a northern officer, at the height of the Battle of Buena Vista, being greeted by the Mississippi Rifles with howls of "Shoot that damned Yankee!"<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless the volunteer troops of each state were willing to take on all comers, at the drop of the hat regardless of sectionalism, and fights were common between the Pennsylvania and New York regiments.<sup>8</sup> To add to the general gayety, the regulars, of course, despised the volunteers and this feeling was, as usual, returned with interest.<sup>9</sup> The sectional feeling was unquestionably worse than the healthy norm, due to the slavery question, but that is all a long and different story and has no place here.

<sup>5</sup>Otto Zirckel, *Tagebuch der Campagne* (Halle, 1849), pp. 9-11.

<sup>6</sup>Letters signed J. H. W., *The Boston Atlas*, April-June, 1848.

<sup>7</sup>Zirckel, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

<sup>8</sup>J. Jacob Oswald, *Notes of the Mexican War* (Philadelphia 1885), pp. 438, 512.

<sup>9</sup>Smith, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

The Americans occupied Mexico City for nine months, during the peace negotiations, until June 12, 1848. Years later a veteran who had been a young lieutenant during the war wrote, "The Mexican capitol, with its peerless climate and picturesque surroundings, its *alamedas*, *paseos*, theatres, bull fights, its darkeyed señoritas and voluptuous señoras, had many alluring attractions, though it did not prove a Capua for the American soldiers; nor did they, like Hannibal's braves, exchange amid its Circean fascinations the role of sturdy warriors for that of listless Sybarites."<sup>10</sup> Flowery words, but on the whole true, for the discipline was strict, even harsh by our present-day standards, and there was but little looting or disorder on the part of the occupying army, and nearly all infractions of good behavior were quickly and severely punished. "Old Fuss and Feathers," as the men called Scott, had always been a real friend to the enlisted men but he was a disciplinarian to the core, especially in such a precarious position, cut off from his base of supplies, and his hand fell heavy upon the malingerer or trouble maker; doubly so if he happened to be an officer.

The disciplinary punishments were rugged! Mutiny and desertion were punished by death, and during this war a most curious mass example of the latter took place—the only case known in which a body of United States soldiers, after deserting, subsequently formed a distinct corps in the enemy's army. The deserters were seduced by religious propaganda and promises of bonuses by the enemy, and formed two companies of infantry known as the "Brigade of Saint Patrick" in the Mexican army, but which were called the "Irish Deserters" by the Americans.<sup>11</sup>

A large number of these renegades, some eighty in all, were captured by the Americans, after a desperate resistance, in the fighting just outside Mexico City. After a court martial, fifty were hanged at various intervals, mostly in the suburb of San Angel. General Scott, taking a literal interpretation of the articles of war for the remainder because they had deserted before the actual declaration of war, remitted the death sentence to the following punishment, as per his General Order No. 340:

"... to forfeit all pay and allowances—to receive fifty lashes on the bare back, well laid on, to have the letter D indelibly branded on the cheek with a red-hot iron, to be confined at hard labor, wearing about the neck an iron collar having three prongs each six inches long, the whole weighing eight pounds, for six months, and at the expiration of that time to have the head shaved and be drummed out of the service."<sup>12</sup>

Lesser infractions of a serious nature, such as drunkenness on guard, insubordination, and extreme disorderly conduct, were punished by "riding the wooden horse" from reveille to retreat, with a half hour out for meals, for periods up to sixty days. This was called being "bucked and gagged" by the men and consisted in being trussed on a sort of saw-horse and left in the broiling sun,<sup>13</sup> a horribly painful procedure; so it can be seen that good behavior, at least among the regulars, had its own reward.

One of the first official acts of General Scott, after entering the city, was to establish a newspaper for the benefit of the soldiers. It was called the "American Star" and was soon published daily except Mondays in Spanish and English, carrying all the General Orders and Official Notices from headquarters. The editor was a Quartermaster Sergeant of the 9th Infantry (New England Volunteers) named John H. Warland who

<sup>10</sup>General Cadmus M. Wilcox, *History of the Mexican War* (Washington, 1892), p. 511.

<sup>11</sup>Edward S. Wallace, "Deserters in the Mexican War," *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, August, 1935, pp. 374-382.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup>*Star*, Sept. 23, 1847.



came from Lowell, Massachusetts, and was a graduate of Harvard College, class of 1827. Warland was a newspaper man by profession and made the *Star* a readable and amusing sheet; that is when "the brass" didn't take up too much space with their general and special orders, and it is from this source that the best overall picture of the life of the American Soldier during the occupation can be obtained.<sup>14</sup>

Santa Anna had opened all the jails upon leaving the city and the Americans had considerable trouble with looting and sniping by the released felons for three days after their entrance, but order was finally established with an iron hand. Another bad element, which was a constant source of trouble throughout the occupation, was the *leperos*, as the swarms of semi-criminal, professional beggars were called, and it was never safe for a soldier to go out at night alone or for even small groups to go unarmed, and assassinations of drunken soldiers at night were frequent. Also, outside the city, the *guerillas* constantly harassed the supply trains going back and forth to Vera Cruz, or any small detachment of troops who wandered too far afield.<sup>15</sup>

The officers and men were billeted in the public buildings and barracks, the "gallant marines" occupying the national palace on the Grand Plaza which had been built on the site of the old Aztec palace and was known as the "Halls of Montezuma,"<sup>16</sup> so that the first line of the Marine Anthem is literally true. Others were quartered in various monasteries where they found their hosts to be a pleasant and congenial lot. Later on, the

officers were allowed to find billets among private Mexican families but only at the owner's consent.<sup>17</sup>

General Scott then levied the reasonable sum of \$150,000 on the city which was used to purchase blankets and supplies for the sick and wounded; the balance being set aside as a nucleus for a fund for an old soldiers' home, which afterwards materialized in Washington, D. C. As soon as this money was received General Scott issued a proclamation promising religious freedom and full civil rights to all law-abiding Mexicans, and the city rapidly resumed its normal tone;<sup>18</sup> and the Americans proceeded to find ways of spending their spare time profitably and pleasantly.

Everybody naturally went to a bullfight; usually once with the customary American reaction of disgust.<sup>19</sup> The theatre, the opera, and the circus, with an occasional fling at the gaming tables, vied with the primary diversion of all soldiers since wars began—that of "fraternization," and many dance halls soon opened, so that balls and masquerades were held nightly with the sound of gay music, particularly the waltzes of Straus, lasting until daybreak in various sections of the City.<sup>20</sup>

The señoritas quickly lost their fear of the northern barbarians and "surrendered unconditionally after trifling resistance," much to the fury of their former Mexican admirers who dubbed each girl with the nickname of an American victory; thus a pretty vivacious little brunette would be called "*Cerro Gordo*"; and a tall, lithesome blonde might become known as "*Palto-Alto*" (tall stick!).<sup>21</sup>

<sup>14</sup>A complete file of the *American Star* was given to Harvard College by John H. Warland, with an interesting explanatory letter discussing the sectional feeling in the 9th Infantry against their Southern officers. This file is now in the Houghton Library in Cambridge.

<sup>15</sup>*Op. cit.*, *passim*.

<sup>16</sup>Richard M'Sherry, M.D., U.S.N., *El Puchero or a Mixed Dish from Mexico* (Philadelphia, 1850), p. 115.

<sup>17</sup>Scott, *Memoirs*, p. 580; *American Star*, Sept. 20, 1847.

<sup>18</sup>Scott, *Memoirs*, p. 581.

<sup>19</sup>U. S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant* (New York, 1885), I, 167; *Star*, *passim*.

<sup>20</sup>*Star*, *passim*.

<sup>21</sup>M'Sherry, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

Competition soon became keen between the various dance halls, and the proprietors of the National Theatre, Wm. Forest's Salon, the Bella Union, Z. Hubbard's Custom House, C. Wagner's Ball Room, and the Pinon Jockey Club filled the advertising columns of the *American Star* with enticing notices of a Grand Fandango, for officers only, at \$2 per ticket which admitted a gentleman and two ladies; or a ball at which real American ladies were admitted gratis; and one where a sumptuous supper was served up to 9 o'clock with efficient police in nightly attendance to preserve order.<sup>22</sup> The most exclusive balls, however, were subscription affairs promoted by the younger officers which were held in an ex-convent near the Grand Plaza.<sup>23</sup>

The G.I.'s of the period, especially the enlisted men of the volunteer regiments, resented the caste system implied by the balls advertised for "officers only" and on one occasion over a half of the men of the 1st Pennsylvania Volunteers sneaked out of their camp in the suburb of San Angel, after taps, and attended a masquerade for officers only in the city, dressed in borrowed native Mexican costumes obtained through the good offices of the local bartenders, and great was their indignation at the efforts of the recently arrived General Caleb Cushing (of China Treaty fame) to prevent such innocent diversions.<sup>24</sup> This regiment was a particularly unruly one which soon made the life of the politically appointed General Cushing miserable.

Magic shows by Herr Alexander and Signor Rossi, faro at *El Gran Sociedad del Progreso*, horse-racing at the Piñon Jockey Club, and the ballet, Spanish style by local danseuses, and American style by such im-

ported talent as Mme. Pautuet, Mme. Armand, and Señor Castaneda, who executed a new dance arranged to the tune of Yankee Doodle, helped pass many an idle hour, but the great attraction was the opera as given by a traveling Italian opera troupe at the National Theatre (formerly the *Gran Theatre de Santa Anna*); this establishment being advertised as "the most magnificent in the world."<sup>25</sup>

Dramatic critic Sergeant Warland attended an opening performance of Bellini's *Los Puritanos* (*I Puritani*) and wrote a favorable review in the *American Star* the following day, which omitted mentioning that this particular opera is a satire on the manners and morals of all Anglo-Saxons, but which advised the soldiers that it would be unfashionable to yell in the theatre for it was so short a time since the storming of Chapultepec Castle that no reminder of it was needed, and that it was not customary for the box-holders to sit with their legs hanging over the railing.<sup>26</sup>

For the more serious minded there were visits to the great cathedral, with its altar rail reputed to be of solid silver, or to the National Museum with its Aztec relics; excursions to the Shrine of the Virgin of Guadalupe<sup>27</sup> (the patron saint of Mexico), or to the caves of Guernavaca, or the climbing of Mount Popocatepetl as accomplished by a party of young officers which included Lieutenant Ulysses S. Grant,<sup>28</sup> or one could have a daguerreotype taken at the studio of C. S. Betts, possibly visited by Lieutenant Thomas Jonathan (Stonewall) Jackson and resulting in the picture of a somber young officer.<sup>29</sup> Then there was the Reading Room opposite the post office which boasted of a circulating

<sup>22</sup>*Star*, *passim*.

<sup>23</sup>M'Sherry, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

<sup>24</sup>Oswandel, *op. cit.*, pp. 464, 474.

<sup>25</sup>*Star*, *passim*.

<sup>26</sup>*Star*, Oct. 10, 1847.

<sup>27</sup>M'Sherry, *op. cit.*, pp. 133, 138.

<sup>28</sup>Grant, *Memoirs*, pp. 162, 190.

<sup>29</sup>*Pageant of America* (New Haven, 1927), VI, 328.

library in English, German, Spanish and French on moderate terms and offered to pay the highest price in cash for English books.<sup>30</sup> For the officers there was the Aztec Club, with General Franklin S. Pierce as its first president, which provided "good cheer at moderate rates."<sup>31</sup>

All of these educational trips and attractions possibly helped the bored young soldier to avoid such places as Thos. Laurent's which served "exquisite wines, cordials, spirits and old Cognac brandy" or the *Eagle Coffee House* which offered "wines, liquors, and segars of the choicest brand" with a side line of "celebrated Life Pills for the cure of Bilious and Intermittent affections, Liver Complaints, Dispepsia, Disentery, Impurities of the Blood, Headache, Costiveness, pains in the back, loins and side. Also Asiatic Tooth Wash, Bears Oil, and the famous Septentrian Oil for the growth of the hair, and black writing ink."<sup>32</sup> General Scott limited these temptations by closing all liquor shops at 6 p.m. after October 22, 1847, mainly to prevent the assassination of drunken soldiers at night by the hated *leperos*.<sup>33</sup>

Souvenirs were sought by the soldiers as eagerly as always and a general order was issued on October 1, 1847 directing that "all pieces of ordnance of whatever calibre and all colors, standards and guidons taken from the enemy and now in possession of individuals will be immediately sent in to ----- the ordnance office"<sup>34</sup> (probably with the usual results), and a Court of Inquiry was established on November 2 to ascertain who stole two Mexican howitzers out of the Chapultepec Castle after its capture.<sup>35</sup> The next spring, under date of May 6, an agent for Phineas T. Barnum inserted an advertisement

in the *Star* soliciting "relics of war, military trophies, etc." and promising that "the names of all donors will be affixed to articles presented and allowed free admittance for 3 years to the Museum." The all time high in gruesome souvenir hunting seems to have been attained by some of the men of the above mentioned, masquerade attending, 1st Pennsylvania Volunteers, as casually reported in the diary of Corporal Oswandel. He noted on May 23 that while on his way "into the city by way of the Tacubaya Road, saw several of our men digging up some of the deserters hung last Sept. The ropes were still around their necks. They are to cut their heads off, and then boil the meat off and take their skulls to the U. S. as souvenirs."<sup>36</sup>

Diaries and letters naturally give a more personal slant on affairs than would an official publication like the *American Star*, or memoirs written by prominent men with an eye on the public reaction. Richard M'Sherry, a Navy Surgeon serving with the U. S. Marines, afterwards published a volume of his letters home (*El Puchero or a Mixed Dish from Mexico*) and from this it is possible to obtain the impressions of an educated officer. M'Sherry was much concerned over the high mortality rate of the American wounded in the Mexico City hospitals during the month following the city's occupation and ascribes this to the result of too much and too rough traveling in the hospital wagons as Scott's attacking column moved forward, cut off from its base. Also there were many raw days in October as the rainy season had begun.<sup>37</sup> He later blamed excessive sickness among the troops to the fact that most of the men were from farms and not used to city life.<sup>38</sup> At the time of entry he estimated there were only about 5,000 men on the duty list.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>30</sup>*Star*, Nov. 9, 1847.

<sup>31</sup>M'Sherry, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

<sup>32</sup>*Star*, Sept. 23, 1847, and *passim*.

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*, Oct. 22, 1847.

<sup>34</sup>*Ibid.*, Oct. 2, 1847.

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.*, Nov. 2, 1847.

<sup>36</sup>Oswandel, *op. cit.*, p. 551.

<sup>37</sup>M'Sherry, *op. cit.*, pp. 127, 133.

<sup>38</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 163.

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 127.



Surgeon M'Sherry was socially inclined and made an effort to meet some of the upper-class Mexicans, with considerable success. He gained an entree at a *tertulia* (reception) given by an English-woman in December where there was dancing, music, and cards; and he admired the natural ability of the Mexican girls for dancing, although he did not consider them up to the Americans in looks, and decided that their Mamas aged quickly. He gained an invitation to the house of a Mexican family, and, from this, others to their friends' and relations'. He noted that there seemed to be no general society, and the groups were formed of blood relations sticking closely to their own company. He spent Christmas Eve with some of his new friends and had a pleasant and temperate time eating *dulces*, sipping chocolate, smoking paper segars (cigarettes), listening to music and occasionally drinking a toast in old sherry.<sup>40</sup>

For the rest of his stay in Mexico City he made a point of calling on his Mexican friends at least two evenings a week, and was always cordially received and offered a cup of chocolate and a case of "paper segars." He believed that the better classes wanted the United States to annex Mexico and dreaded the anarchy which would follow the evacuation after the peace was ratified;<sup>41</sup> a fear which later proved all too prophetic.

In contrast to the somewhat sedate and conventional life of Surgeon M'Sherry in Mexico City was that led by the G.I.'s of the 1st Pennsylvania Volunteers mentioned above, as shown in the diary kept by Corporal J. Jacob Oswandel. This regiment had been mainly recruited in Lancaster and York counties and contained a large proportion of Pennsylvania Dutch. A great part of the

diary is given to normal and healthy gripes about rations, lack of mail, delinquencies in pay, too much "chicken" in some of the officers, too much drilling and "spit-n polish," impatience at the slowness of the peace negotiations, and general homesickness; and if the dates were changed to about 97 years later, the comments could be placed *verbatim* in the columns of *Yank* or *Stars and Stripes* without causing a ripple of unusual interest.

Corporal Oswandel wrote that when the army first entered the city, it was impossible to get a lady to go to any place of amusement but that this feeling changed almost over-night and that all was shortly in good order. In fact the 1st Pennsylvania was soon giving dances at its bivouac area in the suburb of San Angel, for which various committees were appointed to buy food, liquor, and engage the company of as many attractive señoritas as possible. One such gala affair was given on the night of March 20, 1848 (pay day), at which a bevy of beautiful señoritas were in attendance, and there was much singing, drinking of toasts, speeches, and then dancing to music furnished by the band of the brother regiment, the 2nd Pennsylvania Volunteers. The corporal also noted the hangovers and stiffness from dancing the next day.<sup>42</sup>

The men of this regiment sought relaxation in imbibing the cheap native drink of *pulque* at several nearby *cantinas* which they called *pulque tub haciendas*, a diversion shared by the New York and South Carolina volunteers who were encamped in the same area. The Pennsylvanians seemed to fraternize well enough with their southern neighbors but fist-fights with the New Yorkers were a common occurrence in the *pulque* house with a resulting toll of many black eyes at assembly the next morning.<sup>43</sup> They also

<sup>40</sup>*Ibid.*, *passim*.

<sup>41</sup>*Ibid.*, *passim*.

<sup>42</sup>Oswandel, *op. cit.*, p. 513.

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 438, 512.

got on famously with the native bartenders as instanced by the latter's aid in securing Mexican costumes to attend the officers' masquerade ball; and when the regiment marched out for good, homeward bound, on May 30, 1848, a delegation of saloonkeepers and bartenders came to bid them goodbye and brought a little *pulque* to treat some of their regular customers; and also to try and collect a few little bills which had been overlooked. The *pulque* delegation cheered the regiment heartily as they marched off and a few walked along with them for miles.<sup>44</sup>

The relations of the volunteers with the officers varied, to say the least. There was considerable griping at Colonel Wynkoop, commanding the Pennsylvania volunteers, for his alleged mania for reviews and dress parades in honor of visiting general officers, and all agreed that he was "bucking" hard for brigadier general.<sup>45</sup> On one occasion the men of the 2nd Pennsylvania "rotten-egged" a Massachusetts officer who undertook to "buck and gag" one of their men for a trifling offense on guard duty.<sup>46</sup> When official announcement of the ratification of peace was received on the evening of May 27, "the camp went wild with joy and all the bands of the regiments, supported by a singing and cheering mob of soldiers, serenaded the different good officers and a few prominent Mexicans."<sup>47</sup>

The one general officer whose life was really made miserable by this brigade was Brigadier-General Caleb Cushing of Massachusetts. He had come up from Vera Cruz in November, 1847, after the fighting was over, and was assigned to duty with the volunteers at San Angel. Corporal Oswandel wrote that at first he was considered an inexperienced but rather good-hearted officer as he paid a

Mexican muleteer \$12 out of his own pocket for oranges and bread which the men had looted off some pack-mules. The next day, however, some of the men who had furnished their tents with furniture from some deserted ranch-houses by "midnight requisitions" were all put in the guard house and the feeling began to change,<sup>48</sup> and was intensified when the General stopped one of the stages running into Mexico City and put off all except the officers, and that evening "when he rode past the quarters nearly all the men mocked and hooted at him."<sup>49</sup> A week later, on January 31, 1848, Oswandel wrote "some of our regiment and the New Yorkers have stolen Genl. Cushing's horse last night from quarters of the 2nd. Pa. Vol. An ad out saying any one supplying information leading to return gets pass to city. Everyone that read this went away with a hearty laugh saying it was a pity that they didn't steal the general. The cry is who stole the horse?"<sup>50</sup>

Another outburst of the men was directed at Senator Lewis Cass of Michigan who probably never knew anything about it. On the evening of March 23rd an announcement was read at retreat that Congress had deducted \$1 per month from the \$7 clothing allowance. As a private's (one grade only) pay was only \$7 per month, this was a serious matter. The bill to this effect was said to have been introduced by Cass and so great was the resentment that he was hung in effigy by the troops. "Then a fire was built under him although some officers ordered it cut down, and a committee was appointed to present Mr. Cass with a leather medal and also nominate him for the next office as dog-catcher."<sup>51</sup> Lewis Cass ran for president in November of this same year on the Democratic ticket and was defeated, due to the

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 572-573.

<sup>45</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 513.

<sup>46</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 536.

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 559.

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 463.

<sup>49</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 471.

<sup>50</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 474.

<sup>51</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 514-515.

defection of Pennsylvania and New York, and it seems that the returned volunteers of these two states may have had some influence in the matter.

The volunteers left for home on rather an appealing note. Although some of the states had made arrangements for the return of the bodies of the fallen officers, notably New York,<sup>52</sup> nothing was officially done for those of the enlisted men, except at the initiative of their own comrades, and the men of all the regiments were busy digging up the bodies of their friends and buying lead coffins to transport them home, as advertised for sale in the *American Star*.<sup>53</sup> A collection was taken up in Corporal Oswandel's company, to which he contributed \$10, to pay the ex-

penses of bringing home the bodies of William Enrick and Jacob Dauner of Little York, Pennsylvania,<sup>54</sup> and it is to be hoped that both of these soldiers lie peacefully in York County today.

On June 12, 1848, Mexico City was formally relinquished to the Mexicans in a ceremony held in the Grand Plaza. Before detachments of troops of both nations the American flag was lowered to a salute of thirty guns and the Mexican standard raised in its place. An American band broke into a gay march and the last of the conquerors followed it out of the city and took the long trail to Vera Cruz. On the last day of July the final American soldier embarked for home from that port.

<sup>52</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 545.

<sup>53</sup>*Star*, Oct. 14, and *passim*.

<sup>54</sup>Oswandel, *op. cit.*, p. 572



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## HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

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### NAVAL HISTORY PROGRAM

The Office of Naval History, formerly a division of the Office of Public Relations, has been merged with the Office of Naval Records and Library, the whole renamed the Office of Naval Records and History, and the Director made responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations (Administration).

Two more volumes of the *History of U.S. Naval Operations*, being written by Dr. Samuel Eliot Morison and his staff, will be published by Little, Brown & Co. this fall: Volume IV, *Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Operations*, on September 23; Volume V, *Guadacanal*, on November 20. Nine more volumes remain to be written.

Dr. Robert G. Albion, Historian for Naval Administration, will publish his first volume of the *History of the American Naval Establishment* late this winter. The Princeton University Press will publish the projected series: Volume I, *Makers of Naval Policy*; Volume II, *The Navy Department*; Volume III, *The Operating Forces*; Volume IV, *The Shore Establishment and Advanced Bases*. Dr. Albion, who has been a professor of history at Princeton for many years, is now Gardiner Professor of Oceanic History and Affairs at Harvard University.

In addition to the work of Drs. Morison and Albion, *The History of U.S. Naval Aviation* has been written by Captain Archibald D. Turnbull, USNR (Ret.), Deputy Director of Naval Records and History, and Clifford L. Lord, and will be published by the Yale University Press on November 9. In preparation is the history of the Navy's administration of the Trust Territories by Lt. Comdr. Dorothy E. Richard, USN. The

indexing and evaluation of the 250 first narratives of the administrative history of the Navy in World War II is being continued.

The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) historical program, under the direction of Dr. Henry M. Dater, has written *The Navy's Air War*, published by Harper and Brothers and has produced special studies such as *Army-Navy Cooperation in Aeronautics, 1917-1947* for the Eberstadt Committee and *Cold Weather Operations*, the latter written by Mr. Adrian O. Van Wyen. A *History of Technical Developments of Naval Aircraft* for the pre-World War II period is being written by Dr. Grant McColey; the period of World War II will be covered by Mr. Lee Pearson of the Historical Section of the Bureau of Aeronautics. The DCNO (Air) Historical Section is also continuing the writing of the administrative history of DCNO (Air) and the collection of historical reports from all ships, units, and stations concerned with naval aircraft.

The Bureau of Yards and Docks Historical Section, under the direction of Miss Helen R. Fairbanks, has published the wartime history of the Bureau, *Building the Navy's Bases in World War II*, in two volumes, printed by the Government Printing Office. At present a supplementary volume recording the Bureau's post-war activities, is being compiled.

The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery will publish the first two volumes of its history late in 1949. One volume is the pictorial record of the Medical Corps; the other is a memorial volume containing lists of awards and casualties of the Medical Corps. The entire history is scheduled for completion sometime in 1951.

## THE VALUE OF REGIMENTAL MUSEUMS

With the Autumn 1949 issue, the *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* has inaugurated a most interesting supplement. *Museum Supplement No. 1* contains eight pages plus four illustrations, and is bound separately from the main publication. This first issue is devoted to the Regimental Museums of Northern Ireland, but the foreword contains these remarks about regimental museums in general that should interest the readers of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*—several of whom have written to the Editor on this subject:

"The Society has always taken an interest in the museums maintained by regiments, because these are the natural home for those . . . objects which record the history of each regiment in war and peace, and of the individuals who have built up the regimental tradition and prestige; and also because these museums, in course of time, will become fundamental sources of information on which writers on military history should depend. Two years ago the Society reconstituted its Museums Committee, in the conviction that modern developments in the organization of the Army made it less easy than formerly to inculcate in a soldier a firm belief in the high standard of his own regiment, or to build up a determination in each soldier to do his part in maintaining and even enhancing it. The Museum Committee maintained the view that Regimental Museums provide an important means of assisting in that direction.

"In January 1948, the War Office revived its Museum Committee. The present Chairman is Major-General G. P. Walsh, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. This Committee has now collected information as to the position of the various Regimental Museums, from the point of view of permanence, as to their suitability to receive valuable exhibits and as to their functions and requirements. Following the

study of the information so obtained, the War Office then decided to authorize regiments to use increased space for museums and also to obtain showcases and other necessities at the public expense.

"In view of the decision of the War Office that Regimental Museums fulfilled an important function and were to be encouraged, the Society decided that it would, through its Museum Committee, meet as many as possible of those in charge of Regimental Museums and also inspect the museums with the object of describing these in the *JOURNAL* and drawing attention to the distinctive features of each. . . ."

## LETTER TO THE EDITOR OF MILITARY AFFAIRS

I was very glad to see "French Publications Relating to the Activities of the French Forces . . ." in the summer 1949 issue of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*. At the Library, we are extending the acquisition of American unit histories to those of our Allies.

The Library's unit history program is the third concerned with the records of the War. I am enclosing the "Checklist of *Stars and Stripes*." A similar publication for *Yank* is virtually completed. A checklist of American unit histories is scheduled for publication in 1950.

Unfortunately, the majority of American unit histories are not available in the book trade. Conventional methods of acquisition were supplemented by an exhibition and publicity. Earlier this year, *Vet-Times* published in its columns a list of unit history titles. The New York press has given us space. The American Legion monthly will have a notice of our project in the October issue.

The exhibition in fifteen cases which opened on July first and closed on October first brought us scores of desiderata and new titles. By signs in the cases, we invited veterans to examine a typewritten list of all

known unit histories which was at a desk adjacent to the exhibition. In its preface, an appeal was made to assist us in perfecting the collection by noting new titles and sources for desiderata on blank pages at the end of the volume. Every suggestion was acknowledged and has produced additional material. However in many instances, as the veteran had only his personal copy of a title, we borrowed the volume for filming.

The Library's collection now numbers more than 800 titles for the Army, 130 Seabee volumes, 200 ships' cruise books, some 30 Marine titles, and a few titles on naval aviation. These publications are all concerned with World War II.

The Unit Records Section of the AGO is cognizant of our project and is cooperating with us.

Cordially yours,

C. E. DORNBUSCH,

*Special Assistant in Government Documents, New York Public Library.*

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*Index to MILITARY AFFAIRS — 1948* was finally mailed to subscribers late in October of this year. Your editor compiled this Index single-handed and the delay was due to lack of assistance. A very few extra copies are available for subscribers who failed to receive them by mail.



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## THE MILITARY LIBRARY

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### UNITED KINGDOM OFFICIAL HISTORIES OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

#### A PROGRESS REPORT AND A BIBLIOGRAPHY

Considerable progress has now been made in the British Historical Program described in this magazine two years ago.\* Our readers should remember that this program differs considerably from anything being undertaken in the United States. The Historical Section of the Cabinet-Office is preparing two separate series of volumes—Military Histories and Civil Histories. The former are being written on a Joint basis, but as the War Office has no historical unit they must also serve as the sole official record of the British Army's performance in the late war. Historical units in the Air Ministry and the Admiralty are preparing separate histories of their respective services that will not be described at this time.

#### *Military Histories*

The Military Histories are divided into three sub-series—Central Volumes which deal with the general strategic direction of the war at the highest level; Main Volumes which are concerned with operations; and Special Volumes on particular subjects not falling within the other two categories. The Chief Editor for the Military Histories is Mr. J. R. M. Butler, M.V.O., O.B.E., formerly Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge University. The projected volumes of the Military Histories, with the authors so far appointed, are listed below. It is not expected that any of these will be published

earlier than 1951. All the official histories will be published by His Majesty's Stationery Office.

#### CENTRAL VOLUMES

*The Setting for the War*, by Dr. N. H. Gibbs  
*The Defensive War (1940-June 1941)*, by Professor J. R. M. Butler, M.V.O., O.B.E.  
*June 1941-July 1942*, by J. M. A. Gwyer  
*The Counter-offensive July 1942-December 1943*, by Brigadier H. W. Wynter, D.S.O.  
*December 1943 to the End of the War*, by J. P. W. Ehrman

#### MAIN VOLUMES

*Defense of Great Britain*, by J. B. Collier  
*The Control of Sea Communications*, by Captain S. W. Roskill, D.S.C.  
*The Strategic Air Offensive* (Author not yet selected)  
*The Norwegian Campaign*, by T. K. Derry  
*The War in North-West Europe (1939-1940)*, by Major L. F. Ellis, C.V.O., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.  
*The War in the Middle East and Mediterranean*, by Major-General I. S. O. Playfair, C.B., D.S.O., M.C. (Assisted by: Air Vice-Marshal S. E. Toomer, C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C.; Brigadier J. C. Saunders-Jacobs, C.B.E., D.S.O.; and Commander G. M. S. Stitt, R.N.)  
*The Liberation Campaign* (Author not yet selected)  
*The War Against Japan* (Author not yet selected)

#### SPECIAL VOLUMES (Civil Affairs and Military Government).

*General Principles* (Author not yet selected)  
*Italy and the Balkans*, by C. R. S. Harris  
*North-West Europe* (Author not yet selected)  
*Far East*, by F. S. V. Donnison, C.B.E.

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\*See MILITARY AFFAIRS, Vol. XI, No. 2, p. 102.

*Notes on Military Histories:*

1. Titles where given are provisional.
2. A book on Civil Affairs and Military Government in Africa has already been written by Lord Rennell of Rodd. It is not therefore proposed to include a book on this subject in the official histories. (*See Bibliography below.*)
3. Other volumes which have been suggested are:  
*The Influence of Logistics on Strategy*  
*The Influence of Scientific Research on Strategy*  
*British and Allied Higher Organization*  
 No decision has yet been taken regarding these volumes.

*Civil Histories*

The Civil Histories are under the editorship of Mr. W. K. Hancock, formerly Chichele Professor of Economic History at Oxford University. These are also divided into three categories—Introductory volumes, the War Production series, and the General series. The following is a list of the books projected and their authors:

## INTRODUCTORY

- British War Economy*, by Professor W. K. Hancock and Mrs. M. M. Gowing. (London: H.M.S.O., 1949. Pp. 604. \$4.75.)
- Statistical Digest of the War*, by The Central Statistical Office (to be published in 1949 or early 1950).
- British War Production*, by Professor M. M. Postan (to be published in 1950).
- Problems of Social Policy*, by R. M. Titmuss (to be published in 1950).

## WAR PRODUCTION SERIES (Under the general supervision of Professor M. M. Postan).

- Raw Materials*, by J. Hurstfield
- Labour in Munition Industries*, by Mrs. P. Inman
- Factories, Machinery and Plant*, by W. C. Hornby
- Design and Development of Weapons*, by D. Hay, Professor M. M. Postan, and J. D. Scott
- Munitions Contracts and Finance*, by W. Ashworth
- The Royal Ordnance Factories*, by W. C. Hornby and others
- Administration of War Production*, by J. D. Scott and others
- Overseas Supplies*, by H. Duncan Hall

## GENERAL SERIES

- Food*, by R. J. Hammond (to be published in 1950).
- Economic Blockade*, by W. N. Medlicott
- Shipping*, by Miss C. B. A. Behrens
- Fuel and Power*, by Professor W. H. N. Court (Coal and Gas), R. G. T. French (Electricity), W. H. B. Court and D. J. Payton-Smith (Oil).
- Man-power*, by Professor A. V. Judges
- Civil Industry and Commerce*, by E. L. Hargreaves and Mrs. M. M. Gowing
- Agriculture*, by Miss E. H. Whetham
- Studies in the Social Services*, by R. M. Titmuss and others
- Education*, by Dr. Sophia Weitzman
- Civil Defence*, by Major T. H. O'Brien
- Works and Buildings*, by Major C. M. Kohan
- Inland Transport*, by C. J. Savage

*Notes on Civil Histories:*

1. Titles are provisional.
2. Although all the above histories are in preparation the question whether any individual history is published will not be finally decided until the draft is available.
3. Further histories which are being considered are:  
*Financial Policy*  
*War-time Colonial Policy*

## HISTORIES NOT UNDER PROFESSOR HANCOCK'S EDITORSHIP:

- British Foreign Policy*, by Professor E. L. Woodward
- A Medical History*. (This history will be in about 14 volumes with a variety of authors.)

The above lists do not include a large number of monographs and studies, both military and civil, that have been written, or are now in preparation, for the British Government itself. Most of these will not be made available to the public.

*Bibliography*

Another large body of British historical material on World War II is already printed and readily available to the public—including the American public. The following bibliography is in two parts. *Reports and Despatches on Military Operations 1939-1945* is a body of original historical sources of the

first importance. The first item listed (The Eisenhower Report) is familiar to most Americans. While the format of the British edition differs somewhat from the American, the text is identical. This and the next two items on the list (reports by Field Marshal Wilson) were published by His Majesty's Stationery Office (H.M.S.O.). The rest of the *Reports and Despatches* are Supplements to the *London Gazette*. They are listed in order of appearance in that publication.

Part II consists of the publications now listed on the Second World War which have been published by His Majesty's Stationery Office. They range from formal histories, solidly bound, to slender pamphlets of ephemeral significance. They include formal

statements made in behalf of Allied governments-in-exile, and popular accounts of combat units privately reprinted in the United States. Some of the latter have been reviewed or noticed in this magazine, but they are listed here because they are, by origin, official publications of the British Government. Many publications now out of print, which may be found in most large libraries, have been listed here as useful references. Except for books printed in the United States, these publications are for sale by the British Information Services, which have offices in four large American cities.\* Items for which no price is listed are out of print. Prices are given in U. S. dollars at the new rate of exchange. A few free items are marked *gratis*. Date of publication is given in parentheses.

#### I—REPORTS AND DESPATCHES ON MILITARY OPERATIONS 1939-1945

Report of the Supreme Allied Commander on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force; 6th June 1944 to 8th May 1945. (General Eisenhower's Report) H.M.S.O. 65c

Report of the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Southern France, August 1944. (Field Marshal Viscount Wilson's Report) H.M.S.O. 30c

Report by the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Italian Campaign, 8th January to 10th May 1944. (Field Marshal Viscount Wilson's Report) H.M.S.O. 30c

Despatch by the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in the South-West Pacific, 15th January 1942 to 25th February 1942. (Field Marshal Earl Wavell's Report) H.M.S.O. (1947) 25c

*Supplements to the London Gazette:*

Operations in France and Belgium, 1939-1940. Despatch by Lord Gort. 30c

Operations of the British Expeditionary Force, France, from June 12 to June 19, 1940. Despatch by Lieutenant General Sir Alan Brooke, K.C.B., D.S.O.

Operations in Somaliland Protectorate 1939-1940.

Despatch by General Sir Archibald Wavell, G.C.B., C.M.G., M.C. 15c

Operations in the Middle East, August 1939-November 1940. Despatch by General Sir Archibald Wavell, G.C.B., C.M.G., M.C. 15c

Operations in the Western Desert from December 7, 1940 to February 7, 1941. Despatch by General Sir Archibald Wavell, G.C.B., C.M.G., M.C. 15c

Operations in the Middle East from February 7, 1941 to July 15, 1941. Despatch by General Sir Archibald Wavell, G.C.B., C.M.G., M.C. 15c

Operations in East Africa, November 1940 to July 1941. Despatch by General Sir Archibald Wavell, G.C.B., C.M.G., M.C.

Operations in East Africa Command, July 12, 1941 to January 8, 1943. Despatch by Lieutenant General Sir William Platt, G.C.B., K.C.B. 15c

Operations in Iraq, East Syria and Iran from April 10, 1941 to January 12, 1942. Despatch by General Sir Archibald Wavell, G.C.B., C.M.G., M.C.

\*Offices of the British Information Services are located as follows: 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20, N. Y.; 39 South LaSalle St., Chicago 3, Ill.; 1910 "K" Street N. W., Washington 5, D. C.; 310 Sansome Street, San Francisco 4, Calif.



- Operations in the Middle East from July 5, 1941 to October 31, 1941. Despatch by General Sir Claude J. E. Auchinleck, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., O.B.E., A.D.C. 15c
- Operations in Central Norway, 1940. Despatch by Lieutenant General H.R.S. Massy, D.S.O., M.C. 15c
- Operations in the Persia and Iraq Command from August 21, 1942 to February 17, 1943. Despatch by General Sir H. Maitland Wilson, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.S.O. 15c
- Operations in North-West Europe from June 6, 1944 to May 5, 1945. Despatch by Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery, G.C.B., D.S.O. 15c
- The Battle of Britain, Summer 1940. Despatch by Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh C. T. Dowding, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., C.M.G., A.D.C. 50c
- Operations in the Eastern Theatre based on India, March 1942 to December 31, 1942. Despatch by Field Marshal Viscount Wavell, G.C.B., C.M.G., M.C., A.D.C. 15c
- Air Operations in the Middle East from January 1, 1941 to May 3, 1941. Despatch by Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore, G.C.B., D.S.O. 15c
- Operations in North-West Africa from November 8, 1942 to May 13, 1943. Despatch by Lieutenant-General K.A.N. Anderson, C.B., M.C. 15c
- Operations in the Middle East from February 16, 1943 to January 8, 1944. Despatch by General Sir H. Maitland Wilson, G.C.B., G.B.E., D.S.O., A.D.C. 15c
- Air Operations by the Allied Expeditionary Air Force in North West Europe from November 15, 1943 to September 30, 1944. 15c
- Air Operations in Greece. November 1940-April 1941. 15c
- Battle of River Plate, December 13 to December 17, 1939. Despatch by Rear-Admiral H. H. Harwood, K.C.B., O.B.E. 15c
- 1st and 2nd Battles of Narvik on April 10 and 13, 1940, respectively. Despatch by Rear-Admiral R. H. C. Hallifax, Rear-Admiral (D) Home Fleet. 30c
- Norway Campaign, 1940. Despatch of the Admiral of the Fleet, the Earl of Cork and Orrery, G.C.B., C.V.O. 50c
- Evacuation of Dunkirk. May 26 to June 4, 1940. Despatch by Vice-Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay, K.C.B., M.V.O., Flag Officer Commanding, Dover. 40c
- Fleet Air Arm Operations against Taranto on November 11, 1940. Despatch by Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, K.C.B., D.S.O., Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. 15c
- Battle of Matapan, March 27-30, 1941. Despatch by Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, G.C.B., D.S.O., Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station. 30c
- Sinking of the German Battle Cruiser Scharnhorst, December 26th 1943. Despatch by Admiral Sir Bruce M. A. Fraser, K.C.B., K.B.E., Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet. 15c
- The Dieppe Raid, August 18-19, 1942. Despatch by Captain J. Hughes-Hallett, R.N., Naval Force Commander. 15c
- The Battle of Sirte of 22nd March, 1942. Despatch submitted by Admiral Sir Henry H. Harwood, K.C.B., O.B.E., Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station. 30c
- The attack on St. Nazaire. March 28, 1942. Despatch by Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Charles M. Forbes, G.C.B., D.S.O., Commander-in-Chief, Plymouth. 15c
- The Sinking of the German Battleship Bismarck on May 27, 1941. Despatch by Admiral Sir John C. Tovey, K.C.B., D.S.O., Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet. 40c
- The Assault Phase of the Normandy Landings, October 25, 1943 to July 3, 1944. Despatch by Admiral Sir Bertrand H. Ramsay, K.C.B., M.V.O., Allied Commander-in-Chief, Expeditionary Force. 30c
- Liberation of Europe (Operation Overlord). Operations of Coastal Command, R.A.F., from May to August, 1944. Despatch by Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, K.C.B., M.C., D.F.C., Air Officer Commander-in-Chief, Coastal Command, R.A.F. 15c
- The Anti-Aircraft Defence of the U. K. from July 28th 1939 to 15th April 1945. Despatch was submitted to the Secretary of State for War on the 21st Oct. 1946 by Gen. Sir Frederick A. Pile, Br., G.C.B., D.S.O., M.C., Gen. Off. Commanding-in-Chief, Anti-Aircraft Command. 40c
- Final stages of the Naval War in North West Europe. Despatch by Admiral Sir Harold M. Burrough, C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, Expeditionary Forces. 15c
- Operations in the Middle East, Nov. 1, 1941 to Aug. 15, 1942. Despatch by General Sir Claude J. L. Auchinleck, G.C.I.E., C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., O.B.E., A.D.C., Commander-in-Chief, The Middle East Forces. 90c
- Operations in the Far East, Oct. 17, 1940 to Dec. 27, 1941. Despatches by Air Chief Marshal

- Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, G.C.V.O., K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C. Commander-in-Chief in the Far East. 50c
- Operations in Hong Kong, Dec. 8 to Dec. 25, 1941. Despatches by Major-General C. M. Maltby, M.C., late G.O.C., British Troops in China. 40c
- African Campaign from El Alamein to Tunis, Aug. 1942 to May 1943. Despatches by Field Marshal Viscount Alexander of Tunis. 50c
- Attack on the Tirpitz by Midget Submarines. 50c
- Conquest of Sicily, July 10 to August 17, 1943. Despatches by His Excellency Viscount Alexander of Tunis. 30c
- Despatches by Vice Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton on the Loss of H.M. Ships "Prince of Wales" and "Repulse." 15c
- Despatches by Lt. General A. Percival on Operations in Malaya Command from Dec. 8, 1941 to Feb. 15, 1942. 90c
- Despatches by Air Vice Marshal Sir Paul Maltby on Air Operations during the Campaign in Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies from Dec. 8, 1941 to March 12, 1942. 75c
- Despatches by General Sir Archibald P. Wavell, G.C.B., C.M.G., M.C., A.D.C. Operations in Burma, Dec 15, 1941 to May 22, 1942. 50c
- Air Operations in Burma and Bay of Bengal, Jan 1, 1942 to May 22, 1942. Despatches by Air Vice-Marshal D. F. Stevenson, O.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. 30c
- The Capture of Diego Suarez. Despatches by Rear Admiral E. N. Syfret, C.B. 50c
- Operations in India Command, Jan. to June 20, 1943. Despatch by Field-Marshal Viscount Wavell. G.C.B., C.M.G., M.C., A.D.C., Commander-in-Chief, India. 15c
- Naval Operations in Ramree Island Area, Jan. 19 to Feb. 22, 1945. Despatch by Vice-Admiral Sir Arthur J. Power, K.C.B., C.V.O., Commander-in-Chief, East Indian Station. 15c
- Report of an Action with the Italian Fleet off Calabria, July 9, 1940. Despatch by Admiral Sir A. B. Cunningham, K.C.B., D.S.O., Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. 30c
- Operations in the Indo-Burma Theatre based on India from June 21, to Nov. 15, 1943. Despatch by Field Marshal Sir Claude J. E. Auchinleck, G.C.B., G.C.I.E., C.S.I., D.S.O., O.B.E., A.D.C., Commander-in-Chief, India. 40c
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- Report of an Action against an Italian convoy on the night of April 15-16, 1941. Despatch by Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, G.C.B., D.S.O., Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station. 15c
- Transportation of the Army to Greece and Evacuation of the Army from Greece, 1941. Despatch by Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, G.C.B., D.S.O., Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean Station. 30c
- The Battle of Crete. May 15 to June 1, 1941. Despatches by Admiral Sir A. B. Cunningham, G.C.B., D.S.O., Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean. 30c
- The Carrier-Borne Aircraft Attack on Kirkenes and Petsamo, July and Aug. 1941. Despatch by Admiral Sir John C. Tovey, K.C.B., D.S.O., Commander in Chief Home Fleet. 15c
- The Contribution of the British Pacific Fleet to the Assault on Okinawa 1945. Despatch by Admiral Sir Bruce A. Fraser, G.C.B., K.B.E., Commander in Chief British Pacific Fleet. 40c
- Raid on Military and Economic Objectives in the Lofoten Islands, 1941. Despatch by Admiral Sir John C. Tovey, K.C.B., D.S.O., Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet. 15c
- The Raid on Military and Economic Objectives in the Vicinity of Vaagso Island, Dec. 28, 1941. Despatch by Admiral Sir John C. Tovey, K.C.B., D.S.O., Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet. 15c
- The Battle of the Java Seas, Feb. 27, 1942. Despatch by Commodore J. A. Collins, C.B., R.A.N. Commodore commanding China Force. 30c
- Report of the Destruction of Enemy Raider No. 16 by H.M.S. Devonshire, Nov. 1941. Report of the Sinking of the German Supply Ship Python, Dec. 1941. Despatches by Vice Admiral A. U. Willis, C.B., D.S.O., Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic Station. Report of a Gallant Action by H.M.I.S. Bengal and M.V. Ondina with two Japanese raiders, 1942. Despatch by Admiral Sir James F. Somerville, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet. 15c
- Mediterranean Convoy Operations, 1941-2. Despatches by Admiral Sir A. B. Cunningham, G.C.B., D.S.O., Vice-Admiral Sir James F. Somerville, K.C.B., D.S.O., Vice-Admiral Sir Alban T. B. Curtis, K.C.B., Vice-Admiral E. N. Syfret, C.B. 50c

## II—OFFICIAL BRITISH PUBLICATIONS OF WORLD WAR II

*(Published by H.M. Stationery Office)*

- The Abyssinian Campaigns* (The Army at War). The Official Story of the Conquest of Italian East Africa. (1942)
- The Air Battle of Malta*. The Official Account of the R.A.F. in Malta, 1940 to Nov., 1942. (1944)
- Aircraft Builders*. An Account of British Aircraft Production 1935-1945. 25c
- Air of Glory*. Scrapbook by Cecil Beaton. (1942) \$1.40
- Air Sea Rescue*. (1942)
- Arctic War*. Norway's Role on the Northern Front. Royal Norwegian Government Information Office. (1945) 30c
- Ark Royal*. The Admiralty Account of Her Achievement. (1942)
- Atlantic Bridge*. The Official Account of the R.A.F. Transport Command's Ocean Ferry. (1945)
- Australian Army at War*. An Official Record of Service in Two Hemispheres, 1939-1944. (1944) 25c
- Battle of The Atlantic*. The Official Account of the Fight against the U-Boats 1939-1945. 30c
- Battle of Britain*. August-October, 1940. (1941)
- Battle of Egypt* (The Army at War.) The Official Record in Pictures and Maps. (1943)
- The Battle of Flanders* (The Army at War). A descriptive narrative based on Lord Gort's Despatches. (1941) 15c
- The Battle of the River Plate*. An Account of Events before, during and after the Action up to the Self-Destruction of the *Admiral Graf Spee*. (1940) 10c
- Before We Go Back*. Norway's Fight since April, 1940. (1944)
- Berlin Airlift*. An Account of the British Contribution. (1949) 40c
- Bomber Command*. The Air Ministry Account of Bomber Command's Offensive against the Axis. Sept. 1939 to July, 1941. (New York: Doubleday Doran & Co., 1941) \$1.00
- Bomber Command Continues*. The Air Ministry Account of the Rising Offensive against Germany. July, 1941-June, 1942. (1942) Gratis
- The British Navy's Air Arm*. The Official Story of the British Navy's Air Operations. (New York: Penguin Books Inc., 1944) 25c
- British Military Administration of Occupied Territories in Africa* during the years 1941-1947. By Lord Rennell of Rodd, K.B.E., C.B. (1948) Pp. viii, 637. 6 Maps, chronology, personal and geographical indexes. \$4.15
- The Campaign in Burma*. 50c
- The Campaign in Greece and Crete* (The Army at War). (1942)
- Coastal Command*. The Air Ministry Account of the Part Played by Coastal Command in the Battle of the Seas, 1939-42. (1943) (New York: MacMillan Company) \$1.50
- Combined Operations, 1940-42*. (1943) (New York: MacMillan Company) \$2.00
- The Defence of Calais* (The Army at War). (1941)
- The Destruction of An Army* (The Army at War). The First Campaign in Libya. September, 1940-February, 1941. (1942) 25c
- East of Malta, West of Suez*. The Official Admiralty Account of the Mediterranean Fleet; 1939-1943. (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1944) \$2.50
- The Eighth Army*. September, 1941 to January, 1943. (1944)
- The First to Be Freed*. The Record of British Military Administration in Eritrea and Somalia, 1941-43. (1944) 30c
- Front Line, 1940-41*. The Official Story of the Civil Defence of Britain. (New York: Macmillan Co., 1942.) \$1.50
- The German Aggression on Norway*. White Paper issued by the Norwegian Government on April 14, 1940. Authorized English Translation. (1940) 5c
- The Highland Division* (The Army at War). (1942)
- His Majesty's Minesweepers*. Graphic description of a branch of the Royal Navy; includes a chapter on the sweepers at Dunkirk. (1943) Gratis
- His Majesty's Submarines*. A graphic description of the work of our submarines during the war and of the development of underseas warfare. (1945) 25c
- Meet the U. S. Army*. (1943)
- Merchant Airmen*. The Air Ministry Account of British Civil Aviation, 1939-1944. 50c
- Merchantmen at War*. The Official Story of the Merchant Navy, 1939-44. (New York: Ziff-Davis Co., 1945.) \$1.50



- The Navy and The Y Scheme.* (1944)
- The Northern Garrisons* (The Army at War). (1941)
- Ocean Front.* The Story of the War in the Pacific, 1941-44. (1945) 30c
- Over To You.* Broadcasts by the R.A.F. (1943) 25c
- Paiforce.* The Official Story of the Persia and Iraq Command, 1941-46. (1948) \$1.25 (Reviewed in this issue of MILITARY AFFAIRS.)
- Roof Over Britain.* The Official Story of Britain's Anti-Aircraft Defences, 1939-42. (1943)
- R.A.F. Middle East.* The Official Story of Air Operations in the Middle East from Feb., 1942 to Jan., 1943. 45c
- The Royal Armoured Corps.* The first Official Account of the Royal Armoured Corps. Gives the full story of its war history up to the end of the North African Campaign. (War Office, 1945.) 30c
- The Royal Marines.* The Admiralty Account of their Achievement 1939-43. (1944) 25c
- The Saga of the San Demetrio.* The Story of an oil-tanker which sailed in the Jervis Bay convoy. (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1942.) \$1.25
- Science at War.* By J. G. Crowther and R. Whiddington. (1947) 65c
- SEAC Souvenirs.* A South East Asia Command Account of the Burma Front. (1945) 10c
- There's Freedom in the Air.* The Official Story of the Allied Air Forces from the Occupied Countries. (1944)
- They Sought Out Rommel* (The Army at War). A Diary of the Libyan Campaign, from November 16 to December 31, 1941. (1942)

## REVIEWS OF BOOKS

*Guadalcanal: The First Offensive*, by John Miller, Jr. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949. Pp. xviii, 413. 36 maps, 104 photographs. \$4.00.)

This narrative of the Battle of Guadalcanal from its inception to its final phase when the island was declared "secure," explains the problems confronting the various commanders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to squad leaders. Initially, the particularly serious problems were the lack of water transportation, aircraft, supplies, personnel, time, and knowledge of the enemy. (Practically all the necessary tools with which to win a battle.) As the shortages were made up, naturally the tempo of the battle increased. Thus the Japanese forward movement was stopped and the initiative was taken over by our combined forces; Guadalcanal was in fact the ground campaign that was the turning point in the Pacific war.

*Guadalcanal, The First Offensive*, is must reading for anyone who took part in any phase of the campaign, and should be required reading for any student of military history, interested in learning how the actions of small units contribute to a major campaign. The volume is the fourth among the Army's 90-odd in its official *U. S. Army in World War II* series, and the second in the sub-series on the war in the Pacific.

It is written in a clear, concise style, avoiding the pure military diction or jargon that can get so oppressive, so quickly. It is as accurate a picture as it is possible for any one person to draw. Had it been possible for the author to be in all places at all times during the First Offensive, his book might have differed slightly, but not being able to do the supernatural, he has done almost as well by his ponderous research and numerous interviews. To the personnel who participated in this campaign, the realistic descriptions and accurate narrative will bring back memories so vivid that they will hurt.

To the serious or casual reader of military history, there are many lessons to be learned here. It has been said that good battalions make good divisions. The Guadalcanal Offensive showed that it took good Companies to make good Battalions, good Platoons to make Companies, and so on down to the individual soldier. Where most mili-

tary histories dwell on the actions of the large units, this explains the plans of the major commands, but most detail is spent on the actions and reactions of the smaller units. Lacking the open terrain of the continent with the huge troop concentrations, it is obvious that a different type of war had to be fought in Guadalcanal. These facts are responsible for a narrative that can be taken as a "guide to warfare for the small unit commander." Briefly, clearly, and concisely, these tactics are covered in the first part of Chapter XIII. Other parts of this chapter, weapons, intelligence, and logistics, are equally important. In fact the salient points developed in this Chapter should be used as supplementary reading for anyone studying *FM 72-20, Jungle Warfare*.

This reviewer believes that military history, if written for serious professional study, should concentrate upon smaller units, and that *Guadalcanal* fills this specification admirably. But a history that does not explain the broad considerations that lead to action is largely meaningless. The ideal, then, is to present "the big picture" briefly, clearly, and in just enough detail to motivate the analysis of combat that is to follow. Mr. Miller's first chapter "The Strategic Decision," sets a high standard in this respect; he explains the reasons for a Guadalcanal landing in just eighteen pages of text—illustrated, significantly, by three large maps and a graphic chart of U. S. naval deployment. The result is a clear and balanced narrative that is both useful and extremely interesting.

HERBERT V. MITCHELL  
Lt.Col., Army General Staff,  
Washington, D. C.

*Strategic Air Power, The Pattern of Dynamic Security*, by Stefan T. Possony. (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1949. Pp. xii, 313. \$5.00.)

In the midst of so much talking and writing about the atom bomb, World War III, air power, and the role of each of the armed services in national defense, it is good to find a book which discusses these controversial subjects objectively, critically, and intelligently. Obviously, as its title indicates, the book is concerned primarily with strategic air power; but just as obviously its au-

thor is not a member of the school which holds that the long-range bomber is the answer to everything.

Beginning with a clear, concise discussion of the elements of air power, the principles of bombing, and the impact on warfare of the atom bomb, Mr. Possony searchingly examines the types of objectives which were bombed in World War II and which experience indicates would be among the principal targets in the next war. Basing his calculations on a careful evaluation of the effects of our previous effort he concludes that the atom bomb if used against "selective" industrial targets would assure victory by knocking out the enemy's war-making capacity. Hence, strategic bombing will be the decisive factor in the next war, and tomorrow's master of the air will be the nation which has a large number of long-range heavy jet bombers.

This conclusion, however, does not eliminate the Army or the Navy. Ground forces will be "an indispensable adjunct, support and often a co-equal partner" of air power, while the Navy will be needed "as a support weapon" for land-based heavy bombers.

For those of us who have been disturbed by the oft-repeated statement that the loss of life would be terrific in the first day or two of an attack by atom bombs, the author has a word of cheer, albeit a weak word: atom bombs probably could not annihilate the urban population of a nation, owing to two facts: to raze a nation like Germany would require 6,500 bombs; before the next war nations will have developed better defenses and will have scattered their population.

The author, hoping that World War III can be prevented, believes that strategic air power means "dynamic security" to this nation and to the other democracies. He does not feel that an international air force will guarantee peace; but he believes that American air power "can, and should, fulfill a function [the maintenance of peace] similar to that accomplished by British sea power in the nineteenth century." America, by creating a military federation of western democracies backed by our air force, probably can avoid an atomic war. The survival of democracy, he says, is certain only if the democratic nations hold their dominion over the air.

ALBERT F. SIMPSON,  
Air Force Historian  
The Air University

**PAIFORCE: The Official Story of the Persia and Iraq Command, 1941-1946.**  
(London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948. Pp. 137. \$1.25).

Those few Americans who are familiar with World War II as fought East of Suez will associate the Persian Corridor with Joel Sayre's unpretentious, quiet, and memorable stores from *The New Yorker* reprinted as *The Persian Gulf Command* (New York, 1945). They will retain a lively sense of snow and sand, floods, and heat so excessive that in some parts of Iran the natives survive only by living in caves. They will recall that a lot of American soldiers moved a lot of tonnage by train and truck from the Persian Gulf to Soviet receiving points and handed it over on Lend-Lease to the USSR. Sayre was recording not history, but the acute observations of a trained journalist, and so his book does not attempt to embrace the whole sweep of the Allied operation of which the American part, though both large and decisive, was only a part. *Paiforce*, an expanded and corrected version, unsigned, of a well written manuscript by Colonel Hutchinson of the British Army, prepared for the Historical Section, Cabinet Office, has been published by the Central Office of Information. This reviewer understands that, although it is "the official story," it is not issued as the last word. It therefore fits within the British war history program, rather closer to the American *Armed Forces in Action* series than to the *U. S. Army in World War II* series. *Paiforce* is undocumented, though it has been "checked by all the important people who took part." It is informal, spirited, vivid, an unimpeachable first-hand source for all who want to know how the war felt, smelled, sounded, looked, in Syria, Iraq and Iran. There are good maps and photographs, but no index.

The huge scope of British responsibilities in the area can hardly be adequately treated in so short a book, and this one does no more than indicate their number, variety and complexity. The commander of PAIFORCE, after occupying Iraq, Syria and Iran in a series of military actions, had to preserve the internal security of an enormous area, had to be ready to maintain up to ten divisions against threatened German invasion from any of three directions, and simultaneously was committed by Mr. Churchill's prompt pledges to the USSR, to facilitate the movement of the maximum possible tonnages across the Corridor to the Soviets.



It is a story which deserves the spirited telling it has received; but it would have been more valuable as history if it had not omitted so much. Even in a small-scale book like this the reader ought to find a clear-cut discussion of command relationships and responsibilities. PAIFORCE was a composite embracing Tenth Army, Basra-Baghdad Line of Communications, and a variety of responsibilities in Iran. It came under India for some things, under Middle East at Cairo for others, and the picture changed from time to time; but this is not clearly set forth in the official story. More disappointing still, is the book's silence on a significant aspect of Paiforce's performance, namely the divided responsibility and personal rivalries which contributed, insofar as the Russian-aid job was concerned, to the decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to hand over much of the British transport responsibility to the United States. This official story of PAIFORCE nowhere indicates that Iraq and Iran had separate transport directorates; that the Ministry of War Transport and the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, each reporting directly to London (though an attempt was made at one time to bring UKCC under Army control) also had their fingers in the transport pie; and that in result four groups, too autonomous for the good of the project as a whole, were concerned with the handling and forwarding of cargoes, and with port, rail and highway planning and development.

There is a similar vagueness as to dates, names, places and figures. It is stated that, except for the "trickle" of supplies which reached the USSR across Siberia, all else had to go to Russia via Murmansk or the Persian Gulf. But 8 million tons from the Western Hemisphere reached Russia via the Siberian route, and that is no trickle. It about equals the tonnage from the Western Hemisphere that reached the USSR via Murmansk and the Persian Gulf combined. It is stated that the Persian railway's monthly lift was multiplied eight times under British operation before the task was taken over by the U. S. Army. Beginning with a 6,000-ton monthly capacity in 1941, the peak month of British operation (September 1942) hauled 23,807 long tons of Russian-aid cargo on the railway. That is about four times, not eight. The peak American-operated month (July 1944) hauled a quarter of a million long tons of Russian-aid cargo. These figures are not in this book. The claim that "Paiforce enabled five million tons to go to Russia," while literally true, since the American Army was present throughout

as an auxiliary of the British forces, is misleading. British and American agencies together between 1942 and 1945 delivered to the Soviets 5,149,376 long tons. Of this total American agencies delivered to the Russians 4,502,990 long tons. The official story of PAIFORCE omits to say that.

The Persian Corridor operations provide an instance of international co-operation of great difficulty and delicacy, which got results. The results deserve to be recorded fairly as well as vividly, for there is credit enough for all.

T. H. VAIL MOTTER  
Middle East Section

*Historical Division, Department of the Army*

***The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life and Combat and Its Aftermath*** (Studies in Social Psychology in World War II." Vols. I and II). By Samuel A. Stouffer, Edward A. Suchman, Leland C. DeVinney, Shirley A. Star, Robin M. Williams, Jr., Arthur A. Lumsdaine, Marion Harper Lumsdaine, M. Brewster Smith, Irving L. Janis, and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949. xii, 599, 675 pp. \$13.50; \$7.50 separately).

These are the first two of four volumes which constitute a "report after action" of one of the more unusual Army ventures of World War II, the Research Branch of Army Service Forces and its counterparts in overseas theaters. The Research Branch was established in October 1941 as a part of General Frederick Osborn's Morale Division. It remained with General Osborn through the successive reorganizations of his division as the Special Services, Morale Services, and Information and Education Division. Between Pearl Harbor, when the first full scale survey of soldier attitudes was made, and the end of the war it questioned over half a million men on more than two hundred questionnaires, many of them containing a hundred or more separate items. It gathered, analysed, and reported on the information which it obtained from soldiers, at first as an adjunct and aid to those of General Osborn's branches which were responsible for getting morale and attitude building materials to soldiers through press, film, radio, discussion groups, off-duty educational and, for the first half of the war, athletic and recreational programs, and, later, as a service to all branches and echelons of the Army which required specific information on soldier attitudes as an aid to planning activities and to policy formulation.

The types of information sought ranged from radio listening habits to attitudes towards assignment in specific branches through the postwar plans of men leaving the Army. The reports prepared by the Branch ranged from studies of personal esprit to the control of fear in combat. These first two volumes describe in considerable detail the substance and, to a limited extent, the method of the many surveys of attitudes of American soldiers made by the Branch in World War II. They describe and analyze the data collected and they indicate the ways in which the findings were—and were not—used.

These volumes are not, however, a history of the Research Branch but rather a round-up and re-analysis of the principal information gathered, organized here under twenty-two broad headings. The volumes are addressed to three audiences: the Armed Forces, historians, and to social psychologists and sociologists. It is probably the third group which will find these volumes most important, if not most useful and interesting. The Armed Forces will find in them many a sound proposal and useful idea for new training and personnel plans and approaches. Historians will find a record of the attitudes held by samples of American soldiers on many of the subjects which interested them most. Sometimes the data will furnish correctives to impressions gained from official reports, especially those which are concerned with abuses and failures within the Army's structure. As the authors point out, the majority of men were often satisfied with Army services and practices which a vocal or favorably placed minority found fault with. Social scientists will find detailed information on the advances made in the scientific study of attitudes and opinions comparable to that provided the field of testing and aptitude studies by the Yerkes and other reports after World War I.

While social scientists will find much to work with in these two volumes, they will probably find the two volumes yet to come, *Experiments on Mass Communication and Measurement and Prediction*, of even greater value. These two volumes will report on controlled experiments and will explore the methodological contributions of the Research Branch to the study of attitudes. The four volumes together will undoubtedly be a source of experience and a point of departure for new experiments in the fields of attitude and communication research for some time to come.

For those who are primarily interested in the materials of history and in the personal adjustment of the American soldier as it affected his training and combat proficiency, the two volumes at hand have permanent value. They contain significant studies of social mobility in the Army—how time, experience, education, and branch of service affected assignments and promotions and, in turn, morale; of attitudes toward leadership and social control; of Negro soldiers and their special problems; of interbranch and command attitudes towards specific types of service; of psychoneurotic symptoms and their effects; of soldier-home front and of combat-rear echelon relations; and of the process of becoming a veteran. In short, they explore from a mass of data about all types of American soldiers the actions and reactions of men according to time, place, and personal point of view, relating as much of it as possible to the development of techniques which aided the Army in raising and employing the huge mass of men required to fight World War II.

Because the Research Branch was developed primarily to study specific attitudes which might affect particular matters of policy and planning—how successful the Army had been in making men feel that they had been adequately and usefully assigned; how men felt about the promotion system and how they thought it could be improved; how they felt about medical care, about clothing, or recreational services—there were many gaps in the systematic coverage of the attitudes held by the American soldier. Some problems were too large for full study; others were approached too late for full solution. But the Research Branch played a major role in such varied wartime planning as the amelioration of the Infantry's morale problems, the exploration of the problems of rotation and reconversion, and the development of the point system for demobilization. The authors, all of whom were wartime participants in the studies described, imply that by the end of the War they were on the road to the development of techniques which would determine the presence or absence of Tolstoy's "x-factor" in war—"the spirit of the army, the greater or lesser desire to fight and face dangers on the part of all the men composing the army, which is quite apart from the question whether they are fighting under leaders of genius or not, with cudgels or with guns that fire thirty times a minute." How far along this road they got, different readers will judge in different ways. That they eventually succeeded



in accomplishing much more than their Branch was originally expected to be able to do cannot be gainsaid. At the end of the war, the achievement of the Research Branch in keeping a finger on the pulse of the Army in myriad ways was successful enough to warrant the retention, on a reduced scale, of a similar organization for the peacetime Army. The Committee on Human Resources of the Department of Defense's Research and Development Board is another outgrowth of the recognition that social and psychological problems are not only important in modern war but also susceptible to scientific study and, to some extent, to manipulation and control. That much remains to be done, the authors admit. The limitations and shortcomings of their data and methods are perhaps too frequently mentioned for the comfort and acceptance of the reader. They do not hesitate to point out how far short of the desirable their data sometimes fell. But with the careful sampling methods outlined and the cautious reporting system used—several of the Branch's reports to higher echelons are reproduced in full—it is difficult to deny that the Research Branch forged at least the experimental archetypes of new instruments for aiding the efficient organization and use of masses of more or less anonymous men in times of national emergency.

As one of their minor but nonetheless important problems, the authors point out that they had an obligation to present their materials in a form which busy administrators would read and understand. How well this wartime lesson in the presentation of scientific materials was learned is represented by the form and contents of these volumes. They are excellent examples of cooperative and collaborative scholarship. Though one, and sometimes two and three of the authors had responsibility for individual chapters, several others often collaborated either on the original materials or on the finished product. Nevertheless, a unity, clarity, and uniformity of style rare to collective ventures is preserved throughout. A few of the many charts appear somewhat cluttered and crammed and are therefore less easy to read than might have been desired. But, on the whole, both the text and the notes are remarkably free from the professional jargon which mars so many reports of this type. In the assembling and presentation of materials there is but one serious flaw, and this one may be explained in the fourth volume. Often differences in the attitudes of soldiers in the ground, air, and service branches

of the Army are discussed. Sometimes differences among the Ground Forces, Air Forces, and Service Forces, as commands, are discussed. But it is not always clear that the allocation of types of units from which data was obtained was in accordance with the commands to which they were assigned. In some chapters, it seems probable that combat engineers have been included in Service Forces figures when they belong in the Ground Forces columns. What disposition in the compilations was made of ground and air types of quartermaster, ordnance, and signal units is not at all clear. Nor are all the distinctions among major commands completely accurate; Army Service Forces with its high degree of technical skills and its initial control of classification and assignments did not become "the dumping ground for men thought to be unfit even for the Infantry" except in certain limited types of units in certain of her branches. While some realignment of data from certain types of units may be required, it is hardly likely, however, that significant alterations in the findings would be required thereby. The volumes as they stand are packed with information vital to the interests of the three classes of readers which the authors were trying to reach.

ULYSSES LEE

*Historical Division, Department of the Army  
Washington, D. C.*

***The Empire and The Glory: Napoleon Bonaparte, 1800-1806***, by Fletcher Pratt. (New York: William Sloane Assoc., 1948. Pp. 535. \$3.75.)

This latest venture of Mr. Pratt into historical prose dramatization bears the sure imprint of one who is fully aware of his mastery of the genre. It is a craft of a high order, moreover, despite its deceptively simple aim of presenting history as no less than what it naturally is, readable and dramatic. Only a few have practiced it really successfully—Guedalla, Wingfield-Stratford, Belloc—and among them Americans are not numerous. Pratt may not stand in the very front rank, but he is certainly far above the crowd of imitators.

In so adroit and engaging a performance, the reader may readily forgive him the pretension to something more ambitious or at least more solemn: a Reinterpretation. Reinterpretation the book most certainly is not. Indeed, as far as the character of Napoleon is concerned, there is reasonable doubt whether Mr. Pratt's legions of pred-



ecessors have left any possibilities unexplored. The sympathetic portrayal of the great soldier and administrator as the energetic, practical, efficient opportunist that he undoubtedly was—yet withal a man in most respects bigger than his associates and rivals, which also he almost certainly was—this view, after all, places Mr. Pratt in numerous and distinguished company. And in asserting that the Corsican's guiding purpose was only to construct in France and in Europe "a machine that would work," the author merely aligns himself with the many who have rejected the other widespread opinion that Napoleon aspired consistently to revive the empire of the Caesars or Alexander. These questions are, after all, classic. To reexamine them through the medium of the enormous storehouse of contemporary sources, together with the vastly larger array of later interpretation and criticism, is a task to which scholars devote their lives. Mr. Pratt, who has fried a great many other fish in his time, and no doubt has still others in prospect, has not undertaken so much, even though his preface might lead one to expect otherwise. The few original sources into which he has dipped—the memoirs of Caulaincourt, Talleyrand and Fouché, for example—he displays to the reader with a pride which obviates any need for footnotes.

One interesting device in which the author also takes pride is the grouping of random extracts from contemporary newspapers, memoirs, and the like at the end of each chapter, under the picturesque labels, "Worm's Eye View" and "Wrong End of the Telescope." This may have the purpose, as he puts it, "of reporting the past as the past saw itself," but as a trick of historical composition it reminds one of the rather awkward passages on "manners and morals" which Hume used to attach to his chapters in the *History of England*. As a literary device, Dos Passos carried it off more effectively and artistically in the "Camera Eye" and "Newsreel" appendages in his trilogy *U. S. A.*

Mr. Pratt's primary interest and forte, of course, is military history. Most of the pages of *The Empire and the Glory* are given to spirited accounts of the classic campaigns of Marengo, Hohenlinden, Ulm-Austerlitz, and Jean-Auerstadt. If the author has a thesis, it is that for all the tactical genius which characterized Napoleon's plans, the issue was usually decided in the field by the brilliant improvisations of his subordinates and by the sheer hard fighting of the rank and file—the famous *elan* of the French soldier. Mr.

Pratt's narrative has some of this same *elan*. It begins to simmer as the tirailleurs exchange shots, and reaches fever pitch when the roar of battle is loudest.

Mr. Pratt, then, is most at home on the battlefield, and evidently begrudges every hour and every page spent away from it. The result is hardly a balanced analysis of the years 1800 to 1806 in French history. The distortion, moreover, is not wholly a matter of the distribution of pages. Opposition motives and programs, in the controversies over the Constitution (poor old Sièyes comes off rather badly), the Code, the finances, the Concordat, and other central political issues of the period, are dismissed with something of the same cavalier contempt displayed by the Emperor himself toward those whom he labeled "Idéologues." And historians will probably raise an eyebrow at the exculpation of Napoleon in the affair of the Duc d'Enghien.

All of which, it should be repeated, makes very engaging reading.

RICHARD M. LEIGHTON  
Historical Division, Department of the Army  
Washington, D. C.

*Infantry Brigadier*, by Maj. Gen. Sir Howard Kippenberger (London, N. Y. and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1949. Pp. 371. \$4.50).

It is always a pleasure to read a book by a man who knows what he is writing about. This, it is abundantly evident, is the case with *Infantry Brigadier*. Gen Kippenberger has been trained in the hard school of experience where he has developed a keen knowledge of military tactics and has applied it for years under the stress of battle. His book is an authentic and very readable narrative of a New Zealand battalion and brigade commander's experience in World War II. In direct and straightforward language, he tells the story of the small-unit actions which he fought in Greece, Crete, Libya and Italy, covering the years 1940-1944. He throws new light on the operations of an outstanding Allied division—the Germans called it the best in Italy—which suffered terrific casualties over a long period of fighting and yet managed mainly through the superior leadership of such officers as Gen. Kippenberger and Gen. Freyberg, the eleven-times-wounded division commander, to maintain high fighting morale.

For the military reader the book is notable for the inclusion of valuable detail about combat operations at the battalion and brigade level. A battalion commander in Greece and the early desert fighting, Kippenberger served with distinction as a brigade commander throughout most of the North African and early Italian campaigns. As the senior brigadier he took over the 2nd New Zealand Division briefly in the Cassino battle when Gen. Freyberg became the New Zealand Corps Commander. Kippenberger served in that capacity until he stepped on a mine on Mt. Trocchio, which blew off one leg and forced the amputation of the other, a few days before the March attack against Cassino was launched. What Kippenberger thought, knew and did as a field commander as well as what he found out later about the operations are clearly and frankly presented. In battle after battle he gives a realistic picture of the action, the scheme of maneuver which he adopted and the reason why he preferred it. He discusses effectively the changes in the plan made during the operation, the status of morale and training and the performance of his troops. Tactical mistakes are as frankly acknowledged as outstanding successes and at all times the methods employed in each operation are critically and cogently analyzed.

Kippenberger argues persuasively for the New Zealand system of command as opposed to the American system which requires the exercise of less initiative and judgment by the smaller unit commander. In general he is correct in saying that the regimental commander in the U. S. Army—the brigadier's equivalent—is given a plan and is told specifically how to carry it out. In the 2nd New Zealand Division, on the other hand, the brigade commander is consulted about plans before they are formulated, is given a mission but is left free to determine how he will carry it out. The U. S. Army might well consider the merits of the New Zealand approach, for it utilizes the brigade or regimental commander's initiative and close knowledge of the combat situation. In case of good regimental and brigade commanders the system arms them with sufficient authority so that they can exploit local success more quickly and more intelligently than if they receive ready-made instructions about how to carry out their mission from higher headquarters. In the two instances which are cited in support of this view—the 143rd Infantry in the Rapido River crossings and the 34th Division at Cassino—Gen Kippenberger provides some firsthand testimony about the weakness

of the American system of command. He comments acidly on the continued use of the 34th Division at Cassino after the troops were exhausted and unfit for offensive combat, because the division commander did not go forward and was not in close touch with the condition of his troops.

Roughly two-thirds of the book is devoted to the North African campaign and the rest to the Greek, Cretan and Italian operations. The North African portion is a knowledgeable account of desert fighting, emphasizing the peculiar requirements of the terrain, the poor coordination of infantry and tanks in the early stages of the war, and the heavy handicap of conducting mobile, fluid operations with tanks distinctly inferior to the enemy's. Like all troops new to combat, the New Zealanders learned much on the battlefield and developed into seasoned soldiers as the operations continued. For the Italian battles on the Sangro and on the Orsogna-Ortona front the book provides much operational detail which has never been published. The Cassino section describes operations of the New Zealanders in the February 1944 battles more fully than the official accounts which have so far been printed. Certainly the difficulties of taking the Cassino bastion are nowhere made more painfully evident than in *Infantry Brigadier*. The fourteen maps which are included help in following the action but in the North African portions they are not adequate in some cases to illustrate the graphic narrative.

Unlike most American regimental commanders Gen. Kippenberger faithfully kept a day-by-day diary which provided an invaluable contemporary check against memory. As the present Chief of the New Zealand Army's historical program for World War II he had access to and used the official unit war diaries. From reading this personalized narrative it is clear that Gen. Kippenberger is a good historian of the history which he helped to make. He is to be congratulated on making his stirring experiences available to military men everywhere. The general reader will enjoy the high drama of this account, its flashes of humor as well as its moments of desperate tragedy and devotion to duty. It is a classic example of Douglas Freeman's oft-repeated observation that war brings out the best and the worst in men.

SIDNEY T. MATTHEWS\*

\*Mr. Matthews is writing a history of U. S. troops in Italy during World War II for the Army Historical Division.



*Admirals of American Empire: The Combined Story of George Dewey, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Winfield Scott Schley, and William Thomas Sampson*, by Richard S. West, Jr. (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1948. Pp. 354. \$4.50.)

In this book, as his subtitle indicates, Mr. West has compiled a multiple biography of the four principal American naval figures of the war with Spain. Meeting the subjects as cadets at the Naval Academy in chapter one, the reader follows them through the Civil War, the postwar years of naval decline and resurgence, the brief weeks of the "splendid little war," and then on into retirement. Differing widely in personality when they entered the Navy, the four admirals' subsequent careers were equally varied. Dewey, who proved himself as a wartime leader in the Civil War and whose most noticeable characteristic between wars seems to have been lack of interest in naval development, became for a time the hero of the day and ended as the hero who opened his mouth too often. Mahan, disliking the Navy, fought his hardest battles to keep the Naval College in existence and himself attached to it, ultimately attaining the role and status of prophet. Sampson and Schley, the one the devoted scientist, the other the would-be Nelson, had diverse but highly creditable careers which were marred at the last by bitter journalistic controversy.

Mr. West's approach is a catholic one: he has accumulated much information and neither the sublime nor the ridiculous escapes him. On one page, for example, we see the scholarly Sampson assisting the early experiments of his pupil A. A. Michelson; on the next he is kissing the teacher behind the schoolhouse door. Indeed the book seems excessively anecdotal in its treatment of the four lives, perhaps owing to the nature of the source material which consists largely of memoirs, scrapbooks, and contemporary articles in the *Army and Navy Journal*. Multiple biography always presents difficult problems of organization, the more so when the common bond is something as abstract as membership in the same service and participation in the same war, and the problems in this instance have not been wholly overcome. Certain wider questions which could serve as unifying factors do present themselves—the Navy as an institution of American life, the effects on naval officers of the upsurge of imperialism, how promotion is gained, how wars are waged—but they are not developed. We would like to know

Mr. West's opinions and conclusions regarding such matters, but he keeps them to himself.

Again, one may hazard the opinion that the scissors and paste nature of the sources has affected the author's style. There are some awkward transitions; paragraphs both begin and end *in medias res*; loose strings are left untied. These difficulties are most apparent in the treatment of the years of peace and of the subjects' domestic lives; as war approaches they tend to disappear and Mr. West's muse is at her best when he lays her alongside the enemy.

The book is liberally illustrated and contains some interesting photographs of Santiago, although none of Manila Bay. A chart showing the rather complex operations of Sampson and Schley during the search for Cervera would have been of assistance to readers unfamiliar with the Caribbean. The chart which shows the track of Dewey's squadron at Manila without indicating the location of the Spanish ships seems a little like Hamlet without the prince.

JAMES A. FIELD, JR.  
Department of History  
Swarthmore College

*Arabs, Oil and History: The Story of the Middle East*, by Kermit Roosevelt. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1949. Pp. 271. \$3.50.)

In the Middle East, everything changes and everything remains the same. For a book like Mr. Roosevelt's, that is an advantage, for although there have been some changes since last spring when it was published (Syria has overthrown two governments in that period, Transjordan has a new name) everything is still the same, and still as inexplicable to the average well-read American as the Sphinx. Mr. Roosevelt is writing for that public, and he has succeeded in making it now unnecessary for anyone to be either quite so puzzled or quite so ignorant as most of us were up to the beginning of World War II. Read his book to shake your preconceptions loose, and read it again to remake them with understanding of a crazy-quilt region of contradictions whose well-being is unavoidably knit to our own, and whose ways we must know, and whose future we must help without blundering, ignorance, or patronage.

In a deceptively informal style Mr. Roosevelt leads the reader through pleasant Persian Gardens of anecdote toward the stark Sinai of truth.



It is a very neat achievement, and an important one. For beneath the glove of candor, perhaps rare among professional public-affairs commentators with mass audiences, Mr. Roosevelt packs an iron fist of reason. The forthright characterizations of King Abdullah, King Farouk and Lord Killearn (what oft was thought but ne'er so well expressed) are not products of a mucker pose. They are of a piece with the whole treatment of the Zionist-Arab question, and with the consideration of land, people, countries and big powers which leads to perhaps Mr. Roosevelt's most useful suggestion to Americans: that although the states of the Middle East are fundamentally congenial to us, in spite of huge surface differences, they are not "democracies," and that the United States should think of the anti-totalitarian states not as necessarily democracies (for many are anything but that) but as humanistic societies. It is a fine thing to read a book that is serious and amusing at the same time. It is adorned with an endpaper map that must have made the author howl and the Harpers hide their heads in shame.

T. H. VAIL MOTTER  
Washington, D. C.

*The Struggle for Democracy in Germany*, edited by Gabriel A. Almond. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1949. Pp. 345. \$4.00).

Although the most recent developments indicate that the interesting suggestions made by the respective collaborators here are already out of date, this study still retains the distinction of being one of the best that surveys the problem faced by the American occupational forces in Germany. Part one is concerned with the strength and composition of liberal and democratic tendencies in German history and with the extent of their survival in the anti-Nazi resistance (incidentally, one of the most realistic accounts of this much-debated field). Part II discusses the most significant phases of occupation policy—economic, governmental, political, cultural, and psychological—and their impact on the future of Germany. Each functional problem is placed in the context of the East-West struggle, and the various issues are evaluated in terms of their implications for the outcome. Among the collaborators, the best has been given to us by Dr. Anderson of the University of Nebraska and Dr. Wolf-

gang H. Kraus of George Washington University and Dr. Gabriel A. Almond, Research Associate, Institute of International Studies, Yale University.

The book is especially valuable in its "long-range" conclusions. We thus learn that "recognition and acceptance by Germans of their real responsibility for all that Nazism implied will be a slow process. But contrary to some impressions it is not a hopeless task" (p. 307). It will be interesting to watch these developments in terms of the creation of the pro-Soviet German state in October, 1949, and the resurgence of nationalistic fervor throughout Germany.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK  
University of Bridgeport,  
Bridgeport, Conn.

*Eleven Generals*, by Fletcher Pratt. (New York: William Sloane Assoc. 1949. Pp. 355. \$5.00.)

Reading Fletcher Pratt for military history is like reading *Time* Magazine for news. And you get what you bargain for: part of the picture, nicely written with a certain color, little objectivity and much verbosity, analysis generally superficial, often incomplete. It all depends on what you want for your \$5.00 or your twenty cents, as the case may be.

The author, in putting together a book, has taken some articles of his own written about various American generals and attempted to tie them together in a rather lengthy preface by establishing a common ground between them. With the fact that they were all relatively successful military leaders the similarity ceases and surmise creeps in. That they all made contributions other than victories to American military tradition seems to be stretching the point.

With the exception of Summerall, Vandegrift, and Bradley, Mr. Pratt has taken for his subjects some of the lesser known generals. He writes of Greene and "Mad Anthony" Wayne of the Revolution, Jacob Brown and Richard Mentor Johnson of the War of 1812, and Sheridan, Buford, George Thomas, and James Harrison Wilson of the War of the Rebellion. In bringing to light these lesser known officers, the author would have performed a definite service to professional soldier and layman alike had he been more careful and complete in his research, attempted less critical analysis, and worked with more objectivity

throughout. With the wide variety of excellent military history and biography being produced today, with historians of the stature of Douglas Southall Freeman and Samuel Eliot Morrison producing increasingly brilliant work, with the official service histories coming out as top-level examples of exhaustive research and objective production, it seems almost a pity that a writer with as fine a command of language as Fletcher Pratt should attempt to draw a picture of General Bradley in fifty-eight pages or Charles P. Summerall in seven.

In dealing with Nathaniel Greene, the author attempts to place credit for the Quaker's successes with Turenne and John Locke, a seventeenth century French commander and an English empirical philosopher. The picture of a relatively illiterate person successfully applying principles of the *Essay concerning Human Understanding* to a complex military campaign is a bit hard to swallow. The idea of Morgan and his motley crew routing Tarleton's force of "all regulars" at Cowpens would be very pretty indeed if true. Both John C. Miller and Francis Vinton Greene, sound and able authorities, tell us that among the British troops at Cowpens were 400 militia and the British Legion, composed "of American prisoners taken at Camden who, finding themselves opposed by their former comrades, turned and fled."\* That is either inadequate research or plain fact twisting to make a nice point.

Nobody will question the brilliance of Philip Sheridan. He is an American institution. But the author might have done a great service had he told the reader just how the Federal commander obtained his "usual . . . complete accurate information about the enemy." Such a statement borders on the ridiculous. George Thomas was perhaps above the average as a Civil War leader, but when the author is brash enough to state that the "Confederacy might better have spared Lee" when Thomas refused to leave the Federal service and side with his native state, he either compromises his own integrity to prove a point or shows his utter incompetence to write for anything more authoritative than the pulps.

The picture of Summerall is lucid up to the point where he commenced his famous "race to Sedan." But here the whole narrative breaks down. Was the General justified, or was he wrong? Tell us the facts. They are available in

government archives. In the section on Bradley, when the author is not clear in his own mind as to just who made what decision, he says, "Partly this was a committee project, no doubt." Again, a great deal of information on these points is available. If it were not when the sketch was written, either the whole should not have been attempted, or the absence of competent authority should have been noted.

There is one more bone I would like to pick. In the introduction, a statement is made lauding American "marksmen who can kill you as soon as they can see you." Mr. Pratt has obviously ignored an able and exhaustive study by Col. S. L. A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire*, in which is given good evidence, based on sound fact, that no more than one quarter of an infantry unit can be expected to fire their weapons except under the most overpowering circumstances. Hard to take, but true.

This instance suggests that Mr. Pratt accepts our American military legends without question because his purpose is to embellish them. Here are eleven candidates for a higher place in our national mythology, and their cases are pleaded with a great deal of persuasive charm. But this is not history.

EDGAR M. HOWELL

Major, U.S. Army (Ret.)

Washington, D. C.

**Cartridges: A Pictorial Digest of Small Arms Ammunition**, by Herschel C. Logan. (Huntington, W. Va.: Standard Publications, 1948. Pp. 199, appendix and chronology. \$5.00.)

In a profusely illustrated companion volume to his *Hand Cannon to Automatic*, Mr. Logan outlines the evolution of the present day small arms metallic cartridge from its first crude paper prototype. An artist and a writer as well as a recognized authority on firearms, the author has combined all three of his talents in the production of this book which, as he says, is a pictorial digest of small arms ammunition.

The material is organized into sections each dealing with a more or less distinct phase in the history of cartridge development. Each section is prefaced by a short general discussion of that particular phase, followed by both typical and rare or unusual examples. The examples are classified by caliber and each is illustrated by the author's

\*John C. Miller, *Triumph of Freedom*, p. 547.

excellent pen and ink sketches, sectionalized where necessary to show interior construction. Name, dimensions, and bullet weight and type are shown. The development of U. S. center fire cartridges from 1860 to 1875, the period of most rapid and significant evolution, is especially well covered and interestingly documented with appropriate excerpts from Army Ordnance documents of that period. Shot cartridges are treated in a separate section, although examples appear from time to time in other sections where appropriate. A final section is devoted to blank cartridges. Among the unusual items described under this heading is a 6mm cartridge which dispensed perfume instead of bullets!

Interesting and unusual is the Cartridge Chronology. Much data of value to the collector is to be found in the Appendix which lists U. S. patents, headstamps, and U. S. cartridges of the 90's, as well as an illustrated discussion of bullets and primers.

The author makes no claim to a complete listing of all cartridges, either present day or early, nor does he give any ballistic data. This latter we think is a mistake, especially in those sections dealing with rim and center fire rifle and pistol cartridges. However, in his effort to trace the evolution of the cartridge and to document his presentation by examples, he has succeeded admirably. The book is a handsome volume, superbly illustrated and beautifully bound. It will be a valuable addition to the library of the cartridge collector.

RALPH V. STRAUSS,  
Washington, D. C.

*Ordeal of the Union*, by Allan Nevins. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1947. Pp. 593 and 590. 2 vols. \$10.)

Allan Nevins has here written a major work in American history. For his success in producing such a work, he received the \$10,000 Scribner Prize. The two volumes, covering the years from the close of the Mexican War in 1848 to the election of Buchanan in 1856, are only the first of a series dealing with the era of the Civil War. The important things in these two volumes are: the wealth of detail which gives point to the richness of American life, the clear presentation of such confused aspects of the period as its politics, the comprehensive portrayal of the aspiring and uneven social structure, an appreciative treatment of

the South, of which Nevins has written with a sense of both poetry and stern justice, and finally an extended consideration of that pitfall to most historians—slavery—which he believes to have been dominantly an issue of "race-adjustment." Professor Nevins made several sojourns in the South in his search for materials, and he writes that he found there "the overtone of a grim indictment"—the Civil War. For this national tragedy he indicts "a generation of political leaders, and behind them, . . . a whole nation, its spirit and its civilization." . . . In thus indicting the nation as a whole he has laid the theme for these volumes and those which are to follow. The style alone, typical of Nevins at his best, makes this history eminently readable. However, there are many other features of the text which make for continuing interests, among them should be mentioned the brief, skillful portraits of the men and women who made their day historic. Unfortunately they lacked the necessary vision and statesmanship to avoid the Civil War.

HAROLD DEAN CATER,  
Washington, D. C.

*We of The Americas*, by Carlos Davila. (Chicago: Ziff-Davis Co., 1949. Pp. 264. \$3.50.) Are we neglecting our "Good Neighbors" to the south? Mr. Davila, once President of Chile and more recently Chilean Ambassador in Washington, appears to believe so. Certainly the Marshall Plan has made it more difficult for Latin America to obtain needed equipment in this country; and it is probable that Western Europe and the Far East will receive the lion's share of those technological experts whom Mr. Truman proposes to export. It is perhaps a significant sign of the times that Mr. Davila has a kind word to say for the Monroe Doctrine. Most responsible South American statesmen in recent years have privately approved of this policy, although it was political suicide to advocate it publicly. In this connection, it might be worth remembering that the justification of bringing the Pan-American accord into the larger framework of the United Nations was the prospect of "One World." Mr. Davila, a veteran journalist as well as an accomplished diplomat, utters no reproaches, draws no unflattering conclusions. His purpose is to revitalize the Good Neighbor policy, and his arguments are persuasive. But in presenting those argu-



ments he reviews the facts, and these are far from reassuring. It appears that American foreign policy, although shaped by logic, is applied through an emotional public opinion that can only perceive one vital interest at a time. It is unfortunate that the Latin American countries, representing an inner line of U.S. defenses, should be neglected merely because they are not being seriously threatened at the moment.

W. F. Ross,  
Editor.

*Intelligence Is For Commanders*, by Lt. Colonels Philip B. Davidson and Robert R. Glass. (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co. 1948. Pp. 189. \$3.85.) As stated on the jacket, this book was designed as a text. Its authors, being instructors at the Command and General Staff College, are well qualified for their task. They have compiled information that is scattered in various Army manuals, and re-written it in an informal, entertaining style.

Their illustrative examples are culled from recent history, and add much to the interest of the subject. Several of the maps are in color. The result is a book that makes intelligence attractive and interesting for beginners—and many officers well qualified along other lines are in that category regarding intelligence. The officer suddenly called upon to perform intelligence duties will find this a most useful introduction, and the junior commander who for the first time has an S-2 subject to his orders will benefit even more. The concept of intelligence as one of the tools of command—a special tool, with its own peculiar possibilities, limitations, and techniques—is hardly original; but that concept is developed here in a challenging way that gives an air of novelty. While this is no substitute for the Army's official instruction material, it may encourage a few people to study that material seriously.

W. F. Ross,  
Editor.

#### OTHER RECENT BOOKS

*If Russia Strikes*, by George Fielding Eliot. (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1949. Pp. 252. \$2.75.) This book could have been more accurately entitled *If Russia Strikes in 1949*, for the author virtually limits himself to that thesis, and devotes the first eighty pages to an evaluation of this possibility, in terms of Russia's internal politics, and of a Marxian interpretation of current history. Very briefly, Major Eliot believes that such action would be disastrous to Russia, but that it might not seem so to her political leaders, isolated in the ivory tower of the Kremlin. The other thesis—the speedy creation of real military power in western Europe—hardly seems feasible. The body of the book is devoted to an "Estimate of Enemy Capabilities" of a type that will be very familiar to the military reader, despite the lack of technical detail. This is a study of ground maneuver limited only by geography, logistics—and time. Eliot's guess at the time interval before American air power could begin to influence the situation seems reasonable. His estimate of Russian ability to invade Europe, East Asia and the Middle East during that interval appears to be the result of careful re-

search. The final chapters, on the future of air and sea warfare, are naturally far less specific.

*Barbed Wire Surgeon*, by Alfred A. Weinstein, M.D. (New York: Macmillan. 1948. pp. 310. \$3.00). A doctor's own story of the privations suffered by Americans during internment by the Japs in the Philippines and Japan.

*The March of Muscovy*, by Harold Lamb. (New York: Doubleday. 1948. pp. 309. \$3.75). A popular history of Ivan the Terrible and the growth of the Russian Empire, 1400-1648.

*Tell The West*, by Jerzy Gliksman. (New York: Gresham Press. 1948. Pp. 358. \$3.75). What it is like to live in a Russian slave labor camp located in the sub-arctic region of Siberia.

*The Air Officer's Guide*, (Harrisburg: Military Service. 1948. pp. 547. \$3.50). A military encyclopedia, distinct from the "Officer's Guide" published by the same company, designed especially for the air officer to give him a background of the organization, traditions and customs of the Air Force.

**Germany: What Now?** by Joachim Joesten. (New York: Ziff-Davis. 1948. Pp. 331. \$3.75). The political, economic, and social picture of Germany since the conquest of the Third Reich.

**To The Bitter End**, by Hans Bernd Gisevius. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1947. Pp. 632. \$4.00). The author, one of the leaders of the German anti-Nazi underground, traces the pattern of intrigue, blackmail, betrayal and tragedy by which the Nazi took and held power. An informal history of the Third Reich from the Reichstag to Germany in cinders.

**Star-Spangled Radio**, by Edward M. Kirby and Jack W. Harris. (New York: Ziff-Davis. 1948. Pp. 278. \$3.50). The contribution that American radio made toward the winning of World War II.

**The Ranks of Death**, by Col. P. M. Ashburn. (New York: Coward-McCann. 1947. Pp. 298. \$5.00). A medical history of the conquest of America.

**Airborne Warfare**, by Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin. (Washington: Infantry Journal Press. 1947. Pp. 186. \$3.00). A study of vertical envelopment in every Allied airborne campaign in the last war and about its use in future wars.

**We Dropped The A-Bomb**, by Merle Miller and Abe Spitzer. (New York: Thomas Crowell. 1946. Pp. 152. \$2.00). The first eyewitness book of what happened over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as told by one of the radio operators.

**The Potomac**, by Frederick Gutheim. (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1949. Pp. 436, illustrated, \$4.00). In this, the 40th volume of *The Rivers of America* series, the problem of overabundant material has been overcome by a masterpiece of selection and compression. Chief themes are the development of the city of Washington, and of transportation links with the West. Since the role of the Potomac in the Civil War would take up a much larger volume, mention is only made of a few important crossings by large armies.

**One More Hill**, by Franklyn A. Johnson. (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1949. Pp. 181. \$2.50). A personalized account, based on a war diary, of an anti-tank platoon in Italy and Normandy.

**Day Without End**, by Van Van Praag. (New York: Wm. Sloane Associates, 1949. Pp. 261. \$3.00). An extremely dramatic account of one day—a very violent day—in the lives of an infantry platoon.

**See If He Wins**, by Richard Spong. (New York: Wm. Sloane Associates, 1949. Pp. 273. \$3.00). A novel about American deserters and the Paris black market in the winter of 1944.

**Florentine Art Under Fire**, by Frederick Hartt. (Princeton: University Press, 1949. Pp. 148, illustrated, \$5.00). Describes one of the most difficult yet successful assignments of Monuments and Fine Arts officers under Allied Military Government.

**A Sort of A Saga**, by Bill Mauldin. (New York: Wm. Sloane Associates, 1949. Pp. 301, illustrations by the author. \$3.50). A light-hearted auto-biography of the pre-war years by the famous war cartoonist.

**My Life in the Red Army**, by Fred Virski. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 260. \$3.50). Picaresque reminiscences of a very unwilling Polish draftee in the army of the Soviets.

*Just received, and to be reviewed in an early issue:*

**Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference**, by Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1949. Pp. 367, illustrated, index. \$4.00).

**Battle Report, Vol. V, Victory in the Pacific**, by Capt. Walter Karig, USNR, *et al.* (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1949. Pp. 548, illustrated. \$5.00).

**History of U. S. Naval Aviation**, by Archibald D. Turnbull and Clifford L. Lord. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949. Pp. 345. \$5.00).

**Lincoln Finds A General: A Military Study of the Civil War**, by Kenneth P. Williams. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1949. 2 Vols. \$12.50).

**Mines, Minelayers and Minelaying**, by Captain J. S. Cowie, RN. (London: Oxford University Press, 1949. Pp. 216, illustrated. \$4.50).

## SELECTED PERIODICAL LITERATURE

### HISTORIOGRAPHY

"The Bayeux Tapestry," by Lt. Col. L. H. Landon in *Journal of the Royal Artillery*, July 1949 (218-226). The author contends that this famed masterpiece of medieval art is also a remarkably accurate record, designed by an eyewitness, of a historic amphibious operation. In-

ternal evidence suggests that the tapestry was made at Canterbury about 1077 by English needlewomen; and that the work was designed and supervised by Archbishop Odo, who had accompanied Duke William in his successful invasion of England eleven years before. Illustrated.

### INSTITUTIONS

"Communism and the Resistance Movement," by Major Reginald M. Hargreaves in *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, August 1949 (398-403). In the last war, the whole resistance movement within Axis Europe was founded upon a Communist underground. In another war, any attempt at an opposition underground would be frustrated immediately by Communist experts. Therefore, this is not a practical form of warfare for the Western democracies.

"Is Communism Going National?" by William G. Carleton in *Virginia Quarterly Review*, Summer 1949 (321-334). The real power of Communism is decreasing in the West—even in those countries where Communist Parties appear to be growing.

"Italy: Battlefield For the Marshall Plan," by Felix Perris in *Harper's*, July 1949 (77-83). The Communist campaign against the European Recovery Program centers in Italy.

"United States Disaster in China," by E. M. Eller in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, July 1949 (739-751). Historic reasons why China is important to the U. S. and to Russia.

"Demographic Revolution in the United States," by Warren S. Thompson in *Annals of the American Academy of Political & Social Sciences*, March 1949 (62-69). Are a declining birthrate and an aging population undermining the position of the U. S. as a world power?

"Resistance Movements From a Military Point of View," by Arnold Putre in *Baltic Review*, May 1949 (31-33). Russia is doing everything in its power to break up resistance movements and prevent their recurrence.

"The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain," by T. Norwid in *Baltic Review*, May 1949 (28-31). The Underground movements in Soviet-dominated Europe.

"Nazi-Soviet Relations and the Pact of 1939," by Howard M. Ehrman in *Michigan Alumnus Quarterly Review*, Winter 1949 (102-112). The Russians, unable to refute the evidence derived from German diplomatic documents and published by the U. S. State Department, pretend to ignore this aspect of the pre-war years as they strive to incriminate Britain. "The controversy sharpens as the documentation increases."

### NATIONAL WARFARE

"That Next War," by J. M. Spaight in *Royal Air Force Quarterly*, July 1949 (14-18). Atomic bombing of Russia's oil supplies and transportation facilities could immobilize her land armies and overcome her advantage in ground combat. This could be accomplished by today's aircraft.

"Strategic Importance of Western Europe," by F. O. Miksche in *Military Review*, July 1949, (34-41). The productive capacity of the Anglo-Saxon World compared with those of the Soviets and satellites.

"What Kind of War?" by Hanson W. Baldwin in *Atlantic Monthly* July 1949 (22-27). Describes the objectives of a war with Russia.

"La Wehrmacht Vue de France, September 1939," by G. Castellan in *Revue Historique de L'Armée*, June 1949 (35-48). The 2e Bureau of the French General Staff had a fairly good idea of the size of the German Army when World War II commenced. The French estimate of the quality and training of the German Army in 1939 will be the subject of a subsequent article.

"Middle East—Balance of Power Versus World Government," by Jamil M. Baroody in *Annals of the American Academy of Political & Social Sciences*, July 1949 (14-22). Balance of power is still the best method of bridling dangerous international rivalries.



"Alaska and National Policy," by Oran P. South in *Air University Quarterly Review*, Summer 1949 (44-47). The problem of how much should be done in Alaska to make provisions for polar war.

"The Strategic Position of Canada," by J. G.

H. Wattsford in *Canadian Army Journal*, March 1949 (17-21). Canada's strategic assets are her natural resources, her size, and her friendly relations with the U. S. Her great strategic liability is her location, separated from Russia by an Arctic ocean that may prove to be a "new Mediterranean."

#### LAND WARFARE

"The Place of the Engineer in Land Warfare," in *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, August 1949 (355-367). Duties of Royal Engineers are considerably more varied than those of U. S. Engineers. Chief problems, both past and future, concern training of large numbers of reserve personnel in specialized techniques.

"Archimedes and the Design of Fort Euryalus," by Professor A. W. Lawrence in *The Royal Engineers Journal*, June 1949 (131-139). The main fort in the defenses of Syracuse was built in accordance with new scientific principles. In particular, the architect took into account the exact range of the best ballistic weapons of the day. This neat solution of a defense problem is plausibly ascribed to the great Greek scientist.

"Very Cold War," by N.A.C. Croft in *British Army Journal*, July 1949 (25-31). Can modern armies operate in the arctic winter?

"Animal Power in Modern Warfare," by Capt. J. P. Kane in *An Consantoir, The Irish Defence Journal*, September 1949 (453-457). In maneuvers, mechanized equipment gives an appearance of superiority over animal power that is not always confirmed during extended operations, especially in bad weather on difficult terrain. The example is cited that the German Army used about a million horses for infantry transportation alone; and despite shortages of motor vehicles, this figure could have been considerably reduced if considered desirable.

#### SEA WARFARE

"The Influence of Air Forces on Sea Power," by Sqn. Ldr. A. McL. Peacock in the *Royal Air Force Quarterly*, July 1949 (19-27). An aviation extremist argues that sea power, offensive and defensive, can now be exercised by aircraft alone.

"Waging Antisubmarine Warfare," by Rear Admiral C. B. Momsen in *Army Information Digest*, September 1949 (33-41). The invention of the "snorkel" has upset the tactical balance in favor of the submarine, and future defensive measures against it will require an immense portion of any nation's resources. "The key word

describing antisubmarine measures of today is massiveness."

"Considerations on the War of American Independence," by Gerald S. Graham in *Bulletin of the Institute for Historical Research*, May 1949 (22-34). Britain's fatal mistake in 1781 was not faulty naval deployment in the Chesapeake Bay area, but incurring the enmity of all the world's great naval powers simultaneously. In this situation, a British defeat somewhere in the world was inevitable, and it might have been in an area more important than North America.

#### AIR WARFARE

"Unstrategic Bombing and World Ruin," by Maj. Gen. J. F. C. Fuller, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., in *Ordnance*, September-October 1949 (93-96). The renowned British military authority expands his thesis that strategic bombing is immoral and politically unwise. (See: MILITARY AFFAIRS, Summer 1949 p. 118).

"Air Power as Peace Power," by Dale O. Smith in *Air University Quarterly Review*, Summer 1949 (3-14). How can we best employ our power to advance our national aims?

"The Development of Bombing," by Air Mar-

shal Sir Robert Saundby, in *Royal Air Force Quarterly*, July 1949 (3-7). Air bombardment is now by far the most powerful weapon at the disposal of mankind.

"Canada's Defense Problems," in *Economist*, September 17, 1949 (622-623). Canada's main defense shortage is in her Air Force.

"The Air Forces in Parliament," as reported by Hansard, in *Royal Air Force Quarterly*, July 1949 (33-36). Lord Trenchard and other distinguished authorities on air matters advocate greater British air power to implement the At-

lantic Pact; and pay increases to provide a highly qualified, volunteer, Air Force.

"The Air Defense of The United States," by Lt. Col. Floyd A. Lambert, USAF, in *Antiaircraft Journal*, July-August 1949 (23-26). Second

article of a series, this one describes in detail the ADCC's (Air Defense Control Centers) that are to coordinate the defense efforts, active and passive, of various military and civilian agencies. Includes a chart of the proposed communication network.

#### ESTABLISHMENTS

"Gun Seibu—In Japan," by Cecil G. Tilton in *Army Information Digest*, July 1949 (8-15). Organization and functions of American Military Government in Japan.

"LOG DIV—New Concept of Support," by Capt. Thomas R. Nevitt in *Army Information Digest*, August 1949 (7-17). The new Army Logistical Division (T/O&E 110-T) is designed to support a Corps, or with attachments an Army, in combat. It can also serve as a miniature Communications Zone.

"A Progress Report on the United States Constabulary," by Captain H. P. Rand, in *Military*

*Review*, October 1949 (30-38). What was once a police force for the U. S. Zone of Occupation in Germany is now becoming a group of highly mobile, but very heavily armed, mechanized cavalry regiments.

"Raising a Regiment in the War of American Independence," by Eric Robson in *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, Autumn, 1949 (107-115). Several new regiments were raised, and senior commissions given to political and court favorites, despite the preference of George III "for completing the Army" that already existed.

#### OPERATIONS AND BIOGRAPHY

"Germans Cross the Don—1942," by Colonel H. Selle in *An Cosantoir, The Irish Defence Journal*, September 1949 (420-427). The Engineer Officer of Sixth German Army cites his experience to prove that tactical surprise is possible in a river crossing. In this case an unlikely spot was chosen; the bridging train was among the first elements to reach the river, and went promptly to work, ignoring security; and all artillery preparation was omitted.

"The Invasion of Norway—An Example of Extended Strategy," by Lt. Col. James A. Bassett in *Military Review*, October 1949 (3-16). Psychological warfare, diplomacy, and elaborate deception can be used to advantage in a surprise in-

vasion; but these non-military measures must be carefully planned to aid and coincide with military operations.

"The 11th Airborne Division in the Leyte Mountain Operation," by Major Joseph B. Seay, in *Military Review*, October 1949 (17-24). Combat elements of the Division were supplied by liaison plane for a month and a half while fighting in a mountainous jungle terrain.

"Zebulon Montgomery Pike and the York Campaign, 1813," by W. E. Hollon in *New York History*, July 1949 (295-275). The successful attack upon the Canadian city (now called Toronto) was surprisingly like a modern amphibious operation.

#### CUSTOMS AND ANTIQUITIES

"Military Manuscripts in the National Library of Scotland," by Marryat R. Dobie in *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, Autumn 1949 (118-120). Although this library is the

principal repository for *Scottish* military material, it also contains a considerable mass of papers on other military matters, especially the French Revolution and Napoleon.

## TWO YEARS OF UNIFICATION

By MARK S. WATSON\*

IN JAMES FORRESTAL's report as Secretary of Defense on the first fifteen months' operations under the National Security Act of 1947 he made a number of observations whose acuteness still merits attention. Of national obligations with regard to the armed forces and related activities he said:

We must see that expenditures for national security yield full value; that they are made for essential projects only, and that they are kept within the country's capacity to pay for them. This Nation must hold a position of military readiness, created within reasonable limits. One of the great problems from which the Military Establishment [the more realistic title of that day] cannot divorce itself is the complex one of securing proper balance between military necessities and national solvency. The capacity for making war is not separable from economics any more than it is from diplomacy.

To attain this "proper balance between military necessities and national solvency" is an abiding obligation of which much more has been said since Mr. Forrestal's recital. During succeeding months, it was largely the pursuit of that balance which led to the sharpest test yet imposed on the 1947 Act, plus its 1949 amendments, and on the young Department of Defense itself, now in its third year. What was tested was the powers of Mr. Forrestal's successor, Louis A. Johnson, to exercise true "direction, authority and control" over the individual sub-departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force. The specific issue at the outset was Secretary Johnson's halting of construction work on the 65,000-ton aircraft carrier; the fundamental purpose of that action was to save \$165,000,000 in initial cost of the proposed U.S.S. *United*

*States*, plus indeterminate additional costs to follow — the judgment of the Secretary being that the great carrier could not be justified, at this time anyway, as one of those clearly "essential projects" (in Mr. Forrestal's words) which could be undertaken with due regard to national solvency.

Before his resignation in early 1949, Mr. Forrestal blazed a clear trail toward attaining the proper balance which he pointed out as the goal. He supported heartily the consolidation of multi-service efforts in many fields in which the existing Munitions Board had long done a good deal; likewise the concentration within one service of the purchasing authority for all, which had been Army-Navy practice on an increasing scale for years. Also, as head of the newly unified services, he initiated a great many new consolidations, of the two air transport, of the two sea transport and of the two rail transport services previously in existence, of medical and recruiting and printing and machine repair facilities, etc. He took steps to coordinate education, research, reserve activities, systems of pay, justice administration, etc. His own examination of the economies in men and time and equipment thus brought about convinced him that these measures were sound and desirable for reasons of efficiency, but that the actual dollar saving likely to be affected by them was modest. It would reach millions of dollars annually, no doubt, but these did not constitute an impressive percentage of the fifteen billions of dollars in the post-war military budgets. Not much, relatively speaking, could be saved by consolidating three efforts under one management, if that one management should continue to do all the work which three had done before. The big cuts in funds which

\*Mr. Watson, Pulitzer Prize winner and wartime correspondent for *The Baltimore Sun* in several theaters of operations, is outstandingly qualified to appraise America's high command.



national peacetime economy required would be possible only by determining that some of the tasks which three managements had been performing could be terminated altogether. It was easy enough for an opponent of unification to say that if these tasks could be terminated without injury to military security, they could and should be terminated by the individual service which was performing them. That was true. But the individual service was not always inclined to do what it could and should do in that respect, and often there was compelling reason for its reluctance. For years the professional Army had wished to eliminate a host of local posts and stations which cost money to maintain and required the presence of troop units which would have served Army purposes much better elsewhere. For similar reasons the professional Navy would have closed several relatively useless local yards. The trouble in both cases was that numerous local politicians yearned for perpetuation of these ghostly installations, and departments anxious to maintain Congressional comity reconciled themselves to the penalty of it.

But there was a large additional reason for reluctance to eliminate various performances, and in much more important areas. Each service had a natural and not unadmirable belief in its own merit, and its own obligation. If the Navy was entrusted with the duty of defending American interest on the seas and of being prepared for full performance in time of war — and also in the critical periods when war may be averted by national firmness — the Navy's duty was to maintain strength sufficient to justify that trust. Likewise the Army in its field, and the Air Force in its own less predictable responsibility.

Now if the Navy could be permitted to maintain strength wholly adequate to all possible requirements, and the Army and the Air likewise, each would have what it asked for, and there would be no need for inter-

service competition for funds. But there is not that much money. Hence, when the national economy imposes a moderate limit upon the total amount which can be granted to the three services combined, it becomes apparent that one service can get more than its "share" of such a total only by depriving the others of their "share." In this manner each service, properly interested in its own assured needs, tends to examine the others' budgetary demands in order to make sure that the others' are not exorbitant. The services are in that sense competitive and actively so, and there is no escape from such a rivalry, which is healthful or unhealthful according to viewpoint. The question is — who judges the merit of the competitive claims? Before unification the initial decision lay with the Bureau of the Budget (by Presidential direction). Congress, the ultimate determiner of appropriations, was and is the maker of the final decision.

But the prime movers of unification recognized long ago that — always allowing for corrective decision by the Republic's popularly-elected Congress — the initial decision on the military services' competing claims ought to be made at a level below the President, whose duties go far beyond the military. It was therefore planned to vest that important authority in the Secretary of Defense. He would have the advantage of his concentrated interest in the military and hence, presumably, would fully understand the detailed and *ex parte* arguments of the professional Chiefs of Staff. His judgment in those premises would promise therefore to be an informed one, but it still remained subject to revision if necessary, both by President and Congress. The Secretary's authority, in this and in other respects authorized by the Tydings amendments (of 1949) to the Act of 1947, made him a figure of great importance, and very definitely cropped the authority which prior to these legislative acts had

been vested in the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, now both legally and actually very clearly subordinate to the Secretary of Defense.

The testing of that official's authority in the respect stated came early in Mr. Johnson's tenure of office. In the course of extremely noisy and angry public discussions in the summer and autumn of 1949, opponents charged that Mr. Johnson was exceeding the powers Congress thought it was giving him. This charge was not borne out by immediate results, for President Truman supported the Secretary's decisions without deviation and, up to the time of writing, Congressional spokesmen accepting Mr. Johnson's budgetary decisions have been far more numerous than those in opposition. The fact is that peacetime pressure for keeping military expenditures "within reasonable limits" has been widespread, and Mr. Johnson convinced most of his hearers that his carrier decision was dictated by demands of economy. Contemporary witnesses supported him, some of the most persuasive arguments for budgetary reduction being advanced by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff himself, General Omar N. Bradley.

It is well, therefore, to examine further Mr. Forrestal's First Report (destined also to be his last) on unification. It is useful as a chronicle of what took place in the fifteen months succeeding 17 September 1947, and also in its specific recommendations of what his experience convinced him were the chief needs of unification at the close of 1948. He made six specific suggestions which may be thus summarized:

1. Creation of the post of Under Secretary, who should be his chief's alter ego. (The post of deputy was created, and Stephen T. Early named to it).
2. Material strengthening of the Secretary's statutory powers, making clear his responsibility for exercising "direction, authority and control" over the Establishment's three

departments (Army, Navy, Air Force) and agencies. (This was made explicit).

3. Designation of a responsible head for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (A Chairman without vote was authorized — General Bradley).
4. Removing or raising the limit on the size of the Joint Staff, originally limited to 100 (Raised to 210).
5. Clarifying the Secretary's authority with respect to personnel. (He has it).
6. Making the Secretary the sole military representative in the National Security Council by eliminating the Army, Navy and Air Force Secretaries who had previously been there. (So enacted).

Examination of these items in the Forrestal program — antedating Mr. Johnson's arrival on the scene — shows the origin of the powers which the Congress approved in the 1949 Act, and which Mr. Forrestal's successor promptly exercised. Examination of the explanatory text reveals also, and with surprising vividness, the clarity of Mr. Forrestal's discernment of certain important considerations and of certain immaterial but powerful handicaps to unification's uninterrupted progress. A few quotations out of context are suggestive:

. . . In making changes to secure increased economy and efficiency we must do nothing to impair the vital function of the armed services; the ability to fight successfully . . . The mere passage of the National Security Act did not mean the accomplishment of its objectives overnight. The most difficult part . . . is to bring conflicting ideas into harmony.

The public and the Congress are entitled to know the personal views of the Secretaries and the Chiefs, but . . . also entitled to know whenever there is a material distinction between such personal views and the official conclusion which the Military Establishment has arrived at after mature consideration . . .

To promote closer integration of the armed forces, by preventing inevitable differences over internal policies from becoming topics of public debate, I have directed civilian and military chiefs of the three departments to submit public statements . . . (on) controversial subjects to my office for review before publication . . .

It is out of the competition inherent in the division of total funds allocated to the National Military Establishment that the controversies arise . . .

Between the two World Wars there were unnumbered proposals to unify the services or even to unify the commands in a given theater. All wound up in the same place, with hearty "agreement in principle" but firm decision to do nothing in practice, owing to objections raised by Army or Navy or usually by both. That makes the more remarkable such success as General Marshall attained in late 1941 and early 1942 in his persistent quest for unity of command wherever he could get it — over a theater of operations or in Washington, over American forces or over Allied forces. It came about, generally speaking, when necessity compelled it, and thereby in World War II set a notable example of the full cooperation of Allied forces, a feat which had been thought impossible.

It was cooperation of autonomous services, however, not unification, and with the easing of necessity's spur, the post-war cooperation of Army and Navy and Air Forces — especially when it came to dividing the defense dollar — left something to be desired. That explains the Congressional willingness in 1947 to order unification, at first in terms of compromise between far-reaching Army desires and stout Navy opposition. The first tentative legislation permitted experiment, and experiment revealed the need for tighter integration. The fact that after a year of experiment Mr. Forrestal, a moderate man of infinite tact and patience, himself recommended the six important changes listed above is significant. His attitude was influential in Congress' 1949 revision of the Act in those respects, by a vote which this time showed overwhelming approval of the unification principle and its practice as well.

The Navy was startled by the celerity and brusqueness with which this enlarged authority was anticipated, with Presidential

encouragement, by Mr. Forrestal's successor, to halt the carrier construction, reduce sharply the active fleet and many shore operations, cut down Naval and Marine personnel more severely than that of either Army or Air Force, and then to discourage Naval spokesman's public vocal protest against the program. Protest was made anyway, nominally against the method, but fundamentally against the action in reducing the Navy's relative role in the establishment, and this protest led to the angriest interservice fight which Capitol Hill has seen since the Billy Mitchell days. There was frequent expression of fear that the uproar would lead to serious injury, not only to unification but to the defense establishment itself. Actually it does not yet appear that the uproar itself did any such thing. It would have been pleasanter to have the true unification spirit come about in the services by suasion and education, but there is an impression that unification actually has made headway by reason of the fight — through exhaustion of the opposition, and by general acceptance of what previously had been in doubt. Perhaps a fight in time saves nine.

Certainly as 1950 begins there is a fuller acceptance of the fact that unification is here to stay. Within the Department lately there has been a proper concern over sensitive feelings, plus a reluctance to use disciplinary action, plus a recognition that national defense is too large an objective to be unnecessarily jeopardized. There are many who still believe that the large carrier is desirable — not for its own unique value as a weapon, it should be made clear, but because it is part of a weapons system; other parts of that complex system are the greatly improved planes which can be flown only from such a carrier. This would not be the first time that high military authorities have erred grievously in underestimating a weapon or a system of weapons. In the Thirties it was the Navy



which blocked for a long time the Army Air Forces' development of the 4-motor bomber. Time will show whether this time another error has been made, and in that case (as ultimately with the B-17) there may be correction.

In the meantime, the upper levels of the Navy have accepted the situation and made the best of it. Eight of the existing carriers (Essex and Midway classes) are being converted to take heavier and faster planes, and because between-decks space is too low to accommodate the high tails of the new planes, designers are folding the high tails to fit the space. Extra handicaps develop extra ingenuity. If Naval Air must prove its excellence all over again, it may very well do so in impressive style. The Undersea Warfare division, grappling with the immense problems created by new-type submarines, is pushing ahead with renewed energy. The guided missiles experiments and those in atomic propulsion likewise. If funds are reduced, what remains must be expended with even greater discernment, and apparently will be.

Now, as to the savings effected under unification: As remarked, the various consolidations of duplicating enterprises — in transportation, printing, recruiting, purchasing, etc. — have often eliminated unnecessary machinery and jobs. This is a good thing from the viewpoint of operating efficiency. It is also a means of saving money in respectable but not staggering amounts. The big economies have come, not by eliminating "waste," but by reducing outlay on tasks which have merit, but not supreme merit. With sufficient funds available they would have justified continuation. With insufficient funds available in a period of necessary economies, they must be discontinued or reduced — precisely as the individual whose income is reduced, and who must cut his outgo proportionately, eliminates first the frills, then the non-essentials, and then the

less-essentials. And if he does not do it himself, someone does it for him.

But if the important economies are made by cuts within each of the services, it has been asked, why could they not have been made severally by order of the Secretary of each service? Was unification necessary? It is a practical matter. Experience has shown the immense difficulty of making correctly proportioned economies within each department, however rational that would be. It begins to appear, on the contrary, that for a balanced force apportionment should be made on an informed basis within the armed forces as a group, by consultation. If it is most improbable that every joint decision will be correct, it is certain that many decisions by the separate services in the past were far from correct. No machinery will eliminate all operator's errors, but good machinery will help to do so. It is reasonable to offer the judgment that one of unification's largest services to the nation's defense will prove to be its tendency to lessen the errors of the separate forces, both in number and in gravity.

What have been unification's positive and measurable accomplishments in its 27 months' life? The official record lists scores of them in the area of consolidation, chiefly for efficiency but for the most part productive also of dollar economies on a large or small scale.

The mechanisms created or enlarged under unification are many. Of outstanding importance are these:

*The Joint Staff.* Lately enlarged from 100 to 210 officers, equally representative of all the services. It is the prime instrument of planning for unified operations. It also is, or should be, a prime influence on its personnel (the probable "comers" in each service) in keeping them informed on the other services' problems and in inducing intelligent rather than routine cooperation.

*The Weapons System Evaluation Group.* Organized to provide mature and impartial consideration of probable future (rather than current) needs. A link between research

and planning, cognizant of the *system* of weapons and tactics which may in time be developed from a single new weapon or principle. The Group is already studying (and reporting on) the distant problems involved in strategic bombing, undersea warfare, guided missiles, atomic energy, etc.

*The Research and Development Board.* Its eyes likewise are on the distant future — which sometimes becomes the present with astonishing swiftness. The Board guides the separate efforts in this field on the part of the separate services, of industry, and of laboratory, winnowing the promising from the unpromising and giving maximum support where it is needed.

*The Military Assistance Group.* A useful departmental link in the complex of American and foreign effort, diplomatic, military, economic, and political.

*The Controller's Office.* Now under an Assistant Secretary of Defense able to expedite the work of real dollar control, scrutinizing the work of the several service controllers and guiding them informally toward their designated goals.

*The Munitions Board.* Long antedating unification, but materially strengthened in the past two years, with greater authority to match greater responsibility.

*The National War College.* Likewise created a year before unification, but sharing its benefits and — like the Joint Staff — destined to contribute immensely to the reality of unification by exposing promising officers from all services (its students) to intimate intellectual contact with each other. The same thing, in a measure, must be said of the other graduate schools and training operations, whose linking of the three services has been greatly strengthened in the past two years.

Within the Pentagon are joint policy and operating groups, some continuing, some or-

ganized for specific tasks and eliminated as soon as the task is complete. It is easy to point out that they too might easily have been created by the separate services (as were the Munitions Board and the War College and the Joint Board of other days), but it is folly to pretend that the old-time associations of autonomous services were as effective as are associations which have been created under the watchful eye of a single departmental authority with powers of control.

As Mr. Forrestal pointed out, it is no simple thing to overcome the momentum of thinking conditioned to a whole adult life in one service. For that matter, does an artilleryman always think precisely like a cavalryman or an infantryman or an engineer? All are in the Army. Does a Naval aviator always see exactly eye to eye with a destroyer or a cruiser commander? All are in the Navy. Or a bomber crew with its fighter escort or its ground elements, all of which are in the Air Force. Or should they think alike, really? Men are not going to grow up with identical viewpoints, and in a free land they are not encouraged to do so. But they are encouraged to understand other viewpoints and to respect their merits, and to learn from them. If the 1949 hurricanes of conflicting inter-service viewpoints reached a surprising violence, they were succeeded by a welcome calm which promises to last until something else goes wrong. Then there will be another gale, and should be, for in no other way is the air cleared of fog. When American processes, military or civilian, move too long without disagreement, they need a shaking up.

## THE GERMAN OFFICER CORPS VERSUS HITLER

By HARVEY A. DEWEERD\*

THE CONSPIRACIES OF the German officer corps against Hitler make an interesting study in futility. Their history illustrates the difficulties inherent in any effort to overthrow a police state made by senior officers who — to the outside world and to their own troops — seem to be supporting the leader of that state and carrying out his military policy. Their experience from 1938-1945 may have some bearing on the possibility of an army-based *coup d'état* in other totalitarian countries.

It should be noted at the outset that the German officer corps as a whole never opposed Hitler. Opposition came only from a leading segment of that corps.<sup>1</sup> On the night that Hindenburg died in 1934, Hitler tricked the armed services into swearing an oath of personal allegiance to him. By getting the officers and enlisted men to swear this oath, Hitler won immense advantages over any group of plotters who might arise against him in the armed services. Colonel General Ludwig Beck, Chief of Staff of the Army and key figure in later plots against Hitler,

admitted that he had been taken by surprise at this sudden development for which he blamed Blomberg.<sup>2</sup> "This," Beck said that night, "has been one of the most fateful moments of my life." The great bulk of German officers felt that they could not violate this oath as long as Hitler was alive. Beck found this out to his sorrow on 20 July 1944.

The fact that large numbers of German officers did not protest against Nazi anti-semitism, paganism and lawlessness at an early stage in the regime may be explained partly by the step-by-step intensification of those evils and also partly by the rearmament program which occurred simultaneously. Those were the golden days of rapid promotion in the armed services. Officers, long starved for advancement under the Weimar Republic, at last received professional recognition and overdue pay increases. Hitler also took the trouble to bribe certain senior officers by giving them sums of money not appearing in the ordinary military budget and on which no income taxes were paid.<sup>3</sup>

If the evils of the Nazi regime appeared only gradually to awaken the fears of the officer corps, they could not be overlooked for long. Officers were shocked by the cold-

\*Dr. DeWeerd is a charter member of the American Military Institute, and a former editor (1938-41) of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*. Moreover he is one of those very rare people who wrote a doctoral thesis on a military subject prior to World War II. In 1941-42 he was a Research Associate (Military) in the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton. Later, while serving in the Army, he wrote a preliminary version of the *History of the U.S. Army High Command in World War II*, recently completed by his associates and soon to be published by the Army Historical Division. Dr. DeWeerd is now Professor of History in the University of Missouri.

<sup>1</sup>This opposition came primarily from the Army. The newer and more technical services, the Luftwaffe and Navy, seem to have been more completely Nazified than the Army. No important air force officer took part in the plots against Hitler. Only one naval officer, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, was involved in the resistance movement and he was working for the Armed Forces High Command, not the Navy.

<sup>2</sup>Hans B. Gisevius, *To the Bitter End* (Boston, 1947) p. 279. This account is valuable for many details but open to doubt on Gisevius' own relationship to the underground movement. See Hans Rothfels, *The German Opposition to Hitler* (Hinsdale, Ill., 1948) pp. 29-30.

<sup>3</sup>Field Marshal Günther von Kluge, for example, received a birthday gift of 250,000 marks from Hitler, a fact which enabled the underground to put pressure on him. Unfortunately Kluge proved to be one of the least reliable generals in opposition to Hitler. See Fabian Schlabrendorff and Gero S. Gaevornitz, *They Almost Killed Hitler* (New York, 1947) pp. 39-40. This is an abridged translation of Schlabrendorff's *Offiziere gegen Hitler* (Zurich, 1946).



blooded murder of General Kurt von Schleicher and his wife in 1934. They watched the dismissal of Colonel General Kurt von Hammerstein from the office of Commander in Chief of the Army with great distrust.<sup>4</sup> As long as General Werner von Fritsch held that position they still had some ground for comfort, but when the Gestapo maneuvered Blomberg out of office and forced Fritsch's resignation on a trumped up charge of homosexuality in 1938, they knew the worst.<sup>5</sup> This was the year in which Nazi bullies drove the Jewish widow of General Max Hoffman of World War I fame to suicide. With the elevation of Keitel and Brauchitsch in 1938 a dozen divisional and nearly 100 regimental officers were relieved or dismissed. These were the men the Nazis were afraid of. Regimental officers had the sole decision on accepting officer candidates in the Army. One writer believes that the loss of independent leadership in these dismissals accounts in part for the failure of the German officer corps to act decisively against Hitler in the years 1938-1944.<sup>6</sup>

Not only were many officers alienated by Nazi morals, they also had reason to fear the military consequences of Hitler's leadership. The Austrian crisis passed off without war; but as the Fuehrer's intention to invade Czechoslovakia became clear, Ludwig Beck resigned as Chief of Staff of the Army. He predicted that Germany would be defeated in another world war which was certain to come if Czechoslovakia was invaded.<sup>7</sup>

With this act, Beck became the leader of the military forces opposing Hitler. He was a soldier of great ability and a man of un-

questioned integrity. Many regarded him as an officer in the best traditions of Moltke and Schlieffen. To Beck's way of thinking the German General Staff was not simply a corps of military experts; it was also "the conscience of the Army."<sup>8</sup> His claim to leadership in the Army revolt was based on the moral soundness of his position. Beck was the only senior officer who resigned voluntarily before the war.

The German officer corps was not alone in opposing Hitler. There were widespread but poorly organized groups in the underground movement made up of bankers, jurists, industrialists, diplomats, clergymen, politicians and communists.<sup>9</sup> Support of the underground extended to the Gestapo and the S. S. Until he was trapped and executed, S. S. Obergruppenfuehrer Dr. Arthur Nebe, Chief of the Reich Criminal Police, was of considerable help to the plotters. He was able to give them a great deal of information as well as to tip off victims in advance of their arrest. Liaison between the military and civilian groups was provided by Beck, Goerdeler and Hassell.<sup>10</sup>

Beck's position as leader of the military opposition to Hitler had some real drawbacks. From 1938 onward he had to act from the outside through officers on active duty. He could not give orders; he could

use of new instruments in war is advanced by B. H. Liddell Hart, *The German Generals Talk* (New York, 1948) p. 32.

<sup>8</sup>Gisevius, p. 277.

<sup>9</sup>For the widespread and diversified character of the German underground, see Rudolf Pechel, *Deutscher Widerstand* (Zurich, 1947), Allen W. Dulles, *Germany's Underground* (New York, 1947), *The Von Hassell Diaries, 1938-1944* (Garden City, 1947), Maxime Mourin, *Les Complots Contre Hitler* (Paris, 1948), Ruth Andreas Friedrich, *Berlin Underground* (New York, 1947), Heinrich Fraenkel, *The German People Versus Hitler* (London, 1940) and F. L. Ford, "The 20th of July in the History of German Resistance," *American Historical Review*, July 1946 (LI, pp. 609-626).

<sup>10</sup>Karl Goerdeler was a former mayor of Leipzig. By common consent he was slated to head the government which would replace Hitler. Ulrich von Hassell was formerly German ambassador to Italy.

<sup>4</sup>Hammerstein was an early opponent of Hitler. When he wanted to use the Army to put down Hitler, Hindenburg told him to "keep out of politics."

<sup>5</sup>The Gestapo framed Fritsch by using a dossier built up to support a homosexual charge against a retired army captain named Frisch. Schlabbrendorff, pp. 16-17.

<sup>6</sup>Rothfels, p. 69.

<sup>7</sup>The view that Beck being of the anti-tank school tended to underrate what Hitler might achieve by the

only advise and suggest. The senior officers on whom he could count for some support included: Franz Halder, Erwin von Witzleben, Erich Hoepfner, Eduard Wagner, Friedrich Olbricht, Hans Oster, Alexander von Falkenhausen, Günther von Kluge, Georg Thomas, Henning von Tresckow and Admiral Canaris.<sup>11</sup> Many of these officers held key positions in the German military establishment. Halder was Chief of Staff of the Army from 1938 to 1942. Witzleben and Kluge became field marshals. Thomas was head of the Armed Forces Economic Office; Wagner was Quartermaster General; Olbricht was Deputy Commander of the Replacement Army. Oster and Tresckow held positions in *Abwehr*, the Foreign and Counterintelligence Office of the Armed Forces High Command under Canaris. Other important officers who collaborated with the resistance movement at one time or another include: Hammerstein, Brauchitsch, Stülpnagel, Rommel, Paulus and Manstein.

With such a long list of distinguished senior officers willing at one time or another to throw their weight behind — or to approve of — a plot to overthrow Hitler, one wonders how he could have escaped. One explanation may be found in the fact that these officers never acted together at one time. A second is that they were never able in a crisis suddenly to turn the troops against a regime that they (the officers) seemed to be supporting up to that moment. No important fighting unit ever used its weapons against Hitler or the government he represented. Of all the failures of the officer corps in the plots against Hitler, this was the decisive one.

That a decision to act against the head of the state caused German officers great agony of soul is illustrated by the case of Franz

Halder, a key figure in the early plots. Halder, the Chief of Staff of OKH, was a Bavarian catholic of monarchist sympathies. He was outraged by Nazi attacks on the Church and on the Jews, and appalled by the dangers facing Germany as a result of Hitler's unchecked military ambitions. He wanted to prevent Hitler from going to war and if possible to overthrow him at the same time. To accomplish this he needed the firm support of Colonel General Walther von Brauchitsch, Commander in Chief of the Army. Halder felt that he could not compromise his chief before the time for action had come.<sup>12</sup> Thus Halder lived a life of nervous torture, torn between his convictions that he should act, fears that he might expose his chief prematurely, and the promptings of Beck and Goerdeler.

To Halder's pre-war thinking there were three requirements for a successful Army revolt against Hitler. These were:

1. Resolute leadership with clearly defined responsibilities.
2. The fear of war haunting the German people, making them ready to trade Hitler for peace.
3. Correct timing.

All these seemed present in the Czech crisis during the autumn of 1938. Accordingly Halder felt that the time for action had come.

According to the testimony of surviving members of the plot, the plan for action was as follows: Halder would convince Brauchitsch that the anticipated Fuehrer order to invade Czechoslovakia must not be carried out by the Army. The Potsdam division under command of General Erich von Brockdorff-Rantzau would take over control of Berlin. A division commanded by Witzleben would prevent the S. S. forces in Munich

<sup>11</sup>Of all these officers only Thomas, Falkenhausen and Halder escaped with their lives after the attempt on Hitler's life, 20 July 1944.

<sup>12</sup>For Halder's testimony on these matters at Nurnberg, see *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression* (Washington, 1946-1948) Supplementary Volume B, pp. 1553-1558. Hereafter cited as NCA.

from interfering. Hitler's regime could not be expected to survive such a reversal of his policies. The conspirators had nerved themselves to act — when suddenly they received news that Chamberlain and Daladier were flying to Munich. The complete surrender of the Western powers at Munich cut the ground from under the conspirators. They could only wait for another opportunity to strike.

Munich was more than a Hitler victory over Czechoslovakia and the West; it was a tremendous defeat for the German resistance movement. It robbed Halder's concept of correct timing of a great deal of its validity. In a future crisis the German people could say: "Well, the Fuehrer will do it again; he did it at Munich."<sup>13</sup> The threat of war became a less important factor in determining the correct time for an Army revolt. The effects are to be seen in the Polish crisis of 1939. There was no plot to stop the Army from carrying out Hitler's orders to invade Poland. The only important German officer to protest was General Adams, entrusted with the defense of the West with a force of 23 divisions. The only result of this protest was Adams' early relief from command.

Once the war was underway, the military plotters faced a new situation. Britain and France had declared war on Germany. Were they to open Germany's frontiers to invasion by means of an Army revolt? If they overthrew Hitler, who had an unbroken record of triumphs to his credit, would they not lay the foundations for a new and more dangerous stab-in-the-back legend?<sup>14</sup> Could they be certain that Germany would receive liberal terms from the Allies in case they attempted to end the war? Faced by those doubts the plotters felt that they could not act until

Hitler decided to invade Holland, Belgium and France in the late autumn of 1939. To protest against such a step, Halder collected memoranda from Stülpnagel, Thomas and Warlimont purporting to show that Germany did not have the manpower and resources to defeat the Allies in the West.<sup>15</sup> On the strength of these estimates, Brauchitsch, now won over to the plot, was to face Hitler and defy his order to invade France. This time an armored corps was to take over Berlin. A doctor would find Hitler incapable of ruling, and a new regime would attempt to make peace with the Allies.

This plot scheduled for early November 1939 did not come off. When Brauchitsch brought the news of the Army's defensive concepts to Hitler on 6 November 1939, he was treated to one of the Fuehrer's terrible rages. Hitler took tactical advantage of one of Brauchitsch's complaints that the German infantry in Poland did not live up to expectations and would probably fail in France.<sup>16</sup> The Fuehrer quickly turned a matter of grand strategy and revolution into a one-sided discussion of the merits of the German infantry. Brauchitsch apparently surrendered to a bombardment of words. Halder also gave up. The civilian elements in the underground were dismayed by this turn of events. Gisevius wrote: "Brauchitsch suffered a real nervous breakdown; and of course Halder, too, was soon bawling like a baby. That man Halder! We might have known!" Captain Hermann Kaiser, a teacher in civilian life, then serving on the staff of the Replacement Army wrote a little later: "One need only to think of a Scharnhorst, Clausewitz or Gneisenau to realize to what

<sup>15</sup>Milton Shulman, *Defeat in the West* (New York, 1948) pp. 36-37, Gisevius, pp. 384-385.

<sup>16</sup>Gisevius, p. 388. Hitler returned to this charge in his speech to the commanding officers on 23 November 1939 when he announced his irrevocable decision to invade France at the earliest opportunity. With bitter irony he declared that troops were only as good as their officers. NCA, III, pp. 576-577.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 1558.

<sup>14</sup>The original stab-in-the-back legend was fabricated at German GHQ on 9 November 1918 in an attempt to throw the responsibility for the loss of World War I on the homeland.



levels the officer of today has descended."<sup>17</sup>

To the embarrassment of those officers who had predicted disaster in case of an attack in the West, the invasion of Holland, Belgium and France took place in the spring of 1940 with surprising ease. Once more the professional soldiers were discredited in the eyes of Hitler. Was the Fuehrer being ironical or was he trying to buy off the opposition when, after the French campaign was over, he showered promotions on the men who had assured him he could not defeat France? Among those who meekly accepted a field marshal's baton were Brauchitsch, Witzleben and Kluge, all of whom had taken some part in the movement against Hitler.

With Poland, Norway and France to the Fuehrer's credit, the underground had to postpone its efforts until Germany met a setback or until Hitler was assassinated. The idea of having Hitler murdered or "accidentally" killed had its attractions for opposition leaders in the Army. It would relieve all officers from the obligations of their oath to Hitler. Halder, who had given up trying himself, wanted Admiral Canaris' *Abwehr* to do the deed. Admiral Canaris gave a great deal of help to the underground movement, but he told Halder through General Grosskurth that if the Army wanted Hitler killed they should do their own killing.<sup>18</sup>

Halder's "setback" theory got its first test with the German reverse before Moscow in December 1941, but this crisis passed without seriously weakening Hitler's position. Brauch-

itsch was dismissed and Hitler took over personal command of the Army. Field Marshals Leeb and Rundstedt were retired and 35 divisional generals were relieved. Colonel General Erich Hoepfner was later dismissed from the service for ordering a retreat, and General Count Sponeck was condemned to death for cowardice and failing to obey orders.<sup>19</sup> Halder remained as Chief of Staff of OKH for a time, but he finally exhausted Hitler's patience and was relieved in September 1942. Thus the results of the first German reverse were disappointing to the plotters. It was the generals who suffered — not Hitler.

The second big German setback in the East was the occasion for another abortive attempt against Hitler. This time it was the threatened encirclement of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad that gave impetus to action. Since Stalingrad was the product of Hitler's personal strategy, the resistance movement in the Army planned to have Colonel General Friedrich Paulus draw back his army without orders from Hitler. Paulus would be joined by Kluge and Manstein who would take over independent command in the East. Witzleben would take over command in France. General Olbricht, Deputy Commander of the Replacement Army, would take over control of Berlin. All that was needed was action by Paulus. But instead of withdrawing his threatened army, Paulus flew to a conference with Hitler on 30 January 1943. In return for a promotion to the rank of field marshal, Paulus agreed to go back to his post in Stalingrad and carry out Hitler's insane orders not to retreat an inch. When Paulus did this, Kluge and Manstein refused to move. Clothed with his new rank, Paulus led the remnants of the

<sup>17</sup>Quoted in Rothfels, pp. 70-71. Kaiser and his brother were executed by the Nazis after the plot of 20 July 1944.

<sup>18</sup>Admiral Canaris is one of the most mysterious figures in the German resistance movement. An intriguer but hardly a man of action, he provided cover for men like Oster and Trescow. His organization provided explosives for most of the attempts on Hitler's life. By 1943 he had lost his influence in Nazi circles. Himmler set up his own intelligence agency in 1944. Implicated in the early plots against Hitler, Canaris was condemned by the People's Court and executed by strangulation with piano wire at Flossenbug Concentration Camp. Gisevius, p. 389.

<sup>19</sup>Count Sponeck was held in prison until after 20 July 1944. Then he was executed without further judicial action by the officials of Garmersheim prison. Hassell, p. 242.

German Sixth Army into Russian prisoner of war cages.<sup>20</sup> Later because he may have realized the full implications of his action and for other reasons best known to himself, Paulus joined with other German officers in captivity in Russia in setting up a Free Germany Committee which broadcast over the Russian radio urging Germans to break with Hitler and to end the war.<sup>21</sup>

The Stalingrad fiasco was the last attempt of German officers to disobey Hitler's orders and to use this disobedience as the basis for an attempt to overthrow him. From this time on they offered just enough resistance to satisfy their own consciences and then surrendered to the enemy when circumstances permitted. They would no longer rebel against a Hitler order; they merely waited for the end of the war which increasing numbers of them knew was lost.<sup>22</sup> It is a debatable question whether or not the unconditional surrender policy announced by the Allies at Casablanca discouraged German officers from further attempts. Hassell could only tell the soldiers that they could not be sure of liberal treatment for Germany in case of surrender, but he reminded them that Hitler's Germany would get no terms at all.

With the "setback" theory exhausted there remained only the hope of assassinating Hitler. In these endeavors it is worth noting that the military plotters with all their advantages achieved no more than a lone communist carpenter named George Elser, who planted a bomb in the Munich *Bürgerbräukeller* which exploded shortly after Hitler left the room on 8 November 1939.<sup>23</sup> Perhaps

because Tresckow was serving there, Army Group Center in the East took the lead in trying to kill Hitler. On 13 March 1943, Lieutenant Fabian von Schlabrendorff, one of Tresckow's aides, placed an English-made bomb acquired through the *Abwehr* on board Hitler's plane just before it took off from the Smolensk air field for a return trip to Rastenburg. The code words "airplane accident" were to activate the machinery of revolt set up but not used in the Stalingrad *putsch*.<sup>24</sup> Two hours passed after Hitler's plane took to the air and then the incredible news arrived that he had landed safely at Rastenburg. Examination of the bomb, which was recovered before it was discovered by security detachments at Hitler's headquarters, showed that a faulty detonator foiled the plot.

Having failed with a bomb, a group of seven junior officers on the Army Group Center staff determined to kill Hitler with their pistols the next time he visited the front. They were going to open fire as soon as they saw the Fuehrer and keep on firing until he fell without regard for what happened to themselves.<sup>25</sup> This resolve failed because Hitler did not again visit their front. A plan devised by Tresckow to have Hitler killed at a scheduled inspection of a new uniform failed when an Allied air raid caused the inspection to be cancelled. Three young officers, including the son of Ewald von Kleist, volunteered to pose as models and by detonating explosives taped to their bodies planned to blow themselves and Hitler to pieces.<sup>26</sup>

the explanation given to Gisevius by Dr. Arthur Nebe, who investigated the plot, seems most convincing. Elser planted the bomb alone and made a trip back from the Swiss border to see that it was operating, a precaution which led to his arrest and ultimate execution. Gisevius, pp. 401-411.

<sup>24</sup>Schlabrendorff, pp. 57-59, Dulles, p. 67.

<sup>25</sup>It was not so much fear of what might happen to themselves that deterred assassins but the knowledge that the Nazis held families of traitors accountable as well.

<sup>26</sup>Schlabrendorff, p. 100, Dulles, p. 69.

<sup>20</sup>The cowardliness and foolishness of Paulus' actions at Stalingrad and after led Beck to feel ashamed that he belonged to the same profession. Mourin, p. 135.

<sup>21</sup>Among the leaders of this movement were Walther von Seydlitz, Hans von Wartenburg and Alexander Edler von Daniels.

<sup>22</sup>These conclusions were drawn by a Canadian intelligence officer who interrogated many captured German officers after the war. Shulman, pp. 162-177.

<sup>23</sup>The bomb attempt of 8 November 1939 has been attributed to many agencies including the Gestapo, but

As Hitler buried himself for long periods in his "Wolfschanze" headquarters at Rastenburg in 1943-1944, it became difficult to devise any kind of plot to kill him. Picked S. S. troops guarded the whole Rastenburg area. Three check points had to be passed before anyone could approach Hitler's personal quarters. Concrete blockhouses camouflaged with paint and hidden under pine trees protected the Fuehrer from stray Allied bombing planes. From the Allied point of view this protection was hardly needed, for as Churchill remarked later: "It would be most unfortunate if the Allies were to be deprived in the closing months of the struggle, of that form of warlike genius by which Corporal Schickelgruber has so notably contributed to our victory."<sup>27</sup> Nonetheless Hitler was well protected at Rastenburg from his own people. In order to assassinate him it was necessary to find some officer with access to the Fuehrer's headquarters on legitimate military business. The plotters found such a man in Colonel Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg, Chief of Staff of the Replacement Army in 1943-1944.

Stauffenberg, who had lost a hand and an eye in Tunisia, joined the resistance group in 1943. Since troops were badly needed on all fronts in 1943-1944 to make up the losses imposed by Hitler's hold-everything strategy, there were many occasions on which the Fuehrer wanted information from the Replacement Army Office. Stauffenberg frequently served as a liaison officer. He volunteered to carry a bomb into Hitler's headquarters in his brief case and if necessary stay in the room to see that it exploded.<sup>28</sup> On 26 December 1943 he carried

a bomb to Rastenburg, but the conference was cancelled before he got there. Three times he repeated his efforts without success. Something went wrong each time. Either Hitler was absent or Goering and Himmler failed to show up. When it became clear that it would not be possible to wipe out all the top Nazi leaders in one attempt, the decision was made to try for Hitler alone.

In July 1944 the circumstances for an attempt on Hitler's life and the seizure of power seemed extremely favorable. The Allied armies had broken the Atlantic wall and threatened to destroy the German Seventh Army. Rundstedt, who had remained aloof from all plots, had been replaced by Kluge, who had been an in-and-out member of the anti-Hitler group. Kluge led the plotters to believe that if Hitler were killed, he would join in the attempt to seize power. The support of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, commanding Army Group B, was won through Lieutenant Colonel Cesar Hofacker, one of General Stulpnagel's aides.<sup>29</sup> Rommel had been completely disillusioned by Hitler's absurd direction of the Normandy battles. The cooperation of the Army in the West seemed assured.

The seizure of power in Berlin was to be accomplished by the Replacement Army. Though the attitude of General Friedrich Fromm, its commander, was obscure, the plotters intended to short-circuit him. Under the pretense of preparing for a possible uprising in the city of Berlin, elaborate plans were prepared for the action of the Replacement Army. These operations were given the code word "Walküre" and where necessary Fromm's signature was forged to documents. When the code word was flashed indicating that Hitler had been killed, Goerdeler would become the head of the state. Beck would be

<sup>27</sup>Speech before the House of Commons, 28 September 1944.

<sup>28</sup>Because he only had three fingers on his remaining hand, Stauffenberg could not use a pistol effectively. The brief case bomb was of the same type used in the Smolensk attempt. Its operating mechanism activated by a trip wire was silent.

<sup>29</sup>The evidence of Rommel's complicity in the plot of 20 July 1944 is overwhelming. See Keitel's testimony at Nurnberg in NCA, Supplementary Volume B, 1256-1271.



made War Minister; Witzleben would become Commander in Chief of the Army; Hoepfner would replace Fromm as commander of the Replacement Army; General von Thungen would replace General Korfmeier as commander of Military Area Headquarters III.

In the light of later events it is clear that the plotters made one serious mistake just before the attempt of 20 July. Count Helldorf, Berlin Police Chief and a firm supporter of the resistance movement, warned the Replacement Army to send a certain ardent Nazi, Major Otto Remer, out of Berlin on the day of the attempt.<sup>30</sup> Remer commanded a guard battalion in Berlin. This suggestion was turned down for fear of creating suspicion. As it turned out, Remer's presence in Berlin on 20 July was one of the critical factors in the failure of the attempt to seize power.

When Stauffenberg arrived at Hitler's headquarters carrying a bomb in his brief case, he found that the conference scheduled for noon had on account of the heat been moved from Hitler's command post to a wooden shed. He entered the conference room and placed his brief case on the floor near the table at which Hitler was sitting. With his foot he activated the trip wire. Then by pre-arrangement, he was called to the telephone by his aide, Lieutenant Werner von Haeften, who had been left for that purpose at the airfield. Stauffenberg left the room to answer the phone; he heard the explosion and saw bodies fly from the wreckage of the building. Convinced that Hitler was dead, he drove to the airfield and took off for Berlin. He arrived in the capital at 3.30 P.M.

<sup>30</sup>Gisevius, p. 515. For his part in crushing the attempt to seize power in Berlin, Remer was raised to the rank of Major General. In a command assignment far beyond his limited abilities, Remer contributed to the defeat of the German Ardennes offensive in December 1944.

The explosive force of Stauffenberg's bomb was lost on the flimsy structure of the shed. Three officers in the room were killed but Hitler suffered only ruptured ear drums and minor cuts and scratches. It developed later that Hitler had left the table where he had been sitting and had gone over to the wall to look at a map before the bomb exploded. Meantime a second element of failure entered into the plot. General Erich Fellgiebel in charge of communications at Rastenburg was a member of the resistance group. It was his job to destroy all communications equipment so that Rastenburg would be completely cut off from the outside world. He heard the explosion and then saw Hitler emerge from the ruins supported by Keitel. Deciding that the plot had failed, Fellgiebel did not destroy the communications headquarters.<sup>31</sup> It became possible for Keitel and Hitler to speak to Berlin by telephone. This was one of the factors that turned the tide in Berlin.

A third cause for failure appears in the negligence of the group which seized the offices of the Replacement Army shortly after noon on 20 July. Olbricht, Beck, Hoepfner and Quirnheim merely replaced Fromm; they did not arrest him and secure his person. When the news of Hitler's escape reached Berlin, Fromm simply walked back into the room and arrested the conspirators. He convinced Beck that the news of Hitler's escape was genuine and offered his old chief the privilege of committing suicide. Like everything else about the plot, Beck's attempt at suicide was only a partial success. The bullet glanced off his skull and he finally had to be put out of his misery by Fromm. Olbricht, Stauffenberg, Haeften and Quirnheim were executed on Fromm's orders by the guard battalion of Major Remer. Ironic-

<sup>31</sup>Fellgiebel's failure to act did not save his life. He was identified with the plot and executed on 4 September 1944.

ally enough, Fromm did not escape with his life either. Hauled before the People's Court, he was found to have shown lack of zeal in handling the plot and was executed in Brandenburg prison on 19 March 1945.

The Nazis were able to take a terrible revenge on the plotters because in the period between the time "Walküre" was put into effect and the time Hitler's escape became known, thousands of telephone and teletype messages had been sent from the office of the Replacement Army announcing the seizure of power. Lists of the new government officers fell into the hands of the Gestapo. Many officers had taken steps on the assumption that Hitler was dead which they could not retract or cover up. Besides the officers who committed suicide or were shot immediately in Berlin, Stülpnagel, Wagner, Kluge, Rommel and Tresckow lost or took their lives as a result of the plot. Judge Roland Freisler's People's Court made a spectacle out of the trial of Witzleben and Hoepfner who were garroted to death. It has been estimated that nearly 5000 persons were executed as a direct result of the plot and that 700 officers were included in this number.<sup>32</sup> Military victims included: Canaris, Oster, Lindemann, Stieff, Rabenau, Freytag-Loringhoven, Hase, Thungen and many others.

There were no further Army plots against Hitler. Other Nazi camp followers like Albert Speer considered assassinating Hitler to prevent the senseless destruction of German property, but like the soldiers, Speer got around to his plot too late.<sup>33</sup> German officers were never given another chance to murder

Hitler. At future conferences they were searched for weapons and forced to leave their brief cases outside the conference room, Lieutenant General Fritz Bayerlein, commanding the Panzer Lehr Division, said that during a two-hour conference on the Ardennes offensive held in December 1944, he did not dare to reach into his pocket for a handkerchief for fear that the S. S. guards would shoot him on the spot.<sup>34</sup>

Looking back on the failures of the officers' conspiracies, it would appear that both the military and civilian elements mistakenly assumed that Hitler could be overthrown without breaking the power of his elite party troops, the S. S. The officers were merely the spearhead of the resistance movement. They could not bring the German people into the streets against the regime. They waited too long before attempting to kill Hitler. Accustomed to their military ways of doing things, they wanted written orders from somebody directing them to overthrow the regime, as Hoepfner's pathetic insistence on a piece of paper to cover his actions on 20 July indicates. They did not act ruthlessly against men in their own organization like Kluge, who wavered after making promises. The clear cut opportunity to kill Hitler presented on 20 July was muffed because it was assumed that Stauffenberg could both kill Hitler and get away to take part in the seizure of power in Berlin. He accomplished nothing important in Berlin and lost his life in the failure. Had he remained in the room and carried additional explosives taped to his body, it seems likely that the attempt might have succeeded.<sup>35</sup> The failure of all the

<sup>32</sup>These figures based on surviving S. S. reports and on a British Admiralty Press release dated 20 July 1947, giving material in captured German naval records, are given by Rothfels, pp. 9-10.

<sup>33</sup>Speer planned to introduce poison gas into the ventilating system of the Fuehrer bunker in Berlin, but he found the ventilating shaft bricked over before he could accomplish his purpose. H. R. Trevor-Roper, *The Last Days of Hitler* (New York, 1947) pp. 79-80.

<sup>34</sup>Shulman, pp. 230-231.

<sup>35</sup>Heinz Buchholz, who was present in the room when the bomb exploded, testified that Colonel Brandt moved the brief case (bomb) away from the table where Stauffenberg had placed it because it got in his way. Buchholz attributes Hitler's escape in part to this fact. He makes no mention of Hitler having moved across the room to consult a wall map. Dulles, p.6.

efforts against Hitler by what has been described as "an unbelievable accumulation of trivial incidents," has led certain writers to see an inexplicable pattern of tragedy in these events.

Perhaps the best justification of the failures of the officers' conspiracies was voiced by Tresckow shortly before the attempt on 20 July. Speaking to Schlabrendorff he said: "The assassination must be attempted, at any cost. Even should that fail, the attempt to seize power in the capital must be undertaken. We must prove to the world and to future generations that the men of the German resistance movement dared to take the decisive step and to hazard their lives upon it. Compared to this object, nothing else matters."

In a message written just before his suicide

in the Fuehrer bunker, Hitler delivered a Parthian shot at his "unfaithful" generals. A postscript to his political testament attributed Germany's defeat to the treachery of the Army officers.<sup>36</sup> The General Staff in World War II, he complained, could not be compared to the Great German General Staff of 1914-1918. "Its achievements," he wrote, "were far behind those of the fighting front." Having done his best to lay the foundations for a new legend that the Third Reich had been robbed of victory by the incapacity and treachery of its army officers, Hitler took refuge in the shadows of the grave.

<sup>36</sup>The original text of this document did not survive Colonel Nikolaus von Below's attempt to flee from the Fuehrer bunker, but it was reconstructed from memory after the war. One British historian who took great pains to study this period accepts it as genuine on the basis of internal evidence. Trevor-Roper, p. 194.

## HISTORIES OF OLD AMERICAN REGIMENTS

It is believed that these brief outline histories of some of our older American units will be of interest to the readers of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*. These facts have recently been checked and officially recognized by the Organizational Histories and Honors Branch, Army Historical Division, Washington, D. C. Another brief history is given on the foot of page 222. *The Editor*.

### 182D INFANTRY REGIMENT

The 182d Infantry Regiment, whose home station is at Charleston, Massachusetts, was constituted 7 October 1636 from existing train bands as the North Regiment, to include the towns of Charlestown, New Town, Watertown, Concord and Dedham.

The 182d Infantry Regiment is officially credited with the following battle honors:

*Revolutionary War*—Massachusetts 1775, Boston. *War of 1812*—Without inscription. *Civil War*—Bull Run, North Carolina 1862-63. *World War I*—Meuse-Argonne. *World War II*—Guadalcanal, Northern Solomons, Southern Philippines (with arrowhead), Leyte. *Unit Decorations*—Presidential Unit Citation (Navy) Streamer embroidered GUADALCANAL. Company E entitled to Distinguished Unit Streamer embroidered BOUGANVILLE.



## THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE AND PACIFIC STRATEGY\*

By JOHN MILLER, JR.

IF EVER ANY WAR WON by a coalition was fought according to plan, then it was World War II. The documents relating to the strategic direction of the war on the Allied side by the U. S.-British Combined Chiefs of Staff under the supervision of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill contain ample evidence to support this thesis. It is well demonstrated by the conference at Casablanca, French Morocco, in January 1943. Although that conference was held to decide on Allied objectives for the year 1943, the discussions and decisions clearly indicate that the Chiefs of Staff had, at that early date, a clear idea of the strategy which would defeat Japan.

The meeting at Casablanca was the first full British-American conference following the initiation of Allied offensive action in North Africa and the Pacific. By January 1943 the Guadalcanal and Papuan Campaigns in the South and Southwest Pacific Areas were drawing to a successful close. These operations had been originally designed to protect the lines of communication leading from the United States and Hawaii to New Zealand and Australia, as part of a strategic defensive. They were directed toward the Japanese bastion at Rabaul on New Britain in the Bismarck Archipelago. Now

that Hawaii, Midway, and the lines of communication were relatively secure, the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were able to consider plans for a strategic offensive in the Pacific.

The Japanese victories of late 1941 and early 1942 had invalidated, for the time being, American defense plans in event of a Japanese attack. In early 1943 no plan for the defeat of Japan had been prepared, but the subject was under study in Washington. Also under discussion were such related subjects as the advantages and disadvantages of moving against Japan through the North Pacific, and the possibility of conducting operations in Burma to reopen the road to China.<sup>1</sup>

When the President, Prime Minister, and Combined Chiefs assembled in Casablanca, Pacific questions loomed large, but naturally represented only part of the general problem of balancing ends against means in order to determine what strategic objectives the Allies could and should strive toward in 1943. The Americans and British agreed on general objectives, and were firmly convinced that Germany would have to be defeated before the Allies could concentrate against Japan.

Differences over several important matters were made clear before the conference. The Americans wished the Allies to "conduct a strategic offensive in the Atlantic-Western European Theater directly against Germany,

\*This article is taken from Chapter I of *The Northern Solomons and the Reduction of Rabaul*, now in preparation for THE U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II; THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC. A small part of this material appeared in "The Strategic Background of the Northern Solomons Campaign," *Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 58, No. 3, July 1949. Copyright 1950 by Orlando Ward; permission for reproduction may be obtained on request from the Chief, Historical Division, Special Staff, U. S. Army, Department of the Army, The Pentagon, Washington 25, D. C.—The Editor.

<sup>1</sup>CCS Supplementary Minutes, 47th Meeting, Nov 6, 1942; JCS Minutes, 49th Meeting, Jan 5, 1943; JPS Minutes, 48th, 49th Meetings, Dec 2, 1942, and Dec 9, 1942; JPS 67/2, Jan 4, 1943, Proposed Directive for a Campaign for the Defeat of Japan, OPD file 381 Japan (8-27-42), Sec 1, in Plans and Opns Div, General Staff, USA. Bound folders containing CCS, JCS, and JPS minutes are kept in the OPD records now in the Plans and Opns Div, General Staff, USA.

employing the maximum forces consistent with maintaining the accepted strategic concept in other areas," and to aid the Soviet Union. In the Pacific and Far East the Joint Chiefs desired to break the enemy's hold on positions which threatened the Allied lines of communication. They hoped to guarantee the security of Alaska, Hawaii, New Zealand, Australia, and the lines of communication, to keep the initiative in the South and Southwest Pacific Areas with the ultimate intention of establishing bases for offensive action in the Solomons, Bismarck Archipelago, and New Guinea, to inflict heavy losses on the Japanese, and to prevent them from consolidating and exploiting their conquests. Considering that China had to be kept in the war to pin down Japanese soldiers and to preserve for the Allies air bases from which to attack Japan, the Joint Chiefs recommended that Burma be recaptured by the British. Recapture of Burma would reopen the Burma Road and enable the Allies to send more supplies to Chiang Kai-Shek's armies.<sup>2</sup>

The British Chiefs of Staff understandably shied away from enlarging the scope of Allied action in the Pacific. The British were making their maximum possible effort; no further mobilization of industry or manpower was possible. With the Germans sitting right across the Channel from England, the British stressed the importance of concentrating against Germany first. While admitting the value of retaking Burma, they strongly emphasized the importance of aiding the Soviet Union. They suggested that pending the defeat of Germany, the Japanese should be contained in the Pacific by limited offensives.<sup>3</sup>

The first meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Casablanca was held on the morning of January 14, 1943.<sup>4</sup> At the start of the discussion, Admiral King deprecated the fact that so small a portion of Allied resources was being employed against the Japanese. More effort, he felt, should be put forth, for the Japanese were delaying in the Solomons and entrenching themselves in the Netherlands East Indies. General Marshall added to King's points, and informed the British that the Joint Chiefs were anxious to find a method of striking the Japanese defenses in the flanks and rear, for he believed the enemy was establishing a defensive line running from the Solomons through New Guinea to Timor. Marshall also spoke strongly in favor of operations in Burma.<sup>5</sup>

At the afternoon meeting, the British requested a review of the Pacific situation. King declared that of the numerous active fronts, the Allies faced the Japanese on four—the Alaska-Aleutian area, the Hawaii-

<sup>4</sup>Representing the United States at this session were three of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Marshall, Admiral King, and General Arnold, and Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, commanding the Army Service Forces, and Brig. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer and Rear Adm. Charles M. Cooke of the Joint Staff Planners. Admiral Leahy, who was ill, did not come to Casablanca. Great Britain was represented by Gen. Sir Alan F. Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff; Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff; Field Marshal Sir John Dill, head of the British staff mission to Washington; Vice Adm. the Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations, and Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to Churchill and Secretary of the War Cabinet.

<sup>5</sup>CCS Minutes, 55th Meeting, Jan 14, 1943. The proceedings and papers of the Chiefs of Staff at Casablanca are all filed in regular sequence with the CCS and JCS minutes and papers. They were also printed and bound, along with the proceedings of the meetings attended by the President and Prime Minister, in a separate volume, *Casablanca Conference: Papers and Minutes of Meetings* (edited and printed by the U. S. Secretary, Office of the CCS, 1943), filed in the Plans and Opns Div, General Staff, USA. For an able discussion of the conference from Harry Hopkins' point of view, see Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York, 1948), Ch. XXVII.

<sup>2</sup>CCS 135, Dec 26, 1942, Basic Strategic Concept for 1943, OPD file 381 Sec 4 (9-25-41) in Plans and Opns Div, General Staff, USA.

<sup>3</sup>CCS 135/1, Jan 2, 1943, Basic Strategic Concept for 1943—The European Theater, ABC 381 Sec 4 (9-25-41).

Midway line, the South and Southwest Pacific Areas, and China-Burma. After summarizing previous operations in the Pacific, he stated that the main objective of the operations then underway in the Solomons and eastern New Guinea was the security of the approaches to Australia, "and the key to the situation is Rabaul."

In raising the question of where to go after the capture of Rabaul, King urged that the Philippines should be an eventual Allied objective rather than the Netherlands East Indies. "An attack against the Indies would represent a frontal assault against a main enemy source of supply. Since the Philippines lie athwart all the air and sea routes leading from Japan to the Indies, it was clear that seizure of the Philippines by the Allies would cut off Japan from the oil of the Indies.

The route of approach to the Philippines favored by King lay through the Central Pacific. For years, he remarked, the recapture of these islands had been a standard problem of the Naval War College. Three routes from the United States across the Pacific to the Philippines had been studied: the direct approach through the Central Pacific, a northerly route by way of the Aleutians to Luzon, and a southern approach which was outflanked by enemy bases. The Central Pacific route would involve "establishing a base in the northwestern Marshalls and then proceeding to Truk and the Marianas."<sup>6</sup>

The British Chiefs, while giving firm commitments to turn on Japan in full force after the defeat of Germany, were not enthusiastic about taking the initiative against Japan at this time. They felt that the Allies should establish a strong defensive line and let the Japanese beat themselves against it. While

favoring operations in Burma, they feared that too great an effort there would cut deeply into the main effort against Germany. The Philippines, they believed, could not be retaken before the fall of Germany, and it might therefore be unwise to go as far forward as Truk in the immediate future rather than just before the attack on the Philippines. King agreed in principle that the recapture of the Philippines should follow Germany's defeat. The Combined Chiefs concluded the meetings of January 14 by directing the Combined Staff Planners to prepare recommendations on Allied Pacific objectives for 1943.<sup>7</sup>

By the time the Joint Chiefs met at 9:30 A.M. on Sunday, January 17, in advance of the Combined Chiefs' meeting, a good deal of progress had been made toward resolving the British and American differences over Pacific strategy.<sup>8</sup> Rear Adm. Charles M. Cooke of the Naval War Plans Division, the Joint Staff Planners, and the Combined Staff Planners, reported that the Combined Planners had agreed on virtually all Pacific problems, but had not yet settled their differences about Burma. Cooke had told the British planners that the United States did not intend to undertake all the Pacific operations simultaneously, although it might be possible to start an advance through the Gilberts and Marshalls toward Truk during the campaign against Rabaul.<sup>9</sup>

The Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting at 10:30 that morning was largely concerned with Iceland, the Soviet Union, air protection for convoys, and Burma, but the Pacific

<sup>7</sup>CCS Minutes, 56th Meeting, Jan 14, 1943. The Combined Staff Planners consisted of the American Joint Staff Planners and the British planning staff.

<sup>8</sup>President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill had arrived by January 15, and the first full dress meeting was held that afternoon. The chief topics at this meeting were the military situation in North Africa and the Middle East, and Allied relations with Turkey. The Pacific was not discussed. Casablanca Conference, pp. 134-142.

<sup>9</sup>JCS Minutes, 53rd Meeting, Jan 17, 1943.

<sup>6</sup>The minutes use the words "northern route" in connection with the passage quoted, but "Central Pacific" or something similar is obviously meant.



received some attention. Both Americans and British again agreed on the desirability of the project to reopen the Burma Road, although the British did not feel that resources were adequate.

In what must have been a heated discussion of Pacific problems, the American Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed their belief that the prime enemy was Germany, but stressed the necessity for retaining the initiative against Japan. Marshall, concerned over the possibility of military disasters in the Pacific, assured his colleagues that the American people would not stand for "another Bataan." Sufficient resources must be kept in the Pacific, Marshall warned, for "a situation might arise in the Pacific at any time that would necessitate the United States regretfully withdrawing from the commitments in the European theatre." The Joint Chiefs stated that President Roosevelt was anxious to support China, and King reminded the British that many of the demands in the Pacific stemmed from Australia.<sup>10</sup>

The Combined Staff Planners had virtually completed their recommendations on Pacific objectives for 1943 by January 18. When the Combined Chiefs met that morning, they discussed the contents of three papers submitted by the planners — a plan for Burma, the recommendations of the American planners, and some British alternate proposals. When the Americans offered to furnish some of the ships and landing craft for Burma, the Combined Chiefs agreed that plans and preparations should be made to start the recapture of Burma in 1943, but that they would meet again in summer to decide whether the campaign should actually be undertaken.

With Burma settled for the time being, the Chiefs of Staff turned to consider Pacific strategy for the year. The recommendations

of the American planners were contained in a long memorandum which was based on several fundamental assumptions, namely, that the ultimate Allied objective was to win the war as quickly as possible, that the Allied attacks must be aimed at the rapid destruction of the Axis' economic and military power, that Germany was the prime enemy, and that the major part of Allied forces should be directed against Germany as far as was consistent with the objective of winning the war as quickly as possible. The American planners also assumed that Russia and Japan would remain at peace with one another, and that China would stay in the war if furnished with enough supplies by Britain and the United States.

To achieve the main objective of winning the war as quickly as possible, and to maintain the security of Allied positions, the American planners reasoned that the Japanese must be kept under "continual pressure sufficient in power and extent to absorb [their] . . . disposable military effort." Since the Allied positions extended over a 12,000 mile-long line, and the Japanese operated on interior lines, the Allies should keep the initiative by moving against enemy positions sufficiently important to cause Japanese "counteraction," and the Allies had to be able to frustrate that counteraction. Thus the Japanese would not be able to dig in and consolidate, and the Allies would be able to take the offensive when they wished. All Allied attacks should result in a decrease of enemy naval and air power. The major portion of the U. S. Fleet would continue to be used in the Pacific. To give "full implementation" to the fleet, enough mobile air and ground forces, as well as shipping, must be available for limited operations. Pacific campaigns, concluded the planners, were hampered by lack of shipping, but were not much hindered by Japanese submarines, in sharp contrast with the situation in the Atlantic where German

<sup>10</sup>CCS Minutes, 59th Meeting, Jan 17, 1943.

U-Boats, as Churchill insisted on calling them, functioned with deadly effect.

In consonance with these principles and facts, the Americans considered the following operations necessary:

1. seizure of the Solomons, of eastern New Guinea as far as Lae and Salamaua, and of the New Britain-New Ireland area;

2. seizure of Kiska and Agattu in the Aleutians;

3. after Rabaul, seizure and occupation of the Gilberts, Marshalls, and Carolines through Truk and extension of the occupation of New Guinea to the Dutch border; and

4. operations in Burma designed to keep China in the war and increase the employment of China-based aircraft against shipping.<sup>11</sup>

The British planners, while accepting the general principles expounded by the Americans, took issue in regard to several particulars. They desired that it be specifically stated that Germany would be defeated first. Pending the time that the Allies could turn on Japan in full strength, the Japanese should be contained and prevented from consolidating. Once the Allies were established in the Solomons, Bismarck Archipelago, and eastern New Guinea, the Combined Chiefs could meet again to decide on the Aleutians and Gilberts-Marshalls-Carolines campaigns, whether to extend to the Dutch border, and on the Burma operations. Capturing Burma and Truk concurrently might limit the possibility of an early German defeat, the British observed, but one operation might be possible.<sup>12</sup>

Whereas the British Chiefs feared that Pacific operations might draw in so much

Allied strength as to jeopardize the war against Germany, they strongly urged an "all out effort" in the Mediterranean. Marshall, expressing his opposition to "interminable operations" in that region, favored northern France. He reiterated his desire to apply continuous pressure against the Japanese to prevent them from consolidating. Speaking out against a "hand-to-mouth" policy in the Pacific, he declared that lack of resources had nearly caused disasters and threatened the concept of beating Germany first.

In responding to a British suggestion that in 1943 the Allies limit themselves to Rabaul and the recapture of Burma, King remarked that the operations might be carried out in succession. Since Rabaul might be taken by May and the Burma campaign could not start until November, the forces would remain idle unless used in the Marshalls. The Marshalls invasion would not represent an unqualified commitment, King stated; it might prove impossible to take Truk in 1943. But as Cooke declared, a large part of American shipping was needed to maintain the American fleet in the Pacific. This represented a fixed overhead. The requirement would continue regardless of any decision in favor of Truk. Marshall, in analyzing the problem, considered that sacrificing the Burma operation for Truk was out of the question.

To assure the British that the proposed Central Pacific offensive would not be undertaken at the expense of operations against Germany, Marshall then proposed a slight change in the wording of the American paper to specify that the Gilberts-Marshalls-Carolines operations would be carried out "with the resources available in the theater." This suggestion, which was accepted, settled the last disagreement over Pacific strategy for 1943.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup>CCS 153 (Revised), Jan 17, 1943, Situation to be Created in the Eastern Theater (Pacific and Burma) in 1943, in Casablanca Conference, pp. 4-8.

<sup>12</sup>CCS 153/1, Jan 17, 1943, Situation to be Created in the Eastern Theatre (Pacific and Burma) in 1943, in Casablanca Conference, pp. 8-11.

<sup>13</sup>CCS Minutes, 60th Meeting, Jan 18, 1943.

The Combined Chiefs then reported to the President and Prime Minister to outline the conclusions they had reached. At this meeting, on January 18, Prime Minister Churchill stated emphatically that the British would turn all their resources and efforts against Japan once Hitler had been broken. He offered to "sign a bond" but President Roosevelt assured him that "no formal statement or agreement along these lines was the least bit necessary—that the American people accept the word of a great English gentleman."<sup>14</sup>

The meeting on January 18 closed the Combined Chiefs' discussions of Pacific strategy.<sup>15</sup> The conference continued for five more days, but these were largely taken up by European and Mediterranean affairs. With the Pacific issues settled, the American Chiefs of Staff were able to present to the British a statement of what they intended to do in the Pacific during the year. On January 22, after a brief consideration of the potentialities of the B-29 and B-32 bombers (which were not yet in mass production), the Combined Chiefs "took note" of a detailed memorandum from the U. S. Chiefs which set forth their plans.<sup>16</sup> Marshall, King, and Arnold explained that the defeat of Japan, an insular power, would be accomplished by the same general measures that could be used to subdue Great Britain: blockade, bombardment, and assault. Attacks against warships and merchant vessels were naturally an integral part of all operations. In 1943, the Allies would "work toward positions from which land-

based air can attack Japan." "... assault [by ground troops] on Japan," observed the Joint Chiefs, "is remote and may well not be found necessary."<sup>17</sup>

By January 22, the last day of the conference, all questions of world-wide strategy had been resolved, and a program for 1943 was approved. The Allied leaders, in the final resolutions of the conference, agreed to secure the sea communications in the Atlantic, to continue to send supplies to the Soviet Union, to capture Sicily, to bomb Germany heavily and continue to build up forces in Britain for an invasion of the European continent, and to attempt to enlist Turkey as an active ally. It was agreed that China should be supported with a view to mounting air attacks against Japan from Chinese bases, and that Burma should therefore be recaptured. The Combined Chiefs were to meet later on to determine whether the recapture of Burma could be undertaken in 1943.

In order that preparations for Europe would not be jeopardized by the necessity for diverting forces to salvage disasters elsewhere, adequate forces would be maintained in the Pacific and Far East. Operations would be conducted to keep continuous pressure on Japan and "attain a position of readiness" for a full scale offensive once Germany was defeated. These operations were to be kept within such limits that they would not threaten the capacity of the Allies to capitalize on any chance for defeating Germany in 1943.

Specifically, in the Pacific the Allies hoped to mount operations to secure the Aleutians, to advance in a northwesterly direction from Samoa to protect the U. S.-Australian line of communications, to launch diversionary attacks against the Malay Barrier (the Malay

<sup>14</sup>President Roosevelt's speech to the White House Correspondents' Association, Feb 12, 1943, quoted in Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 700; Casablanca Conference, pp. 142-154. The phrase "sign a bond" was used by King at the Pacific Military Conference in Washington on March 12, 1943.

<sup>15</sup>CCS Minutes, 61st Meeting, Jan 19, 1943; CCS 155/1, Jan 19, 1943, *Conduct of the War in 1943*, in Casablanca Conference, pp. 18-20.

<sup>16</sup>CCS Minutes, 67th Meeting, Jan 22, 1943.

<sup>17</sup>CCS 168, Jan 22, 1943, *Conduct of the War in the Pacific Theater in 1943*, in Casablanca Conference, pp. 95-99.



Peninsula, Sumatra, and Java), and to advance west against the Truk-Guam line in conjunction with the operations against Rabaul. The recapture of Rabaul in 1943 was taken almost for granted. No advance from Rabaul to the Truk-Guam line would begin "unless and until" forces were on hand to finish the task and follow up. The advance westward to the Truk-Guam line would probably follow the capture of Rabaul, but would not be permitted to prejudice the recapture of Burma.<sup>18</sup>

The Allied leaders were cheered by their accomplishments at Casablanca. King spoke of the "great value of the basic strategic plan" which he asserted was the "biggest step forward in the winning of the war."<sup>19</sup> Churchill's praise was unstinted. Speaking

from a great fund of first-hand and historical knowledge, he stated that "there never has been, in all of the interallied conferences I have known, anything like the professional examination of the whole scene of the world in its military, its armament production and its economic aspects."<sup>20</sup> Harry Hopkins' satisfaction with the final decisions was pithily expressed in a note to Sir John Dill: "I think this is a *very* good paper and a damn good plan . . ."<sup>21</sup>

Events would soon show that the Combined Chiefs, especially the Americans, had been overly optimistic about Pacific objectives for 1943. Rabaul could not be taken in 1943, and in the end was neutralized rather than recaptured. The plans had also to be changed in some other respects. Truk was by-passed. The long-range air bombardment of the Japanese home islands was based on the Marianas instead of China. But as an examination of the course of the war will show, the strategic concepts expressed by the Joint Chiefs at Casablanca were an accurate forecast of the way by which Japan was defeated.

<sup>18</sup>CCS 170/2, Jan 23, 1943, Final Report to the President and Prime Minister Summarizing Decisions by the CCS, in Casablanca Conference, pp. 117-125; CCS 168, Jan 22, 1943, Conduct of the War in the Pacific Theater in 1943; CCS 155/1, Jan 19, 1943, Conduct of the War in 1943; proceedings of the last meeting, Casablanca Conference, pp. 154-169. It was at Roosevelt's insistence that air operations from China were specified. No advance northwest from Samoa was ever undertaken, but the invasions of the Gilberts and Marshalls in 1943 and 1944 did advance Allied holdings in a northwesterly direction from Samoa.

<sup>19</sup>CCS Minutes, 69th Meeting, Jan 23, 1943.

<sup>20</sup>Quoted in Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 684.

<sup>21</sup>Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 691.

## FAID — KASSERINE: THE GERMAN VIEW \*

By GEORGE F. HOWE

On the night of 13/14 February, 1943, Allied troops from Gafsa to Fondouk were expecting an Axis attack through the mountain chain screening the coastal plain of Tunisia into the area west of it. Along the plain ran the line of communications from the Tunis bridgehead to Tripolitania. Near it the American II Corps was assembling on the southern flank of the British First Army, planning to launch aggressive operations in March. Allied forces were strung out widely. The line was thinly held. The Americans of II Corps were largely of the opinion that the attack would strike their sector through Faid Pass, which the enemy held for the last two weeks. Higher levels were persuaded that the enemy would come through Fondouk Pass, farther north.<sup>1</sup> This uncertainty prevented an adequate concentration near Faid Pass even to counterattack. It facilitated the success of an attack which, beginning with the penetration of the mountain screen near Faid, forced the Allies to engage in desperate defenses of the higher western mountain barrier at several points. The Axis operations appeared to proceed "according to plan." Certain beliefs about them became widespread. They were termed an attack by the "Afrika Korps" under command of Field Marshal Rommel with the purpose of seizing Tebessa (the advanced base for the American II Corps). Ultimate failure was

attributed to a shortage of essential supplies rather than to Rommel's disposition of forces or the quality of Allied resistance. The loss of Kasserine Pass was attributed to the faulty conduct of the defense there and thought to have opened the way for Rommel to raise havoc with the Allied Force. It is the main purpose of this brief sketch to show what German records indicate to be fact or mistaken supposition concerning the battles from Sidi Bou Zid to the area beyond Kasserine Pass.

The concentration of American troops in January was watched closely by the Germans and in particular by Field Marshal Rommel. He did not wish his army to be threatened in the rear by a strong force during the defense of the Mareth Position. The genesis of the attack of 14 February appears to have been a memorandum to the high command which he submitted on 4 February.<sup>2</sup> Like Gen. Jurgen von Arnim, commanding the *Fifth Panzer Army* in northern Tunisia, Rommel conducted the operations of his *German-Italian Panzer Army* (of which the *Deutsches Afrika Korps* formed one part) under control by the Italian chiefs of staff, the *Comando Supremo*. Its directives were issued through Field Marshal Kesselring, *Commander-in-Chief, South*. The memorandum of 4 February proposed attacks against the Americans at Gafsa by Rommel's mobile troops and against another point northeast of Gafsa by troops of the *Fifth Panzer Army*.

*Comando Supremo's* first consideration was to avoid endangering the troops of the *German-Italian Panzer Army* in southern

\*This article is an abridged version, omitting American sources, of a chapter in Dr. Howe's forthcoming book, *Operations in Northwest Africa, 1941-1943*, one of the volumes of the official *U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II* series, to be published by the Army Historical Division. Copyright 1950 by Orlando Ward; permission for reproduction may be obtained on request from the Chief, Historical Division, Special Staff, U. S. Army, Department of the Army, The Pentagon, Washington, 25, D. C.—*The Editor*.

<sup>1</sup>Gen. D. D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (N. Y., 1948), 142.

<sup>2</sup>Hq. Ger-Ital Pzr Army, *Schlachtbericht*, 4 Feb 43, and *Anlage* Nr. 995 in *Anlagenband VIII*; *Anlage* Nr. 1038 in *Anlagenband IX*.

Tunisia by withdrawing armored elements. Its directive confined Rommel to a minimum task force of mobile troops (*Kampfgruppe D A K*) from the *German Africa Corps*, plus armored elements of *131 Armored (Centauro) Division* already stationed northwest of Gabes, and in addition, attachment of mobile elements from *21 Panzer Division*, which had passed recently to von Arnim's command.<sup>3</sup>

*Comando Supremo's* directive had just been issued, and the commanders were conferring at Rhennouch when reconnaissance reports revealed a northward displacement by most of the Americans from the Gafsa-Tebessa area. In the end, it was agreed that the attack against Sidi Bou Zid should precede Rommel's Gafsa attack by about two days, that *21 Panzer Division* should take part in both, and that *10 Panzer Division* should return to north Tunisia as soon as possible. Exploitation of success would be governed by the tactical situation.<sup>4</sup> What has been thought of as the Faid-Kasserine battles began, then, as two interrelated operations, *FRUEHLINGSWIND* by *Group Ziegler* from *Fifth Panzer Army* and *MORGENLUFT* by *Kampfgruppe D A K*.

*Fifth Panzer Army* set the date for its operation and placed it under General of Artillery Heinz Ziegler, von Arnim's second in command. From *10 Panzer Division* (Maj. Gen. Freiherr Fritz von Broich), two attack groups were created, each going through Faid Pass and then diverging. One circled around Djebel Lessouda from the north, thus isolating a force of infantry, artillery, and armor which had been stationed on that hill and getting in position north of the Faid-Sbeitla road to intercept Allied movement between Sidi Bou Zid and Sbeitla. The other group pushed along the road and struck southwest at Sidi Bou Zid itself. They

were able to engage Gen. McQuillin's Combat Command A, 1st Armored Division, piecemeal and to harry it out of the area. *21 Panzer Division* (Col. Hans-Georg Hildebrandt) set up two attack groups which used the Maizila Pass, 18 miles south of Faid. They began emerging from the western exit at first light and thereafter separated. One protected the exit and moved northward, west of the mountain chain. The other made a wide sweep around the mountains south of Sidi Bou Zid and approached that objective from the southwest along the highway from Gafsa. They encircled more than a battalion of American infantry on two adjacent hills southwest of Sidi Bou Zid, Djebel Ksaira and Garet Hadid. By nightfall, the Americans had retired to the northwest, losing 40 tanks, 71 prisoners and numerous guns and vehicles.<sup>5</sup> More would be found when the area had been mopped up and the isolated troops had been taken.


The approach of a column (Combat Command C, 1st Armored Division) to counter-attack on 15 February was reported to *10 Panzer Division* about 1130, 15 February. The commanders at Sidi Bou Zid arranged a trap. Three companies of tanks and one of grenadiers were placed in position to strike the southern flank and one company of tanks was sent northwest of Sidi Bou Zid with orders to envelop to the west at the proper time. The American attack was unexpectedly weak both in numbers, armor, and fire power, and was overwhelmed. Three American tanks got at least three miles southeast of the village toward Djebel Ksaira, but not near enough to cover a withdrawal by the isolated troops there. 36 other tanks, 17 armored personnel carriers, 4 antitank guns, 2 self-propelled guns, 8 machine guns, 1 105-mm howitzer and 1 105-mm gun, and almost 100 vehicles

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, 8 Feb 43, and *Anlage Nr. 1016*.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, 9 Feb. 43.

<sup>5</sup>Hq, 10 Pzr Div, Ic, *Tätigkeitsbericht*, 14 Feb 43; Hq, 21 Pzr Div, *KTB*, 13-17 Feb and *Anlagenband IX*, Nr. 260/43.





were reported by 10 Panzer Division as captured or destroyed. German tanks put out of action on these two days at Sidi Bou Zid were salvaged.<sup>6</sup>

*Kampfgruppe D A K*, commanded by Col. Freiherr von Liebenstein, discovered that the Allies had evacuated Gafsa during the night of 14/15 February, a fact which made unnecessary the transfer to that area of 21 Panzer Division, and enabled Group Ziegler to call back Reconnaissance Battalion 580.<sup>7</sup>

Group Ziegler went on to exploit the victories at Sidi Bou Zid by an attack on Sbeitla when it seemed unlikely that the Allies would send another force to counter-attack. A night assault on 16/17 February was stopped but it seemed clear that the Allies would hold Sbeitla only long enough to evacuate material and troops. Gen. von Arnim therefore recalled 10 Panzer Division's elements for operations much farther north and left Gen. Ziegler to occupy Sbeitla with 21 Panzer Division.<sup>8</sup>

The defense of Sbeitla was stubborn, particularly in the southeastern sector, where armored elements held the attack at bay until darkness, sacrificing 25 or more tanks and tank destroyers but permitting the town to be virtually empty when the first German troops entered in the late afternoon. The Americans and French who had fallen back to the northwest and west had once more to give up ground, which the Axis troops were not seeking, to avoid destruction, which was the main objective of the operation. In prisoners alone, however, they had lost 54 officers and 1,660 enlisted men.<sup>9</sup>

While the Americans and French were retreating from Sbeitla, they also evacuated

Feriana and the airfields at nearby Thelepte on 17 February. *Kampfgruppe D A K*'s reconnaissance party met one from Sbeitla in the village of Kasserine early in the afternoon, 18 February.<sup>10</sup> Kasserine also was empty of defenders. Air reconnaissance reports to Rommel revealed that troop columns were apparently moving farther away from the western mountain barrier, not coming up as reinforcements to defend its various major gaps.

At this juncture, the imaginative Marshal outlined a daring plan of exploitation to which Kesselring's sanguine nature responded and which fired the enthusiasm of the normally cautious *Comando Supremo*.

In a radio message sent to *Comando Supremo* through Field Marshal Kesselring at 14.20 that afternoon Rommel said:

On the basis of the enemy situation and provided that the supply situation of the Fifth Panzer Army permits, I recommend an immediate enveloping thrust by strong forces from the southwest on Tebessa and the area to the north of it. I propose that, if necessary, 10 and 21 Panzer Divisions be attached and be sent forward as rapidly as possible to the area Thelepte-Feriana.<sup>11</sup>

Kesselring was impressed also with the opportunity, and replied:

I consider it necessary that the left flank should continue its drive northward with all available forces via Tebessa to exploit our success to a point which could have still unsuspected consequences for the enemy. This message is simply for preliminary information. I shall speak in this sense to the Duce and to Ambrosio today.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>6</sup>Hq, 10 Pz Div, *1c, Tätigkeitsbericht*, 15 Feb 43; Hq, Ger-Ital Pz Army, *Schlachtbericht*, 15 Feb 43.

<sup>7</sup>Hq, EUCOM, Office of the Chief Historian, MS D-124, by von Liebenstein, dated 16 June 1947.

<sup>8</sup>Hq, 21 Pz Div, *KTB*, 16-17 Feb 43.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, 17 Feb; *Schlachtbericht*, Anlage Nr. 1090/5, Anlagenband IX.

<sup>10</sup>*Schlachtbericht*, 18 Feb 43, and Anlage Nr. 1102/2, Anlagenband IX.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, Anlage Nr. 1107 Anlagenband IX.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, Anlage Nr. 1108, dated 1630/18 Feb 43, Anlagenband IX.

The high command concluded that "a unique opportunity is now offered to force a decisive victory in Tunisia." It ordered Rommel to thrust to the north with his objective not Tebessa but Le Kef, in order not to destroy an American base but rather to threaten the deep flank of the British First Army, if possible to isolate it, and at least to force its withdrawal. As a measure of *Comando Supremo's* sudden kindling of hope, its directive declared that the Mareth Position was entitled to no more than a small modicum of Rommel's mobile reserves, that weak forces could be left for the line Gafsa-Tozeur, and that Rommel should use 10 and 21 *Panzer Divisions* and all their normal allotment of supplies from *Fifth Panzer Army* and be given full support by the entire Axis supply establishment. *Fifth Panzer Army* and the *Naval Command, Africa* were directed to prepare diversionary attacks, including a sea-borne flanking attack on the north coast.<sup>13</sup>

Rommel ordered 21 *Panzer Division* north from Sbeitla to penetrate the mountain barrier at the Sbiba gap and to continue to Ebba Ksour. He recalled 10 *Panzer Division* from Pichon to Sbeitla for commitment probably behind 21 *Panzer Division*, but he reserved decision lest developments require its commitment elsewhere. From Kasserine, he had *Kampfgruppe D A K* send a reconnaissance battalion for a surprise attack at dawn on the pass northwest of the village.<sup>14</sup> Farther to the southwest, he sent mobile elements of *Centauro Division* in feints at the passes leading toward Bou Chebka. If his plans went well, he would seize Kasserine Pass, make a feint toward Tebessa, and withdraw most of *Kampfgruppe D A K* toward Sbeitla as a covering force.<sup>15</sup>

Things did not go very well for Rommel's Operation STURMFLUT. The ground was rain-soaked. Low fog hung around the mountains hampering air support and air reconnaissance. A well-managed defense of Sbiba behind a double belt of mines stopped 21 *Panzer Division* short.<sup>16</sup> The defense of Kasserine Pass, less well-coordinated, held up *Kampfgruppe D A K* two full days. Rommel committed 10 *Panzer Division* there rather than at Sbiba.<sup>17</sup> Once through Kasserine Pass the two formations advanced along diverging roads separated by the River Hatab and the muddy, irregular Bahiret Foussana plain. The smaller force was sent along the road to Tebessa and was soon overextended in battles on highly unfavorable terrain. American artillery on the heights above the plain rained shells from several directions on the hapless vehicles and troop concentrations below them. Resolute defensive fighting by Gen. Paul Robinett's armored command proved too much for the force of Gen. Bülowius. He received authorization to withdraw it into the pass late on 22 February.<sup>18</sup> 10 *Panzer Division* took up the attack against the defenders of Thala in the middle of the afternoon, 21 February, drove ahead through the defense line, taking 463 prisoners and destroying or capturing 32 tanks, 12 anti-tank guns, 13 heavy mortars, 3 selfpropelled guns, 1 antiaircraft gun, and numerous vehicles.<sup>19</sup> The British 26 Armoured Brigade and 2nd Battalion, 5 Leicestershire Regiment reinforced by various American units continued to resist with the greatest determination but no longer held the means of withstanding a strong assault.

During the night of 21/22 February, reinforcements for the defenders of Thala ar-

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, Anlagen Nr. 1131, dated 2339/18 Feb 43, and Nr. 1113/2, Anlagenband IX.

<sup>14</sup>This was the defile, Col Du Chambi, which the Americans renamed "Kasserine Pass."

<sup>15</sup>*Schlachtbericht*, Anlagen Nr. 1141/1 and 1141/2 in Anlagenband IX; Hq, DAK, KTB, 19-21 Feb 43.

<sup>16</sup>Hq, 21 Pzr Div, KTB, 19-24 Feb 43.

<sup>17</sup>*Schlachtbericht*, 19-22 Feb 43; Hq, 10 Pzr Div, Ic, *Tätigkeitsbericht*, 19-22 Feb 43.

<sup>18</sup>Hq, DAK KTB, 21-22 Feb 43.

<sup>19</sup>Hq, 10 Pzr Div, Ic, *Tätigkeitsbericht*, 21-22 Feb 43.



rived.<sup>20</sup> The increased volume of artillery fire and aggressive patrolling in front of the main line of defense seemed to von Broich to presage an Allied counterattack. He persuaded himself that he would do better to wait for it, contain it, and lunge forward through Thala on the rebound than to carry out his original plans to attack at noon. No counterattack by the Allies was ever received. The day slipped by with artillery exchanges and minor clashes, plus air attacks by both sides. *10 Panzer Division* might have pushed northward again very late in the day, but by then the whole operation had failed.<sup>21</sup>

Gen. von Arnim urged Kesselring to have the *10 Panzer Division* brought back before it got into an inextricable position at Thala, and then sent north from Sbeitla by roads east of that along which *21 Panzer Division* had approached Sbiba. Kesselring declined on the ground that the roads in question had not been reconnoitered, and that the operation must regain momentum at once or be terminated. Instead he put more of *Fifth Panzer Army* under Rommel's control for attacks west of Kairouan toward Maktar.<sup>22</sup> These attacks made no progress.

Marshal Kesselring and Marshal Rommel concluded late on 22 February that Operation STURMFLUT should be cancelled forthwith and attention shifted to another military opportunity.<sup>23</sup> The British Eighth Army's advance elements might perhaps be caught by an attack in front of the Mareth Position before they had organized if Rommel's force were quickly switched.

In approving the cancellation of the thrust on Le Kef, *Comando Supremo* wrote off its highest hope, effecting the westward with-

drawal of British First Army by penetration of its southern flank. If the available mobile forces of both Axis armies could not in February produce the desired effects on one of the Allied armies, they might still be used to hit the other. *Kampfgruppe D A K* went back through Gabes toward the Mareth area. *10* and *21 Panzer Divisions* were assembled on the coastal plain in the general vicinity of Sfax and Gabes for employment where needed.<sup>24</sup> Their mobile armored elements prepared for the battle of Medenine.

The withdrawal from the Kasserine-Faid area was authorized at the same time that a new Axis command system in Tunisia was put into effect. Army Group Africa was activated on 23 February and Rommel took command at once.<sup>25</sup>

The Faid-Kasserine battles originated, it will be recognized, in a proposal to break up an American concentration in the Gafsa-Tebessa area before it became too large to be readily overcome and at a time when the defense of southern Tunisia required little of the *German-Italian Panzer Army*. The battles opened as two interrelated operations by a mixed German-Italian force from Rommel's army and another mixed force from von Arnim's army. The initial successes were so easily won that further exploitation was tried with the hope of extraordinary rewards. Rommel's project took precedence over von Arnim's but for Rommel's proposed objective, the softer target at Tebessa, *Comando Supremo* substituted Le Kef. When the straightest route to Le Kef was barred at Sbiba, Rommel sent the bulk of his command through Kasserine Pass to approach Le Kef more circuitously. He had to use more time and more of his force to break through the pass than he could well afford. Once his

<sup>20</sup>They were the artillery of the U. S. 9th Infantry Division, taking up positions southwest of Thala at the conclusion of four days continuous march which had started more than 800 miles to the west.

<sup>21</sup>*Schlachtbericht*, 22 Feb 43; See also Note 19.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, 22-25 Feb 43; Hq, DAK, *KTB*, 22-25 Feb 43.

<sup>25</sup>Ambrosio to FM Rommel, 1530/23 Feb 43, in *Schlachtbericht*, Anlage Nr. 1172, Anlagenband IX.

troops were through the pass, along the roads which diverged from a fork within it, the resolution and brilliance which he had shown thus far began to falter. *Kampfgruppe D A K* butted against conditions much too difficult for it to overcome instead of simply protecting the exits of Kasserine Pass with one part and reinforcing *10 Panzer Division* with the remainder. The latter overcame the armored defense of Thala but succumbed to prudence when faced with an opportunity to press its advantage. In the end, neither force was successful and Rommel, who had been sucked into three major simultaneous efforts to pierce the Western

Dorsal, failed at each point. No shortage of ammunition or fuel affected his decision that the operation must be cancelled, for enough was at hand at all times.<sup>26</sup> He had taken his forces into a situation which they could not improve and which threatened to deteriorate. With characteristic rapidity, he turned to the next opportunity and wasted no time in moving to grasp it.

The German view of the Faïd — Kasserine operations then requires us to rename it, "the thrust towards Le Kef."

<sup>26</sup>Hq, Ger-Ital Pzr Army, *O Qu Anlagen* Nr. 187, 200, 215; 19, 21, 22 Feb 1943; in *Anlagenband X*. These were radioed reports on the supply situation.

## OLD AMERICAN REGIMENTS

### 176TH INFANTRY REGIMENT (1ST VIRGINIA)

The 176th Infantry Regiment, whose home station is Richmond, Virginia, was originally organized in 1652 as the Charles City-Henrico Counties Regiment of Militia. Regimental commanders have included Colonels George Washington, Patrick Henry and John Marshall.

The institutional character of this unit as the traditional First Regiment of Virginia has been on several occasions officially recognized by the Commonwealth of Virginia. General Order 4, issued by the Adjutant General of Virginia, 12 April 1928, reconstituted the 1st Infantry Regiment, Virginia National Guard, which served during World War I as part of the 116th Infantry, 29th Division, and consolidated it with the 183d Infantry Regiment (now the 176th Infantry Regiment). On 28th June 1948, the Governor of Virginia issued an Executive Order to the effect

that the present regiment was established with the creation of the earliest militia forces of the Colony of Virginia.

The 176th Infantry Regiment is officially credited with the following battle honors:

*Revolutionary War*—Virginia 1775, Long Island, New York 1776, Trenton, Princeton, Brandywine, Germantown, Monmouth, South Carolina 1780. *War of 1812*—Without inscription. *Civil War* (Confederate Service)—Bull Run, Peninsula, Manassas, Antietam, Fredericksburg, North Carolina 1864, Gettysburg, Cold Harbor, Petersburg, Appomattox. *World War I*—Alsace, Meuse-Argonne.

The 176th Infantry Regiment was inducted into Federal Service, 3 February 1941, at Richmond, Virginia and was inactivated 10 July 1944, at Fort Benning, Georgia, where it had served as the demonstration regiment for The Infantry School.

It was reallocated to the National Guard and was federally recognized at Richmond, Virginia, 20 November 1946.

## THE DUTCH INVASION OF ENGLAND: 1667

By ALVIN D. COOX\*

WHEN, IN THE GRIM months that followed the collapse of France in 1940, Great Britain faced her "shining hour," journalists frequently recounted the Isles' past brushes with invasion, from the times of the Romans, the sea-rovers, and the Normans through the projected Boulogne expedition of Napoleon. Yet nothing was said of a full-scale amphibious operation, undertaken by the Netherlands with ample success in the summer of 1667. It may be that a rankling national humiliation was no fit subject for treatment while Nazi barges were being assembled in North Sea ports; or perhaps no need was seen to stress the past hostile role of a present crippled ally. But whatever the journalists' reasons for ignoring the episode, the tale is worth the attention of the military historian, for the curious second Anglo-Dutch naval war of 1664-67 was terminated soon after Dutch troops had been landed on English soil, and Dutch ships had destroyed major units of the Royal Navy in its own lair, in the "most serious defeat it has ever had in its home waters."<sup>1</sup>

The scant decade of peace following the first Anglo-Dutch war of 1652-54 was ably utilized by the Dutch Republic in preparation for forthcoming maritime struggle. Jan De Witt devoted himself toward organizing the Dutch finances, toward re-establishing credit and reducing the rate of interest on the debt, and toward the formation of a monetary reserve, which was to make possible the swift construction and outfitting of a powerful naval force. In this major effort, he was ably backed by Michael De Ruyter,

who, as commander of the Admiralty of Amsterdam, virtually created order out of chaos. The makeshift conglomeration of merchant privateers was superseded by a well-organized, disciplined fleet with a professional cadre. A uniform type of warship was constructed, to be accompanied by a separate supply fleet on extended operations. Victualing was facilitated by the establishment of an efficient supply and rationing system. Thanks to this vital overhauling, the Dutch navy was rapidly regaining its old prestige.<sup>2</sup>

The inception of the second Anglo-Dutch war was colonial in nature. In 1664 English aggression resulted in the acquisition by naval expeditions of the New Netherlands colony in North America and of the isles of Tobago and St. Eustatius in the Caribbean. Cabo Corso and other Dutch trading-posts in West Africa were conquered by English men-of-war. In vain the States protested to the dissembling Charles II. Thereupon, De Ruyter was sent with a squadron to the African coast and, subsequently, to the West Indies. When the English government was apprised of the secret Dutch retaliation, it promptly declared war in the spring of 1665.

Two large-scale naval engagements followed. Off Southwold Bay in 1665 the fleet of the Duke of York trounced a Dutch squadron commanded by an ex-army officer, Van Obdam. The Dutch commander was himself killed when his flagship blew up, and probably 2000 of his seamen perished in the disastrous battle. But the great recuperative powers of Dutch maritime strength, buttressed by the excellent reforms of De Witt

\*Mr. Coox has already contributed to MILITARY AFFAIRS (See "Valmy" in Vol. XII, No 4.)

<sup>1</sup>H. George Franks, *Holland Afloat* (London, 1942), 98.

<sup>2</sup>A. J. Barnouw, *The Making of Modern Holland* (New York, 1944), 116; Bernard H. M. Vlekke, *Evolution of the Dutch Nation* (New York, 1945), 230.



and of De Ruyter, were evinced by June of the following year, when occurred the famous Four Days' Battle of North Foreland. The British fleets, split by the threat of French naval action (Louis XIV was the nominal ally of the Dutch), were defeated in sustained battle, with the loss of seventeen ships and six prizes.<sup>3</sup>

Standard histories generally ignore the next operations. Yet, one year before the Dutch expedition of 1667, plans were readied by De Witt for an immediate invasion of England. Although the English government had claimed a victory in the Four Days' Battle, well-informed quarters had realized the imminence of a great disaster, while in Holland there was general elation and great confidence. It was resolved to dispatch a fleet to the mouth of the Thames at once, concurrently with the revival of Continental sea-trade.<sup>4</sup> An English exile having suggested to De Witt that actual landings on the Isles would rally to the invader a great number of malcontents, De Ruyter was sent out with over 6000 troops in transports, escorted by seventy-five warships and seven fireships. The English, however, had taken vigorous measures to repel landings. Artillery was mounted on the river banks; ships were berthed higher up the river; and, perhaps of greatest importance, buoys and beacons were removed. In addition, a sizeable fleet of over sixty-five men-of-war and fireships was concentrated off Queenborough.<sup>5</sup>

The Dutch, who had planned a landing up the Thames anchorage, where the English ships might be burned and the point fortified, reconnoitered carefully and were surprised at

their original overcalculation of the enemy's losses at North Foreland. A landing was attempted on the Isle of Thanet, but the local cavalry repulsed the invaders. De Ruyter concluded that his designs were impracticable at that time, and wisely sent his troops home. The Dutch complained bitterly that lack of support from their French allies at the critical moment, "while the enemy was still reeling from shock of defeat, had given him time to recover himself," and had therefore frustrated their own ambitious plans.<sup>6</sup>

Soon after the Dutch invasion operations of 1666 had failed to materialize, the English dealt their enemies a critical naval blow, in a hard-fought battle off the Dutch coast. Prince Rupert and George Monk, Duke of Albemarle, with combined squadrons smashed the Dutch blockade of the Thames estuary. De Ruyter brilliantly saved his surviving fleet and drew off, after Tromp's tactical blunder had endangered even retreat. But the English were now masters of the sea and instituted a virtual blockade of the enemy's coasts. In one crippling attack, the English raided the island of Schelling, burned 138 Muscovy-bound merchantmen and two convoy frigates, destroyed seventeen million florins' worth of goods, and razed a peaceful fishing town.<sup>7</sup> With Sweden as an intermediary, the Dutch now opened peace negotiations. War-weariness, the immense cost of naval struggle for the trading Dutch, and lost confidence in their dubious French allies had reaped their inevitable harvest.

Yet the English, not so eager to terminate a war which had developed so favorably for them, began to haggle over minor points of prize indemnification; and the war dragged on while the delegates quibbled at Breda. De Witt realized that his nation's bargaining position was meanwhile rapidly deteriorating.

<sup>3</sup>C. M. Davies, *The History of Holland* (London, 1851), iii, 25; Barnouw, *op. cit.*, 113.

<sup>4</sup>*Calendar of State Papers* (Venetian), 1666-68, #15, 16; x, xi.

<sup>5</sup>G. Grinnell-Milne, *Life of Lieut.-Adm. De Ruyter* (London, 1896), 139; *Calendar* (Venetian), 1666-68, #38; x.

<sup>6</sup>*Calendar* (Venetian), #49; x.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, #62. Grinnell-Milne, *op. cit.*, 146, says 12,000,000 florins.

With "brilliant inspiration and indomitable courage" he decided to stake all in one last gamble against the over-confident English, in an effort to win speedier and better terms for the sorely pressed Dutch. Indeed, the States, only willing to negotiate such a peace as would impair neither honor nor advantage, continued their war effort, while England, "blindly relying on the conclusion of a peace, acted as though resolved that the treaty *should* succeed, and, with fatal precipitancy, strove to relieve herself of the burden of war, before assured of the certainty of peace."<sup>8</sup>

De Witt was in constant receipt of intelligence from his agents in England to the effect that Charles II, debt-laden but ever arrogant, was laying up the Royal Navy and was rapidly undermining its hard-won naval supremacy. As a contemporary Dutch writer said, the fact that the English were expecting peace and were anticipating that they could have it whenever they so wished — and without the heavy expense of naval outfitting — all this was known in Holland in the winter of 1666-67. "(And) the more we learned that the English were relaxing their efforts, the more we hastened to become complete masters of the sea," in an effort to obtain a "just, honorable, and equitable peace, and to put an end to this cruel, bloody war."<sup>9</sup> Both the backward state of English preparedness and the purely defensive English naval policy were well-known to the States. The French likewise stirred up the Dutch to strike while the foe was off guard, a situation enhanced by the recent plague and Great Fire of London. Indeed, had not the French court suggested to money-hungry Charles II that he could give no better proof of his good faith, once the Breda negotiations were undertaken, than by reducing his naval installation? With these motivations, which were coupled

with his personal reasons for opposing immediate peace, De Witt undertook to outfit a last great Dutch naval offensive and expedition, which might utilize certain information acquired in the operation of 1666 concerning the shoals and channels at the mouth of the Thames.<sup>10</sup>

Contrasted with the feverish Dutch naval preparations, the overconfidence of the English is amply apparent from the testimony of their own writers. Agreement is general that governmental parsimony had resulted in the decommissioning of many first- and second-class vessels. The dispersion of the remainder for the convoy of merchantmen was effected in 1666 upon the counsel that "the Dutch might best be beaten by sending small squadrons abroad to interrupt and ruine their trade without which it would be impossible for them to continue the Warr or support themselves in Peace."<sup>11</sup> The disaffection of the English seamen was general.

Our Seamen, whom no danger's shape could fight,

Unpaid refuse to mount their ships, for spite:  
Or to their fellows swim, on board the Dutch,  
Who show the tempting metal in their clutch.<sup>12</sup>

It was said that English prisoners even refused to be repatriated, preferring to take service with the Dutch, whose lure was "dollars, not tickets," as Pepys put it. Unpaid for the campaigns of 1666, merchants were hesitant to fit out new warships; while the few dispersed men-of-war in the river were but partially manned. Confident that

<sup>10</sup>*Calendar (Venetian)*, 1666-68, #165, 173, 175; William L. Clowes et al., *The Royal Navy: A History* (London, 1898), ii, 288; Grinnell-Milne, *op cit.*, 149; Charles D. Yonge, *The History of the British Navy*, (London, 1866), i, 95.

<sup>11</sup>Rawlinson MSS. D. 924, *Continuation of the Dutch War* (Bodleian Library, Oxford University); cited in Arthur W. Tedder, *The Navy of the Restoration* (Cambridge, 1916), 179. See also *Calendar (Domestic)*, 1667, viii, xi, xii.

<sup>12</sup>Marvell. *Instructions to a Painter*; quoted by Tedder, *op. cit.*, 184.

<sup>8</sup>*Calendar of State Papers (Domestic)*, 1667, viii.

<sup>9</sup>Barthelemy Piélat, *La vie et les actions mémorables de Michel de Ruyter* (Amsterdam, 1677), i, 452, 460.

no sea conflict would take place, Charles sent out but two small squadrons for summer duty in 1667. "Culpable unpreparedness" aptly describes the situation of England in that year.

So it was that the Dutch States issued successive orders to the refitted navy; the exact words are illuminating: "... as the English forces seem to be presently not in a condition to resist our fleet, and consequently it looks as if this State will become Mistress of the Sea this summer, ... attempt an enterprise against the ports, cities, and strong points of the enemy ... ." It was stressed that, although danger was courted, the welfare of the Republic was well worth it. Actual Dutch operational plans stated that waiting contingents of troops were to be embarked at the Meuse, whereupon the "fleet shall head for the river of London and enter it, and will thence go to Chatham or to Rochester, to take or destroy the vessels which may be there; and, also, to burn and ruin the royal magazine at Chatham, ... for which task all the troops and sailors aboard the fleet shall be landed ... ."<sup>13</sup>

This was a blow at the very center of British naval power, which in the Seventeenth Century was concentrated in the Thames and the Medway. The now famous naval bases of the South Coast were not yet of any great importance.

De Witt's preparations were successfully deceptive. Squadrons were prepared at dispersed points, for later rendezvous. In April 1667 a small naval task force was sent to sea, ostensibly to harry Scottish privateers. Van Ghent, the Dutch commander, convoyed a large fleet of laden merchantmen and then veered to the Firth of Forth, which was entered. An attempt to ascend the Firth and burn shipping anchored there proved unsuccessful, and the Dutch merely bombarded

Burntisland, captured a half-dozen small ships, and soon returned to rejoin De Ruyter in home waters. It was at the same time that preliminary soundings were also taken for passing ships up the Medway. Van Ghent's diversion had served to screen the main formidable Dutch naval effort.<sup>14</sup>


Late in May, De Ruyter, who had by now recovered from a serious affliction that had been incapacitating his work, was ready to sail from the Texel, collecting ships and men as he proceeded southwards along the coast. Evincing excellent staff work, the admiral called his officers and ship captains aboard the 84-gun flagship *Dolphin*, and made known all the signs and orders prepared for the expedition. De Ruyter's squadron commanders were to be Van Ness, Van Ghent, and Meppel. Cornelius De Witt, the burgo-master brother of Jan, joined the fleet as Deputy of the States. By May 27 the united fleets (although never reinforced by the anticipated Danish warships) comprised 64 ships of the line and frigates, seven armed dispatch boats, 15 fireships, and 13 galliots. The gun batteries totalled 3330 pieces, and the crews consisted of 17,500 officers and men. At one time the States, backed by this impressive armament, may have been toying with the idea of presenting an ultimatum to the English government for the conclusion of an immediate peace or the dissolution of the Breda negotiations, but this course was apparently not favored, and De Ruyter sailed right for the Thames.<sup>15</sup> Once the English coast was raised, a ship was sent to advise the Dutch Ambassador at Paris of the progress of the fleet, and to hasten a junction with the French warships, still safely an-

<sup>14</sup>J. J. Backer Dirks, *De Nederlandsche Zeemacht* (Nieuwediep, 1867), 218. A complete, documented narrative of the subsequent expedition will be found on pp. 218-37. See also, Clowes, *op. cit.*, ii, 288.

<sup>15</sup>*Calendar* (Venetian), 1666-68, #204. Lt.-Col. J. R. Cambier, *De Nederlandsche Mariniers van 1665 tot 1900* (Helder, 1899), 18, 19; also, Grinnell-Milne, *op. cit.*, 151; Clowes, *op. cit.*, ii, 289.

<sup>13</sup>Piélât, *op. cit.*, 453-4.





chored at home ports (June 6). Several days before, the jittery Pepys had learned that the Dutch were at sea in force, and had written that he already feared the loss, through the "negligence of our Prince," of both the kingdom and its reputation. Englishmen anxiously hoped that the winds would scatter the invading fleet, but soon the latter was reported off Harwich, and at much the same time guns were heard at Bethnal Green. "Military steps (for naval there could be none) were now taken to repel them, and all the young Hectors of the Court went posting off to Essex — to little purpose, thought Pepys, but to debauch the country women thereabouts."<sup>16</sup>

After having weathered the heavy storm that forced some of its ships to cut anchor, the Dutch fleet assembled off the mouth of the Thames. At another council of war aboard the flagship, it was decided to assign a squadron of more than a score of vessels to Van Ghent, whose own pennon was to fly from the 50-gun *Agatha*. It was hoped to take the ten frigates and twenty-five Barbados merchantmen then reported lying not far from Gravesend. One thousand marines, under command of Colonel Dolman, a "renegade English republican," were assigned the projected *descente notable*.<sup>17</sup>

Van Ghent accordingly dashed up the river, but, delayed by adverse winds, missed his quarry, which slipped safely away to berths further upstream (June 9). Next day, after receiving reinforcements from De Ruyter, Van Ghent took the island of Sheppey and

its fort at Queenborough; thence he moved toward the fortress of Sheerness, guarding the passage to Chatham and Rochester.<sup>18</sup> After a brisk bombardment of about two hours, 800 marines were landed under Dolman, and the important bastion occupied. The royal magazine was relieved of quantities of masts, cables, rigging, ammunition, and fifteen 18-pounders. What could not be taken aboard ship was then blown up. The value of the stores seized or destroyed was variously estimated at 400,000 livres or four tons of gold. Greater damage might have been inflicted and Sheerness retained as a base for interior operations, if the Dutch had not been deprived of many marines when troop transports were deflected from the operations by the storm off the Thames mouth, referred to above. Therefore, although the States apparently desired Sheerness to be held and had dispatched several hundred troop reinforcements for that purpose, De Ruyter's council thought otherwise, "because the most part of our Land-Troops were separated from us by the foul weather, the General officers thought not fit to engage themselves too far up the country with so few People."<sup>19</sup> Having lost only fifty men at Sheerness, the Dutch now headed for Chatham, for whose safety Pepys had "great fears." While the whole action had been going on, Pepys was down the river at Gravesend, where he found the Duke of Albemarle with a great many idle lords and gentlemen, pistols and other "fooleries," awaiting the attack of the Dutch fleet. Still unconscious of the disaster at Sheerness, "though the offals of sheep borne up the river by the flood showed all too well what

<sup>16</sup>Arthur Bryant, *Samuel Pepys*; vol. i: "The Man in the Making" (Cambridge, 1933), 329.

<sup>17</sup>Cambier, *op. cit.*, 19; the marine officers are here detailed; a less complete tabulation is given in Leupe and Houckgeest, *De Geschiedenis der Mariniers . . .* (Nieuwediep, 1867), 16. See also, Piélat, *op. cit.*, 455; Clowes, *op. cit.*, ii, 289, 290; and *Calendar* (Venetian), 1666-68, #206. Tedder, *op. cit.*, 184, says that De Ruyter gained considerable help in his attack from a Captain Thomas Holland, an old Commonwealth officer. At *ibid.*, note 3, Tedder asserts that he has been unable to find any authority for Clowes's saying "Dolmar."

<sup>18</sup>The fort of Sheerness had never been completed. On June 11th, when news of the Dutch fleet in the Thames had scared people into a panic-stricken energy, Sir Edward Spragge was sent down to raise the long-planned fortifications there. But the Dutch arrived before he did. Tedder, *op. cit.*, 182.

<sup>19</sup>*La vie de Corneille Tromp* (The Hague, 1694), 425; cited in Tedder, *op. cit.*, 185.

the Dutch had been doing," Pepys returned mournfully to the capital.

At Chatham, the Duke of Albemarle had hastily but zealously laid a chain across the Medway — a six-inch chain of "thick and heavy iron, running on pulleys, which turned on wheels." The English had also scuttled four fireships and six warships to impede passage, although some of the vessels were sunk in useless places, and others which might have been saved were not moved away. Not merely was the work not done, but there were no men to do it. Men who had not been paid for long months refused to work in this emergency. "Out of 1100 men in pay at Chatham Dockyard not more than three attended to help . . . in any way." The workers had refused to tow the deserted English warships up the river as ordered, "having been more profitably occupied in moving their own belongings to safety."<sup>20</sup>

On June 12 De Ruyter sailed toward Upnor Castle and bombarded its works, next turning his fire against the doomed English ships lying in the river. At this time Van Braakel, a Dutch officer who had been under arrest for having landed sailors without orders, asked for and received permission to attack the chain. Pushing through the surrounding hulks, Van Braakel's ship *Vrede* of 40 guns closed with the frigate *Jonathan* and swiftly boarded her. Van Rhyn, following just behind with his fireship, then snapped the chain and captured the *Mathias*, which was blown up at once. The *Charles V* was then consumed, its captain Douglas heroically perishing with his doomed ship, after having first driven off two fireships. Dutch warcraft were now edging through the gap in the chain, and were launching long-boats to board the remaining Englishmen. A former Dutch prize, *Castle of Hoeningen*, was destroyed in this way. But the prize of

all was the three-decked 100-gun *Royal Charles*, the gilded flagship of the Duke of Albemarle. Now mounting only 32 of her guns and with but a skeleton crew, she was easily boarded, and Van Ghent transferred his battle flag to her. (Later, the rich prize was sailed off in triumph to Holland, where her gilded stern-plates and White Ensign adorn a naval museum to this day.) Pepys, in a bitter passage, describes the humiliating episode, in which nine Dutch sailors captured the pride of the Royal Navy, "at a time both for tides and wind when the best pilot in Chatham would not have undertaken it, they heeling her on one side to make her draw little water: and so carried her away safe."

On the thirteenth of June the Dutch attacked the surviving English ships beyond Upnor Castle. The land batteries at the ends of the boom had already been silenced, and a party of Dutch marines had landed and blown up one of the magazines. But it was only after a sharp struggle that three more large warships could be burned: the *Loyal London* (90 guns), *Royal Oak* (76), and *St. James* (82) — "the pick of the British navy." Almost every Dutch fireship had been expended, however, and the narrowness of the river in face of hostile fire, and the prompt measures taken by the English to call the militia and garrison the forts — all contributed to prevent further Dutch successes. With insufficient force, as he saw it, De Ruyter thereupon took advantage of a fair wind and, with his prizes, fell back toward the main fleet at the mouth of the Medway. The Dutch had lost 50-150 men; the English, probably 500.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>21</sup>*Calendar (Domestic)*, 1667, ccv, #78; Davies, *op. cit.*, iii, 60. "Some say (that) the chain was loosened by a party of sailors, who, landing under fire, broke the bar to which it was fastened." (Davies, *ibid.*) Tedder, *op. cit.*, 182, adds that on May 10th, Commissioner Pett had written to the Navy Commissioners, "the chain is promised to be dispatched tomorrow, and a!l things are ready for fixing it"; it had been ordered four months before.

<sup>20</sup>*Calendar (Domestic)*, 1667, ccv, #5; Tedder, *op. cit.*, 183; Bryant, *op. cit.*, i, 331.



The twelfth of June and its sequels have been termed a *beroemde tocht* ("glorious expedition") by one eminent Dutch naval officer. The picture is amplified picturesquely by Clowes who depicts the Chatham episode as follows:

The river was full of moving craft and burning wreckage; the roar of guns was almost continuous; the shrieks of the wounded could be heard even above the noise of battle, the clangour of trumpets, the roll of drums, and the cheers of the Dutch as success after success was won; and above all hung a pall of smoke, illumined only, as night closed in, by the gleam of flames on all sides and the flashes of guns and muskets.<sup>22</sup>

Throughout the operations, De Ruyter and De Witt and Van Ghent were to be seen constantly, as with "boyish daring" they directed the attack from their frail long-boats.

No one denies the terror then inspired at London by the Dutch naval operations. The situation was truly serious, but rumor made it far worse. Not only was Chatham reported burned, but also Gravesend, Harwich, Queenborough, Colchester, Dover. Alarms were bruited that the Dutch were cruising—or landing—at Portsmouth, Plymouth, Dartmouth—everywhere at once; until old Batten, one of the Navy Commissioners, cried with a great oath: "By God, I think the Devil sends Dutchmen." Pett wrote frantically to the Navy Office, where Pepys commented that the Commissioner was "in a very fearful stink for fear of the Dutch and desires help for God and the King and Kingdom's sake." And seamen's wives wailed that such things were a punishment for not paying their husbands.

Trade was at a standstill: the Port of London was closed. Coals sold at £5 10s. a

cauldron, and the poor grew daily more restless. But the Dutch, declining to venture higher up the Thames, rode across the river mouth with a hundred sail, "as dread a spectacle as ever Englishman saw, and a dishonor never to be wiped out," as Pepys saw it. While Britain was being strangled, "one of the richest Dutch convoys that had ever come home passed unmolested up Channel under the protection of an insignificant escort of fighting ships."<sup>23</sup>

"Never were people so dejected as they are in the City all over . . . ; and do talk most loudly, even treason. . . . The merchants are undone. Our great bankers . . . have shut up their shops. People are ready to tear their hair off their heads. . . . People are fled . . . with their families and children. We are betrayed. . . ." Pepys as an Admiralty official dreaded personal violence — his heart was "full of fear." After evacuating his wife and father to the country, he promptly made his will. The King was said to have fled, with the Papists taking over; an imminent French invasion was to be expected from Dunkerque. "It is strange how everybody nowadays reflects upon Oliver (Cromwell), and commend him, what brave things he did, and made all the neighbor princes fear him." Nor was the conduct of the English soldiery itself laudable. Contrasted with the honorable, admirable conduct of the invading Hollanders (who had been amply provoked, it will be remembered, by the wanton raid on Schelling in 1666), the English militia "are far more terrible to those people of the country towns than the Dutch themselves." It is indeed weakening to national morale when one's own troops pillage and ravage, while the enemy does neither. Yet such, it appears, was the case in 1667.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>22</sup>Clowes, *op. cit.*, ii, 293. The preceding phrase is Col. Cambier's (*op. cit.* 20). See the painting, "The Dutch burning the English fleet at Rochester in 1667," in Franks, *op. cit.*, facing p. 144. See also, the Dutch entry (in translation from a contemporaneous fly-sheet printed in Amsterdam) in *Calendar* (Domestic), 1667, ccv. #5: "Short & reliable account, etc."

<sup>23</sup>Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, *Statesmen and Sea Power* (Oxford, 1946), 50.

<sup>24</sup>Paragraph based upon the following citations, in order: *Calendar* (Domestic), 1667, xxvii, ccv, #3; #63; ccvi, #12. Pepys, *Diary* (London, 1877), iv. 364.

The psychological effect upon English morale was obvious. De Ruyter, however, had probably far exceeded his own expectations of damage to be inflicted upon the enemy. Although the sound of enemy cannon booming not far from one's capital is a fearsome thing, the truth was, as an English contemporary correctly guessed, that "the Dutch have no order to land any forces, but merely to lie on the coast, hinder trading to London, and prevent the English fleet abroad from returning."<sup>25</sup> As a result, the subsequent Dutch operations were in the nature of a protracted anticlimax after the spectacular successes at Sheerness and at Chatham. The English now scuttled more vessels in the channels at Woolwich and Blackwall, but in the general chaos of the moment they were the wrong ships, and vessels bearing sorely needed stores were sent down instead of the empty tonnage that lay alongside. Further batteries were erected, however, and although the Duke of Albemarle had been unsuccessful in his tactical resistance, he had won valuable time for Admiral Spragge to build up the defensive naval power of England, to check additional depredations.

De Ruyter's reinforced fleet was divided into squadrons, for patrol, raiding, and convoy duty. The blockade was continued off the Thames estuary, where there was less danger from fireships. The reconnaissance of various coastal points convinced De Ruyter that Portsmouth, Plymouth, the Isle of Wight, and Guernsey were "imprenables"; while the many little towns and villages along

the Channel and on the river were not worth pillaging. But, inasmuch as no peace had yet been signed at Breda, the States determined upon the continuation of aggressive action, and for that purpose sent strong reinforcements of marines to De Ruyter. In June the Dutch made small-scale, sporadic, but well-disciplined landings for provisions only. Not until the first week of July was another major landing effort essayed.

On July 2, about sixty Dutch men-of-war appeared off the Landguard fort at Harwich. Unexpectedly navigating a tortuous channel (for the buoys had been taken up by the English), the invaders were nevertheless hampered in closing into shore by the shallowness of the water. Under cover of a dense smoke screen, 1600 marines and sailors were landed on the beachhead. A strong force under Van Hoorn was left to cover the landing craft. Four hundred assault troops, with scaling-ladders and "grenadoes," raced along the sand to storm the twenty-foot walls of the fort. Two brisk attacks with cutlass and musket were repulsed by the grape-shot of the English. One source alleges that the Dutch, in their attack, deridingly cried, "Peace! peace!" Be that as it may, the Dutch fell back in some disorder, abandoning a number of their ladders and weapons. Meanwhile, Van Hoorn's troops repulsed the Earl of Suffolk's cavalry attacks. The beachhead comparatively secure, the defeated Dutch assault troops were re-embarked, and when before dawn the tide floated the ships, the invaders sailed off. Most authorities assert that the Dutch lost about 150 men in the operation, but a distinguished Dutch naval officer admits a toll of but forty-two.<sup>26</sup>

After the repulse at Harwich, the Dutch attempted no further major landings, although the warships continued to prowl off

*Calendar (Domestic)*, 1667, ccv, #76 (John Rushworth, a London correspondent). Pepys, *op. cit.*, iv, 367-70; 423; 406. *Calendar (Domestic)*, 1667, ccv, #5. See also, on the same subject, Grinnell-Milne, *op. cit.*, 156. In an interesting aside, Pepys says: "Sir H. Cholmly . . . tells me . . . that the night the Dutch burned our ships the King did sup with my Lady Castlemayne at the Duchess of Monmouth's, and they were all mad in hunting a poor moth." *Diary*, June 21, 1667; cited in Bryant, *op. cit.*, i, 330, note 1. Also see, Pepys, *op. cit.*, iv, 385.

<sup>25</sup>*Calendar (Domestic)*, 1667, ccvi, #83.

<sup>26</sup>Cambier, *op. cit.*, 21; *Calendar (Domestic)*, 1667, ccvii, #113; #53, 72; ccix, #8.

the coasts. Van Ghent's squadron operated off northern Scotland, while De Ruyter maintained successive reconnaissances along the Channel coast. On July 24 Van Ness's blockading squadron lost several fireships to Spragge in a sharp naval engagement. Two days later, Jordan was driven off by the Hollander in an indecisive encounter. But the Dutch, fearing further attacks by fireships and lacking the latter themselves, drew back to the mouth of the Thames. In August, before another battle could recur, De Ruyter at last learned of the final ratification of the Treaty of Breda. Leisurely the Dutch fleets sailed homewards, where De Ruyter triumphantly landed at Helvoetsluis.<sup>27</sup>

The Dutch naval operations of the summer of 1667 have been dealt with in some detail expressly to indicate the serious nature of De Witt's operational plans. The actual effect that De Ruyter's campaign had had upon the peace negotiations at Breda is, however, not so well-defined as modern historians often indicate. For, as contemporary evidence tends to show, the startling successes of the Dutch for a time threatened to have an effect contrary to that intended. The English delegates at Breda, decrying the Dutch action during peace negotiations, actually withdrew for a time, although the overt reason was fear of the plague. Foreign observers, noting the understandable rage and humiliation of the English, saw the possibility that the latter, "who were ready for peace, will be more than ever determined upon war."<sup>28</sup> It required very strong representations by the Swedish intermediaries before the congress could be re-convoled. The indecisive, vacillating English government, brought to dire straits by the short-sighted policies of

Charles II, was obliged to bow before the dictates of grim necessity and of temporarily superior enemy naval power. Pepys summed up the *dénouement* for himself and for posterity: "Thus in all things, in wisdom, courage, force, knowledge of our own streams, and success, the Dutch have the best of us, and do end the war with victory on their side."

Under the circumstances, then, the vigorous Dutch operations did induce a more conciliatory attitude from a foe who had suffered an "irreparable blow to prestige" in his home waters. The English King was obliged to confess that the "spirits of the seamen were down; the forces of our enemies are grown too great and many for us"; but of course Charles would admit no personal culpability for the "load of dejection." In this connection, several of Pepys's further comments are interesting for the light they throw upon English morale: "Wise Britons at heart wish for war, but agree that the King is not the man to be trusted with it." England suffers from a "lazy Prince, no Council, no money, no reputation at home or abroad." Hence, although nobody seemed pleased with the peace, yet nobody dared hope for a continuation of hostilities, "it being plain that nothing does or can thrive under us."

Accordingly, the Dutch, who had been losing the war in 1666, emerged rather advantageously in 1667. Although the salute to British warships in home waters was still required, the commercial terms of the treaty of 1662 were re-established, and the Navigation Act was modified to allow Dutch merchantmen to carry Lowlands merchandise to England. In addition, it was agreed that all territories held by the contracting parties before 1664 be retained, except that Britain was to keep New York and New Jersey, and the Dutch West India Company was to

<sup>27</sup>*Calendar* (Domestic), 1667, ccv. #127; #218, 223. *Calendar* (Venetian), 1666-68, #208, 212; Cambier, *op. cit.*, 21; Piélat, *op. cit.*, 468, 476; Clowes, *op. cit.*, ii, 296; Grinnell-Milne, *op. cit.*, 159; Pepys, *op. cit.*, iv, 433, 436, 437, 440.

<sup>28</sup>*Calendar* (Venetian), 1666-68, #212, 206, 208.



recover Surinam. It is an interesting sidelight that Holland then considered Surinam and its dependencies to be more valuable than the lost North American possession. The peace of Breda, finally signed July 31, 1667, comprised, in addition to the Anglo-Dutch instrument, bilateral treaties between France and England; and between Denmark and England.<sup>29</sup>

Thus it may safely be concluded that De Witt's daring and successful program, "as moderate in success as firm in adversity," had exacted for the Republic advantageous concessions — which was all that was sought. A tendency to rhapsodize over De Ruyter's "glorious exploits" (*luisterrijke bedrijven*) as "an adventure in which England's own Drake would have been proud to take part," is understandable. Yet it would seem that De Ruyter's excess of caution lost him a good opportunity of immediately improving upon his Chatham exploit. The blockade of the Thames was effective enough, but a contemporary Englishman drew a tenable con-

clusion when he wrote that "De Ruyter might have done much more mischief, if he had immediately after the exploit at Chatham seconded it with another in the Thames: for Gravesend was slenderly provided, Tilbury fort not erected, and the Dutch having a Spring tyde and an Easterly wind, might soon have pass'd Gravesend, and nothing could have hindered but that ye Frigatts and Fireshipps might have come up as high as Woolwich at least, and have fired all the ships that were afloat and have endangered the King's yard and Storehouses."<sup>30</sup>

Such further operations of limited objective may have been feasible enough. Yet it appears to this writer to be little more than a pleasant flight into imaginative fantasy to suggest, as does one historian, that De Ruyter had been on the brink of "the greatest naval success of all time," or that "the entire course of history" might have been altered, with the Dutch Empire becoming the greatest the world had ever known — *if* De Ruyter had been able to take London!<sup>31</sup>

<sup>29</sup>Franks *op. cit.*, 104; *Calendar* (Venetian), 1666-68, #311; Grinnell-Milne, *op. cit.*, 160. Yonge, *op. cit.*, i, 97, stresses the unimportance of the material damage inflicted by De Ruyter; calls the general effects of the war less injurious to England than to Holland; and castigates Charles II and his cowardliness in the face of "disgraceful insult"; the personal pleasures of the King thus took precedence over the national welfare. Pepys asserts that, although the people were eased by peace, there was general shame and displeasure, except

at Court and in the City, where Dutch noncompliance with the treaty was feared! In *Calendar* (Domestic), 1667, lv, there is, however, a vivid depiction of the general joy in the English sea towns, once intelligence of Breda reached them.

<sup>30</sup>Quotations, in order, from Davies, *op. cit.*, iii, 62; Dirks, *op. cit.*, 234; Franks, *op. cit.*, 104; Rawlinson MSS. D. 924. (Bodleian Library, Oxford University); Tedder, *op. cit.*, 187-88.

<sup>31</sup>See Franks, *op. cit.*, 116.

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## HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

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### THE FUTURE OF MILITARY AFFAIRS

Last June the Historical Division of the Army decided that it would be unable to continue the assistance it had been giving during the last three years for the publication of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*. By this decision the journal lost on October 18, 1949 the full-time services of its editor, Captain William F. Ross, and part-time secretarial help. The trustees of the American Military Institute fully appreciated the sound motives underlying this decision, and they expressed to the Chief of the Historical Division their sincere thanks for the splendid help and cooperation which the Institute had received over the past years.

The problem which confronted the Institute in June was to find new ways and means to continue the publication of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*. The response to a circular letter sent to selected members was unanimously against the suspension of the journal. At the same time, however, it was obvious that a return to the former method of publication through the voluntary work of some Washington members was inadvisable. Pastwar developments make it essential that the Institute grow and expand. More than ever before do we need an organizational focus for the study of military history and for the promotion of an understanding of the relationship of military developments to the evolution of the United States and to current national security problems. This task cannot be carried out by voluntary workers.

The trustees of the Institute appointed a special committee to look into the problem,

and during the last six months of 1949 an extensive correspondence was carried on with institutions and persons interested in military history. All possible solutions were explored, and it was finally thought most advisable to try to obtain affiliation with a university. Every institution that was approached showed great interest in the problem, but financial and administrative complications proved difficult to overcome.

The most encouraging response was received from a major eastern University. Its administration faces at the present time the same difficulties as those of other institutions, but its president has expressed a deep interest in the project, and General Donald Armstrong, one of the trustees of the Institute, was able to make an initial contribution to facilitate the transfer of *MILITARY AFFAIRS* to this university. Additional funds were needed, however, and Mr. Edwin Norman Clark of New York volunteered to head the drive to obtain sufficient pledges for meeting a possible deficit in the future publication of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*.

In the meantime, preliminary negotiations have been completed, and officials of the university have expressed their readiness to assume the responsibility for the publication of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, subject to the success of Mr. Clark's efforts. As this issue goes to press, negotiations should be in their final stages. The terms and feasibility of the transfer will then be reviewed by the trustees and officers of the Institute and, barring any major difficulty, the transfer should be com-

pleted during the latter part of April or early in May. Because of inevitable complications in these negotiations, publication of the 1950 issues of *MILITARY AFFAIRS* will be somewhat delayed, but the next issue of the Journal will furnish full information on the new editorial management and policies.

The transfer of *MILITARY AFFAIRS* to a major university should make possible the steady growth of the journal and the Institute. The objective of the Institute is to advance the historical study of military matters. This mission can best be accomplished in an institution of higher learning, where continued professional interest in scholarship and history will provide the atmosphere necessary for stimulating research in military history. The thorough study and analysis of the vital problems in this field has, through the international developments after World War II, become of vital importance to our national security. *MILITARY AFFAIRS* will, in its new environment, be able to make a more effective contribution than heretofore.

### AUSTRALIAN OFFICIAL WAR HISTORY

Progress in the compilation of the history of Australia's part in the war of 1939-45 is proceeding satisfactorily. Subject to the receipt of comment from colleagues overseas, and to some revision, the manuscript of the first Middle East volume — "Bardia to Damour" — has been completed by Mr. Gavin Long. The writer of the "Tobruk and El Alamein" volume, Mr. Chester Wilmot, is in England but will shortly come to Australia to continue examination of source material and to interview political and military leaders. The manuscript of the four remaining army volumes deals with operations in the Pacific theatre and should be completed next year.

Work on the two naval volumes, by Commander G. Hermon Gill, is progressing, part of the first volume being completed and much research carried out on the remainder of the volumes.

The three R.A.A.F. volumes are now taking shape and should be completed early next year. Those dealing with the political and economic field, comprising four volumes, are also well in train.

In October 1949 a series of meetings of a United Kingdom and Dominions Medical Histories Liaison Committee were held in Canberra under the chairmanship of the Australian Medical Editor—Colonel Allan S. Walker. The United Kingdom was represented by Professor F. A. E. Crew, F.R.S., and Squadron Leader H. N. H. Genese with Mr. W. Franklin Mellor as Secretary; Canada by Lieut-Colonel W. R. Feasby; and New Zealand by Colonel T. D. M. Stout. A considerable volume of draft material was presented by delegates, much of it being discussed and some exchanged for future study. Detailed examination of campaign accounts was made, and notes compared as to the method of presentation of factual material.

### CANADIAN ARMY HISTORICAL PROGRAM

Considerable progress has been made with the Canadian Army historical program previously outlined in these columns (*Military Affairs*, Fall, 1948). The Director of the Historical Section, Colonel C. P. Stacey, is engaged in writing Volume I of the Official History, dealing with events in Canada, the United Kingdom and the Pacific, 1939-43. Lt.-Col. G. W. L. Nicholson, the Deputy Director, who in 1948 made a tour of the battlefields of Sicily and Italy to check certain topographical points and take photographs, is writing Volume II, dealing with the Italian campaign.



The preliminary volume entitled *The Canadian Army, 1939-1945: An Official Historical Summary* received the Governor-General's Award for Academic Non-Fiction for 1948 (the first time an official book has gained one of these awards). The English version is now in its second printing. In June of this year the King's Printer, Ottawa, published a French edition. All printings of the book to date total 19,000 copies.

The production of preliminary narratives continues, but this work is approaching completion. Work in United Kingdom sources is carried on by a Canadian Army Historical Liaison Officer, Major T. M. Hunter, stationed in London. Capt. A. G. Steiger has continued to work in the German documents. Two additional officers of the infantry corps with operational experience overseas joined the staff in Ottawa recently.

Medical aspects of the Second World War are the subject of a two-volume history covering the three armed forces and certain civilian services. The Medical Historian is Dr. W. R. Feasby of Toronto. Preliminary narratives of Army medical work are being prepared under the direction of Major J. P. McCabe. One volume has been completed in draft.

Lt.-Col. C. J. Lynn-Grant, Executive Officer, is in charge of the administration of the Section, including the task of dealing with the numerous miscellaneous inquiries directed to it by government departments and private individuals.

#### NEW LOCATION OF THE HISTORICAL DIVISION, U. S. AIR FORCE

The Air Historical Group moved from Washington, D. C. to Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, in September, 1949. The name of the office has been changed to "Historical Division" and it is now a part of the Department of Air Force Library. Colonel Wilfred J. Paul, former chief of office, was made Director of the Department

of Air Force Library with Lt. Col. Garth C. Cobb acting as his deputy in addition to being chief of the Historical Division. Historians who moved with the office include Dr. Albert F. Simpson, Air Force Historian, Dr. Chauncey Sanders, Dr. Edith C. Rodgers, Miss C. Juliette Abington, Mr. Robert F. Futrell (now on leave at Vanderbilt to complete work on his Doctorate), Mr. Robert T. Finney, Mr. Martin Goldman, Mr. Ernest L. Jones, and Capt. B. L. Mortensen.

The personnel has been augmented by nine historians, formerly comprising the Documentary Research Section of the Air University. They are headed by Dr. Charles M. Thomas, now chief of the Studies and Research Branch of the Historical Division. The group includes Doctors Hilton P. Goss, Earl R. McClendon, Woodford A. Heflin, Raymond Estep, and Eugene M. Emme, in addition to Oron P. South, Robert W. Schmidt, Littleton B. Atkinson, Carmen White, Eolian R. Lawrence, and Mary C. McRee.

A liaison office is being maintained in the Pentagon in Washington, with Lt. Col. Arthur J. Larsen in charge. Historians remaining with the Liaison Office are Dr. H. L. Bowen and Dr. Alfred Goldberg.

The Historical Division has recently been charged with the responsibility of writing the yearly reports of both the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Chief of Staff, as well as the Annual History of Headquarters, USAF. The division will continue with its work of writing the official Air Force seven-volume history, two volumes of which have already been published. The latest, Volume II, Europe—TORCH TO POINTBLANK (August 1942 to December 1943) came off the University of Chicago's press in June 1949. The next volume will be number IV, which will cover the Pacific War in 1942 and 1943. It is expected that this book will be put on sale in June 1950.

## PROGRESS REPORT ON NEW ZEALAND WAR HISTORIES

The War History Branch of the Department of Internal Affairs was set up on 1 April 1945 under the control of Mr. E. H. McCormick as Chief War Archivist. A small staff was collected, mainly composed of men still in the Services, premises were obtained and the huge task of collecting, sorting, cataloguing and indexing war records of all descriptions was commenced.

Early in 1941 a War Archivist's section had been set up in Middle East under the control of Lieut. E. H. Halstead (now M.P.) which did invaluable preliminary work, including the production of the very successful brief histories of the various campaigns, which sold readily during the war.

In 1944 Navy and Air Force set up Archives Sections.

On 7 February 1946 I was appointed Editor-in-Chief of the War Histories. I took up my appointment on 1 July 1946.

The principal terms of the contract (dated 15 Jan. 1947) between the Crown and myself were:

- (i) That I should serve as Editor-in-Chief for a period of 7 years from 1 July 1946, the Crown having the right to require me to serve in that capacity for any further period it desired.
- (ii) That I should have access to all relevant documents, be subject to no censorship except in respect of technical military secrets of continuing importance.
- (iii) That possible defamatory matters, or matter or comment that might affect relations with any other British state or foreign country should at my discretion be referred by me direct to the Prime Minister for direction before publication.
- (iv) I was empowered to enter into contracts with such authors as I thought fit for preparation of volumes of the

history at rates of remuneration approved from time to time by the Crown.

I was instructed to submit a plan for a comprehensive and detailed history of New Zealand's war experience. Cabinet also approved the request of a very fully attended meeting of former commanding officers that unit histories should be prepared under my control. I was also directed to prepare histories of the war-time activities of all Government Departments.

The project as so approved and percentage of completion to date are as follows:

*Civilian*: "Political & External Affairs" by Wood, 50%. "Economics & Industry" by Shearer, 50%. "Social Developments" by Duff, 25%.

*Navy*: 2 Vols. ("RNZN and New Zealanders In Royal Navy") by Waters, 50%.

*Army*: "Preliminaries, Greece" by McClymont, 50%. "Crete" by Davin, 80%. "Libya, 1941" by Cox, 40%. "Syria & Egypt 1942" by Scoullar, 60%. "Alamein to Tunisia" by Scoullar, 30%. "Italy"—(No appointment yet). "Pacific Campaigns" by Gillespie, 50%. "NZ Army 1840-1945"—(No appointment).

*Air Force*: "Royal New Zealand Air Force 1911-1945" by Ross, 60%. "New Zealanders in the Royal Air Force, 1939-45" by Thompson, 40%.

*Diplomatic*: 3 Vols. of correspondence between N. Z. & other Governments relative to certain important decisions. (Collected and annotated by staff. 1 vol near publication.)

*Medical*: 3 Vols., by Dr. T. D. M. Stout, Editor, 30%.

*Dental*: 1 Vol., by T. Y. Anson, 50%.

*Scientific & Industrial Research*: 1 Vol., by Burbidge, 20%.

*Popular*: 4 Vols., (48 parts). Deal with phases & episodes of particular interest. Very well illustrated. 12 published, others in preparation, mostly by staff. Education Dept. takes 750 sets. 25%.

*Prisoners of War*: 1 Vol., by Mason, 80 %.  
*Chaplain in the N. Z. Services*: 1 Vol., by Underhill & others 100%.

*Unit Histories*: (About 25). These are prepared by authors selected by Branch, with approval of unit committees. The authors work under direction and with assistance of Branch. One published and about a dozen progressing well. Several others, of important units, will have to be done by my staff, when available, and some others combined into one volume. 25%.

*South African War*: A special task set by Cabinet. Four previous efforts, from 1903 onwards, had collapsed for various reasons.

This small volume is about to be published. 100%.

*Departmental Histories*: There were 64 Government Departments during the war. Histories have been compiled on the formula—what were the war-time problems, what action was taken, and with what effect. They are for departmental guidance in case of a future emergency and are not for publication, and are source documents for both civil and military volumes.

Histories of 40 have been completed. Some of the remainder are short and unimportant. In some cases we have received no co-operation from the Department concerned and have been unable to do anything, while in other cases members of my Staff have written Departmental narratives where the Department either because of staff shortage or lack of qualified research assistants has been unable to do the work itself.

This work should be completed during the current year.

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Percentages estimated above relate to the actual research and writing only and take no account of the further process to be gone through before the volumes are available for sale. Work on maps and photographs proceeds during the writing, indices and statistical data have to be prepared, many items settled with printers and distributors, proofs to be read, complimentary lists have to be revised and address slips prepared—there are 250 names on the present approved list and copies of the one unit history so far published have been sent to 700 ex-members whose service had to be checked. From completion of text to publication takes about one year.

The fees paid to authors are on the same scales as have been adopted in England, U.S.A., and Australia, i.e. £1000 to £1500 for authors of major volumes, £500-£800 for unit historians. It was estimated that authors, working long hours part time, would take 2-3 years to write a volume—after receipt of our preliminary narratives—and this estimate appears to be correct.

We have now completed most of the sorting and cataloguing and have made considerable progress in binding diaries, etc. Seventeen thousand unit diaries had to be dealt with, about 80,000 photographs and 7000 reports.

Very full factual narratives are prepared by the Research Assistants on my Staff. These contain every ascertainable relevant fact, fully referenced, statistics, copies of orders, reports and maps. They are then handed to the author, who is briefed with these narratives, the relevant corresponding narratives of British, American, Australian, Canadian, South African, Greek, French or Indian Historical Sections, with all published works or articles concerning his subject, with translations of all obtainable relevant German and Italian documents, with notes of interviews, intelligence and censorship summaries. We make special enquiries as requested or as seems necessary. The author is then expected to write his book.

This is recognized as a sound procedure. We endeavour to ensure that every statement made is supported by good evidence, easily referred to. The preliminary narrative system is essential for recording sources and for circulation to other Historical Sections and to participants.

An immense amount of checking and verifying has to be done. Nothing is published which has not been examined word by word and statement by statement, by a research assistant, my Associate Editor, and myself. But I believe that in this way we will produce



an authoritative history, as nearly accurate as is humanly possible and of lasting value.

The size and composition of my staff of course depended on the task set. At present it is comprised as follows:

|                      |                       |
|----------------------|-----------------------|
| Associate Editor     | Mr. M. C. Fairbrother |
| Illustrations Editor | Mr. J. D. Pascoe      |
| Archivist            | Mr. A. E. Monaghan    |
| Sub-Editor           | Mr. W. A. Glue        |

The above mentioned are key personnel whose services, or those of replacements, will be required until the work is completed.

|                      |  |
|----------------------|--|
| Naval Historian      | Mr. S. D. Waters (employed by Navy Department)   |
| Medical Historian    | Dr. T. D. M. Stout (on a five years appointment)   |
| Air Force Historians | Squadron Leader J. M. Ross, Wing Commander H. L. Thompson (both on Short Service Commissions). |

All the above work under my control and have the assistance of the War History Branch Staff.

|                                    |               |    |    |
|------------------------------------|---------------|----|----|
| Research Assistants and Narrators) | In Wellington | 16 |    |
|                                    | In London     | 2  |    |
|                                    | In Washington | 1  | 19 |
| Map Draftsman                      |               | 1  |    |
| Photographic Assistant             |               | 1  |    |
| Clerks                             |               | 2  |    |
| Cataloguers                        |               | 2  |    |
| Typists (very much understaffed)   |               | 4  |    |
|                                    |               | —  |    |
| Total                              |               |    | 37 |

There has been a slow reduction from two years ago, and this will continue till a minimum of about 15 is reached. With the exception of the Associate Editor, the Historians mentioned above, and myself, all members of the Staff are Civil Servants.

It was expected that the Government Printer would be able to handle all our publications. This soon proved impossible and

with the approval of Cabinet and of the Government Printer we asked for tenders from the printing trade. . . .

The captured German records are now held in Washington as the joint property of the British and American Governments. A member of my staff is in Washington and is translating all such records as are of direct interest to us. He is maintaining a high rate of production and his work is invaluable.

We maintain close relations with the Historical Sections of the other States of the British Commonwealth and with that of the U.S.A. We interchange, correct and comment on narratives, interchange translations and comment on opinions.

I am unable to give any close estimate of the time that will be required to complete this program. The other States of the Commonwealth and the U.S.A., all have similar programs and all have extended their estimates of time. The U.S.A. plans for 99 volumes, of which five have so far been published, apart from unit histories. We are at least not behind anyone else. All that I can say is that the original estimate of seven years is too low.

I have an enthusiastic, hard working and increasingly skilled staff and we work at a steady pressure. One volume and twelve numbers of the Popular Series were published in 1949, the equivalent of two volumes. In 1950 we should produce five and it can reasonably be guessed that we should finish by 1956 or 1958, ten to twelve years from the time I took over. Volumes will be published as ready.

This series, following on the Centennial Series, will provide a fairly complete and authentic history of New Zealand for its first century or so as a civilized state.

HOWARD K. KIPPENBERGER,  
Editor-in-Chief,  
*New Zealand War Histories.*

### TRUXTUN-DECATUR NAVAL MUSEUM

The Truxtun-Decatur Naval Museum, which is being built at 1610 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. by the Naval Historical Foundation, is scheduled to open about March 1950. The Museum will occupy the carriage house of Decatur House, the mansion designed by Benjamin Latrobe for Stephen Decatur and occupied by the Commodore in 1819. The exterior of the carriage house will retain its original appearance, but the interior will be the most modern museum in Washington.

The opening exhibition, designed to complement the celebration of the Sesquicentennial of the city of Washington as the Capital, will be on the subject of the two men for whom the Museum is named and the Navy of their time. Commodore Thomas Truxtun figured largely in the organization of the United States Navy and was the outstanding hero of the Naval War with France in 1798-1801. Commodore Stephen Decatur is well known for his participation in the Wars with the Barbary Powers and the War of 1812. Included in this show will be paintings, prints, relics and charts from the collections of the Naval Historical Foundation and from museums and private individuals. Many of these have never been shown in any public exhibition.

Following the opening exhibition, the Museum will continue a series of three or four special exhibitions each year on the history of the naval services and on many subjects pertaining to salt water, such as yachting, merchant shipping and foreign trade.

Membership in the Naval Historical Foundation is open to all who are interested in the Navy and the sea. Information may be obtained by writing to the Secretary, Captain A. D. Turnbull, Naval Historical Foundation, 2041 Navy Department, Washington, 25, D. C.

### JAPANESE MILITARY DOCUMENTS

TO THE EDITOR OF MILITARY AFFAIRS:

I am a graduate of the United States Naval Japanese Language School and a member of Professor Morison's history staff. Since one of my duties is to exploit Japanese wartime documents for the *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, I would like to respond to Captain Toshikazu Ohmae's remarks concerning the History's possible weakness in Japanese documentation, by explaining how our Japanese information is derived.

There are two general sources of such material. One is the Army Historical Section in Tokyo which has translated well over one hundred lengthy monographs on Pacific operations written by Japanese wartime military and naval leaders. The other is the United States Strategic Bombing Survey which went to Japan at the end of the war, interrogated many Japanese officials and brought back to the U. S. important Japanese military documents for translations and compilation.

Without the aid of these monographs and USSBS compilations a comprehensive view of Japan's strategy and tactics would be all but impossible. As sources, however, there are weaknesses in both. Many important groups of official wartime records were, as Captain Ohmae states, destroyed by the Japanese at the close of hostilities; others were removed to this country. Thus the monographs have been prepared without benefit of much official documentation and perforce had to be based for the most part on recollections and records of individuals. The Bombing Survey materials are often found wanting for historical purposes in that they paint with too broad a brush. They were assembled hastily without the opportunity of bringing the Japanese information

into the sharp focus with the Allied side of the story which history demands.

One other basic source of translated Japanese information used in Professor Morison's History is a series of compilations prepared in Japan in 1946 under the aegis of Lieutenant Commander Henry Salomon, Jr. USNR (then a member of the History staff). With splendid cooperation from Major General Charles A. Willoughby and the capable assistance of several Japanese ex-naval officers (including Captain Ohmae) who were assigned to him, Mr. Salomon obtained answers to many specific questions prepared by Professor Morrison. Successful as Mr. Salomon was in this job, the answers having been based largely on reconstructed records and memory are susceptible to the normal vagaries of such sources.

Such then are the principal translated sources of Japanese data which are aligned against the full fount of Allied records at Professor Morison's disposal. We try to compensate for these limitations by recourse to the Japanese war documents removed to the U. S. In addition to those brought back by USSBS there were tens of thousands more sent back and processed by the Washington Document Center (WDC). WDC put out accession lists on these documents and translated parts of them for Allied governmental agencies including USSBS, on a priority basis. But these activities came to a close when WDC was dissolved in December 1946. The Japanese military and naval documents, some 50,000 in all, were then moved to the National Archives where they have since been retained.

Unfortunately the Archives employs no Japanese linguists. It is also a matter of regret that the Japanese records were not maintained in the order that WDC had held

and worked with them. Hence the Archives has no satisfactory subject-index system for finding a desired Japanese document. And even when the required document is located, there still remains the problem of translation.

The foregoing is written to explain why, in Professor Morison's work, the effort is first made to use materials already translated. Then as inconsistencies are manifest we try to resolve them by recourse to original Japanese documents. Working with a very small staff and only one part-time translator, it would be impossible for Professor Morison to achieve the ideal of sounding the depths of all sources of Japanese information on the war; and even if this could be done, the proportionate space devoted to such material in the History could not be measurably increased. Indeed, just in checking translated sources, I have already translated far more from the original documents than Professor Morison could possibly incorporate in his History, but it has been necessary for him to select the best material available within the limits of time, space and his translator's ability.

Progress has been made, and within the past year thanks to General Willoughby and his historical section the opportunity has been opened to Professor Morison to avail himself directly of the assistance of such people as Captain Ohmae himself, Captain Yasuji Watanabe and other of their colleagues. Such avenues will surely serve to improve our already earnest efforts to tell the History of U. S. Naval Operations in World War II in its fullest and most accurate light.

ROGER PINEAU  
*Lieutenant, USNR*  
*Washington, D. C.*

12 December 1949



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★   ★   ★   ★   ★   ★   ★   ★

## THE MILITARY LIBRARY

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### CORAL SEA, MIDWAY AND SUBMARINE ACTIONS, MAY 1942 - AUGUST 1942

*History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume IV*

By SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON

(Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1949. Pp xxiii, 307. \$6.00)

Review by Toshikazu Ohmae\*

As an ex-Japanese Naval Officer I am very grateful for having been recently given a chance of reading Professor Morison's book and for the opportunity to discuss it. This fourth volume covers the expansion of the Japanese south of Rabaul, the Battle of the Coral Sea, Midway, the Aleutian operations, submarine actions in 1942 and 1943 and the plans and preparations for the first American offensive in the Solomons.

The Japanese Navy's operational plan against the United States was based upon a study entitled, The National Defense Policy of the Empire (Teikoku Kokubo Hoshin) formulated in 1911 and since then strictly adhered to by Japan, and studied very care-

fully and intensely for long years. Its fundamental idea was to encounter an oncoming American fleet in the western Pacific and all operational preparations and plans of the Navy were made along this fundamental principle. When the Tripartite Pact which had long been the subject of much discussion was made in 1940, however, the world situation marked a sharp turn. The relationship between the United States and Japan became gradually tense, while there were obvious indications that Great Britain and the Netherlands would, in cooperation with the United States, fight Japan. Consequently, the Japanese Navy was forced to redraft its operational plan against the United States, combining operations against Great Britain, the Netherlands, and China with it, and after hard and careful studies since June 1941 a new practical plan was formulated in September 1941.

In the new operational plan a drastic change was made so as to make a surprise attack upon the American fleet in the Hawaii area with a carrier task force at the very beginning of the war, but the fundamental principle of encountering the American fleet in the western Pacific remained unchanged. High ranking officers of the Navy General Staff of that time thought there were good possibilities of a naval victory, if such an operation could be carried out in the early

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\*Captain Ohmae, as a member of the Naval Affairs Bureau, Japanese Navy Department, was in charge of missions and movements of ships. He has had a close connection with Japanese naval operations since before the war. After Midway he served as operations staff officer on several of Japan's most important fleets, and took part in most of the major sea battles from Savo Island to Leyte Gulf. Toward the end of the war he participated in the planning of all naval operations as Chief of the Operations Section, Naval General Staff. Since the end of the war he has been engaged in helping to prepare war histories as a member of the Japanese Second Demobilization Bureau and in General Headquarters, Far East Command. So far as the Editor knows, this review is the first of its kind to appear, in any American publication, concerning any war in which the United States ever took part. In canvassing the opinions of former enemies MILITARY AFFAIRS intensifies a policy of long standing—a search for the best qualified specialists to review important books.—*The Editor.*

stages of the war, but at the same time the war seemed absolutely sure from any angle to be a prolonged one; therefore, they were much worried about how a decisive battle could be waged in the early stages of the war. A fundamental reason for fighting the decisive battle early in the war came from a conclusion reached after careful studies of the naval strength of both the United States and Japan, their production abilities supported by national strength and supposed changes of fighting strength of both countries. These studies showed that Japan would be out-matched in the race for naval power in the Pacific within less than two years.

The Japanese thought that steps might be successively taken so as to seek an early decisive sea battle, in which a fatal blow would be inflicted upon the American fleet. Subsequently repeating this sort of tactics, the favorable strength ratio for Japan should be maintained, thus an impregnable position should be secured to wait for a favorable turn of the world situation, particularly in the European theater. Especially Admiral Yamamoto, commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet, had a strong will of waging by all means a decisive sea battle by the end of 1942.

The Coral Sea Battle was fought when Japan attempted to make the Port Moresby invasion, extending its operational line further south. The Japanese Navy, however, never considered this operation as seriously as it should have and did not think of it in relation to the all-out decisive battle; they looked upon it only as a supporting operation to the attempt to capture Port Moresby. The failure of the Japanese Naval Command to concentrate greater strength in the Coral Sea area accounts in part for the strategic victory of the United States Navy in this engagement. Although, as Professor Morison points out, the Japanese gained a tactical victory, they could have been more successful

if preliminary planning had been more thorough and had the Japanese learned to concentrate all available forces to secure a sure victory and a complete one.

The Japanese also jeopardized their chances for ultimate success by imposing a subordinate transport mission upon the carrier task force (pp. 24-25). The *Shokaku* and *Zuikaku* were to deliver nine fighter planes to the 25th Air Flotilla in Rabaul. Bad weather on 3 and 4 May, however, prevented these fighters from leaving the carriers and flying to their land base at Rabaul. As a result the two carriers were delayed two days and instead of being to the northeast of San Cristobal Island when Admiral Fletcher made his strike against Tulagi, they were about 700 miles to the northwest — too far away to counterattack Admiral Fletcher aboard the *Yorktown*. Had the *Zuikaku* and *Shokaku* been in their originally designated positions when Admiral Fletcher attacked Tulagi, both Japanese carriers could have concentrated on the *Yorktown*. This may have started the world's first sea-air battle several days sooner and may have brought about different results. With this in mind Fletcher's air strike against Tulagi could be questioned from the point of view of sound naval strategy.

As about the postponement of the Port Moresby invasion by Admiral Inouye (p. 61): Inouye only postponed the invasion but he did not set the postponement date of 3 July for he had no authority to do this. The date for the new invasion attempt was set on 9 May by the Combined Fleet when it was decided that the invasion would be postponed until after 1 July by which time it was assumed the Battle of Midway would have been fought.

The Battle of Midway is the high point in Professor Morison's book as it was the turning point in the naval war in the Pacific between Japan and the United States. The

Japanese had expected so much from victory at Midway that when the battle was lost they were forced to revise their entire naval strategy and planning in the Pacific war and to cancel all further large-scale seaborne invasion plans. They had been rather undisturbed by the setback in the Coral Sea engagement, and they felt that Port Moresby could be "captured at leisure" because they believed that practically all roads would be open to them after victory at Midway for it was hoped that this operation would result in the all-out decisive battle. There was not one bit of consolation in the loss at Midway for the core of the striking strength of the Combined Fleet was gone — the four carriers *Akagi*, *Kaga*, *Hiryu* and *Soryu*. Some officers of high standing, like Admiral Nagano and Shimada, pretended that the loss was not overwhelming but Admiral Yamamoto knew that the defeat was a major disaster. There was some discussion among high ranking military circles on the advisability of telling the true facts of the Midway defeat to the Japanese people to consolidate their morale. Premier Tojo, however, opposed this plan by the reason that it was needless to inform the people of the disaster because it would only reduce their morale and lessen their fighting spirit. The Midway operation was so great in size, scope, purpose, planning and expectations that it cannot be understood correctly unless the entire Japanese background and pre-Midway thinking is clear. This is one of the gaps in the present volume. Professor Morison is at his best writing about the battle action of the American fleet at Midway. His excellent action reports are of the greatest interest to Japanese readers.

The Aleutian invasion had its origin in the Army's demand for carrying out this operation. The Combined Fleet headquarters asserted that the Aleutian invasion could be simultaneously carried out as a supporting

operation to the attack against Midway and thus succeeded to have the Naval General Staff withdraw its opposition against the Midway operation. The consequence was the compromise between the Naval General Staff and the Combined Fleet to make simultaneous operations against Midway and the Aleutian Islands. The simultaneous operations against Midway and the Aleutians which resulted in a great setback in the Japanese naval operations had its origin in this compromise decision. It is true that the Japanese, as Professor Morison says (pp. 161-162), did not plan to invade the United States via the Aleutians, but it is not true that the Japanese thought that the United States was "foolish enough to try the reverse." (p. 162). I must say, too, that the Aleutians were of value to Japan independent of Midway so the loss of the Midway operation did not nullify entirely the importance of the Aleutians to the Japanese (p. 181).

It is a most regrettable fact that many of the Japanese historical materials were burned in accordance with orders which were issued in the confusion at the time of surrender. It is not necessarily impossible, however, to collect materials for the study of Japanese naval history because some documents are still remaining and the papers of those who participated in some of the operations and statements from those officers who are still alive today are helpful. Professor Morison has made as thorough investigation as he could from confiscated Japanese official documents now in America and from statements by some of the Japanese officers who took part in the operations. His best source of study, however, is the United States Navy documents and the American side is always presented much more fully than the Japanese side for that reason. Professor Morison's attempt to write on Japanese naval operations is well in accord with a principle advocated



by Admiral Mahan to the effect that a good study of history should be made in documents of the defeated side, for this is the way to reveal the real facts and to seek genuine conclusions. Sometimes Professor Morison has relied on only one Japanese source for some of his conclusions and, in several cases, his story has not been so strong as a result. For instance, he writes about the attitude and psychology of Admiral Yamamoto during the Battle of Midway by the source of the statement of Yamamoto's yeoman aboard the *Yamato* (pp. 95, 138 and 144). According to Captain Watanabe who was with Admiral Yamamoto's staff since 1939 and a prime favorite of the Admiral, the story of his yeoman is not true. Captain Watanabe was with Admiral Yamamoto throughout the entire Midway operation and he states that Admiral Yamamoto's yeoman was not in a position to sit and talk with the Admiral and thus could not accurately describe his feelings. Admiral Yamamoto personally dealt with every difficulty in the Battle of Midway and it was not until later that he retired to his sick bed with stomach disease. He did not complain but he expressed regret concerning the inadequacy of the submarine screen which had not been properly provided for in the operational order of his own name. This order was drafted by his senior staff officer and the idea of a submarine screening force sweeping eastward on reconnaissance missions was Admiral Yamamoto's own idea. His single regret covered the direct cause for the Japanese tactical failure at Midway: poor Japanese intelligence and inadequate reconnaissance.

The lack of Japanese sources on high level planning and strategy is the main reason why Professor Morison is not able to go deeply into the problem of Japanese strategy. The book has many strong sides and it is a most important contribution to the history of the war in the Pacific, but if it has a weakness the inadequacy of the Japanese story is the main one. If the documentation, especially on the Japanese side, would be mentioned more clearly and in Japanese (Romaji) the readers in Japan and future generations of Japanese would get more benefit from this significant study. This is most important to all Japanese students because many documents were not only burned in Japan but taken from the country and if we know that the source of some statements is still in existence in America it would help Japanese students and others in the future to study the history of the war in the Pacific and to find out where the exact sources are for reconstructing a more extensive account. Some of the documents on Japanese naval strategy are not documented and some do not agree with the majority opinions of those Japanese naval officers who survived the war.

Professor Morison's book is very well written and discloses many interesting facts on both the American and Japanese side to Japanese readers. The author's attitude is most fair and reasonable and his criticisms are just both to the United States and Japan. His historical honesty is to be admired and this is the correct way to write history. It is also an important factor to leave this book for future generations of both Americans and Japanese.

## REVIEWS OF BOOKS

*Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference*, by Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1949. Pp. 367. \$4.00).

In describing his selection of the outstanding books of 1949, Charles Poore of *The New York Times* recently commented: "Mr. Stettinius' calm and authoritative book on what happened at Yalta is particularly worth reading at a time when Yalta is obviously becoming the Versailles of World War II—a sort of chimeric feast for the second guessers who make it their business to straighten out the world. Retroactively, that is."

This volume is one of the most illuminating contributions to the literature of the war period. There has been so much partisan oratory and polemic writing on Yalta that it may be difficult to uproot some popular legends about what actually happened. But Stettinius has provided us with the most complete documentation on the Conference that has yet been published. Even Winston Churchill's memoirs cannot be expected to provide as thorough an account.

The author was fortunate in securing the assistance of Walter Johnson, of the History Department of the University of Chicago, in the preparation of this book. In the words of Mr. Stettinius, Professor Johnson "has assisted me in placing this Conference in its proper perspective in the unfolding of American foreign policy and in filling an important gap that has hitherto existed in the history of the war period." As a result, the book profits by an initial discussion of the background of the Conference, takes us through an admirably thorough day-by-day account of discussions and decisions, and concludes with two sparkling chapters assessing the "balance sheet" of what was accomplished at Yalta and the grim story of the breakdown after Yalta.

Those who have already made up their minds about Yalta will probably suspect that Stettinius is trying to whitewash his old Commander in Chief. Ten minutes with this book will show that this is a grossly unfair assumption. Roosevelt is justly taken to task for the errors he made at Yalta — notably his unexplainable refusal to make public the agreement on votes in the Assembly for Byelorussia and the Ukraine.

Yet Roosevelt emerges from the book as a towering figure of world statesmanship. By his labors, agreements were reached which involved greater concessions by the Soviet Union than by

Great Britain and the United States. The President's role in this process is summarized on p. 322:

"From my close association with Franklin D. Roosevelt, I know that he was primarily motivated by the great ideal of friendly cooperation among nations. At the same time he had no illusions about the dangers and difficulties of dealing with the Soviet Union. He emphasized many times that we must keep trying with patience and determination to get the Russians to realize that it was in their own selfish interest to win the confidence of the other countries of the world . . . Although he knew that the winning of Russian confidence in a world organization would be difficult, and would take time and patience, peace was too vital a necessity not to make a supreme effort toward achieving this goal."

In the case of the Far Eastern agreement—perhaps the most vulnerable of the agreements concluded at Yalta—Stettinius points out that it was made five months before we knew the atomic bomb would be successful. It was also made at a time when Roosevelt's military advisers were predicting that an invasion of Japan would bring one million casualties in a war likely to extend several years beyond 1945.

One of the most revealing portions of the book is the description of the breakdown of relations with the Soviet Union which followed the Yalta Conference. Here Stettinius shows clearly, with good documentation, that President Roosevelt fully appreciated that a change in Soviet policy necessitated a change in America's handling of Russia. In fact, on the morning of his death, Roosevelt, in his last official message, counseled Churchill to maintain a firm attitude toward the Russians. The very last sentence of this cable to Churchill commenced with the phrase "We must be firm."

Stettinius shows conclusively in this volume that "It is not Yalta that is the trouble with the world today, but subsequent failure to adhere to the policies Yalta stood for and to carry out agreements that were reached there. Difficulties have developed, not from the agreements reached at Yalta, but from the failure of the Soviet Union to honor those agreements."

KENNETH W. HECHLER\*  
Washington, D. C.

\*As a Major, Mr. Hechler was a combat historian in the First and Third U. S. Armies in Europe, 1944-46.

*Lincoln Finds a General: A Military Study of the Civil War*, by Kenneth P. Williams. (New York: Macmillan, 1949. Pp. 902 (2 vols.) \$12.50.)

These two volumes, the first in a projected series of four, are without question the most iconoclastic and provocative books on the military history of the Civil War that have been published in our time. Their author, a professor of mathematics previously unknown as a historian, stalks with breath-taking boldness into a field which many experts have been wont to tread with caution, and by the time he concludes the Gettysburg campaign near the end of volume II, his trail is piled with the wreckage of prior ideas about the war and of historians responsible for their dissemination. Then, as if not fully satisfied with his accomplishment, he extends the demolition in a lengthy appendix.

Professor Williams' work is primarily a study of high command. He approaches the problem from the point of view of the White House, and his emphasis is on the Army of the Potomac. But his purview includes Confederate activities, as it properly should, and some of his most sensational conclusions are those concerning Lee and Jackson.

In fact, it hardly seems too much to state that the effect of Williams' analysis, if fully accepted, is to reduce Lee and Jackson from the stature of great generals to that of good ones. Lee, for instance, appears unimpressive during the Seven Days', especially in view of the miserable performance attributed to McClellan. At Second Manassas he is represented as by no means pulling the wool completely over the eyes of Pope, and the reader sees in his performance more of the daring born of desperation, and luck, than of brilliant generalship. The Antietam campaign, from adding to Lee's greatness, serves more to point up the utter incompetence of McClellan. In the approach to Fredericksburg, Burnside is said to have confused and misled Lee. The implication of Williams' is that detention of Federal pontons may well have prevented a Confederate defeat. Hooker's performance in the early stages of the Chancellorsville campaign, as presented by Williams, compares favorably with that of Lee and after Jackson's death Hooker stood a good chance of crushing Lee's army in detail if only he had not gone to pieces and ordered abandonment of Hazel Grove. Lee appears at disadvantage in letting Hooker's main army slip across the Rappahannock without his knowledge; and the Con-

federate leader whose name has come to be regarded as synonymous with truth and honesty, in attempting to leave an overfavorable impression in his final report on Chancellorsville, is charged by Williams with "disingenuous fabrication" — which according to my dictionary borders very closely on lying.

But perhaps it is with reference to Gettysburg that prevailing ideas concerning Lee receive their worst drubbing. Lee's orders to Stuart are interpreted as giving him conflicting missions, and Williams holds that if Lee suffered from Stuart's absence he had himself principally to blame. Orders given to Ewell were lacking in definiteness and Ewell appears no more irresolute on the afternoon of July 1st than Lee, who was on the spot. More than that, a careful study of the strength and disposition of Union forces in the Cemetery Hill area indicates that Ewell could not have taken and held that eminence if he had tried. Williams appears to accept the late Colonel D. B. Sanger's claim that if Lee expected Longstreet to attack before early afternoon of July 2nd, he was hoping for the impossible, and in view of the situation on the Union side, Williams deems an attack made any later than one o'clock of doubtful success. Of Pickett's charge Williams states: "The attack that day cannot be viewed as anything more than a last hopeless venture."

Of the principal Union generals, McClellan receives most attention and Williams' treatment of him is devastating. As a strategist the author finds McClellan wanting; as a tactician, lamentable; as a combat commander, hopeless; and as a man, so deficient in character as to be detestable if not loathsome. While even the enemies of McClellan have been inclined to concede his competence as an organizer and trainer, Williams in these respects as in others finds him seriously deficient. And the change of base before Richmond which often has been acclaimed as a masterly feat Williams pictures as a poorly planned retreat, the accomplishment of which is to be credited mainly to corps commanders. Williams' final verdict on McClellan is this: "McClellan was not a real general. McClellan was not even a disciplined, truthful soldier. McClellan was merely an attractive but vain and unstable man, with considerable military knowledge, who sat a horse well and wanted to be President."

McDowell and Patterson appear in somewhat better light than usual; Hooker shines in preliminary maneuvering, but fails in the all-important role of commanding an army in combat.



Meade comes off rather badly in his direction of the Gettysburg campaign. But it is Pope whose record is most drastically revised by Williams. This erstwhile maligned figure is portrayed as completely outgeneralling the mighty Lee for four days, and the author finds his performance as army commander, on the whole, more worthy of praise than censure.

In addition to re-evaluating the principal commanders, Williams throws much new light on the performance of lesser leaders. The Northern cavalry gets a considerably higher rating than most writers have given it and Confederate *beau sabreurs*, especially Stuart, lose some of their lustre. The author presents his point of view clearly and persuasively, and his findings undoubtedly require modification of a number of current concepts. Gettysburg, in particular, must be viewed in a different light as a result of Williams' study, and numerous other aspects of the conflict must be re-examined. In general, re-examination rather than revision is suggested, for two reasons.

First is the matter of sources. Williams' basic source is the 128 volume *Official Records*. He has worked this publication with a care and thoroughness which few if any prior authorities have equalled and none have excelled. He knows the *Official Records* from cover to cover, and references to them constitute the overwhelming bulk of his 106 pages of footnotes. But if the footnotes are a fair indication, his use of other sources is extremely disappointing. Personal narratives, unit histories and periodicals are cited infrequently. The *New York Tribune* is the only newspaper cited, and while Greeley's paper seems to have been used extensively, this is of doubtful merit if the end is a fair and balanced appraisal of issues and persons (especially McClellan). Only one citation of an unpublished source was found in the entire two volumes, a circumstance that appears startling in view of the fact that Professor Randall, whose two volumes on Lincoln cover about the same period, devotes four pages of his bibliography to manuscript collections.

Second, the tone of the author's treatment is not always such as to inspire full confidence in his conclusions. He appears cocksure about points which hardly lend themselves to certain judgment, especially on the basis of material cited, and a certain impatience with opinions differing from his own is suggested by his repeated use of the word "nonsense." His treatment of McClellan seems to have an animus that hardly lends itself to a

fair weighing of that general's qualities, and his inclination toward Pope appears overly solicitous. For McClellan he seems to take the role of prosecutor and for Pope that of defense counsel, rather than in each case acting as judge whose principal concern is an impartial seeking out and evaluation of pertinent evidence. Other indications of bias are suggested by his repeated reference to Wigfall as "the duellist" and attributing Woodbury's failure in the Fredericksburg crisis to reluctance to leave a warm bed in Washington.

But these criticisms are not meant to detract from the many commendable qualities of *Lincoln Finds a General*. The style is exciting, the interpretation original, and the conclusions stimulating. The other volumes will be awaited with an eagerness bordering on impatience by students of the Civil War.

BELL IRVIN WILEY  
Emory University  
Atlanta, Georgia

*The Struggle for Guadalcanal: August 1942-February 1943* (Vol. V of *The History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*), by Samuel Eliot Morison. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1949. Pp. xxii, 389. Maps, photographs, and index. \$6.00).

The Guadalcanal Campaign was one of the most tense and dramatic of the Pacific war. It was the first Pacific offensive by American ground troops. Begun as the opening phase of an Allied offensive directed against the Japanese base at Rabaul in New Britain, its purpose, protection of the lines of communication leading from the United States and Hawaii to New Zealand and Australia, was primarily defensive. Although the 1st Marine Division, which invaded Guadalcanal and Tulagi on August 7, 1942, quickly seized its major objectives, the Japanese reacted so violently and Allied control of the sea and air routes to the island was so tenuous that the campaign developed into a fierce six-month struggle. At sea and in the air Americans and Japanese fought grimly for control of the lines of communication, and on land the contending forces battled incessantly for possession of Henderson Field on Guadalcanal. The Japanese threw in virtually all the naval surface ships and planes they had left after Midway. The Allies, who during most of the operation were heavily involved in North Africa and the Mediterranean, sent in every ship and plane that could be spared. But the Allied means of war were so limited

that the cliché Operation SHOESTRING has been applied time and again as a sardonic code name. The number of ground troops engaged was relatively small: two U. S. Marine and two U. S. Army Divisions, two Japanese divisions, with reinforcing and supporting units on both sides.

In many ways the campaign was a unique one. It differed from later Pacific operations in that complete control of the air and sea routes to the target were not wrested from the Japanese naval and air forces before landings on the hostile shore began. The Americans did not win substantial control of the lines of communication until the great battles of mid-November, which followed four naval battles, the relief or transfer of several high-ranking admirals, and the assumption of command in the South Pacific by the gallant and inspiring Halsey. The costly mid-November engagements, rather than the ground fighting, were the most decisive actions of the campaign, but defeat on land might have brought about defeat at sea. As the author points out, the Japanese, while committing large fleets in an effort to control the lines of communication, sometimes reversed Mahan by trying to capture Henderson Field with ground troops in an effort to win control of the air and the sea.

*The Struggle for Guadalcanal*, the fifth volume in Capt. Samuel Eliot Morison's HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II and the second published in 1949, describes the entire complicated Guadalcanal Campaign except the planning and preparations prior to August 7, 1942, and the initial landings. The author is at his best in describing naval actions, and here, where the relatively evenly matched contending forces fought six major naval engagements, he has wide scope for his talents. All the battles are well described. Perhaps the most outstanding analyses are those of the gallant night action of the American cruisers against Japanese battleships (November 13, 1942) and of the tragic Battle of Savo Island (August 9, 1942). The account of the fiasco at Savo is the fullest and best yet to appear. Captain Morison shows, exactly and specifically, how American errors in judgment, communications troubles, lack of a battle plan, weariness, haste, optimism, and plain bad luck permitted the Japanese to surprise and defeat a strong force. The largest numbers of "revelations" are to be found here, for the author's researches have taken him far beyond the findings and conclusions of the now famous Hepburn Board report.

There are a good many other revelations too. The responsibility that must be borne by one admiral who was eternally concerned with his fuel supply is made clear. Certainly many readers will be surprised to learn that in October 1942, when Admiral Scott led his ships to victory at Cape Esperance, he was one of the first Allied task force commanders to enter action with a carefully prepared battle plan. The student of ground operations, although accustomed to periodic failure of radio and telephonic communications on land, may be surprised to learn of the high incidence of such failures between warships, with their stable and extensive facilities.

Captain Morison treats naval actions in greatest detail, but he summarizes ground and Army air operations. Thus he demonstrates that victory was won by a combination of all United States armed forces — Army, Navy, and Marine Corps — and by all branches of those services — infantry, artillery, aircraft, surface ships, and submarines. Nor is the enemy side omitted. By extensive use of Japanese documents supplemented by interrogations of surviving officers, Captain Morison is able to present such a consistent and fair account of enemy operations that the reader cannot but admire the martial skills of the Japanese, especially in night gunnery and torpedo attacks by destroyers.

*The Struggle for Guadalcanal* is valuable not only for its information, but also for its literary worth. Literary craftsmanship is evident on every page. Witty, lively, often vernacular and always lucid, Captain Morison's style is a fine tool that is skilfully used. The passage, for example, on page 252 describing the main deck of the *Atlanta* after the cruiser-battleship action is as clear and moving as any piece of writing that has come out of World War II.

The only serious defect in this volume is the hasty manner in which the strategic background of the campaign is disposed of on page 12. This summary dismissal has led some readers to the erroneous conclusion that Guadalcanal was not a worthwhile strategic objective, and that the Allies and the Japanese fought there purely for the sake of killing. True, the strategic background, as well as the preparations and initial landings, are described in the previous volume in the series,\* but more recapitulation in Volume V

\**Coral Sea, Midway, and Submarine Actions: May 1942-August 1942*. See Review in this issue, P. 242.



would clarify matters for the reader.

Documentation of *The Struggle for Guadalcanal* follows the pattern set by the earlier volumes. Citations are generally lumped together in a footnote at the beginning of each chapter. This method has the virtue of avoiding the heavily Teutonic footnotes that adorn each page of so much American historical writing, but it makes difficult the location of sources of specific statements. Since there is neither a systematic bibliography nor a bibliographical note, the consolidated footnote method tends to obscure the voluminous and careful research that went into writing *The Struggle for Guadalcanal*. But these are relatively minor deficiencies in an otherwise excellent book.

Captain Morison, well known as historian, biographer, and Harvard professor, saw extended active service as a naval historian during the war. He is perhaps the one American scholar best qualified to write on American naval operations during World War II. In addition, in treating so difficult a subject as Guadalcanal he had the help of several able assistants, especially Comdr. James C. Shaw, USN, and Lt. Roger Pineau, USNR.

Captain Morison, who loves ships and the sea, is admittedly fond of the U. S. Navy, but he does not lose his objectivity. He is careful to let the reader know of errors and weaknesses, just as he is careful to give credit where it is due. *The Struggle for Guadalcanal* is an invaluable contribution to the naval history of World War II. Captain Morison has set a high standard for the remaining nine volumes in his series.

JOHN MILLER, JR.  
Washington, D. C.

*History of United States Naval Aviation*, by Captain Archibald D. Turnbull, USNR, and Lt. Commander Clifford L. Lord, USNR. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949. Pp. i-ix, 1-323. Index. \$5.00.)

This is an "unofficial" history; "unofficial" in the same sense that Captain Morison's fine history is "unofficial." This makes it just as "official," or "unofficial," as the Army's historical effort: the only difference being that the Navy's history is being published by private houses rather than by the GPO. But such a designation is of no consequence. The real question to be answered is whether any one of these efforts, and particularly the book being reviewed, is "history" in the scholarly sense of the word. Unfortunately, in the immediate case, the reviewer is faced with an

unusually well-written book which could tell a magnificent story of the development of naval aviation against great obstacles, of the heroic record of that service in World War II, and of its role in national defense. It does not do that in any truly historical sense. There is no criticism, save for a few mild examples and even then over-compensated for with fulsome praise, and little analysis. It can only be described as a propaganda tract of quite great merit, which is unusually readable. This is particularly apparent from the last three sentences of the book, which is really the theme. (These sentences, incidentally, if preceded by "That . . ." and placed at the head of the book, would give it the wonderful sound of medieval theology.)

*All could know, however, that this war, like every important war in history, had been won by sea power, but this time with a difference. Sea power could no longer be effective by controlling the waters of the earth on and under their surface. It must henceforth have one mighty arm reaching high into the air. (italics mine)* P. 323.

Further, (p. 318) the authors point out that the two carriers remaining to the Pacific Fleet in 1942 managed to hold the enemy while a fleet could be created, and "... the battleships of that fleet had been designed to win World War II . . ." One might also note that the attack on Pearl Harbor, covered in one paragraph (p. 317), points out that the catastrophe there had the great redeeming feature: "The damage to the battleships removed all possibility of what might otherwise have been expected, a demand by the American people that the fleet at once attack Japan." In addition, the attack made it "... possible to rebuild the battleships to be much more powerful than they had been before . . ." This strikes the reviewer as one of the most astounding rationalizations of an overwhelming defeat that has ever been presented.

To turn from the argument to the substance of the book, one must note that it presents a wealth of detail, though not critically, on the development of one phase of aviation in the United States. Much of the field of the history of the early phases of aeronautics has been left to Army men, or advocates thereof, with the result that this book enables one to see a new side and a line of research, trial, and error which was being carried on simultaneously with the work in the new Army Air Service. It would, however, be much more valuable if some references could be given



to developments in the Army, other than occasional snide or derogatory remarks, which would enable the reader to compare the progress of the two services without being forced to another reference book. One would never learn from this book, for example, that the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, which it frequently eulogizes, is situated on an Air Force Base, using Air Force facilities. Yet it is fascinating to read of the early days of aviation: of Ely, on November 14, 1910, making the first takeoff from a ship (p. 11), of Admiral Fiske, in the early days, standing out almost alone among the senior officers as a proponent of and believer in the potentialities of air power (p. 48), and of the gallant efforts of the early fliers, often at cost of their own lives, to prove that aviation would be a key combat arm at sea or on the land.

It is regrettable that, when such a good story could be told, it was not. Too many issues come up which cause the reader to become suspicious of the integrity of this whole effort. One cannot be convinced that every senior officer in the Navy since 1893, however much he might have proved a roadblock to every constructive effort, was a fine and able sea-faring man; that every Army officer was obstructive, while the Naval officers merely had the courage of their convictions; or that General Mitchell was a dishonorable, self-seeking man. As an illustration of this, one notes that the latter, during the bombing tests in 1921, accused the Navy of risking the lives of Army men by putting the target ships so far out to sea that only seaplanes could be safely used against them. The Navy replied that it was testing, not the performance of different types of planes, but the effect of bombs on ships. This peculiar explanation for placing the targets 100 miles to sea seems to thoroughly satisfy the authors, but it certainly escapes me (p. 196).

It is interesting to note one other point which is peculiarly relevant to the recent Congressional investigation and "L'Affaire Crommelin." When General Mitchell chose to criticize the defense policies of the directing officials, an action for which he was later court-martialed, in a way similar to that employed by Captain Crommelin, Admiral Moffett wrote, and the authors quote approvingly, that, "... in advocating a policy opposed to that of the President and the Navy Department, ... his false and misleading statements are delaying and hampering the efforts of those who are responsible for Naval Aviation ... who are endeavoring to loyally carry out the

orders and policies of their superiors." (p. 196). How times change!

Despite these criticisms, and I believe they are warranted, this is a book well worth the reading, especially for those of us schooled in the Army and Air Force. For us it is an excellent brief survey, when read with a wary eye, of the enormous progress and capabilities of a sister arm.

BYRON S. MARTIN  
Washington, D. C.

*British Military Administration of Occupied Territories in Africa During the Years 1941-1947*, by Lord Rennell of Rodd. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948, viii, 637 pp. 17/6).

In accordance with the Customs and Laws of War as set forth in the Hague Rules of 1907, the responsibility for the administration of occupied enemy territory was fixed upon the military commander, to be exercised until the peace settlement. The authority thus granted is absolute, and extends to every aspect of existence in the areas under military rule. The author of this comprehensive account of British administration of Italian territories in Africa, took part in the administration of Syria in 1918, and served in several capacities in various former Italian territories in World War II, including the important post of Chief Political Officer, East Africa, in 1943. He presents the established principle of British colonial administration, that use of troops to enforce administrative measures is inadvisable, and his book is a valuable record of the difficult process of a war-born type of administration which, while essentially civil in purpose, stems from the basic exercise of force. This paradox was thoroughly recognized by responsible British administrators in the Italian territories, and was well stated by the Deputy Chief Political Officer, Cyrenaica, in November 1942:

"It is, however, this easy exercise of absolutism that provides the greatest danger to good government. We shall not aim at good government in any theoretical sense but as the best practical solution to the rather complicated problem that Cyrenaica presents."

At the same time General Montgomery in a message to the people of Barqa said:

"The military government will not enter into questions relating to political affairs of the future but will endeavor to rule with firmness, justice and consideration for the interests of

the people of the country. The population is called upon to behave peacefully and to obey my orders and the orders of my officers . . ."

After a succinct précis of the African campaign from the Italian declaration of war on 10 June 1940 to the surrender of Tripoli in January 1943, the narrative covers Ethiopia, Eritrea, British and Italian Somaliland, Madagascar, Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, the Dodecanese Islands, and chapters on the organization of headquarters, on law, finance and the custody of enemy property, and on administration in the Middle East and East Africa from 1944 to 1947. There are maps, charts and documentary appendices, a bibliography and a useful chronology. Problems varied widely from province to province, especially the degree to which former Italian governmental employees could be used to supplement the small British military staffs available for administration. There were always, however, two parallel commands: the military administration for the area, and the military command, the one for the preservation of local law and order, the other for defence. An effort to combine the two functions failed by a decision of General Alexander in March 1943, which recognized the basic principle of the distinct nature of enforcement of administrative regulations and the functions of military command.

Responsibility for military administration (the term "Civil Affairs," adopted early in 1943 to provide a common nomenclature for British and Americans, Lord Rennell considers an unsatisfactory designation for an essentially military function) stemmed from the Political Branch at GHQ, Middle East Forces, Cairo, until April 1941 when Branch headquarters was moved to Nairobi. From February 1942 there were two Political Branches, at Cairo and at Nairobi, whose Chief Political Officers acted in the Libyan and East African areas through local Military Administrators. This division persisted in spite of efforts toward unification. The comprehensive functions of administration are indicated by the departments of military government under the Military Administrators: finance, customs and excise, trade and supplies, education, legal, agriculture, printing and information, veterinary, medical and public health, public works, labor, transport (road and rail), ports, lights and marine, posts and telegraphs, custody of enemy property, antiquities, and survey.

T. H. VAIL MOTTER\*

\*Dr. Motter, Chief, Middle East Unit, Army Historical Division, is completing the MS of a volume, *The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia*, for the series, *THE U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II*.

*The Eagle in the Egg*, by Oliver La Farge.  
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949. Pp. 320.  
\$3.50).

The novelist's sense of color and the ethnologist's perception of changes in cultural patterns come smoothly to the aid of Oliver La Farge in this account of the Air Transport Command. He offers a book filled with acute personal observation and judgment, and clearly organized to show all major alterations of policy; changes in organization and developments in procedure by means of which the 1941 ferrying egg yielded the 1945 air transport eagle. Despite the suggestion that the book is a history of the A. T. C., Colonel La Farge himself might be the first to agree that it is not. Rather, after starting out as the array of facts which military historians look for, it bursts its own eggshell and thereafter remains a first-person commentary, an "I Was There" book. There is an easy explanation for this shift. When he is writing about the early struggles of the ferrying organization, La Farge is describing what he had no part in; so few persons had any part in it, moreover, that none of them could be spared for the reporter's or observer's role. By the time that the Command was firmly airborne, however, and was shuttling cargo, passengers and airplanes over the world, he was on hand, and beheld the casual prodigy from a desk in headquarters and a seat in an ocean-crossing or island-hopping or continent-bisecting airplane. His ear heard, his eye saw, his hand jotted in a notebook, his file collected reports and letters, and the result is this sprightly portrait.

Marshalling its material from the beginnings of the Air Transport Command a year before Pearl Harbor, at a time when the beleaguering of Britain stirred attempts to help, including a cautious come-and-get-it offer to sell airplanes to her, *The Eagle in the Egg* describes how the principal non-combat mission of the Army Air Forces began. Far from including air transport, it began with what is known as air ferrying, and only partial air ferrying at that. The term, which La Farge attributes to the British, refers to the business of delivering airplanes to combat zones, much as an automobile may be driven from Flint to a Chicago salesroom. It came into being as one of many non-belligerent devices, culminating in the Lend-Lease Act, for throwing weight toward the opponents of the Axis. At first it involved transfer of title at the Canadian border or at Miami, where British or Canadian pilots took over the airplane from the American crews; the Russians prescribed

this same arrangement at Fairbanks, Alaska, where their crews replaced the Americans well away from any Siberian landing-strip. After the United States entered the war and was setting up its own theaters of operation, ferrying came to be a matter of flying bombers and fighters out to them as well as Lend-Lease delivery. In any case, ferried aircraft were predominantly combat models, and thus were distinguished from the C-47's, C-54's, C-46's and C-60's by being called tactical aircraft. Even a transport plane, however, was called tactical if, like many of the C-47's of the Troop Carrier Command, its mission were not essentially logistic. Subsequently the transport duty forged forward to match the ferrying job and, near the end of the war, when the plan was to shift thousands of troops from the Atlantic hemisphere to the Pacific, far exceeded it.

Without pausing for breath or even for authority, the original Ferry Command of the late General Robert Olds assumed one aspect after another until it delivered airplanes and extraordinary assortments of cargo and passengers over seven major routes. Each of these emerged under strategic demands. The route via Newfoundland, Greenland and Iceland to Scotland, for example, not only followed the great circle and made use of the hemispheric defense sites but also terminated in the only portion of Europe still open. Its parallel South Atlantic route, the first to be an established aerial highway, appeared not only out of the desire for an alternate path when winter bedeviled the North Atlantic but also because of the urgency of warding off assault upon the Bulge of Brazil, of conveying equipment to Marshal Montgomery, and finally of supporting the invasion of Algeria and Tunisia. For a considerable period this route bypassed Axis Spain and France and reached England from the south. The South Atlantic route, which also extended via Ascension Island across central Africa and thence continued to India and China, was the longest and for two years the busiest of all. Ferrying P-39's and A-20's for the USSR was not the sole reason for the Alaskan route; the early strategic concept which built the Alcan Highway and the rude modification of the concept by the Japanese seizure of Attu and Kiska determined it, too. The scene upon which the Air Transport Command both opened and closed was the Pacific. Colonel La Farge urgently describes a series of special efforts to get a dozen airplanes — half a dozen — even one — there in 1941 and 1942. By 1944 and 1945 he is dealing with an intricate coordina-

tion of flight schedules, weight and balance, priorities, medical evacuation, maintenance, transient service, and command authority which stretched to the Philippines and Okinawa.

These routes make a story worth many another book. This one is the halfway point between the glorious technicolor *Flight to Everywhere* by Ivan Dmitri (New York: Whittlesey House, 1944) and the high, wide, broad and deep history which must ultimately be written, based upon detailed research and reaching from the bases up as well as from the headquarters down. To such a history *The Eagle in the Egg* will be fundamental, along with the fifty manuscript volumes by wartime A. T. C. historians of which the author speaks in his preface. What he has left out will loom larger, however we admit his plea of extenuation. The Brazil-Ascension Island route, for example, is seriously underplayed. Some of Colonel La Farge's account will fade, including not only the trivialities with which he has sometimes obscured the "grand design" but also the sharp argumentative asides which at the moment are one of the book's brisk features. The most remarkable of these is the way in which the Navy is scalped, skinned and left drying in the sun. Many naval apologists, lowering their guard before a tribute to their service's "friendliness, help in need and genuine courtesy," will learn for the first time what bitter springs feed the opposition to them. Yet Colonel La Farge's remarks are not directed at the Navy as a personal devil of the Air Force but rather at wars within wars, *imperia in imperiis*, and fingers in other cooks' broths. Unquestionably the future historian of the A. T. C. will be indebted to this book for many quick and telling sketches of men and women serving with it, including a happily wry one of its commanding general, Harold L. George; for a flawless exposition of the complexities and subtleties of demarcating command-boundaries; and for chapters on commercial "contract carriers," route-briefing and navigational aids, the Women's Auxiliary Service Pilots, traffic scheduling, such projects as *Sonnie* and the Himalayan Hump operation, and search and rescue. In this last connection, La Farge is particularly skilful in imagining and describing the terror of confronting death in an element still, after two wars in which to make it familiar, unknown to man.

DULANY TERRETT

Historical Division, Department of the Army  
Washington, D. C.



*The Bismarck Episode*, by Captain Russell Grenfell, R.N. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949. Pp. 219. \$4.00).

*The Bismarck Episode*, the story of how the British planned and carried out their operations for the search and destruction of the German Battleship *Bismarck* in May 1941, is a book that every officer, regardless of service, should read. The non-military reader, who may not be interested in strategy and tactics, will find the story most interesting and enjoyable. His attention will be held by the drama revealed in the changing fortunes of the British which ranged from cool confidence, to outright optimism, followed by stunning defeat and despair which in turn was changed to a vital victory — all within a period of six days.

Capt. Grenfell, a naval writer with more than 30 years' service in the Royal Navy, is well qualified to write the first authentic account of this naval epic. His friendship and discussion with many of the British officers who played leading parts in this drama have enabled him to record in a very interesting manner the thinking and reactions of the principal commanders during the various phases of the operations. His access to official British reports lends credence to the facts of the story and will be of interest to future historians.

A recollection by the reader of Britain's critical situation in the spring of 1941 is necessary in order to appreciate the importance of the sinking of the *Bismarck*. Standing alone, with mounting merchant ship losses rapidly reducing her vital supplies and equipment, Britain was carrying on with little more than the will to fight and the determination to win. The strategic and tactical decisions should be judged in the light of these considerations. While the tendency to second guess is always present in this type of book, Captain Grenfell's approach in recording the discussions and considerations of the various commanders which lead to their decisions and restricting the German decisions to a few foot notes adds suspense and interest to the story.

While it is true that subsequent developments in radar and aircraft would make an affair similar to the *Bismarck* less complicated and with more assurance of success nevertheless there are many factors in Captain Grenfell's story worthy of consideration by any military student. First and foremost, is the value of correct and timely intelligence. Without good intelligence the British would not have been alerted to the departure of

the *Bismarck* from the sheltered waters of the Baltic. Second is the importance and at the same time the danger in effecting strategic deployments to cover all eventualities. The cooperation between shore and sea based commanders, both with unity of purpose, should be studied by officers of all services. The necessity for reliable radar and the advance made in radar in the short period since the *Bismarck* affair should be noted by all officers. There are other important factors worthy of consideration but in the opinion of the reviewer the *Bismarck* story is a classic example of British determination and will to win, without which no nation can survive wars of the future.

*The Bismarck Episode* gave the reviewer, who was embarked in *Rodney*, an opportunity to experience once again the "blow by blow" account of the most interesting and exciting six days of his naval career. To the best of his knowledge this is the first time the public has had an opportunity to read the complete and authentic story of the sinking of the *Bismarck*.

J. H. WELLINGS\*

*Wings of the Phoenix: The official story of the Air War in Burma*, prepared by the Air Ministry and the Central Office of Information. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949. Pp. 143. Illustrated. \$1.25).

"Wings of the Phoenix, the Official Story of the Air War in Burma," is another of the series of booklets in which the British Central Office of Information has told British subjects and Allied citizens of what the British armed forces did in the war. One of the earliest, if not the earliest, and likely the best, was "The Battle of Britain" by Hilary St. George Saunders. They are uniformly excellent in literary quality, written with an enviable easy grace, stressing the picturesque, the colorful, and the human. In some cases they are minor epics, like the account of the 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem, which ends with the good old phrase: "Now these things befell at Arnhem." But like all epics they are not strictly factual in their accounts of how the latter-day Boewulfs had at the Nazi and Japanese dragons. The inaccuracies that creep into "Wings of the Phoenix" do so when the author tries to describe the campaigns as distinguished from the daily give-and-take of air fighting. The background account of the First Burma Campaign in this volume is just that, a

\*Captain Wellings, an observer with the British Navy during World War II, is now on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

highly colored background for the heroics he describes, and like all theatrical backgrounds is not an accurate portrayal of the scene where the action takes place but rather an aid to suggesting a mood and helping carry along the action.

"Wings of the Phoenix" is rich in incident, action, and local color. Using obsolescent Hurricane I's, and P-36's and early mark Blenheims the RAF fought with great gallantry over Burma, Assam, and the Arakan, in conditions of climate and terrain that were often fantastically difficult. They bore themselves well when the Japanese had the better aircraft and more of them, and they were untiring and relentless when the industrial resources of the Commonwealth and the United States gave them in turn the edge in materiel. Americans who served in CBI will be interested in reading this account of how the RAF lived, fought, and conquered, and reliving the campaign through its wealth of skilfully handled anecdote. Professional students of the Far East and of jungle war will be better advised to wait for the official RAF account by the Air Ministry.

RILEY SUNDERLAND  
China-Burma-India Section  
Historical Division of the Army.

*Day Without End*, by Van Van Praag. (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1949. Pp. 261. \$3.00).

*One More Hill*, by Franklyn A. Johnson. (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1949. Pp. 181. \$2.50).

In a recent article for *Military Affairs* (Spring, 1949, "Novels of World War II: The First Round"), I criticized the initial crop of World War II novels for being untrue to the military background. This failure is notably absent in a more recent novel, Mr. Van Praag's *Day Without End*. From the dawn of a day of combat on a Normandy hedgerow until the sun sets and the leader of the First Platoon, Company B, Lt. Paul Roth, awakes in delirium in a hospital, few combat veterans or students of military affairs can find any fault with the authenticity of the story. Therein lies the strength of *Day Without End*, for it is not a novel in the usual sense: it merely follows the First Platoon through a day of representative infantry action, a welcome relief from the agonizing soul-searchings of earlier war novels. The characters, except for Lt. Roth, fail to stand out effectively as individuals, but that, too, was often how it was. Unfortunately, the publishers of Mr. Van Praag's book could not respect the

dignity of his work, and many serious readers may be frightened away by the usual ridiculous blurb, complete with absurd quotes from Mauldin and McCarthy.

A second recent war book, also of more than usual interest to students of military affairs, is Mr. Johnson's factual account of his experiences as a First Division anti-tank platoon leader in North Africa, Sicily, and Normandy, *One More Hill*. Although no fault of the author, how much more general would be the appreciation of his account if he had been a rifle platoon leader; for despite Mr. Johnson's wealth of combat experience and a striking ability to tell about it, it is generally a fact that anti-tankers just did not see the same war their rifleman comrades saw. Also unfortunate is the author's choice of a present-tense, diary form of narration, for his literary capabilities cry for much wider expression. An acute sense of humor heightens many passages but is carried too far when often it obscures the vital battlefield element of fear. But for a well-written factual account of battle as seen by the leader of a small unit, of particular value for pictures of the virtually unrecorded war in North Africa and Sicily and for scenes inside a makeshift German hospital for prisoners of war, Franklyn Johnson's *One More Hill* is an important addition to our war literature.

CHARLES B. MACDONALD  
Washington, D. C.

*Artillery Through the Ages*, by Albert Manucy (U. S. Department of the Interior). (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949, Pp. 92. \$-.35.)

This booklet, published by the National Park Service, though compactly presented in only 92 pages, represents the first comprehensive work on the history of American artillery. Illustrated with numerous sketches, the evolution of the cannon is reviewed from the days of the Roman catapult up through the ages to the modern automatic weapon. The author, with the able technical assistance of Harold L. Peterson, has presented the story behind the guns in a manner appealing to both the layman and the technician.

Recognizing the derivation of the early American guns from their Spanish, French, and English progenitors, there are frequent well-chosen references to such famous artillerymen as Collado, Ufano, Saint-Remy, and Miller. Quotations from the works of these early authorities, especially from Collado, add much spice to the text. Luis Collado, Spanish mathematician and historian,

first published his "Pratica Manuale di Arteglieria," in 1586, in Italian. Later, however, apparently dissatisfied with this edition, he completely revised it and reprinted it in 1592 in his native tongue. Much of the data translated by Manucy has not hitherto been published in English.

No phase of artillery is overlooked. The author covers all the features of mortars, howitzers, and guns; and, further, he presents an interesting series of evolutionary developments in propellants, projectiles, fuzes, primers, and explosives. The student of history cannot help but gain a deeper appreciation of the whys and wherefores of artillery design. The contour of each old cannon assumes a new meaning, not only from the technical standpoint, but also from its historical application. Most of the technical phrases are clearly explained in the text, but, for convenient reference, there is appended a brief glossary. The author's drawings, though sometimes sketchy, are especially appropriate as to subject. A selected bibliography is included for those desiring to further pursue this fascinating field of research.

In the many U. S. National Parks there stand a great variety of long-silent cannon. These guns range from the seventeenth-century garrison type at Castillo de San Marcos, in Florida, to the Civil War field guns at Gettysburg. This publication will not only greatly enhance the enjoyment of inspecting these historical pieces, but should furthermore prove to be a valuable reference manual to all students of military history.

JOHN J. DRISCOLL  
Lt. Colonel, USAF  
Washington, D. C.

*Mines, Minelayers and Minelaying*, by Captain J. S. Cowie, C.B.E., Royal Navy. (London: Oxford University Press. 1949. Pp. 216. 43 illustrations, 6 plates, 3 maps. \$3.00.)

Sea mines have always been regarded as ominous things. Perhaps most everyone feels that the best rule is simply "Avoid them." But with the increased use of mines in modern warfare and with the emphasis today on special weapons, it behooves the military man as well as the civilian to keep informed.

A more up-to-date, readable and technical historical survey, equally suited to the general public as well as to the military, simply cannot be found. Indeed it is a valuable text for all officers of the Armed Forces, particularly for those who regard the use of ships and mines as outmoded.

In 216 pages, Captain Cowie, who so ably executed the plans for the many British minelaying

operations of World War II, traces the development of mines from the first known use by the Dutch in 1585, at which time they disposed successfully of several hundred Spaniards by means of boats filled with gunpowder. He continues through the Revolutionary War, the Crimean War, the American Civil War and World Wars I and II with the modern magnetic, acoustic, and pressure mines dropped by the R.A.F., the R.A.A.F. and the U.S.A.A.F. He covers the early development of mines in two chapters and devotes four more to mines in the two World Wars. It will be news to many Americans to learn that Captain Cowie considers David Bushnell the "father of torpedoes and mine warfare as we know it today." Some will find amusing the incident of the "Battle of the Kegs" at Philadelphia, where the Americans floated many kegs loaded with gunpowder down the Delaware River in the hope of destroying the anchored British naval units.

The period 1865-1914 covers the development of the mine to the grand scale use in the North Sea Barrage, largely an American effort. The Russo-Japanese War saw the first extensive use of open sea mining by both Russians and Japanese, with heavy loss of *major* ships by both sides bringing to the fore the question of the legality of the mine under international law, to which the author devotes a chapter. And he confines World War II to British activities. Captain Cowie does not cover the great American effort in the Pacific, the mining of the main ports of the United States with protective fields, or the highly successful blockade of the Japanese by mines laid by Naval and Air Force units. The prospective reader should be reminded that as implied by the title, minesweeping and minesweeping methods are not covered in this book.

It is significant that Captain Cowie's worthwhile book shows the important contribution of America to the early development of the mine; yet in 1914 he finds the United States little prepared with any mine resources, and in 1939 finds Great Britain with only some 20,000 mines of all types, too many of which were obsolescent. The reader will quite readily see that the mine has come a long way since the last century — a very long way. Although Captain Cowie does not even suggest it, it is easy to imagine a time just around the corner when perhaps Uncle Sam will be searching for minesweepers to sweep atom mines!

ERNEST OLMSTED SALTMARSH  
Lieutenant Commander, USNR













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